CSS 2022 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Pakistan's foreign policy options after Russia's invasion of Ukraine
2. Q3 — The 2021 Taliban takeover: anticipated Taliban policies and the regional and global response
3. Q4 — New START (2021 extension): US–Russia deterrence and implications for Pakistan's nuclear programme
4. Q5 — Ways and means to unite the Muslim Ummah, pragmatically
5. Q6 — Draft your own practical political system for good governance in Pakistan
6. Q7 — The US–China trade war as a Second Cold War; the future world order (China, Russia, US)
7. Q8 — Short notes: SAARC, poverty and trade · Xi Jinping vs Joe Biden leadership · FIFA World Cup 2022 and Arab politics

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump to its answer. Each answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and has a 🆕 box with developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each.

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Q2. Pakistan's foreign policy options after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Propose prospective foreign policy options for Pakistan in the wake of Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

What the examiner wants

• Propose options, the main task: several options, each weighed
• Pakistan's interests and constraints as the basis
• A recommended course

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Pakistan's stakes and constraints
• III. Foreign policy options
  1. Join the Western position
  2. Lean toward Russia
  3. Principled neutrality (active non-alignment)
  4. Economic pragmatism
  5. Mediation and multilateral diplomacy
• IV. Recommended mix
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Russia invaded Ukraine on the very day PM Imran Khan was meeting President Putin in Moscow. Pakistan was suddenly caught in a great-power crisis with little room to manoeuvre.
• Thesis: Pakistan's best option is principled neutrality with economic pragmatism. That means upholding the UN Charter in words, avoiding blocs in action, and protecting its economic and security interests with the West, China and Russia alike.

II. Pakistan's stakes and constraints

• West: the US and EU are Pakistan's largest export markets (GSP+), and the IMF and World Bank depend on Western support.
• China: Pakistan's closest strategic partner, and itself close to Russia.
• Russia: a growing partner in energy, wheat, defence and the Pakistan Stream gas pipeline.
• Ukraine: a major wheat supplier and a defence partner (tank engines, maintenance).
• Domestic: the economic crisis, inflation, and political turmoil in 2022.

III. Foreign policy options

• 1. Join the Western position (condemn and sanction Russia)
  • Pros: pleases donors; aligns with principles of sovereignty.
  • Cons: angers Russia and possibly China; Pakistan gets little in return; contradicts its non-bloc policy.
• 2. Lean toward Russia
  • Pros: cheap energy and wheat; a new strategic partner.
  • Cons: risks Western sanctions and IMF trouble; Russia is closer to India; it fits poorly with Pakistan's economy.
• 3. Principled neutrality (active non-alignment)
  • Uphold the UN Charter (sovereignty, no use of force), call for a ceasefire and dialogue, and abstain from bloc votes.
  • Pros: matches the majority of the Global South (India, China and many African states abstained); keeps every door open.
  • Cons: may be seen as fence-sitting by the West.
• 4. Economic pragmatism
  • Diversify food and energy imports: Russian crude and wheat where legally possible, Gulf oil, Central Asian supply.
  • Protect export markets in Europe.
• 5. Mediation and multilateral diplomacy
  • Work through the OIC, the UN and humanitarian channels; support the Black Sea Grain Initiative for food security.
  • Evacuate Pakistani students and nationals safely.

IV. Recommended mix

1. Rhetorical principle: consistent support for the UN Charter, the same principle Pakistan invokes on Kashmir.
2. Practical neutrality: abstain on bloc votes and join no sanctions regime.
3. Economic hedging: buy energy and food where cheapest and legal.
4. Balance: reassure Washington and Brussels while keeping Beijing and Moscow close.
5. Domestic resilience: food and energy security, so outside wars hurt less.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• Pakistan imported discounted Russian crude in 2023 and abstained at the UN General Assembly.
• Relations with the US warmed in 2025, while Pakistan kept ties with Russia through the SCO, which shows the balanced approach works.
• US-led peace efforts (the Alaska summit, August 2025, and a November 2025 framework) moved the war toward negotiations, though without a final settlement in the latest reports.

V. Conclusion

• Pakistan didn't start this war and can't end it. Its task was to avoid becoming a casualty of it.
• A policy of principled neutrality, economic pragmatism and active diplomacy protects Pakistan's interests with all the great powers.

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Q3. The Taliban takeover: policies and responses

The 2021 Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan presents regional and global challenges. Elaborate the anticipated policies of the Taliban government and the regional and global response.

What the examiner wants

• The Taliban's policies: anticipated in 2022; now we can show what actually happened
• The regional response: Pakistan, Iran, China, Central Asia, India, Russia
• The global response: US, UN, EU, aid

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The takeover (15 August 2021)
• III. Taliban policies
  1. Governance and ideology
  2. Women and education
  3. Security and militant groups
  4. Economy and narcotics
  5. Foreign policy
• IV. Regional response
• V. Global response
• VI. Challenges ahead
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• On 15 August 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul as the Western-backed government collapsed and the US completed its withdrawal.
• Thesis: the Taliban have governed as a rigid, male-only Islamic Emirate. They restored basic security and banned opium, but excluded women and failed to rein in militant groups. The world responded with cautious engagement but no broad recognition, a stance that is now slowly shifting.

II. The takeover

• The Doha Agreement (February 2020) set the US exit.
• Afghan forces collapsed within weeks; President Ghani fled.
• The chaotic evacuation and the ISIS-K bombing at Kabul airport (26 August 2021) marked the end.

III. Taliban policies

• 1. Governance: an all-male, mostly Pashtun interim government under Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, with decrees from Kandahar; no constitution, no elections.
• 2. Women and girls:
  • Girls barred from secondary school (March 2022) and from universities (December 2022).
  • Women banned from working for NGOs and the UN.
  • The 2024 "vice and virtue" law restricted women's voices in public.
• 3. Security: a sharp fall in war violence; action against ISIS-K. But al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul (July 2022), and the TTP operates freely, according to UN monitoring reports.
• 4. Economy and narcotics:
  • The economy collapsed after aid stopped and about $7 billion in central bank reserves were frozen.
  • An opium ban (April 2022) cut cultivation by around 95% in 2023 (UNODC).
  • Mining and trade deals were pursued, especially with China.
• 5. Foreign policy: pragmatic outreach to China, Russia, Central Asia, Iran and even India; tension with Pakistan.

IV. Regional response

• Pakistan: initially hopeful, then frustrated by the TTP surge. It deported undocumented Afghans from 2023, and border tensions grew.
• China: engaged for security (Uyghur militants) and minerals; accepted a Taliban ambassador (2024).
• Iran: pragmatic ties, but disputes over Helmand water and refugees.
• Central Asia: trade and connectivity, alongside worries over the Qosh Tepa canal.
• Russia: removed the Taliban from its terror list (2025) and became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government (July 2025).
• India: reopened a technical mission (2022), then upgraded ties in 2025.

V. Global response

• No broad recognition: the UN seat is still held by the former government's representatives.
• The UN's Doha process (meetings in 2023–24) for engagement without recognition.
• Humanitarian aid continued through the UN, but fell sharply after 2025 US aid cuts.
• Sanctions on Taliban leaders; the ICC sought arrest warrants for gender persecution (2025).
• The US: no recognition; occasional talks on detainees.

VI. Challenges ahead

• Humanitarian crisis and poverty.
• Militancy exported to neighbours.
• Women's exclusion blocking legitimacy.
• Internal Taliban divisions (Kandahar vs Kabul).
• Climate shocks and the 2025 earthquake in the east.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• Russia's recognition (July 2025) broke the recognition barrier.
• The October 2025 Pakistan–Afghanistan border clashes, then the Doha ceasefire and talks in Istanbul, with the TTP as the core issue.
• India–Taliban rapprochement: the Taliban foreign minister visited India in October 2025.
• The Kunar earthquake (August 2025) killed over 2,000 people.

VII. Conclusion

• Four years on, the Taliban are firmly in power but isolated, poor and accused of harbouring militants.
• The region has chosen pragmatic engagement; the West is still holding back.
• Lasting stability needs an inclusive Afghanistan that educates its girls and stops militants crossing its borders.

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Q4. New START and implications for Pakistan

How do the nature and possible prospects of US-Russia strategic nuclear deterrence change with the enforcement of New START treaty of 2021? What could be the treaty's implications on Pakistan`s nuclear programme, keeping in view its defence policy?

What the examiner wants

• How US–Russia deterrence changed with New START's 2021 extension
• Prospects for that deterrence
• Implications for Pakistan's nuclear programme and defence policy

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. New START: what it is
• III. How the 2021 extension shaped US–Russia deterrence
• IV. Prospects: from extension to collapse
• V. Implications for Pakistan
  1. Weakening of the global arms-control norm
  2. China's build-up and India's response
  3. Pakistan's credible minimum deterrence
  4. Diplomatic positioning
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• New START was the last treaty limiting the two largest nuclear arsenals. In February 2021, the US and Russia extended it for five years, to 5 February 2026.
• Thesis: the extension preserved stability and transparency for a while, but couldn't stop the slide into a new arms race. For Pakistan, the treaty has no direct legal effect, but the collapse of great-power arms control reshapes the strategic environment that South Asia's deterrence operates in.

II. New START

• Signed 2010 (Obama–Medvedev), in force February 2011.
• Limits: 1,550 deployed strategic warheads; 700 deployed launchers (ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, heavy bombers); 800 total launchers.
• Verification: on-site inspections and data exchanges.

III. How the 2021 extension shaped deterrence

• Stability: capped arsenals and kept a predictable balance.
• Transparency: inspections built confidence; a ten-year record of compliance.
• Prevented a free-for-all after the INF Treaty collapsed (2019).
• Limits: didn't cover tactical nuclear weapons, new systems (Russia's hypersonic Avangard, the Poseidon torpedo) or China.

IV. Prospects

• Russia suspended participation (February 2023) after the Ukraine war, which ended inspections.
• Russia "de-ratified" the CTBT (2023), and nuclear threats rose during the Ukraine war.
• The treaty was due to expire in February 2026. Russia proposed to keep its limits for a year if the US did the same (September 2025). Check the post-expiry status before the exam.
• The China factor: China's arsenal is growing fast (around 600 warheads by SIPRI 2025), and the US wants any new deal to include China, which refuses.
• Outlook: a three-way arms race with no binding limits for the first time since the 1970s.

V. Implications for Pakistan's nuclear programme

• 1. A weaker arms-control norm: when the great powers abandon restraint, pressure on smaller states to accept limits (FMCT, CTBT) loses credibility. Pakistan can argue this point diplomatically.
• 2. The chain reaction: US–Russia and US–China competition pushes China's build-up, which drives India's (Agni-V MIRV, a 2024 test; nuclear submarines), and that in turn affects Pakistan.
• 3. Pakistan's defence policy:
  • Credible minimum deterrence, refined into full-spectrum deterrence, aimed at India.
  • It must keep deterrence credible against India's growing capabilities (missile defence, MIRVs, submarines) through Ababeel (MIRV), Babur cruise missiles and a sea-based second strike.
  • It must avoid an arms race it can't afford economically.
• 4. Diplomatic positioning:
  • Pakistan supports non-discriminatory, criteria-based arms control and proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime with India.
  • It keeps its no-testing moratorium and its safety record (the National Command Authority, SECDIV export controls).
• 5. Direct legal implications: none, since Pakistan isn't party to New START. The effects are strategic and normative.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• New START's expiry date passed in February 2026, leaving the US–Russia arms control architecture at its weakest in decades.
• The May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict showed deterrence holding under stress, with both sides avoiding nuclear signalling beyond words.
• US sanctions on Pakistan's missile development bodies (December 2024) show continuing Western pressure on Pakistan's long-range programme.

VI. Conclusion

• The 2021 extension bought five years of stability, but the era of US–Russia arms control is ending.
• Pakistan isn't bound by New START, but it lives with the consequences: a more competitive nuclear world and a faster-arming India.
• Its answer should remain credible, affordable deterrence plus persistent diplomacy for regional restraint.

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Q5. Uniting the Muslim Ummah pragmatically

Muslim Ummah has failed to unite under one roof. The leadership, their internal wrangling and sectarian divide keeps them away from each other. No wonder the Muslim world is in shambles in their home countries, at OIC level and at international forums. Taking a tag from above, discuss ways and means to unite the Muslim Ummah with a pragmatic approach.

What the examiner wants

• Start from the statement: the causes of disunity, briefly
• The main task: ways and means, with a pragmatic (realistic, not idealistic) approach

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The state of the Ummah
• III. Causes of disunity
  1. Leadership and rivalry
  2. Sectarianism
  3. Nation-state interests and foreign alignments
  4. Weak OIC
  5. Economic gaps
• IV. Pragmatic ways and means
  1. Economic integration first
  2. Reform the OIC
  3. Conflict mediation mechanisms
  4. Science, education and technology
  5. Common positions on core issues
  6. Countering sectarianism
  7. Media and soft power
  8. Collective security, carefully
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Muslim world has about 1.9 billion people, 57 OIC states and huge energy reserves, yet little collective influence. On Palestine, Kashmir and the Rohingya, its voice is loud but ineffective.
• Thesis: a single political "roof" (a caliphate or a Muslim union) is unrealistic. A pragmatic unity built on economic interdependence, a reformed OIC and shared positions on a few core issues is achievable.

II. The state of the Ummah

• Wars and crises in Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Gaza.
• Rivalries: Saudi Arabia vs Iran; Türkiye and Qatar vs the UAE and Egypt (2017–21).
• Divergent alignments: the Abraham Accords (2020) split positions on Israel.
• Low intra-OIC trade: around a fifth of members' total trade.

III. Causes of disunity

• 1. Leadership rivalry: competition for leadership of the Muslim world (Riyadh, Tehran, Ankara).
• 2. Sectarianism: the Sunni–Shia divide, exploited in proxy wars.
• 3. National interest and foreign alignments: many states depend on outside powers for security.
• 4. A weak OIC: consensus-based, no enforcement, limited budget.
• 5. Economic gaps: rich Gulf states vs poor, conflict-hit states.
• 6. Authoritarianism and weak institutions at home.

IV. Pragmatic ways and means

• 1. Economic integration first (the EU model)
  • An OIC preferential trade system (TPS-OIC), customs facilitation, Islamic Development Bank financing and halal-industry standards.
  • Gulf investment in poorer members (as with Saudi and Emirati investment in Pakistan and Egypt).
• 2. Reform the OIC
  • Majority voting on some issues, a dispute-settlement mechanism and a stronger secretariat.
  • Specialised bodies that deliver: COMSTECH (science, Islamabad), COMCEC (trade).
• 3. Conflict mediation
  • Build on the 2023 Saudi–Iran reconciliation (China-brokered); create an OIC contact group for intra-Muslim disputes.
  • Pakistan, Qatar, Türkiye and Oman as mediators.
• 4. Science, education and technology
  • Joint universities, research funds and student exchanges; Muslim countries spend little on R&D.
• 5. Common positions on a few core issues
  • Palestine, Kashmir, Islamophobia and climate.
  • Pakistan's success: the UN declared 15 March the International Day to Combat Islamophobia (2022), proof that focused diplomacy works.
• 6. Countering sectarianism
  • Joint fatwas against sectarian violence (the Amman Message, 2004; Pakistan's Paigham-e-Pakistan, 2018); end sectarian funding.
• 7. Media and soft power: a joint media voice; counter disinformation.
• 8. Collective security, carefully: counter-terrorism cooperation (IMCTC) that includes all, not one bloc; defence partnerships (such as Pakistan–Saudi, 2025) kept defensive.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2023–26)

• Gaza produced joint Arab–Islamic summits (Riyadh, 2023 and 2024) and an emergency summit in Doha (September 2025) after Israel struck Qatar, but limited concrete action.
• The Saudi–Iran détente held even through the June 2025 Israel–Iran war.
• The Pakistan–Saudi defence agreement (September 2025) created a new security link in the Muslim world.

V. Conclusion

• Muslim unity won't come from slogans or a single government.
• It can come step by step, through trade, institutions, mediation and a few shared causes, the way Europe built unity after centuries of war.
• Pragmatism, not idealism, is the path to a stronger Ummah.

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Q6. A practical political system for good governance in Pakistan

Numerous political systems- Parliamentary as well as Presidential, have been in vogue in Pakistan with limited success. Draft your own proposed but practical system that would result in good governance of the country. Stipulate reasons and conditions for its success.

What the examiner wants

• Why past systems had limited success (briefly)
• Your own proposed system: draft it clearly, with its features
• Reasons it would work and conditions for its success

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Why past systems failed
• III. My proposed system: a reformed federal parliamentary model
  1. Executive and legislature
  2. Electoral reform
  3. Empowered local government
  4. Administrative reform
  5. Independent institutions and accountability
  6. Judicial reform
  7. Civil–military balance
• IV. Reasons for its success
• V. Conditions for its success
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan has tried a parliamentary system (1947–58, 1973, 1988–99, 2008–), a presidential system (Ayub Khan, 1962), and hybrid systems under Zia and Musharraf (Article 58(2)(b)).
• Thesis: the problem has been less the system than how it was run: weak institutions, over-centralisation and repeated interruptions. My proposal keeps the federal parliamentary framework of the 1973 Constitution, which has national consensus, but reforms its weak points.

II. Why past systems failed

• Interruptions: four military takeovers; no elected prime minister has completed a full term.
• Centralisation: power concentrated in Islamabad and provincial capitals; local governments neglected.
• A weak civil service: politicised and outdated.
• Elite capture: the same families and interest groups dominate.
• Weak accountability: selective, politicised anti-corruption campaigns.
• The presidential experiments concentrated power in one person and alienated smaller provinces (the lead-up to 1971).

III. My proposed system: a reformed federal parliamentary model

• 1. Executive and legislature
  • Keep the parliamentary system: the PM answers to Parliament, which suits a diverse federation.
  • Fixed five-year terms, with dissolution only by a vote of Parliament.
  • A stronger Senate with directly elected members and real power over finance.
  • Strong committees with expert staff to oversee ministries.
• 2. Electoral reform
  • A mixed electoral system: part first-past-the-post, part proportional representation, to reduce wasted votes and improve representation.
  • An independent, well-resourced Election Commission; electronic results transmission with audit trails.
  • Internal democracy in parties: regular party elections.
• 3. Empowered local government (the third tier)
  • Constitutionally protected local governments (strengthen Article 140-A).
  • Directly elected mayors with real control over budgets, police coordination, schools and health units.
  • A Provincial Finance Commission share for districts.
• 4. Administrative reform
  • Merit-based civil service with specialisation, performance contracts and fixed tenures.
  • E-governance: digital services, open data.
• 5. Independent institutions
  • A single, independent anti-corruption body free from executive control; an independent auditor-general.
  • A strong Federal Tax Ombudsman and Right to Information laws.
• 6. Judicial reform
  • Time limits for case decisions, specialised courts and merit-based appointments with transparent criteria.
• 7. Civil–military balance
  • A strengthened National Security Committee as the forum for security policy under civilian leadership, and parliamentary oversight of defence budgets.
• 8. Federalism
  • Honour the 18th Amendment and the NFC; consider new administrative provinces through consensus.

IV. Reasons for its success

• It builds on the 1973 Constitution, which all parties accept, so it needs no destabilising overhaul.
• Local government brings services to people, which builds legitimacy.
• Proportional elements make Parliament more representative of all regions and groups.
• Independent institutions reduce corruption and the politics of revenge.
• Comparable success: India's stability under a federal parliamentary model; Indonesia's devolution after 1998.

V. Conditions for its success

1. Continuity: no extra-constitutional interruptions.
2. Political consensus: a charter of democracy and economy between major parties.
3. Civilian capacity: competent, honest leadership and bureaucracy.
4. Rule of law: equal application to all, including the powerful.
5. Economic stability: good governance needs fiscal space.
6. An informed citizenry: education and a free media.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2024–26)

• The 26th Amendment (October 2024) changed the appointment of the Chief Justice and created constitutional benches.
• The 27th Amendment (November 2025) created a Federal Constitutional Court and restructured military command.
• Supporters say these changes add efficiency; critics say they weaken judicial independence. Use them as live examples of the governance debate.
• Local government elections remain delayed in several provinces.

VI. Conclusion

• Pakistan doesn't need a new system; it needs the existing one to work.
• A reformed parliamentary federation with strong local government, independent institutions and continuity would give the country the good governance it has never had for long.

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Q7. US–China trade war: a Second Cold War? The future world order

The US and China have been in an on-going trade war since 2018. In academic circles, it has been argued that this conflict may as well be the Second Cold War. Critically evaluate the future world order with main actors as China, Russia and the US.

What the examiner wants

• The trade war and the Second Cold War debate: is it one?
• Critically evaluate the future world order with three actors: China, Russia, the US

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The trade war (2018 onward)
• III. Is it a Second Cold War?
  • A. Similarities
  • B. Differences
  • C. Verdict
• IV. Future world order: three actors
  • A. United States
  • B. China
  • C. Russia
  • D. Possible scenarios
• V. Implications for Pakistan
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• In 2018 the US imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods; China retaliated. What began over trade deficits became a contest over technology, ideology and global leadership.
• Thesis: this is a new kind of cold war: a systemic rivalry with economic interdependence, not a copy of the US–Soviet one. The future order looks like a contested multipolarity with the US and China as the two poles and Russia as a disruptive partner of China.

II. The trade war

• 2018–19: tariff rounds; the Phase One deal (January 2020).
• Tech war: sanctions on Huawei, chip export controls (2022 onward), the CHIPS Act; China's push for self-reliance.
• Biden kept most tariffs and expanded tech controls ("small yard, high fence").
• Trump's second term (2025): tariffs on China climbed above 100% before a truce. After the Trump–Xi meeting in Busan (October 2025), both sides agreed a one-year truce that cut tariffs and paused some export controls.

III. Is it a Second Cold War?

• A. Similarities
  • A bipolar contest between two superpowers.
  • Ideological contrast: liberal democracy vs a one-party state.
  • Arms and tech competition: AI, chips, space, hypersonics.
  • Rival blocs: the Quad and AUKUS vs China–Russia alignment.
  • Proxy flashpoints: Taiwan, the South China Sea.
• B. Differences
  • Deep interdependence: US–China trade is still hundreds of billions of dollars a year, while the US and USSR barely traded.
  • No rigid blocs: most states (India, the Gulf, ASEAN, Pakistan) refuse to choose sides.
  • China doesn't export a revolution, unlike the USSR.
  • Shared global problems: climate, pandemics, financial stability.
• C. Verdict: a "Cold War 2.0" with economic entanglement: rivalry is structural, but full decoupling is impossible. Scholars like Graham Allison (Destined for War, the "Thucydides Trap") warn of conflict risk; others like Joseph Nye prefer "cooperative rivalry".

IV. Future world order

• A. United States
  • Still the leading military and financial power (the dollar, alliances, technology).
  • But its domestic polarisation and the "America First" turn (tariffs, withdrawals from WHO and Paris) weaken its leadership of the liberal order.
• B. China
  • The second-largest economy; leads in manufacturing, EVs, solar and batteries.
  • Builds parallel institutions (AIIB, BRI, an expanded BRICS and SCO).
  • Constraints: slowing growth, an ageing population, tech restrictions and neighbours' distrust.
• C. Russia
  • A declining economy but a nuclear superpower; disruptive through the Ukraine war.
  • Increasingly dependent on China, a junior partner in the axis.
• D. Possible scenarios
  1. Bipolar rivalry: US vs China, with Russia aligned with China.
  2. Multipolarity: the US, China, Russia, India, the EU and middle powers (the Gulf, Türkiye) balancing.
  3. Fragmented order: regional blocs and weakened global institutions.
  • Most likely: a mix of 1 and 2, with the US and China competing and many states hedging.

V. Implications for Pakistan

• Pressure to choose between its closest partner (China) and a major market and lender (the US).
• Opportunity: both courted Pakistan in 2025, the US over minerals and trade, China through CPEC.
• Best strategy: balance and hedge; avoid becoming a battleground.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2025–26)

• Tariff escalation, then the Busan truce (October 2025).
• China's rare-earth export controls showed its leverage.
• The SCO Tianjin summit (2025) gave a high-profile image of China–Russia–India engagement.
• The US pursued deals with partners (Japan, the Gulf) and pressed India over Russian oil.

VI. Conclusion

• The US–China contest is the defining rivalry of this century, but it isn't the old Cold War. Interdependence and a multipolar world make it more complex.
• The future order will be contested, with the US and China at the top, Russia as a disruptive partner, and middle powers like Pakistan seeking room between them.

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Q8. Short notes (any two of three — all three solved)

(a) Poverty and trade in South Asia, and the role of SAARC

• Introduction: South Asia holds a large share of the world's poor. Intra-regional trade is only around 5% of total trade.
• Poverty picture: hundreds of millions live below the poverty line; high malnutrition and stunting (Pakistan's stunting is around 40%); widespread informal work.
• Trade picture:
  • High tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
  • Poor connectivity; trade often goes via third countries (Dubai, Singapore).
  • The World Bank estimates intra-regional trade could be about three times higher.
• SAARC's role
  • Founded 1985 (Dhaka), with eight members; secretariat in Kathmandu.
  • SAPTA (1995) and SAFTA (2006), plus the SAARC Development Fund and SAARC Food Bank.
  • Poverty alleviation commitments (the SAARC Social Charter, 2004).
• Why SAARC failed
  • India–Pakistan rivalry; decisions require unanimity.
  • No summit since 2014; the 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled.
  • Bilateral disputes can't be discussed in SAARC.
• Way forward:
  • Revive SAARC at ministerial and technical levels.
  • Food security cooperation (a working food bank).
  • Trade facilitation and energy trade.
  • Climate cooperation.
• Conclusion: trade could be South Asia's strongest anti-poverty tool, but politics keeps the door shut. SAARC needs political will more than new charters.

(b) Leadership qualities: Xi Jinping vs Joe Biden

• Xi Jinping
  • General Secretary since 2012 and President since 2013; term limits removed (2018); a third term from 2022.
  • Style: centralised, disciplined, long-term planning (Made in China 2025, BRI); anti-corruption campaign; strong control over the party and media.
  • Strengths: strategic vision, continuity, decisive implementation.
  • Weaknesses: concentration of power, limited dissent, policy errors such as the long zero-COVID lockdowns.
• Joe Biden (President 2021–25)
  • Style: consensus-building, alliance-focused, experienced in foreign policy (decades in the Senate).
  • Strengths: rebuilt alliances (NATO over Ukraine, the Quad, AUKUS); big domestic investments (the Infrastructure Act, the CHIPS Act, the Inflation Reduction Act).
  • Weaknesses: the chaotic Afghan withdrawal (2021); questions over age; a divided Congress limited his agenda. He withdrew from the 2024 race.
• Comparison table

• Conclusion: Xi's strength is continuity and control; Biden's was coalition-building within a democracy. Each reflects his system. Update: Donald Trump succeeded Biden in January 2025, so the comparison now is Xi's steadiness against Trump's transactional style.

(c) FIFA World Cup 2022 and politics of the Arab world

• Introduction: Qatar hosted the first World Cup in the Arab and Muslim world (20 November–18 December 2022), a major soft-power project.
• Political dimensions
  • Soft power and nation branding: Qatar reportedly spent over $200 billion on infrastructure.
  • Gulf reconciliation: coming soon after the 2017–21 blockade ended (AlUla, January 2021). Saudi Crown Prince MBS attended the opening, signalling Gulf unity.
  • Arab solidarity: Morocco became the first Arab and African team to reach the semi-finals. Fans across the Arab world celebrated together.
  • Palestine: Palestinian flags were everywhere; many fans refused to engage with Israeli media, showing popular rejection of normalisation.
  • Culture clash: Western criticism over migrant workers' rights and LGBT issues; Arab defence of cultural values and charges of Western double standards.
• Effects: confidence for Gulf states as event hosts (Saudi Arabia will host the 2034 World Cup); sport as a diplomatic tool ("sportswashing" debates).
• Conclusion: Qatar 2022 was more than football. It showcased Gulf ambition, brought Arab publics together and put the Palestinian cause back in the global spotlight.