CSS 2026 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Pakistan's converging crises: climate, population, governance, security and fiscal stress
2. Q3 — Brain drain and Pakistan's SDGs
3. Q4 — Natural resources as a source of conflict (resource curse) and lessons for Pakistan
4. Q5 — Why space for NGOs is shrinking, with reference to Pakistan
5. Q6 — Achievements of COPs in general and COP-30 in particular
6. Q7 — Palestine: prospects after the US-drafted UNSC resolution; Pakistan's role
7. Q8 — Short notes: GMOs · depopulation · China's role in the world order

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump straight to its answer. Every answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and includes developments up to 2026.

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⏱️

Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each. Spend marks and time on each part of a question in proportion to what it asks. A part you skip caps your score no matter how good the rest is.

📌

The 2026 paper leaned heavily toward non-traditional security: climate, population, brain drain, natural resources, NGOs and GMOs. Only Gaza and China's role were classic geopolitics. Facts below run up to 2026. Recheck the latest figures before January 2027.

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Q2. Pakistan's converging crises

"Pakistan stands at a decisive turning point where climate shocks, rapid population growth, governance gaps, multi-dimensional security threats and intense fiscal stress are converging to heighten national vulnerability." Critically evaluate the above statement and propose policy measures for building a stable, secure and climate-resilient Pakistan.

What the examiner wants

• Critically evaluate the statement: how far is it true? Take a position.
• Cover all five stresses: climate, population, governance, security, fiscal.
• Show the convergence: how each crisis feeds the others.
• Then give policy measures for stability, security and climate resilience.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Pakistan as a "polycrisis" state
  • B. Thesis: the statement is largely true, because the crises reinforce each other; but the 2024–25 stabilisation shows the trend can be reversed if reforms hold
• II. Climate shocks
  • A. 2022 floods: about $30 billion in damage and losses
  • B. 2025 monsoon floods in Punjab and KP
  • C. Heatwaves, glacier melt, water stress
• III. Rapid population growth
  • A. 241.5 million (2023 census), growing 2.55% a year
  • B. Youth bulge, unemployment, pressure on cities
• IV. Governance gaps
  • A. Weak local government, elite capture
  • B. Political polarisation and contested legitimacy
  • C. Poor service delivery
• V. Multi-dimensional security threats
  • A. TTP and Baloch insurgency
  • B. May 2025 conflict with India; Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance
  • C. Afghan border clashes, October 2025
  • D. Hybrid and information warfare
• VI. Fiscal stress
  • A. Interest payments eat about half of the federal budget
  • B. Tax-to-GDP around 10–11%
  • C. Repeated IMF programmes
• VII. The convergence
  1. Floods widen the fiscal deficit
  2. Population growth deepens water stress
  3. Governance failure fuels insurgency
  4. Security spending squeezes development
• VIII. Counter-view: signs of resilience
  • A. Inflation fell from near 38% (May 2023) to low single digits (2025)
  • B. Record remittances; IMF reviews completed
  • C. Military deterrence held in May 2025
• IX. Policy measures
  1. Climate adaptation and finance
  2. Population policy
  3. Governance and local government
  4. Comprehensive security
  5. Fiscal reform
• X. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan today faces not one crisis but several at once. Economists call this a polycrisis: problems that would be manageable alone become dangerous because they hit together and feed each other.
• The statement captures this well. Climate disasters, a fast-growing population, weak institutions, terrorism and a debt-heavy budget are no longer separate files on separate desks.
• Thesis: the statement is largely accurate. Pakistan's vulnerability is real and rising. But it is not fate. The partial recovery of 2024–25 shows that steady reform can bend the curve, if it lasts beyond one IMF programme.

II. Climate shocks

• 2022 floods: a third of the country under water, about 33 million people affected, over 1,700 deaths, and damage and losses of roughly $30 billion (Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, 2022).
• 2025 monsoon: cloudbursts in KP (Buner, Swat) and major river floods across Punjab displaced millions and destroyed crops.
• Heat and water: Jacobabad regularly crosses 50°C. Glacial lake outburst floods threaten Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral.
• Germanwatch's Climate Risk Index 2025 ranked Pakistan the most affected country in 2022.
• Why it matters: each disaster wipes out years of development and adds billions to the deficit, while Pakistan emits less than 1% of global greenhouse gases.

III. Rapid population growth

• The 2023 census counted 241.5 million people, growing at 2.55% a year, one of the fastest rates in Asia.
• Roughly two-thirds are under 30. The labour market needs well over a million new jobs every year and doesn't create them.
• Water availability per person has fallen below 1,000 cubic metres, the scarcity line.
• Link to other crises: more people on the same land and water means more people exposed to floods and heat, and more pressure on an already thin budget.

IV. Governance gaps

• Weak local governments: elected councils are often suspended or delayed, so services stay far from people.
• Elite capture: tax exemptions and subsidies for powerful groups (energy, real estate, agriculture) cost the state heavily.
• Polarisation: contested elections and long political confrontation since 2022 have eroded trust in institutions.
• Constitutional churn: the 26th (2024) and 27th (2025) Amendments reshaped the judiciary and command structures. Supporters call this efficiency; critics call it centralisation.
• Why it matters: governance is the hinge. Good institutions turn shocks into setbacks; weak ones turn them into collapses.

V. Multi-dimensional security threats

• Terrorism: the Global Terrorism Index 2025 ranked Pakistan second most affected. 2024 was the deadliest year in about a decade. The Jaffar Express hijacking (March 2025) showed BLA's reach.
• Eastern front: after the Pahalgam attack (April 2025), India put the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. The May 2025 conflict ended in a ceasefire but left water as a weapon on the table.
• Western front: border clashes with Afghanistan in October 2025 led to talks in Doha and Istanbul, but the TTP question stays unresolved.
• Hybrid threats: disinformation, cyber attacks and economic coercion.

VI. Fiscal stress

• Interest payments take roughly half of federal spending (about Rs 8.2 trillion budgeted for FY2025-26).
• Tax-to-GDP sits around 10–11%, among the lowest in the region.
• Pakistan has had more than 20 IMF programmes. The current $7 billion Extended Fund Facility (2024) is again tied to tax, energy and state-enterprise reform.
• Result: little money is left for health, education or climate adaptation, the very spending that would reduce vulnerability.

VII. The convergence: why the whole is worse than the parts

• Climate → fiscal: floods raise relief spending and cut revenue.
• Population → climate: more people live in flood plains and drought zones.
• Governance → security: neglect in ex-FATA and Balochistan feeds militancy.
• Security → fiscal: defence and counter-terrorism leave less room for development.
• Fiscal → governance: an indebted state can't pay for reform, so the cycle repeats.
• This loop is the strongest evidence for the statement.

VIII. Counter-view: signs of resilience

• Inflation fell from around 38% (May 2023) to low single digits in 2025. The policy rate came down from 22% to around 11%.
• Remittances hit a record of about $38 billion in FY2024-25.
• IMF reviews have been completed on time, and Pakistan has kept a primary surplus.
• Deterrence held during the May 2025 crisis with India.
• So the statement overstates fatalism: Pakistan is vulnerable, but it is not powerless.

IX. Policy measures for a stable, secure and climate-resilient Pakistan

• 1. Climate resilience
  • Fully implement the National Adaptation Plan (2023) and the 4RF recovery framework.
  • Build flood-plain zoning, early-warning systems and climate-proof infrastructure.
  • Tap the Loss and Damage Fund, the IMF Resilience and Sustainability Facility, and green bonds.
• 2. Population management
  • Treat population as a national priority, following the Council of Common Interests' 2018 recommendations.
  • Expand family planning through Lady Health Workers.
  • Invest in girls' education, which is the strongest long-run lever on fertility.
• 3. Governance reform
  • Hold regular local government elections and add Article 140-A protections.
  • Merit-based civil service reform; a digital, transparent government.
• 4. Comprehensive security
  • Revive the National Action Plan with real civilian capacity: police, prosecution, CTDs.
  • Engage Kabul through trade and border mechanisms; manage India through crisis hotlines and legal action on the Indus Waters Treaty.
  • Development packages for Balochistan and the merged districts.
• 5. Fiscal reform
  • Broaden the tax net: retail, agriculture income, real estate.
  • End blanket subsidies; restructure loss-making state enterprises such as PIA and the power distribution companies.
  • Raise exports through SIFC-led investment and the IT sector.

X. Conclusion

• The statement is a fair warning. Pakistan's crises are converging, and treating them one at a time has failed.
• The answer is a joined-up strategy in which climate, population, governance, security and the economy are planned together.
• The 2024–25 recovery proves that discipline works. The real test is whether Pakistan can keep reforming once the immediate crisis passes.

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Q3. Brain drain and the SDGs

"Brain drain threatens Pakistan's ability to achieve its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030." Write a comprehensive note on the causes and consequences of brain drain from Pakistan, focusing on its impact on achieving SDGs (you may choose any three SDGs for answering this question).

What the examiner wants

• Causes of brain drain
• Consequences, linked to three named SDGs, with data
• A balanced view: brain gain and remittances
• Way forward

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Definition of brain drain
  • B. Scale: about 2.4 million registered emigrants in 2022–24
  • C. Thesis
• II. Scale and trends
  • A. Bureau of Emigration data
  • B. Doctors, nurses, engineers, IT professionals
• III. Causes
  • A. Push factors
    1. Economic: inflation, low pay, unemployment
    2. Political instability
    3. Insecurity
    4. Merit and research gaps
  • B. Pull factors
    1. Higher wages, Gulf and Western demand
    2. Visa and immigration schemes
• IV. Consequences for three SDGs
  • A. SDG 3 (Health)
  • B. SDG 4 (Education)
  • C. SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth)
• V. The other side: brain gain
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Brain drain is the large-scale departure of educated and skilled people from a country, usually toward better pay and opportunity abroad.
• Pakistan has always exported labour. What's new since 2022 is the scale and the type: doctors, engineers, IT experts and young graduates are leaving in record numbers.
• Thesis: brain drain is now a real threat to Pakistan's SDG targets, especially health, education and growth. Remittances soften the blow but can't replace the skills that leave.

II. Scale and trends

• The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment registered about 832,000 emigrants in 2022 and 862,000 in 2023, record highs, and around 727,000 in 2024. That's roughly 2.4 million in three years.
• Much of this flow is to the Gulf, but the share of highly qualified people (doctors, engineers, accountants, nurses) has grown sharply.
• Thousands of doctors pass foreign licensing exams (PLAB, USMLE) every year. Many never return.
• The IT sector reports a steady loss of senior engineers to remote foreign jobs or emigration.

III. Causes

• A. Push factors
  • Economic squeeze: inflation near 38% in 2023, falling real wages and few good jobs.
  • Political instability: repeated crises since 2022 have hurt confidence in the future.
  • Insecurity: terrorism in KP and Balochistan, plus street crime in cities.
  • Weak meritocracy: nepotism, slow promotions, poor research funding (Pakistan spends well under 1% of GDP on R&D).
  • Poor work conditions: young doctors' long hours and low pay in public hospitals.
• B. Pull factors
  • Salaries abroad are often five to ten times higher.
  • UK health and care visas, Gulf demand for professionals, and Canada, Germany and Australia skilled migration routes.
  • Better public services, security and education for children.

IV. Consequences for three SDGs

• A. SDG 3 — Good Health and Well-being
  • Pakistan already has too few doctors and far too few nurses for WHO norms. Each specialist who leaves widens the gap.
  • Rural areas are hit hardest, since they already struggle to attract staff.
  • Targets on maternal mortality, child mortality and universal health coverage become harder to meet.
• B. SDG 4 — Quality Education
  • Universities lose PhD faculty and researchers, which lowers teaching quality and research output.
  • About 26 million children are out of school. Fixing that needs trained teachers, who are also drawn abroad.
  • The cycle repeats: weak education produces fewer skilled people, while the best of those who are produced leave.
• C. SDG 8 — Decent Work and Economic Growth
  • Losing engineers, managers and tech talent reduces productivity and innovation.
  • Firms struggle to scale, especially in IT, which is Pakistan's best hope for export growth.
  • Growth depends on remittances and consumption rather than on productive investment.
• Wider effect: fewer taxpayers and a shrinking middle class weaken SDG 16 (strong institutions) and SDG 17 (partnerships) too.

V. The other side: brain gain

• Remittances: a record $38 billion in FY2024-25, more than total goods exports in some months, supporting the balance of payments and poor households (SDG 1).
• Diaspora networks bring trade links, investment (Roshan Digital Accounts) and knowledge.
• Return migration of trained professionals can upgrade local skills, as India and China showed.
• But: remittances fund consumption more than investment, and skills lost in health and education can't be bought back with dollars.

VI. Way forward

1. Make staying worthwhile: pay and career reforms for doctors, nurses and teachers; rural service incentives.
2. Fund research: raise R&D spending, HEC research grants and tenure-track posts.
3. Managed migration: train surplus workers for export (nurses, technicians) while protecting critical posts, in the style of the Philippines model.
4. Diaspora engagement: return fellowships, tax incentives, dual appointments, remote contribution schemes.
5. Stability: economic and political stability is the deepest fix. People stay where they see a future.
6. Grow the IT sector: better internet, tax certainty and payment gateways so tech talent can earn global wages from Pakistan.

VII. Conclusion

• Brain drain is a symptom of deeper problems: low growth, weak institutions and insecurity.
• Left unchecked, it will push Pakistan's health, education and growth targets well past 2030.
• The goal isn't to stop migration. It is to turn brain drain into brain circulation, where talent leaves, learns, invests and comes back.

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Q4. Natural resources: blessing or curse?

Critically appraise the following statement with relevant examples. Furthermore, draw relevant lessons and propose way forward for Pakistan. "Natural resources, though desirable for development of a country, can become a source of conflict and instability."

What the examiner wants

• Critically appraise: say how far the statement is true, with examples on both sides (resource curse vs. resource success).
• Examples from the world.
• Lessons for Pakistan.
• Way forward for Pakistan.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. The "resource curse" idea (Richard Auty, 1993)
  • B. Thesis: the statement is true where institutions are weak; resources don't cause conflict, bad governance of resources does
• II. How resources become a source of conflict
  • A. Economic: Dutch disease, rent-seeking
  • B. Political: corruption, authoritarianism
  • C. Security: rebel financing, secessionism
  • D. External: great-power competition
• III. Global examples of the curse
  1. DR Congo
  2. Sudan
  3. Nigeria (Niger Delta)
  4. Venezuela
  5. Water: Nile (GERD), Indus
• IV. Counter-examples: resources as blessing
  1. Norway
  2. Botswana
  3. Chile and Malaysia
• V. Pakistan's case
  • A. Balochistan: Sui gas, Saindak, Reko Diq
  • B. Water: provincial disputes, Indus Waters Treaty
  • C. Minerals diplomacy (2025)
• VI. Lessons for Pakistan
• VII. Way forward
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Oil, gas, minerals and water should make a country richer. Yet many resource-rich states are poorer, more violent and less democratic than resource-poor ones. Richard Auty called this the "resource curse" in 1993.
• Thesis: the statement is largely true, but with an important condition. Resources become a curse where institutions are weak, revenues are hidden and local people are left out. With strong institutions they are a blessing, as Norway and Botswana show.

II. How resources turn into conflict

• Economic channel
  • Dutch disease: resource exports push up the currency, so manufacturing and farming decline.
  • Volatility: price crashes hit budgets hard (Venezuela after 2014).
• Political channel
  • Rentier state: the government lives on resource income rather than taxes, so it answers less to citizens.
  • Corruption and elite capture of royalties.
• Security channel
  • Rebel financing: "conflict minerals" and diamonds pay for militias (Paul Collier's "greed" thesis).
  • Secessionism: locals feel robbed and demand control.
• External channel
  • Great powers compete for critical minerals: cobalt, lithium, rare earths.

III. Global examples of the curse

• DR Congo: holds most of the world's cobalt, yet decades of war continue. The M23 offensive in 2025 took Goma, and a US-brokered DRC–Rwanda peace deal (June 2025) was linked to minerals access.
• Sudan: the war since April 2023 between the army and the RSF is fuelled partly by gold revenues. It has created one of the world's largest displacement crises.
• Nigeria: oil wealth in the Niger Delta brought pollution, militancy and pipeline sabotage, while local poverty remained.
• Venezuela: the largest proven oil reserves in the world, yet economic collapse and millions of emigrants after oil prices fell and mismanagement deepened.
• Water as a resource: Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (inaugurated September 2025) strains ties with Egypt and Sudan. India's 2025 move to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance turned water into a security issue in South Asia.
• Ukraine: the April 2025 US–Ukraine minerals deal showed how resources now shape war diplomacy.

IV. Counter-examples: resources as a blessing

• Norway: oil revenues go into a sovereign wealth fund worth well over a trillion dollars, with strict spending rules and full transparency.
• Botswana: diamonds funded schools, roads and health through a fair partnership with De Beers and clean institutions.
• Chile: a copper stabilisation fund saves money in boom years.
• Lesson: the resource is the same everywhere; the institutions are what differ.

V. Pakistan's case

• Balochistan
  • Sui gas was discovered in 1952, yet much of Balochistan got gas connections decades later, if at all. This is a central grievance behind insurgency.
  • Saindak (copper and gold), run by a Chinese company, raised complaints about local benefit.
  • Reko Diq: one of the world's largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits. After a costly international arbitration loss, a new 2022 deal with Barrick gave Balochistan a 25% stake. Financing advanced in 2025.
  • BLA attacks on Chinese nationals and CPEC projects show how resource grievances become security threats.
• Water
  • Inter-provincial disputes over Indus water and new canals (the Cholistan canals row of 2025 with Sindh).
  • External threat: India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty.
• Minerals diplomacy
  • The Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum (April 2025) and a 2025 minerals understanding with US firms put Pakistan's minerals into great-power competition, which brings both opportunity and risk.

VI. Lessons for Pakistan

1. Local ownership prevents rebellion. Communities that see benefits protect projects instead of attacking them.
2. Transparency matters. Secret contracts breed suspicion; Reko Diq's first deal cost Pakistan dearly.
3. Institutions before extraction. Sign deals only with strong legal and revenue-sharing rules in place.
4. Avoid single-buyer dependence. Diversify partners to avoid being caught between the US and China.
5. Water needs law, not just diplomacy. Use the Indus Waters Treaty's legal mechanisms (the Court of Arbitration, the World Bank) and fix domestic sharing through the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord and the CCI.

VII. Way forward

• Give provinces their constitutional share under Article 172(3) and the 18th Amendment (joint ownership of oil and gas).
• Create a transparent royalty system and a provincial sovereign-wealth-style fund for Balochistan.
• Hire and train locals first; build schools and hospitals near mining sites.
• Join and comply with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) fully.
• Add value at home: refining and processing instead of raw ore exports.
• Strengthen security through consent, not only force: political dialogue in Balochistan.
• Build water storage, efficiency and telemetry, and pursue Indus Waters Treaty remedies through international law.

VIII. Conclusion

• The statement is true but incomplete. Resources become a curse where governance is weak and benefits are captured by a few.
• Pakistan stands at a choice point with Reko Diq, its mineral partnerships and its water. If it follows the Norway and Botswana path of transparency, fairness and local ownership, its resources can fund development instead of fuelling conflict.

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Q5. Shrinking space for NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), once called "force multiplier", are now having trust issues as public skepticism about the virtues and advantages of NGOs has deepened. Critically examine why NGOs' space is shrinking in many parts of the world with specific reference to Pakistan.

What the examiner wants

• Why NGOs were seen as force multipliers
• Why space is shrinking worldwide: state action plus loss of public trust
• Specific Pakistan reference
• A critical, balanced judgement and a way forward

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. NGOs and the "force multiplier" idea
  • B. Thesis: space is shrinking because of state security fears, foreign-funding politics, aid cuts and some NGOs' own failures; the answer is accountability, not closure
• II. Why NGOs became force multipliers
• III. Global reasons for shrinking space
  • A. Foreign-agent and funding laws
  • B. Security and counter-terrorism rules (FATF Recommendation 8)
  • C. Populism and nationalism
  • D. The 2025 aid collapse (USAID)
  • E. NGOs' own trust deficit
• IV. Pakistan's case
  • A. Regulatory history
  • B. The Shakil Afridi episode
  • C. INGO expulsions; EAD and interior ministry rules
  • D. FATF-linked scrutiny
  • E. Public perception
• V. Critical evaluation: two sides
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Since the 1990s, NGOs have been treated as "force multipliers" for development. They reach places governments can't, deliver services cheaply and give voice to the marginalised.
• That image has faded. Governments see many NGOs as foreign tools, and the public often sees them as elite, donor-driven businesses.
• CIVICUS Monitor reports that most of the world's population now lives in countries where civic space is "repressed", "obstructed" or "closed".
• Thesis: NGO space is shrinking because of state security fears, the politics of foreign funding, the 2025 collapse in aid and genuine failures inside the sector. The solution is a balanced regime of accountability, not suffocation.

II. Why NGOs became force multipliers

• Reach: last-mile delivery in health, education and disaster relief.
• Cost and flexibility: they innovate faster than bureaucracies.
• Voice: advocacy for human rights, women and minorities.
• Examples from Pakistan:
  • Edhi Foundation: the world's largest volunteer ambulance network.
  • The Citizens Foundation: schools for low-income children.
  • Akhuwat: interest-free microfinance for millions.
  • Indus Hospital: free quality healthcare.
  • Rural support programmes (AKRSP, NRSP): community-led development.

III. Global reasons for shrinking space

• A. Foreign-agent and funding laws
  • Russia's "foreign agent" law (2012), widened repeatedly.
  • India's FCRA: tens of thousands of NGOs have lost their foreign-funding licences since 2015.
  • Hungary's 2017 law, and Georgia's 2024 "foreign influence" law, which sparked mass protests.
  • China's 2017 Overseas NGO Law.
• B. Security and counter-terrorism rules
  • FATF Recommendation 8 asks states to stop charities being misused for terror financing. Many governments over-applied it to restrict NGOs in general.
• C. Populism and nationalism
  • Populist leaders portray NGOs as agents of foreign values or "the elite".
• D. The 2025 aid collapse
  • The US dismantled most of USAID in early 2025 and cancelled the large majority of its programmes. Several European donors also cut aid budgets.
  • Thousands of NGO projects shut down, which weakened the sector everywhere, including in Pakistan.
• E. NGOs' own trust deficit
  • Scandals: misconduct in some international NGOs (e.g., the Oxfam Haiti scandal, 2018).
  • Donor-driven agendas that don't match local priorities.
  • High overheads, foreign-staff salaries and weak transparency.
  • "NGO-isation": activism turned into a career industry.

IV. Pakistan's case

• A. Regulatory history
  • NGOs register under many laws: the Societies Act 1860, the Trusts Act, the Companies Act (Section 42), and provincial charity laws.
  • INGO Policy 2015: international NGOs must sign an MoU with the Interior Ministry.
  • Local NGOs receiving foreign funds must register with the Economic Affairs Division (2022 rules).
• B. The Shakil Afridi episode (2011)
  • A fake vaccination campaign used to trace Osama bin Laden badly damaged trust in aid work. It fed vaccine refusal and attacks on polio workers. Save the Children's office was sealed in 2015.
• C. INGO expulsions
  • In 2018 around 18 INGOs were told to leave Pakistan over security concerns.
  • NGO access to Balochistan, the merged districts and Gilgit-Baltistan is tightly controlled.
• D. FATF-linked scrutiny
  • During the FATF grey-list period (2018–22), banks and regulators tightened checks on charities, and some were banned for links to proscribed groups.
• E. Public perception
  • Many people see NGOs as agents of a Western agenda on gender or religion, or as money-making ventures.
  • At the same time, Pakistanis are among the most generous givers in the world, but mostly to individuals, mosques and trusted local charities rather than formal NGOs.

V. Critical evaluation

• The case for tighter control
  • National security concerns are real: the Afridi episode and terror-financing risks.
  • There's a genuine need for accountability over large foreign funds.
  • Donor agendas can clash with local values and priorities.
• The case against over-restriction
  • Service delivery suffers most where the state is weakest, for example in floods: NGOs were central to the 2022 relief effort.
  • Vague rules allow arbitrary closures and silence legitimate criticism.
  • Restriction pushes giving into informal, unregulated channels, which actually raises misuse risk.
• Verdict: both states and NGOs share the blame. The state over-securitised a whole sector because of a few bad cases, and parts of the sector failed to earn public trust.

VI. Way forward

1. One clear legal framework: a single, transparent registration law with time-bound approvals and appeal rights.
2. Risk-based regulation: apply FATF's revised Recommendation 8 (2023), which targets only high-risk organisations, not the whole sector.
3. NGO self-regulation: a code of conduct, public audits and the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy's certification.
4. Localisation: fund local organisations directly, with local staff and community priorities.
5. Public–NGO partnerships: use NGOs formally in disaster response (NDMA) and in schools and health (PPP models such as TCF adopting public schools).
6. Rebuild trust: publish results and finances; separate humanitarian work from intelligence and politics.
7. Domestic philanthropy: channel zakat and local giving through credible, transparent NGOs to replace lost foreign aid.

VII. Conclusion

• NGOs haven't stopped being useful. They have stopped being automatically trusted.
• In Pakistan, as elsewhere, shrinking space reflects real security fears, a global funding collapse and the sector's own lapses.
• The way out is a bargain: NGOs accept full transparency, and the state accepts that civil society is a partner, not a threat.

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Q6. COPs and COP-30

COP — the annual climate negotiation, Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) — is organized every year since 1995. What are the significant achievements of COPs in general and COP-30 in particular?

What the examiner wants

• Achievements of COPs in general (1995 onward)
• Achievements of COP-30 in particular
• A critical view: limits and failures
• A Pakistan angle adds marks

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. UNFCCC (1992), first COP in Berlin (1995)
  • B. Thesis: COPs built the rules and money of global climate action, but delivery lags far behind promises
• II. Milestone achievements of COPs
  1. Kyoto Protocol (COP-3, 1997)
  2. Copenhagen $100 billion pledge (COP-15, 2009)
  3. Paris Agreement (COP-21, 2015)
  4. Glasgow Climate Pact (COP-26, 2021)
  5. Loss and Damage Fund (COP-27, 2022)
  6. Global Stocktake (COP-28, 2023)
  7. New climate finance goal (COP-29, 2024)
• III. COP-30, Belém (2025)
  • A. Setting and significance
  • B. Main outcomes
  • C. What it failed to do
• IV. Critical evaluation of the COP process
• V. Pakistan and the COPs
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Its parties have met every year since the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in Berlin in 1995.
• COPs are slow, noisy and often disappointing. But almost every global climate rule that exists today was born at one.
• Thesis: COPs have built the architecture of climate action (targets, transparency and finance). Their weakness is implementation: promises keep running ahead of delivery. COP-30 in Belém showed both sides clearly.

II. Milestone achievements of COPs

• In simple words: COPs moved the world from "only rich countries must act" (Kyoto) to "everyone acts according to capacity" (Paris), and from talking about cuts to talking about money, damage and fossil fuels.
• Other general gains:
  • A transparency system: countries report their emissions regularly.
  • Adaptation was recognised as being as important as cutting emissions.
  • Before Paris, the world was heading for about 4°C of warming. Current policies point to roughly 2.6–3°C. That's still far too high, but it is real progress.

III. COP-30, Belém, Brazil (November 2025)

• A. Setting and significance
  • Held at the edge of the Amazon, ten years after Paris. It was billed as the "COP of implementation" and "the forest COP".
  • The United States sent no official delegation after withdrawing from the Paris Agreement again in January 2025.
• B. Main outcomes
  • Global Mutirão decision: a package named after an Indigenous word for collective effort. It recommits to Paris and the 1.5°C goal.
  • Adaptation finance: a call to triple adaptation finance by 2035, plus a set of indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation.
  • Tropical Forest Forever Facility: Brazil's new fund to pay countries for keeping their forests standing, with billions in initial pledges (Norway among the main backers).
  • Just transition mechanism: agreed to support workers and communities moving away from fossil fuels.
  • New NDCs: many countries submitted updated 2035 targets, including China's first absolute emissions-cut target.
  • Indigenous participation: the largest Indigenous presence at any COP, with recognition of land rights.
• C. What it failed to do
  • No agreed roadmap to phase out fossil fuels in the final text, despite support from over 80 countries. Brazil said it would pursue roadmaps outside the formal process.
  • National targets together still fall well short of 1.5°C.
  • Finance pledges remain far below what developing countries need.

IV. Critical evaluation of the COP process

• Strengths
  • The only forum where small, vulnerable states sit at the same table as great powers.
  • Builds norms and pressure, even without enforcement.
  • Gradual progress: loss and damage went from taboo to a fund in one year.
• Weaknesses
  • Consensus rule: any big oil producer can water down the text.
  • No enforcement: Paris targets are voluntary.
  • Broken promises: the $100 billion goal was met two years late, mostly in loans.
  • Fossil-fuel influence: oil states hosted three COPs in a row (Egypt, UAE, Azerbaijan).
  • US withdrawals weaken trust.

V. Pakistan and the COPs

• Pakistan contributes under 1% of global emissions but is among the ten most climate-vulnerable countries.
• Pakistan chaired the G77 + China at COP-27 and led the push for the Loss and Damage Fund.
• Its updated NDC (2021) aims for a 50% cut in projected emissions by 2030 (15% unconditional, 35% conditional on finance) and 60% renewable energy.
• Pakistan's priorities for COP-31 (Antalya, 2026): adaptation finance, fast access to the Loss and Damage Fund, debt-for-climate swaps and glacier protection.

VI. Way forward

1. Move from pledges to delivery, with independent tracking of finance.
2. Prioritise grants over loans for vulnerable countries.
3. Agree a fair, phased fossil-fuel transition roadmap.
4. Reform voting rules so a few states can't block progress.
5. For Pakistan: prepare bankable adaptation projects, strengthen climate institutions and use carbon markets (Article 6).

VII. Conclusion

• In thirty years, COPs have turned climate change from a scientific warning into a global system of targets, reporting and funds.
• COP-30 added forests, adaptation and a just transition, but ducked the hardest question: fossil fuels.
• COPs remain necessary but not sufficient. For countries like Pakistan, the real test is whether the money and support promised in conference halls actually reach flood-hit villages.

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Q7. Palestine and the US-drafted UNSC resolution

Conduct a critical analysis of the prospects of resolution of the Palestinian conflict with special reference to the UN Security Council's recently approved U.S. drafted resolution for peace in Gaza. Can Pakistan play any role in this initiative?

What the examiner wants

• Critical analysis of resolution prospects
• Special reference to UNSC Resolution 2803 (November 2025)
• Pakistan's possible role

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. A conflict on the UN table since 1947
  • B. Thesis: Resolution 2803 has stopped the worst fighting, but it offers a managed ceasefire, not a settlement; lasting peace still needs a Palestinian state
• II. Background
  • A. 1947 partition plan; 1967 occupation; Oslo (1993)
  • B. 7 October 2023 and the Gaza war
• III. The road to Resolution 2803
  • A. Trump's 20-point plan (September 2025)
  • B. Ceasefire on 10 October 2025; Sharm el-Sheikh summit
  • C. Resolution 2803 (17 November 2025): key features
• IV. Prospects: positives
• V. Prospects: obstacles
• VI. Pakistan's role
• VII. Way forward
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Palestinian question has been on the UN's agenda since the 1947 partition resolution (181). It has outlasted dozens of resolutions and several peace processes.
• On 17 November 2025, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing a US-drafted plan for Gaza.
• Thesis: the resolution has ended the most intense phase of the war and opened a path for reconstruction. But it is a security-first, externally managed arrangement that postpones the core issue: Palestinian statehood. Its success depends on whether it becomes a bridge to two states or a substitute for them.

II. Background

• 1948: creation of Israel and the Nakba (displacement of around 700,000 Palestinians).
• 1967: Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. UNSC Resolution 242 set the "land for peace" principle.
• 1993 Oslo Accords: created the Palestinian Authority, but final-status issues (borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements) were never settled.
• 7 October 2023: Hamas attacked Israel, killing about 1,200 people and taking around 250 hostages.
• The Gaza war: Israel's campaign killed tens of thousands of Palestinians (well over 65,000 by Gaza health ministry figures in late 2025), displaced almost the entire population and caused famine conditions, confirmed by the IPC in August 2025.
• The ICJ ordered provisional measures in South Africa's genocide case (2024). The ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant (November 2024).

III. The road to Resolution 2803

• A. Trump's 20-point plan (29 September 2025)
  • Ceasefire, release of all hostages and Palestinian prisoners.
  • Hamas disarms and has no role in governance.
  • A technocratic Palestinian committee runs Gaza under international oversight.
  • Phased Israeli withdrawal; no forced displacement of Gazans.
  • A conditional "pathway" to Palestinian self-determination after Palestinian Authority reform.
• B. The ceasefire
  • Took effect on 10 October 2025; hostage–prisoner exchanges followed.
  • The Sharm el-Sheikh summit (13 October 2025) gathered regional and world leaders behind the plan.
• C. Resolution 2803 (17 November 2025)
  • Endorsed the plan.
  • Authorised a Board of Peace as a transitional administration.
  • Authorised an International Stabilization Force (ISF), with a mandate running to the end of 2027.
  • Vote: 13–0, with Russia and China abstaining. Pakistan, a non-permanent member, voted in favour.

IV. Prospects: the positives

• The killing has largely stopped: this is the first sustained pause since 2023.
• International ownership: UN cover gives legitimacy and opens the door to reconstruction funding.
• Arab and Muslim buy-in: Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Pakistan backed the plan.
• Recognition momentum: the UK, France, Canada, Australia and others recognised Palestine in September 2025. Over three-quarters of UN members now recognise it.
• US leverage over Israel, which no other actor has.

V. Prospects: the obstacles

• Statehood is vague: the plan offers only a conditional "pathway", with no borders, no Jerusalem and no timeline. This is a two-state solution in name only.
• Hamas disarmament: it's unclear who will disarm Hamas, and Hamas has resisted full disarmament.
• The ISF's mandate: countries are wary of sending troops who might end up fighting Palestinians or policing on Israel's behalf.
• Israeli politics: the right-wing coalition rejects a Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank (including the E1 plan) continues.
• Palestinian division: Hamas vs. the Palestinian Authority, and the PA's weak legitimacy.
• Ceasefire violations: repeated strikes and casualties after October 2025 show how fragile the truce is.
• Russia and China's abstention signals doubts about a US-led, externally run model.
• Reconstruction scale: Gaza's rebuilding is estimated at around $70 billion (UN, EU and World Bank assessment, 2025).

VI. Can Pakistan play a role?

• Yes, within limits.
• Diplomatic: as a UNSC non-permanent member (2025–26), Pakistan can push for the statehood pathway, humanitarian access and accountability.
• OIC leadership: Pakistan can build a common Muslim position through the OIC and the Arab–Islamic contact group.
• Peacekeeping experience: Pakistan is among the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping in history. It could contribute to stabilisation, but only under a clear UN mandate that protects Palestinians and does not disarm them on Israel's behalf. This has been debated at home.
• Humanitarian aid: Pakistan has sent relief consignments to Gaza through Egypt and Jordan.
• Constraints
  • Pakistan doesn't recognise Israel, which limits direct contact.
  • Strong public opinion against anything that looks like normalisation.
  • Limited economic leverage.
• Pakistan's principled position: a two-state solution on the pre-1967 borders with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as the capital of Palestine.

VII. Way forward

1. Turn the ceasefire into a permanent end to the war, with monitoring.
2. Tie Gaza's reconstruction to a time-bound statehood process.
3. Reform and reunify Palestinian governance through elections.
4. Freeze West Bank settlement expansion.
5. Keep the ISF under clear UN rules and limited in time.
6. Back accountability through the ICJ and ICC to deter future violations.

VIII. Conclusion

• Resolution 2803 is the most serious international step on Gaza in years. It stopped the bombs and opened the aid routes.
• But it manages the conflict rather than solving it. Without a credible, time-bound path to a sovereign Palestinian state, it risks becoming another interim arrangement that collapses.
• Pakistan can't decide the outcome, but through the UNSC, the OIC and peacekeeping it can help steer the process toward a just two-state settlement.

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Q8. Short notes (any two of three — all three solved)

(i) Pros and cons of food production through GMOs

Outline

• I. Definition and global use
• II. Pros
• III. Cons
• IV. Pakistan's experience
• V. Conclusion

Short note

• Definition: Genetically Modified Organisms are plants or animals whose DNA has been altered to add a useful trait, such as pest resistance, drought tolerance or extra nutrients.
• Global use: GM crops are grown on about 200 million hectares, mainly in the US, Brazil, Argentina, India and Canada. The main crops are soybean, maize, cotton and canola.
• Pros
  • Higher yields: pest-resistant (Bt) crops cut losses.
  • Less pesticide use, which lowers costs and protects farm workers.
  • Climate resilience: drought- and salt-tolerant varieties suit water-stressed countries.
  • Nutrition: Golden Rice (with vitamin A), approved in the Philippines in 2021, targets deficiencies.
  • Food security for a growing population.
• Cons
  • Corporate control: a few companies own the seed patents, and farmers have to buy new seeds each season.
  • Biodiversity loss: monocultures; risk of gene flow to wild relatives.
  • Pest resistance: pests adapt, as pink bollworm did against Bt cotton.
  • Public trust: health fears persist, although major scientific bodies (WHO, the US National Academies) find approved GM foods safe to eat.
  • Trade risk: some markets restrict GM imports.
• Pakistan's experience
  • Bt cotton has been grown since the mid-2000s (officially approved in 2010), but fake and substandard seed and pink bollworm have hurt yields.
  • Regulation falls under the Biosafety Rules 2005 and the National Biosafety Committee. Approval of GM maize remains debated.
• Conclusion: GMOs are a tool, not a miracle. With strong biosafety rules, local research and protection for small farmers, they can help Pakistan's food security. Without these, they mainly benefit seed companies.

(ii) Implications of depopulation

Outline

• I. What depopulation means
• II. Where it's happening
• III. Implications
• IV. Responses
• V. Pakistan's contrast

Short note

• Meaning: a sustained fall in population, mainly because fertility drops below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, sometimes worsened by emigration.
• Where it's happening
  • South Korea: the world's lowest fertility rate, about 0.72 in 2023.
  • Japan: population falling since about 2010.
  • China: population has declined since 2022.
  • Europe: Italy, Spain and much of Eastern Europe.
  • The UN's World Population Prospects 2024 projects the global population to peak at around 10.3 billion in the mid-2080s and then decline.
• Implications
  • Economic: a shrinking workforce, labour shortages and slower growth.
  • Fiscal: fewer workers paying for more pensioners, putting pension and health systems under strain.
  • Social: ageing societies, lonely elderly people, empty villages and schools.
  • Strategic: smaller armies and less global influence. China's decline matters in its competition with the US and India.
  • Migration: growing dependence on foreign workers, which can fuel anti-immigrant politics.
  • Positive side: less pressure on resources and the environment; higher wages for workers.
• Responses: baby bonuses and childcare support, raising the retirement age, automation and robotics, and managed immigration.
• Pakistan's contrast: Pakistan has the opposite problem. Its fertility is around 3.5–3.6. But today's low-fertility countries offer it a chance to export labour, and a warning to manage its own demographic transition wisely.
• Conclusion: depopulation is becoming the 21st century's quiet crisis in rich and middle-income countries. It is reshaping economies, migration and power, just as population growth did in the 20th century.

(iii) Role of China in the evolving world order

Outline

• I. From rising power to shaper of order
• II. Economic role
• III. Diplomatic and institutional role
• IV. Security role
• V. Limits and criticism
• VI. Implications for Pakistan
• VII. Conclusion

Short note

• Introduction: China has moved from "hide your strength, bide your time" (Deng) to openly shaping global order under Xi Jinping. It presents itself as the champion of the Global South and of a multipolar world.
• Economic role
  • The world's second-largest economy and largest trading nation.
  • The Belt and Road Initiative (since 2013) has drawn in around 150 countries.
  • It dominates the processing of critical minerals and leads in electric vehicles, solar and batteries.
• Diplomatic and institutional role
  • New banks and forums: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the expanded BRICS and SCO (Tianjin summit, 2025).
  • Its four global initiatives: Development (2021), Security (2022), Civilisation (2023) and Governance (2025).
  • Mediation: brokered the Saudi–Iran deal (March 2023) and Palestinian unity talks (Beijing Declaration, July 2024).
• Security role
  • Rapid naval build-up; assertiveness in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.
  • Close partnership with Russia.
• US–China rivalry
  • The 2025 tariff war under Trump, then a trade truce after the Trump–Xi meeting in Busan (October 2025).
  • Competition over technology: chips, AI and export controls.
• Limits and criticism
  • Debt-trap allegations (Sri Lanka's Hambantota), although many researchers dispute the "trap" framing.
  • Human rights concerns (Xinjiang, Hong Kong).
  • Slowing growth, property crisis and an ageing population.
  • Distrust among neighbours (India, the Philippines, Japan).
• Implications for Pakistan
  • CPEC is BRI's flagship, and China is Pakistan's main source of arms and diplomatic support.
  • Pakistan must balance Chinese partnership with its links to the US and the Gulf.
• Conclusion: China isn't replacing the US-led order outright. It is building a parallel one and reforming the existing system from within. The result is a more multipolar, contested world in which middle powers like Pakistan have more options but also face harder choices.