CSS 2023 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Pakistan–Türkiye relations beyond socio-economic and strategic realms; ripple effects in the Himalayas, Arabian Peninsula and South Caucasus
2. Q3 — COP-27 roadmap on climate change; reconstruction and rehabilitation of Pakistan after the 2022 floods
3. Q4 — Causes of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; global consequences; impact on Pakistan and lessons
4. Q5 — CPEC: the idea, advantages, challenges and future prospects
5. Q6 — 8 billion people: is the 21st century a century of damaging population growth?
6. Q7 — Energy's influence on world geopolitics and the nature of global energy governance
7. Q8 — Pakistan's balance-of-payments constraint; exports as the core challenge; structural reforms

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump straight to its answer. Every answer follows the question's exact demand and marks. A 🆕 box in each answer adds developments up to 2026, so a repeat of the theme in 2027 can be answered with current facts.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each. Long, multi-part questions were the hallmark of 2023. Answer every part in the order asked.

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Q2. Pakistan–Türkiye relations and their ripple effects

Discuss historic Pakistan and Turkey bilateral relations beyond the areas of socio-economic and strategic realms. Explain its geopolitical ripple effects in the Himalayas, the Arabian Peninsula, and the South Caucasus.

What the examiner wants

• Relations beyond economics and strategy: history, culture, people, religion and diplomatic solidarity
• Ripple effects in three named regions, each covered separately

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. "One nation, two states"
  • B. Thesis: a bond rooted in history and identity that now shapes alignments from Kashmir to the Caucasus
• II. Historic and emotional foundations
  1. The Khilafat Movement and support for the Turkish war of independence
  2. Iqbal, Rumi and shared Islamic heritage
  3. Founding fathers: Jinnah's admiration of Atatürk
• III. Relations beyond economy and strategy
  1. Diplomatic solidarity at the UN and the OIC
  2. Disaster solidarity (2005, 2010, 2022, 2023)
  3. Culture, media and education
  4. People-to-people and public opinion
  5. Institutional framework: HLSCC
• IV. Ripple effects
  • A. The Himalayas (Kashmir, India, China)
  • B. The Arabian Peninsula (Gulf rivalries)
  • C. The South Caucasus (the Azerbaijan trilateral, Armenia, India)
• V. Limits and balancing
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Few relationships in Pakistan's foreign policy are as emotional as its bond with Türkiye. Leaders on both sides often describe it as "one nation, two states".
• The question asks us to look past trade and defence, at the history, faith, culture and political solidarity that sustain the friendship, and then at how that friendship ripples across three regions.
• Thesis: the Pakistan–Türkiye bond rests on shared memory and identity more than on interest. That makes it unusually durable, and it now shapes alignments in Kashmir, the Gulf and the Caucasus.

II. Historic and emotional foundations

• Khilafat Movement (1919–24): Muslims of the subcontinent campaigned to protect the Ottoman Caliphate. Women donated their jewellery to fund Turkish forces in the war of independence. Turks still remember this support.
• Allama Iqbal drew deeply on Rumi. A symbolic grave of Iqbal stands beside Rumi's tomb in Konya.
• Jinnah admired Atatürk as a reformer who built a modern Muslim state.
• Turkey was among the first states to recognise Pakistan in 1947.

III. Relations beyond economy and strategy

• 1. Diplomatic solidarity
  • Türkiye supports Pakistan on Kashmir; President Erdoğan has raised it at the UN General Assembly several times.
  • Pakistan supports Türkiye on Cyprus (it backs the Turkish Cypriot position) and on terrorism concerns.
  • Both stood with each other in the 1965 and 1971 wars.
• 2. Solidarity in disasters
  • Turkish relief after the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 and 2022 floods.
  • Pakistan sent rescue teams and aid after the February 2023 Turkish earthquake; ordinary Pakistanis donated generously.
• 3. Culture and media
  • The drama Diriş: Ertuğrul broadcast on PTV (2020) became a phenomenon in Pakistan.
  • Turkish films, the Yunus Emre Institute, Maarif schools and scholarships.
• 4. People-to-people ties
  • Public opinion surveys regularly show Pakistanis rank Türkiye among the most favoured countries.
  • Turkish Airlines connects Pakistani cities to the world, and tourism is growing.
• 5. Institutional framework
  • The High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC), set up in 2009, meets at leader level. The 7th session (Islamabad, February 2025) signed around two dozen agreements.

IV. Geopolitical ripple effects

• A. The Himalayas
  • Kashmir: Türkiye's open support internationalises the issue and irritates India. India responded by cultivating Greece, Cyprus and Armenia.
  • India–Türkiye ties stay cool; India blocked Türkiye's interest in certain projects and criticised its Kashmir statements.
  • The China factor: Türkiye, Pakistan and China share an interest in limiting Indian dominance, though Türkiye's Uyghur sympathy complicates its China ties.
• B. The Arabian Peninsula
  • Türkiye backed Qatar during the 2017 blockade, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE led it. Pakistan stayed neutral to protect its Gulf ties.
  • 2019 Kuala Lumpur Summit: Türkiye, Malaysia and Pakistan planned a new Muslim forum. Pakistan withdrew at the last minute under Saudi pressure, which showed the limits of Pakistan's freedom to act.
  • Since 2021, Türkiye–Saudi and Türkiye–UAE ties have improved, which makes Pakistan's balancing easier.
• C. The South Caucasus
  • Pakistan–Türkiye–Azerbaijan trilateral: the Islamabad Declaration (2017) and the Baku Declaration (2021), plus the "Three Brothers" military exercises.
  • Nagorno-Karabakh: both strongly backed Azerbaijan in the 2020 war and the 2023 operation, in which Azerbaijan regained full control.
  • Pakistan doesn't recognise Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan.
  • India's counter-move: India became a major arms supplier to Armenia, extending the India–Pakistan rivalry into the Caucasus.

V. Limits and balancing

• Trade is still small for two friendly countries (below the $5 billion target).
• Pakistan must balance Türkiye against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its main financiers.
• Türkiye is a NATO member with its own Western and Russian balancing.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• During the May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, Türkiye and Azerbaijan openly backed Pakistan. India saw public boycott calls against Turkish and Azerbaijani tourism and products, and cancelled some Turkish firms' clearances.
• Defence: MILGEM-class (Babur-class) corvettes for the Pakistan Navy; Turkish drones; cooperation on the KAAN fighter programme discussed.
• February 2025: Erdoğan visited Islamabad for the 7th HLSCC; both sides set a $5 billion trade target.
• Pakistan and Azerbaijan expanded investment ties (Azerbaijani pledges announced in 2025).

VI. Conclusion

• The Pakistan–Türkiye relationship is built on memory, faith and mutual respect more than on balance sheets, and that is why it survives changes of government.
• Its ripple effects are real: it strengthens Pakistan's voice on Kashmir, links it to a Turkish–Azerbaijani bloc in the Caucasus, and tests its balance in the Gulf.
• The next step is to give this emotional bond a stronger economic base.

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Q3. COP-27, the 2022 floods and Pakistan's reconstruction

The UN climate summit (COP-27) in Sharm el Sheikh (Egypt) discussed Pakistan catastrophic summer floods exacerbated by climate change and the country is facing imminent threat of epidemics and other multi-dimensional dangers. Discuss the COP-27 roadmap to face the challenge of climate change and proposed measures for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Pakistan.

What the examiner wants

• The COP-27 roadmap: its decisions and plan
• Reconstruction and rehabilitation measures for Pakistan
• A short link to the floods and the "multi-dimensional dangers"

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The 2022 floods and their multi-dimensional dangers
• III. COP-27 roadmap
  1. Loss and Damage Fund
  2. Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan
  3. Mitigation work programme
  4. Adaptation and the Global Goal on Adaptation
  5. Finance reform; Early Warnings for All
  6. Weaknesses
• IV. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of Pakistan
  • A. Immediate relief and health
  • B. Housing and infrastructure
  • C. Agriculture and livelihoods
  • D. Institutions and finance (4RF, Geneva pledges)
  • E. Long-term resilience
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The 2022 monsoon floods put a third of Pakistan under water. At COP-27, Pakistan became the face of climate injustice: a country responsible for under 1% of global emissions paying one of the highest prices.
• Thesis: COP-27's historic achievement was the Loss and Damage Fund, but its overall roadmap was weak on emissions cuts. Pakistan's recovery depends on rebuilding "better" and on turning international pledges into real money.

II. The floods and their dangers

• About 33 million people affected, over 1,700 killed, millions of homes and thousands of kilometres of roads damaged (NDMA).
• The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment estimated about $14.9 billion in damage**, **$15.2 billion in losses and $16.3 billion in recovery needs.
• Multi-dimensional dangers:
  • Epidemics: malaria, dengue, cholera, diarrhoea.
  • Malnutrition, and loss of crops and livestock.
  • Millions of people pushed into poverty.
  • Damage to schools and health centres.

III. The COP-27 roadmap (November 2022)

• 1. Loss and Damage Fund: after 30 years of resistance from rich countries, parties agreed to create a fund for vulnerable countries. Pakistan, as chair of the G77 + China, led the push.
• 2. Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan: reaffirmed the 1.5°C goal; called for a phasedown of unabated coal and the phase-out of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies.
• 3. Mitigation Work Programme: to speed up emission cuts during this decade.
• 4. Adaptation: progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation, and a call to at least double adaptation finance (from the Glasgow promise).
• 5. Finance and early warning: a call to reform multilateral development banks; the UN Secretary-General's Early Warnings for All initiative (every person covered by 2027); the G7's "Global Shield" for climate risk insurance.
• 6. Just energy transition partnerships (such as Indonesia's).
• Weaknesses:
  • No new commitment to phase down all fossil fuels.
  • The fund was created empty; details were left for later.
  • Emissions targets remained far from 1.5°C.

IV. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of Pakistan

• A. Immediate relief and health
  • Clean water, mobile health camps, vaccination and vector control to prevent epidemics.
  • Cash support through the Benazir Income Support Programme (flood relief cash to millions of families).
• B. Housing and infrastructure ("build back better")
  • Flood-resilient housing (raised plinths, local materials) with owner-driven construction.
  • Rebuild roads, bridges and embankments to higher standards; restore the drainage of natural waterways.
• C. Agriculture and livelihoods
  • Seed and fertiliser support, livestock restocking and crop insurance.
  • Drain standing water from farmland in Sindh and Balochistan.
• D. Institutions and finance
  • The 4RF framework (Resilient Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Framework).
  • The Geneva International Conference on Climate Resilient Pakistan (January 2023): pledges of about $10.9 billion, mostly project loans, so disbursement has been slow.
  • Debt-for-climate swaps; World Bank, ADB and Islamic Development Bank financing.
• E. Long-term resilience
  • The National Adaptation Plan (2023): flood-plain zoning, early warning, glacier monitoring.
  • Wetland and floodplain restoration through the Living Indus Initiative.
  • Stronger NDMA and PDMAs, and local-government preparedness.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• The Loss and Damage Fund was operationalised at COP-28 (2023). Its board is hosted in the Philippines, and the first funding window opened in 2025, though money remains small compared with needs.
• COP-29 (Baku) set a new climate finance goal of at least $300 billion a year by 2035. COP-30 (Belém) called for tripling adaptation finance.
• The IMF approved a $1.4 billion Resilience and Sustainability Facility for Pakistan (2025).
• The 2025 monsoon floods in Punjab and KP showed that the reconstruction lessons from 2022 had been only partly applied.

V. Conclusion

• COP-27 will be remembered for the Loss and Damage Fund, a moral victory led by Pakistan.
• But a fund without money and a roadmap without emissions cuts won't protect the next flood victims.
• Pakistan must rebuild with resilience at the centre and keep pressing for grants, not loans, so that recovery doesn't deepen its debt crisis.

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Q4. The Russian invasion of Ukraine: causes, consequences and lessons for Pakistan

Discuss the core causes of Russian invasion of Ukraine which have considerable socio-economic, political and strategic consequences on the world. Explain its devastating impact on Pakistan and its severe lesson for the country's survival.

What the examiner wants

• Core causes of the invasion
• Consequences on the world: socio-economic, political and strategic
• Impact on Pakistan
• Lessons for Pakistan's survival
• Marks focus: four parts, so keep each tight and balanced.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Core causes
  1. NATO expansion and Russian security fears
  2. Putin's nationalist vision
  3. Ukraine's westward turn
  4. Unfinished conflict since 2014
  5. Misjudgement of Western resolve
• III. Consequences for the world
  • A. Socio-economic
  • B. Political
  • C. Strategic
• IV. Impact on Pakistan
• V. Lessons for Pakistan's survival
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the largest war in Europe since 1945.
• Thesis: the war grew from a clash between Russia's security fears and imperial ambitions on one side and Ukraine's choice of a Western future on the other. Its shocks spread worldwide, and for Pakistan they exposed how fragile a weak economy is in a crisis it didn't create.

II. Core causes

• 1. NATO expansion
  • NATO grew from 16 members to 30 between 1999 and 2020, reaching Russia's borders. The 2008 Bucharest summit said Ukraine and Georgia "will become members".
  • John Mearsheimer argues the West provoked the crisis by ignoring Russian red lines.
• 2. Putin's nationalist vision
  • In his July 2021 essay On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin denied Ukraine's separate nationhood. He called the Soviet collapse a great tragedy.
• 3. Ukraine's westward turn
  • The Orange Revolution (2004) and the Euromaidan (2014) moved Ukraine toward the EU and NATO.
• 4. The unfinished conflict since 2014
  • Russia annexed Crimea (2014) and backed separatists in Donbas. The Minsk agreements failed.
• 5. Miscalculation
  • Russia expected a quick victory and a divided West. Neither happened.
• Balanced view: NATO expansion explains Russia's grievance, but it doesn't justify invading a sovereign state, which violates the UN Charter (Article 2(4)).

III. Consequences for the world

• A. Socio-economic
  • Food crisis: Ukraine and Russia supplied about a quarter of world wheat exports. Prices spiked until the Black Sea Grain Initiative (July 2022–July 2023).
  • Energy shock: gas and oil prices soared and Europe's energy crisis followed.
  • Inflation and interest rates rose worldwide, and debt distress grew in poor countries.
  • Refugees: millions of Ukrainians fled to Europe.
• B. Political
  • Western unity: NATO revived; Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) joined.
  • A divided world: much of the Global South refused to take sides (India, Pakistan, South Africa abstained at the UN).
  • Weaker UN: the Security Council was paralysed by Russia's veto.
• C. Strategic
  • The return of great-power war and rising defence budgets (Germany's €100 billion fund; NATO's 2025 target of 5% of GDP).
  • A deeper Russia–China partnership ("no limits", February 2022).
  • Nuclear threats and arms control collapse.
  • Weaponised interdependence: sanctions, frozen reserves and SWIFT bans.

IV. Impact on Pakistan

• Bad timing: PM Imran Khan was in Moscow on the day of the invasion, which embarrassed Pakistan in Western capitals.
• Economic damage:
  • Wheat, edible oil and fertiliser import bills rose sharply.
  • LNG suppliers defaulted on contracts and spot LNG became unaffordable, causing load-shedding.
  • Fuel prices and inflation surged; inflation reached near 38% in May 2023.
  • Foreign reserves fell to critical levels, deepening the 2022–23 balance-of-payments crisis.
• Diplomatic squeeze: pressure from the West to condemn Russia versus Pakistan's wish to stay neutral. Pakistan abstained at the UN General Assembly.
• Food security: dependence on imported wheat in a flood year (2022) made things worse.

V. Lessons for Pakistan's survival

1. Economic self-reliance is national security: a state with weak reserves and heavy import dependence is exposed to every global shock.
2. Energy and food security: produce more at home (local renewables, coal, Thar gas, wheat productivity) and diversify suppliers.
3. Don't rely on others' guarantees: Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum (1994) for security assurances that failed. This reinforces Pakistan's view of its own nuclear deterrent.
4. Balanced foreign policy: avoid blocs; keep ties with the US, China and Russia alike.
5. National unity and resilience: Ukraine's resistance shows that a united society can withstand a bigger enemy.
6. Modern warfare: drones, cyber and information warfare are now central, which Pakistan saw again in May 2025.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• Trump's peace push: the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska (August 2025) and a US peace framework (November 2025). Negotiations over territory and security guarantees continued without a final settlement in the latest reports. Check the status close to the exam.
• EU sanctions packages continued, and the plan to phase out Russian gas by 2027 was agreed.
• NATO's 2025 Hague summit set a new defence spending target of 5% of GDP.
• Pakistan was hit again by a global shock in 2025, US tariffs, which shows the same lesson about economic resilience.

VI. Conclusion

• The war in Ukraine came from a mix of security fears, nationalism and miscalculation. It reshaped Europe and shook the global economy.
• For Pakistan, its cost was inflation, energy shortages and diplomatic pressure.
• The lesson is simple: in a world of great-power conflict, only a self-reliant, united and economically strong state is truly secure.

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Q5. CPEC: advantages, challenges and future prospects

Discuss the project idea of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is the great leap forward of economic regionalization in the globalized world. Explain its potential advantages, challenges and future prospects.

What the examiner wants

• The project idea, linked to regionalisation
• Advantages
• Challenges
• Future prospects

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The project idea
  1. BRI flagship (2013–15)
  2. Components and phases
  3. Link to economic regionalisation
• III. Potential advantages
• IV. Challenges
• V. Future prospects
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• CPEC is the flagship of China's Belt and Road Initiative. It was launched formally in April 2015, when President Xi visited Islamabad, with an initial package of about $46 billion, later valued at around **$62 billion**.
• Thesis: CPEC has already transformed Pakistan's energy and road infrastructure. Its second phase, focused on industry, exports and connectivity, is stalled by security problems, debt and slow reform. Its future depends on Pakistan making it a driver of productivity, not just infrastructure.

II. The project idea

• Route: a corridor from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, about 3,000 km.
• China's interest: a shorter route to the Middle East and Africa, avoiding the Strait of Malacca chokepoint; developing western China.
• Pakistan's interest: ending energy shortages, building infrastructure, attracting investment.
• Phases:
  • Phase I (2015–20): energy (over 8,000 MW added), roads (Karakoram Highway upgrade, motorways), Gwadar port and Lahore's Orange Line metro.
  • Phase II: Special Economic Zones, agriculture, industry, the ML-1 railway, and social development.
• Regionalisation: CPEC links Pakistan with China, and potentially Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and the Gulf, making Pakistan a regional trade hub.

III. Potential advantages

• Energy security: ended the severe load-shedding of the early 2010s.
• Infrastructure: motorways and better connectivity across provinces.
• Gwadar: a deep-sea port, with the potential to become a regional transit and logistics hub.
• Industrialisation: the planned SEZs (Rashakai, Dhabeji, Allama Iqbal Industrial City and others) could attract Chinese industry relocating because of rising wages at home.
• Jobs: tens of thousands of jobs during construction.
• Regional connectivity: links to Central Asia and Afghanistan.
• Strategic depth: a closer economic partnership with China strengthens Pakistan's position.

IV. Challenges

• Security:
  • Attacks on Chinese nationals: Dasu (2021), Karachi University (2022), Besham (March 2024) and near Karachi airport (October 2024).
  • BLA attacks in Balochistan.
  • China has pressed hard for better protection.
• Financial burden:
  • Capacity payments to Chinese independent power producers and overdue payments.
  • Concerns over debt and returns.
• Slow Phase II: SEZs lagging; ML-1 delayed over financing.
• Local grievances: Gwadar residents' protests over water, electricity and fishing rights (the Haq Do Tehreek).
• Transparency concerns over contracts.
• Geopolitics: US criticism and Indian opposition (the route passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India claims).
• Political instability and inconsistent policy.

V. Future prospects

• Agreed vision: China and Pakistan agreed on "five corridors" (growth, livelihood, innovation, green and openness) in 2024.
• Gwadar: the New Gwadar International Airport opened for flights in January 2025.
• ML-1: the Karachi–Rohri section is being prioritised with new financing arrangements.
• Industrial relocation: a major chance if Pakistan offers secure SEZs and stable policies.
• Green CPEC: solar, hydropower and electric vehicles.
• Regional expansion: linking to Afghanistan (the trilateral with China, 2025) and to Central Asia.
• Prospects are bright only if security, payments and reforms are fixed.

VI. Way forward

1. Create a dedicated, well-equipped security force for CPEC projects and a single command for coordination.
2. Clear payment arrears and restructure power contracts.
3. Fast-track a few SEZs with one-window facilities.
4. Give Balochistan's people jobs, water and fishing rights.
5. Publish contracts for transparency.
6. Focus on export-oriented industry and agriculture.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• CPEC entered its "2.0" phase. Chinese leaders tied future investment to security guarantees after the 2024 attacks.
• The Pakistan–China–Afghanistan foreign ministers' meeting (2025) agreed to extend CPEC to Afghanistan.
• China backed Pakistan diplomatically during the May 2025 conflict with India.
• Pakistan announced new SEZ incentives and agreed with China on industrial relocation areas.

VII. Conclusion

• CPEC is a real example of economic regionalisation. It has transformed Pakistan's infrastructure and energy.
• But roads and power plants alone don't make an economy. The next phase must create factories, exports and jobs.
• If Pakistan delivers security, transparency and reform, CPEC can be the game changer its founders promised.

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Q6. Eight billion people: a century of damaging population growth?

November 15, 2022, will be a historic date in humanity's history because at this date the Earth's population reached to the 8 billion mark. Critically discuss that the 21st century is a century of rapid population growth which has a devastating negative impact in the world. Explain the severe consequences of rapid population growth which will affect to every country on earth.

What the examiner wants

• Critically discuss the claim: is the 21st century really a century of rapid growth? Show both sides.
• The severe consequences for every country
• Marks focus: a critical view earns high marks. Don't just agree with the claim.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. 8 billion on 15 November 2022
  • B. Thesis: the claim is half true; global growth is slowing, but growth is concentrated in poor regions, and its consequences still reach every country
• II. The facts
• III. Critical discussion
  • A. Why the claim is true
  • B. Why it is overstated
  • C. Theories: Malthus vs Boserup and Simon
• IV. Severe consequences of rapid growth
  1. Food and water stress
  2. Climate and environment
  3. Urbanisation and slums
  4. Jobs and the youth bulge
  5. Migration and conflict
  6. Health and education
  7. Global spillovers
• V. Pakistan's case
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• On 15 November 2022, the UN marked the world's population reaching 8 billion. It took about 12 years to grow from 7 to 8 billion.
• Thesis: the claim is only partly true. Global growth is actually slowing, and many countries are now shrinking. But growth is concentrated in the poorest, most climate-vulnerable countries, and its effects (food, climate, migration and conflict) reach every country.

II. The facts

• The global growth rate fell below 1% a year in 2020, for the first time since 1950.
• The UN's World Population Prospects 2024 projects a peak of about 10.3 billion in the mid-2080s, then a slow decline.
• India overtook China as the most populous country in 2023.
• Over half the growth to 2050 will come from just eight countries, mostly in Africa and South Asia, including Pakistan.
• About two-thirds of people already live in countries with fertility below replacement level (2.1).

III. Critical discussion

• A. Why the claim is true
  • In absolute terms, the world will still add about 2 billion people this century.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa's population may double by 2050.
  • High-growth countries are often the poorest, so pressure on scarce resources is severe.
• B. Why it is overstated
  • The 21st century is better described as the century of demographic divergence: growth in Africa and parts of Asia, and ageing and decline in East Asia, Europe and even China.
  • Consumption matters as much as numbers: the richest 10% cause about half of global emissions (Oxfam).
  • Technology and policy can expand resources (the Green Revolution).
• C. Theories
  • Thomas Malthus (1798): population outruns food, leading to famine and conflict.
  • Ester Boserup (1965): population pressure drives agricultural innovation.
  • Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (1981): people are the ultimate resource.
  • Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (1968): predicted mass famines that didn't happen.
  • Balanced view: population becomes a crisis where growth outpaces governance and investment.

IV. Severe consequences of rapid population growth

• 1. Food and water: more demand for food on shrinking farmland; water scarcity (more than 2 billion people lack safely managed drinking water).
• 2. Climate and environment: deforestation, biodiversity loss and more emissions as populations grow richer.
• 3. Urbanisation: most growth is in cities, much of it in slums without services.
• 4. Jobs and the youth bulge: Africa and South Asia must create hundreds of millions of jobs. Without them, frustration fuels unrest.
• 5. Migration: economic and climate migration toward Europe and the Gulf, with political backlash.
• 6. Conflict: competition for land and water in the Sahel; recruitment by armed groups.
• 7. Health and education: overstretched systems, high maternal and child mortality.
• How it affects every country:
  • Global food prices.
  • Climate change.
  • Pandemics spread faster in dense populations.
  • Migration and security spill across borders.
  • Rich countries face the opposite problem, ageing and labour shortages, which ties the two worlds together through migration.

V. Pakistan's case

• 241.5 million people (2023 census), growing at 2.55% a year, the fifth most populous country.
• Fertility is about 3.5–3.6 children per woman, and contraceptive use is low (around 34%).
• Effects:
  • Water scarcity.
  • About 26 million out-of-school children.
  • Unemployment.
  • Urban sprawl in Karachi and Lahore.
  • Pressure on the budget.
• The 2018 Council of Common Interests decisions and the Supreme Court's population task force recommended action, but implementation has been weak.

VI. Way forward

1. Education for girls, the most powerful long-run lever on fertility.
2. Accessible family planning through Lady Health Workers and private providers.
3. Involve religious scholars (as Bangladesh and Iran did).
4. Create jobs for young people, and turn the youth bulge into a dividend.
5. Climate-smart agriculture and water management.
6. Plan cities with housing and transport.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• UN World Population Prospects 2024 lowered the global peak forecast and brought it earlier.
• Depopulation has become a policy issue. South Korea's fertility fell to about 0.72; China's population has declined since 2022. CSS 2026 asked about the "implications of depopulation".
• Pakistan's growth rate remains among the highest in Asia; the 2025 floods again showed how population pressure increases climate risk.

VII. Conclusion

• Eight billion is a milestone, not a doomsday.
• The real challenge of the 21st century isn't simply "too many people". It is uneven growth, poor planning and overconsumption.
• Countries like Pakistan that manage their transition well can gain a demographic dividend; those that don't will face a demographic disaster.

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Q7. Energy and world geopolitics; global energy governance

Critically discuss the conceptualized energy's influence on the world geo-politics and its distinctiveness of global energy governance.

What the examiner wants

• How energy shapes geopolitics, critically
• What makes global energy governance distinctive (fragmented, no single regime)
• Marks focus: two halves; the geopolitics half slightly larger.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Energy as a source of power: concept
• III. Energy's influence on world geopolitics
  1. Oil and the 20th century
  2. Chokepoints and sea lanes
  3. Energy as a weapon (1973; Russia, 2022)
  4. Petrodollar and rentier states
  5. The energy transition and critical minerals
  6. Energy and great-power rivalry
• IV. Global energy governance: distinctive features
  1. Fragmented regime complex
  2. Producer vs consumer institutions
  3. State and market mix
  4. Security vs climate goals
  5. No binding global treaty
• V. Critical assessment
• VI. Pakistan's angle
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Energy is the lifeblood of economies and armies. Daniel Yergin's The Prize showed how oil shaped the 20th century; his later book The New Map argues that energy still shapes power today.
• Thesis: energy has always been a driver of geopolitics: it creates power, dependence and conflict. Unlike trade (WTO) or finance (IMF), there is no single global energy regime. Governance is fragmented, split between producers and consumers, and torn between security and climate goals.

II. Energy as a source of power

• Countries that control energy supply, routes or technology gain leverage over others.
• Energy security means reliable supply at affordable prices. Producers want security of demand; consumers want security of supply.

III. Energy's influence on world geopolitics

• 1. Oil and the 20th century: Britain shifted its navy from coal to oil (1912), which made the Middle East strategic. Oil shaped both world wars.
• 2. Chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz (about a fifth of world oil), Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping (2023–24) showed their vulnerability.
• 3. Energy as a weapon:
  • The 1973 Arab oil embargo quadrupled prices.
  • Russia's gas cut-offs to Ukraine (2006, 2009) and to Europe (2022).
• 4. Petrodollars and rentier states: oil revenue sustains Gulf monarchies and funds their influence; the dollar's role in oil trade boosted US financial power.
• 5. The energy transition: power is shifting to whoever controls critical minerals and clean tech.
  • China dominates the processing of rare earths, lithium and cobalt, and leads solar, batteries and EVs.
  • The US and EU respond with subsidies (the Inflation Reduction Act) and supply-chain deals.
• 6. Great-power rivalry:
  • The US became the top oil and gas producer through shale, which changed its Middle East calculus.
  • Russia–China energy ties (Power of Siberia).
  • China's Malacca dilemma explains CPEC and Gwadar.

IV. Global energy governance: what makes it distinctive

• 1. A fragmented "regime complex": many overlapping bodies, none in charge.
  • IEA (1974): created by oil-consuming OECD states after the 1973 embargo; emergency stockholding.
  • OPEC (1960) and OPEC+ (with Russia, since 2016): producers managing supply.
  • International Energy Forum: the producer–consumer dialogue.
  • IRENA (2009): renewables.
  • Energy Charter Treaty: investment protection; the EU and several states withdrew (2024) because it shielded fossil-fuel investors.
  • UNFCCC / Paris Agreement: climate goals that affect energy, but say little directly.
  • G20 and the IAEA (nuclear safety).
• 2. Producers vs consumers: institutions represent one side or the other, with no common platform with real power.
• 3. A state and market mix: energy is traded in markets but controlled by national oil companies and governments.
• 4. Security vs climate: governance now has two conflicting goals: secure fossil supply today, and cut fossil use tomorrow.
• 5. No binding global energy treaty: sovereignty over resources (UNGA Resolution 1803) keeps energy national.

V. Critical assessment

• Fragmentation allows flexibility but means no one coordinates during crises.
• Developing countries are under-represented (the IEA is an OECD club).
• The rise of China and India as consumers hasn't been matched by institutional reform.
• The climate transition demands stronger governance of minerals, finance and technology transfer.

VI. Pakistan's angle

• Pakistan imports most of its oil and LNG, so it is badly exposed to price shocks (as in 2022).
• Its energy diplomacy: Qatar LNG deals, the Iran–Pakistan pipeline (blocked by sanctions), TAPI, CASA-1000.
• Opportunity: domestic solar (a rooftop solar boom since 2023), Thar coal, hydropower, and minerals.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• Israel–Iran war (June 2025): renewed fears of a Hormuz closure and oil price spikes.
• OPEC+ unwound some production cuts in 2025, pushing prices down.
• China tightened rare-earth export controls (2025), then paused some under the US–China trade truce. This showed minerals are now a weapon.
• The EU agreed to phase out Russian gas by 2027.
• Pakistan imported huge volumes of solar panels, reshaping grid demand and debates on net metering.

VII. Conclusion

• Energy remains one of the strongest forces in geopolitics. Today it is shifting from oil fields to mineral mines and clean-tech factories.
• Yet global energy governance remains a patchwork without a centre.
• The world needs a more inclusive system that balances energy security with climate action and gives developing countries a real voice.

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Q8. Pakistan's balance-of-payments constraint and exports

Critically discuss that why Pakistan's economic growth continues to be "Balance-of-Payments" constraint which is one of the core cause to keep the foreign exchange reserves under pressure. Do you think that Pakistan's export performance remains the most relevant long-term challenge to alleviate the balance-of-payments constraint for sustained economics growth and explain radical structural reforms to improve export performance?

What the examiner wants

• Why growth is constrained by the balance of payments (BoP)
• Your opinion: are exports the most relevant long-term challenge?
• Radical structural reforms to improve exports

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Thirlwall's law: growth is limited by the external balance
  • B. Thesis: yes, weak exports are the core long-term challenge
• II. Why growth hits a BoP wall
  1. Import-intensive growth
  2. Weak, undiversified exports
  3. Low savings; reliance on foreign debt
  4. Energy imports
  5. Overvalued exchange rate cycles
  6. Debt servicing
• III. Are exports the most relevant challenge?
  • A. Yes
  • B. Other factors
  • C. Verdict
• IV. Radical structural reforms
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan's growth story repeats itself. When growth rises above about 4–5%, imports surge, the current account deficit widens, reserves fall and the government must slow the economy or go to the IMF.
• A.P. Thirlwall's law explains this: a country's long-run growth is limited by how fast its exports can grow relative to its appetite for imports.
• Thesis: Pakistan's BoP constraint is structural, and yes, weak export performance is the most relevant long-term challenge. Remittances and loans can postpone crises but can't end them.

II. Why growth hits a balance-of-payments wall

• 1. Import-intensive growth: growth is consumption-led; machinery, fuel, raw materials and even food (edible oil, wheat in bad years) are imported.
• 2. Weak exports:
  • Exports are about 10% of GDP, down from around 16% in the early 2000s (Vietnam's are over 80%).
  • Around 60% are textiles, mostly low-value (yarn, fabric, home textiles).
  • Concentrated in a few markets (the US, the EU, the UK, China).
• 3. Low savings and reliance on foreign money: investment is financed by loans, deposits and rollovers rather than domestic savings.
• 4. Energy imports: oil and LNG are among the largest import items, so any global price spike hits reserves.
• 5. Exchange rate cycles: past policies kept the rupee overvalued (e.g., 2015–17), encouraging imports and hurting exports, followed by sharp devaluations.
• 6. Debt servicing: large foreign debt repayments drain reserves even when the trade balance improves.
• Result: the 2018 and 2022–23 crises; reserves fell to barely a few weeks of import cover in early 2023.

III. Are exports the most relevant long-term challenge?

• A. Yes, because:
  • Exports earn dollars without creating debt.
  • Countries that escaped BoP traps (South Korea, China, Vietnam, Bangladesh) did so through export growth.
  • Remittances help (about $38 billion in FY2024-25), but depend on other economies.
  • Every import cut slows growth; only exports allow faster growth without crisis.
• B. But other factors matter too:
  • Import substitution in energy: local renewables could save billions.
  • Fiscal discipline: government deficits drive imports and borrowing.
  • FDI: Pakistan attracts very little foreign direct investment (under 1% of GDP).
• C. Verdict: exports are the single most important long-term fix, but they need fiscal, energy and investment reforms alongside them.

IV. Radical structural reforms to improve export performance

• 1. End the anti-export bias
  • Cut high import tariffs on inputs and raw materials, which protect inefficient domestic industry. The National Tariff Policy 2025–30 began rationalisation.
  • Refund taxes to exporters quickly.
• 2. Competitive, stable exchange rate
  • A market-based rate, with no return to artificial overvaluation.
• 3. Energy at competitive prices
  • Exporters pay far more for power than competitors in Bangladesh and Vietnam. Fix circular debt and offer regionally competitive tariffs.
• 4. Diversification
  • Value-added textiles (garments, technical textiles).
  • IT and digital services: IT exports reached about $3.8 billion in FY2024-25, with high potential.
  • Engineering, pharmaceuticals, surgical goods, agri-processing and halal food.
  • Minerals: processing rather than raw exports (Reko Diq).
• 5. Productivity and technology
  • Upgrade machinery, research and skills; link universities with industry.
• 6. Market access
  • Retain GSP+ (valid until 2027); phase II of the China FTA; new FTAs with the Gulf, Central Asia and Africa.
• 7. FDI for exports
  • Export-oriented SEZs (CPEC relocation), with SIFC facilitation.
• 8. Trade facilitation
  • Digital customs (the Pakistan Single Window), and lower port and logistics costs.
• 9. Remittances into investment
  • Channel diaspora money into productive sectors (Roshan Digital Accounts, diaspora bonds).

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• FY2024-25 current account surplus: the first in over a decade, helped by record remittances and import compression, not a structural export boom.
• The IMF's $7 billion Extended Fund Facility (2024) demands tariff rationalisation and tax reforms that support exporters.
• US tariffs (2025): Pakistan negotiated a lower rate than India, a possible opening for textile exports.
• The Uraan Pakistan plan (December 2024) set an export target of $60 billion by 2029.

V. Conclusion

• Pakistan's growth keeps hitting the balance-of-payments wall because it buys more from the world than it sells.
• Remittances and rollovers have kept the country afloat, but they treat the symptoms.
• Only a radical shift to export-led growth, with competitive energy, a fair exchange rate, diversification and productivity, can break the boom-bust cycle for good.