CSS 2020 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Climate change, Pakistan's water resources and inter-provincial harmony
2. Q3 — FATF grey list: why, implications and measures to exit
3. Q4 — Lockdown in Indian Occupied Kashmir: Pakistan's viable policy choices
4. Q5 — The evolving Indo–US partnership and its impact on Pakistan–US and Pakistan–China relations
5. Q6 — Indo-Pacific competition: interests and roles of the US, China, India, Japan and Australia
6. Q7 — Role of the OIC, the Arab League and the GCC in Middle East crises
7. Q8 — The future of globalism and multilateralism

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump to its answer. Each answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and has a 🆕 box with developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each.

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Q2. Climate change, water and inter-provincial harmony

What impact global climate change will have on the water resources of Pakistan? How will it affect inter-provincial harmony?

What the examiner wants

• Impacts on water resources of climate change
• Effects on inter-provincial harmony

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Pakistan's water system
• III. Climate impacts on water resources
  1. Glacier melt: short-term surplus, long-term deficit
  2. Erratic monsoons: floods and droughts
  3. Rising temperatures and evaporation
  4. Groundwater depletion
  5. Sea intrusion in the Indus Delta
• IV. Effects on inter-provincial harmony
  1. The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord under stress
  2. IRSA disputes
  3. Dams (Kalabagh)
  4. New canals (the 2025 Cholistan row)
  5. Flood blame and relief politics
• V. Way forward
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan depends almost entirely on one river system, the Indus, fed by glaciers and monsoon rain. It is among the world's most water-stressed countries; per-person availability has fallen below 1,000 cubic metres.
• Thesis: climate change will make Pakistan's water both more extreme and more uncertain: floods today, shortages tomorrow. Because water is shared among provinces under a fragile accord, scarcity will strain federal harmony unless institutions are strengthened.

II. Pakistan's water system

• The Indus Basin Irrigation System, one of the world's largest; agriculture uses over 90% of water.
• Glaciers in the Himalaya, Karakoram and Hindu Kush supply much of the summer river flow; there are over 7,000 glaciers in the north.
• Storage is low: about 30 days of river flow, against over 200 in many countries.

III. Climate impacts on water resources

• 1. Glacier melt: faster melting increases flows in the short term, with dangerous glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), but reduces flows in the long run as glaciers shrink.
• 2. Erratic monsoons:
  • Extreme floods: 2010, and 2022 (a third of the country submerged).
  • Droughts: Thar and Balochistan.
• 3. Heat and evaporation: heatwaves raise crop water demand and evaporation losses.
• 4. Groundwater depletion: over-pumping, especially in Punjab and Balochistan (Quetta's water table is falling fast).
• 5. Indus Delta: low downstream flows let seawater intrude, destroying farmland and mangroves in Thatta and Badin.

IV. Effects on inter-provincial harmony

• 1. The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord: shares water among provinces, but disputes continue over how to measure flows, how to share shortages and "surplus" water.
• 2. IRSA disputes: Sindh accuses Punjab of taking more than its share during shortages; Punjab disputes this. Telemetry has never worked well.
• 3. Dams: Kalabagh Dam was opposed by Sindh, KP and Balochistan assembly resolutions. It shows how water infrastructure becomes a federation issue.
• 4. Canals: the 2025 controversy over new canals for Cholistan (the Green Pakistan Initiative) led to protests in Sindh. The Council of Common Interests shelved the plan in April 2025, which shows the CCI resolving a dispute.
• 5. Floods: blame over breaching embankments and diverting floodwater between districts and provinces.
• 6. Balochistan: feels neglected in canal water (the Kachhi Canal delays).
• Result: as scarcity grows, every drop becomes political, and small provinces' distrust of Punjab deepens.

V. Way forward

1. Telemetry and transparency: real-time flow measurement at all barrages, made public.
2. Strengthen IRSA and the CCI as neutral, rules-based forums.
3. Storage by consensus: Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand dams; small and medium dams; groundwater recharge (the Recharge Pakistan project).
4. Efficiency: drip irrigation, canal lining, crop choices (less water-intensive crops than rice and sugarcane).
5. Delta protection: guaranteed environmental flows below Kotri.
6. Climate adaptation: glacier monitoring, flood-plain zoning, the National Adaptation Plan (2023).
7. National Water Policy (2018) implementation.

🆕 Recent developments (2022–26)

• The 2022 and 2025 floods showed the extremes.
• India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance (April 2025), adding an external threat that could unite provinces around shared water security but also heighten scarcity fears.
• The canals dispute (2025) was resolved in the CCI, a positive sign for federal institutions.

VI. Conclusion

• Climate change will turn Pakistan's water problem from a management issue into a survival issue.
• How provinces share scarcity will test the federation. Fair rules, transparent data and joint investment can turn water from a source of conflict into a bond of unity.

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Q3. Pakistan and the FATF grey list

Why was Pakistan placed on the 'Grey List' of Financial Action Task Force (FATF)? What are the implications and what measures should Pakistan take to move out of this list?

What the examiner wants

• Why Pakistan was grey-listed
• Implications
• Measures to exit. Pakistan exited in 2022, so mention what actually worked.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. FATF and its grey list
• III. Why Pakistan was grey-listed
• IV. Implications
• V. Measures to exit (and what Pakistan did)
• VI. Lessons and staying off the list
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), set up by the G7 in 1989, sets global standards against money laundering and terrorist financing.
• Pakistan was placed on its "grey list" (jurisdictions under increased monitoring) in June 2018, its third time (2008, 2012–15).
• Thesis: the listing reflected real weaknesses in Pakistan's anti-money-laundering and counter-terror-financing regime, plus geopolitical pressure. Determined legal and institutional reforms got Pakistan off the list in October 2022.

II. FATF and the grey list

• 40 Recommendations on preventive measures, supervision and law enforcement.
• Grey list: countries with strategic deficiencies that commit to an action plan.
• Black list: high-risk countries (Iran, North Korea, Myanmar).

III. Why Pakistan was grey-listed

• Technical deficiencies: weak enforcement against terror financing by UN-designated groups and their charity fronts (such as Lashkar-e-Taiba fronts).
• Weak supervision of banks, exchange companies and the informal hawala/hundi system.
• Few prosecutions and convictions for terror financing.
• Cash-based economy and a weak tax system.
• Geopolitics: the US moved the nomination, backed by the UK, France and Germany; India lobbied actively. China, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia initially resisted.

IV. Implications

• Economic:
  • Higher compliance costs and stricter checks for Pakistani banks.
  • Reduced foreign investment and credit-rating pressure.
  • A Tabadlab study estimated losses of around $38 billion to GDP over the grey-list years (2008–19).
• Financial: "de-risking": foreign banks cut correspondent relationships.
• IMF and lenders: FATF compliance became tied to IMF programmes.
• Diplomatic: reputational damage; India used it to label Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism.
• Risk of blacklisting, which would have been devastating (as with Iran).

V. Measures to exit (and what Pakistan did)

• The 27-point action plan (2018), plus a 7-point plan from the Asia Pacific Group (2021).
• Legal reforms: amended the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2020), and laws on mutual legal assistance and foreign exchange.
• Enforcement: froze assets of proscribed groups; prosecuted and convicted terror financiers, including senior leaders of banned groups (2020).
• Supervision: SBP and SECP risk-based supervision; registration of exchange companies; beneficial-ownership registers.
• Institutions: strengthened the Financial Monitoring Unit and a national FATF Secretariat; the Apex Committee under the PM and army chief.
• Diplomacy: worked with China, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the US.
• Result: FATF's on-site visit (August 2022) led to removal from the grey list in October 2022.

VI. Lessons and staying off the list

• Keep reforms permanent, not tick-box: the next FATF/APG mutual evaluation will test effectiveness again.
• Regulate non-profits proportionately, under the revised Recommendation 8 (2023).
• Document the economy, digitise payments and shrink hawala.
• Stay ahead of new risks: crypto, trade-based money laundering.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• Pakistan has stayed off the grey list since October 2022.
• The Pakistan Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (2025) and a crypto council show attention to new financial risks.
• After the May 2025 conflict, India pushed to bring Pakistan back under FATF scrutiny. Strong compliance is Pakistan's best defence.

VII. Conclusion

• Pakistan was grey-listed because of genuine gaps and because geopolitics made those gaps visible.
• It exited by doing the hard work: new laws, real prosecutions and better supervision.
• The lesson: financial integrity is national security. Staying off the list depends on keeping reforms alive.

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Q4. Kashmir lockdown: Pakistan's policy choices

Given the volatile lockdown in Indian Occupied Kashmir, what are the viable policy choices available to Pakistan? What can Pakistan realistically do to ease the sufferings of Kashmiri people?

What the examiner wants

• Viable policy choices, weighed: what is feasible and what isn't
• Realistic steps to ease Kashmiris' suffering

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Context: 5 August 2019 and the lockdown
• III. Policy choices for Pakistan
  1. Military option (not viable)
  2. Diplomatic internationalisation
  3. Legal and human rights track
  4. Bilateral engagement
  5. Information and diaspora campaign
  6. Economic and trade measures
• IV. Realistic steps to ease suffering
• V. Constraints
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• On 5 August 2019, India revoked Article 370 and 35A, ending Jammu and Kashmir's special status, and imposed a long lockdown with a communications blackout and mass arrests.
• Thesis: Pakistan's viable choices are diplomatic, legal and informational, not military. Realistically, it can't end the occupation alone, but it can keep the issue alive globally and press for human-rights relief for Kashmiris.

II. Context

• The state was split into two union territories (Jammu and Kashmir; Ladakh).
• Thousands were detained, including mainstream politicians; internet shutdowns lasted months, among the world's longest.
• New domicile rules raised fears of demographic change.
• Pakistan's response (2019): downgraded diplomatic ties, suspended trade, and took the matter to the UNSC (the first closed-door discussion in decades, August 2019).

III. Policy choices

• 1. Military option: not viable. Two nuclear powers, Pakistan's economic weakness, and international costs.
• 2. Diplomatic internationalisation
  • The UNSC, the UN Human Rights Council and OIC contact group statements.
  • Engage China (UNSC support), Türkiye, Malaysia and Iran.
  • Use bilateral meetings with major powers to raise Kashmir.
• 3. Legal and human-rights track
  • Document abuses using reports by the UN OHCHR (2018, 2019) and Amnesty International.
  • Push for UN special rapporteurs' access.
  • Highlight the UNSC resolutions and the Fourth Geneva Convention on demographic change.
• 4. Bilateral engagement
  • Backchannel talks when conditions allow; the February 2021 Line of Control ceasefire shows talks can achieve things.
• 5. Information and diaspora campaign
  • Counter Indian narratives through credible, fact-based reporting; mobilise the diaspora in the UK, the US and EU parliaments.
• 6. Economic measures
  • Trade suspension: symbolic, but costly to Pakistan too.

IV. Realistic steps to ease Kashmiris' suffering

1. Raise human-rights cases of detentions, internet bans and press freedom at UN forums, with evidence.
2. Humanitarian channels: push for access by the ICRC and UN agencies.
3. Support for Kashmiri voices abroad: scholarships, media platforms.
4. Facilitate families divided by the Line of Control through cross-LoC mechanisms when relations allow.
5. Restrain militancy: avoid actions that give India a pretext and hurt Kashmiris' cause internationally.
6. Stable LoC ceasefire to protect civilians on both sides.

V. Constraints

• India rejects third-party mediation and calls Kashmir an internal matter.
• Major powers prioritise India as a market and partner.
• Pakistan's economic weakness and FATF pressure at the time.
• OIC divisions (the UAE and Saudi Arabia have close India ties).

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• India's Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Article 370 (December 2023).
• Assembly elections (2024): Omar Abdullah became chief minister, but statehood hasn't been restored.
• The Pahalgam attack (April 2025) and the May 2025 conflict: the US-brokered ceasefire and Trump's offer to mediate on Kashmir internationalised the issue again, against India's wishes.
• India's move on the Indus Waters Treaty linked Kashmir to water security.

VI. Conclusion

• Pakistan can't change facts on the ground in Kashmir by force.
• Its strength lies in law, diplomacy, information and patience: keeping Kashmir on the world's agenda and pressing for Kashmiris' basic rights until a political solution becomes possible.

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Q5. The Indo–US partnership and its impact on Pakistan

Discuss the strategic contours of Indo-US evolving partnership and how will it impact Pakistan-US and Pakistan-China relations?

What the examiner wants

• Strategic contours of the Indo–US partnership
• Its impact on Pakistan–US relations
• Its impact on Pakistan–China relations

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Strategic contours of the partnership
  1. Origins: from estrangement to partnership
  2. The 2005/2008 civil nuclear deal
  3. Defence: foundational agreements and arms sales
  4. Technology (iCET/TRUST)
  5. The Indo-Pacific and the Quad
  6. Economy and diaspora
  7. Limits
• III. Impact on Pakistan–US relations
• IV. Impact on Pakistan–China relations
• V. Pakistan's response
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Once Cold War rivals, India and the US have built one of the most important partnerships of this century, driven by a shared concern about China's rise.
• Thesis: the Indo–US partnership has de-hyphenated US policy in South Asia: India is treated as a global partner, Pakistan as a regional issue. That has pushed Pakistan closer to China, though Pakistan still seeks a separate, interest-based relationship with Washington.

II. Strategic contours

• 1. Origins: non-alignment and the Soviet tilt during the Cold War; a turn after 1991 economic reforms; the Clinton visit (2000).
• 2. The civil nuclear deal (2005/2008): the US gave India an exception to non-proliferation rules and secured an NSG waiver.
• 3. Defence:
  • "Major Defence Partner" (2016).
  • Foundational agreements: LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018), BECA (2020).
  • Large arms purchases (Apache helicopters, P-8I aircraft, MQ-9B drones); joint exercises (Malabar).
• 4. Technology: the iCET initiative (2023), renamed TRUST; GE jet-engine co-production; semiconductors.
• 5. Indo-Pacific and the Quad: India as a counterweight to China; the Quad revived (2017), with leader-level summits since 2021.
• 6. Economy and diaspora: the US is India's largest export market; a powerful Indian-American diaspora.
• 7. Limits:
  • India's "strategic autonomy": ties with Russia (oil, S-400s), and refusal to be a formal ally.
  • Trade disputes.
  • US concerns over democratic backsliding.

III. Impact on Pakistan–US relations

• De-hyphenation: the US no longer balances India and Pakistan; Pakistan is seen mainly through Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and China.
• Military imbalance: US technology to India widens the conventional gap, pushing Pakistan to rely more on nuclear deterrence.
• Reduced aid and attention: security assistance was cut (2018); relations became transactional.
• But not zero-sum: Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and regional stability keeps it relevant. In 2025 the US and Pakistan warmed noticeably.

IV. Impact on Pakistan–China relations

• Closer alignment: China became Pakistan's main source of arms (J-10C jets, frigates, submarines) and investment (CPEC).
• A "two-front" calculus for India: China–Pakistan cooperation deepens India's concerns, as seen in the Galwan clash (2020) and the May 2025 conflict, where Chinese-origin Pakistani systems were tested.
• Diplomatic cover: China's support at the UNSC on Kashmir (2019) and FATF.
• Risk: Pakistan is seen in Washington as part of China's camp, which narrows its room to manoeuvre.

V. Pakistan's response

1. Balance, not bloc politics: strengthen China ties while seeking an independent, economic relationship with the US.
2. Highlight Pakistan's value: geography, Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, minerals, its market.
3. Maintain credible deterrence against India's growing capabilities.
4. Diplomatic efforts to keep Kashmir and the regional balance on the US agenda.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• US–India friction: Trump imposed heavy tariffs on India in 2025, including a penalty over Russian oil purchases, and claimed credit for the India–Pakistan ceasefire, which annoyed New Delhi.
• But the strategic link continues: a 10-year US–India defence framework was signed (2025).
• The US–Pakistan thaw (2025): the White House meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, a trade deal and minerals cooperation.
• China–Pakistan: Chinese weapons were used in the May 2025 conflict, deepening the defence relationship.

VI. Conclusion

• The Indo–US partnership is a structural shift in Asian geopolitics.
• It has pushed Pakistan closer to China, but 2025 shows the US–Pakistan relationship can still be revived when interests align.
• Pakistan's task is to avoid being boxed in, staying close to China while keeping its own door open to Washington.

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Q6. Indo-Pacific competition: five actors

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly becoming intense. Define the interests and role of US, China, India, Japan and Australia in the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific region.

What the examiner wants

• Define interests and role for each of five actors, roughly equal space for each
• A brief context and conclusion

Outline

• I. Introduction: what the Indo-Pacific is and why it matters
• II. United States
• III. China
• IV. India
• V. Japan
• VI. Australia
• VII. Overall assessment and implications for Pakistan
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Indo-Pacific links the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It contains over half the world's population, about 60% of global GDP and the busiest sea lanes (the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea).
• The term replaced "Asia-Pacific" to bring India in, and is promoted by the US, Japan, India and Australia, often to balance China.
• Thesis: the region is the main stage of US–China rivalry. The other three powers align with the US through the Quad, but each pursues its own interests.

II. United States

• Interests: keep primacy and freedom of navigation; protect allies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia); prevent Chinese dominance; protect trade and technology.
• Role:
  • The Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (2017; Indo-Pacific Strategy, 2022).
  • Alliances and the Quad; AUKUS (2021).
  • Military presence (the 7th Fleet, bases in Japan, Guam, the Philippines).
  • Freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea; arms to Taiwan.
  • Economic tools: IPEF (2022), chip export controls, tariffs.

III. China

• Interests: secure its periphery and sea lanes (the "Malacca dilemma"); claim the South China Sea (the "nine-dash line"); unify with Taiwan; become the leading regional power.
• Role:
  • Island-building and militarisation in the South China Sea.
  • The world's largest navy by number of ships.
  • BRI and ports across the Indian Ocean (Gwadar, Hambantota, Djibouti base).
  • RCEP (the world's largest trade bloc, in force 2022).
  • It rejected the 2016 arbitration ruling in the Philippines case.

IV. India

• Interests: be the leading power in the Indian Ocean; counter China (border disputes, "string of pearls" fears); attract investment; strategic autonomy.
• Role:
  • Quad member, but not a formal ally.
  • The "Act East" policy; the SAGAR vision for maritime security.
  • Naval expansion (aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, 2022).
  • Defence ties with the US, Japan and France.
  • Still buys Russian arms and oil, and stays in BRICS and the SCO.

V. Japan

• Interests: security against China and North Korea; protect sea lanes for its energy and trade; uphold a rules-based order.
• Role:
  • Shinzo Abe pioneered the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept (2016) and the Quad idea (2007).
  • Doubling its defence budget toward 2% of GDP (2022 strategy).
  • Infrastructure finance as an alternative to BRI; capacity-building for Southeast Asian coast guards.
  • Leadership in the CPTPP after the US left the TPP.

VI. Australia

• Interests: security against China's growing reach in the Pacific; protect its alliance with the US; manage trade with China, its largest trading partner.
• Role:
  • Quad member; AUKUS (nuclear-powered submarines with US and UK help).
  • Pacific Islands engagement (competing with China after its 2022 security pact with the Solomon Islands).
  • Trade tensions with China (2020) eased after 2022.

VII. Overall assessment and implications for Pakistan

• A US-led balancing coalition vs a rising China; each partner hedges in its own way.
• Risks: flashpoints in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and an arms race.
• For Pakistan: the Indo-Pacific strategy elevates India and sidelines Pakistan. Gwadar and the Arabian Sea link Pakistan to China's maritime strategy. Pakistan should avoid being seen as a pawn and promote CPEC as an economic corridor open to all.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• The Philippines–China clashes at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal (2024–25).
• AUKUS continued after a US review (2025).
• Trump's tariffs strained ties with India, Japan and Australia even as security cooperation continued.
• Japan's new leadership (2025) maintained a strong defence posture.

VIII. Conclusion

• The Indo-Pacific is where the 21st century's balance of power will be decided.
• The US, India, Japan and Australia share a concern about China but don't form a rigid bloc; China is building its own network.
• Middle powers like Pakistan must navigate this rivalry through balance rather than alignment.

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Q7. The OIC, the Arab League and the GCC in Middle East crises

Discuss in detail the role of OIC, Arab league and GCC in the Middle East crises and conflicts.

What the examiner wants

• Role of each of the three organisations, in detail, with examples of crises
• A comparative assessment

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The OIC
  • A. Background
  • B. Role in crises
  • C. Assessment
• III. The Arab League
• IV. The GCC
• V. Comparative assessment: why they underperform
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Middle East has seen wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Gaza, plus rivalries between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Türkiye and Qatar.
• Thesis: three regional organisations exist to deal with such crises, but all three have been weak because of members' rivalries, consensus rules and dependence on outside powers. Their record is mostly statements, with a few useful mediations.

II. The OIC

• A. Background: founded 1969 after the arson attack on Al-Aqsa Mosque; 57 members; headquarters in Jeddah.
• B. Role in crises:
  • Palestine: the core issue. Many resolutions and extraordinary summits; the joint Arab–Islamic summits in Riyadh (November 2023 and 2024) on Gaza.
  • Iran–Iraq war (1980–88): mediation attempts failed.
  • Syria: suspended Syria's membership (2012).
  • Yemen and Saudi–Iran tensions: no effective role.
  • Islamophobia: won a UN day against Islamophobia (2022).
• C. Assessment: a moral voice but weak in action. Divided by Saudi–Iran rivalry and members' alliances; no enforcement mechanism.

III. The Arab League

• Background: founded 1945; 22 members; headquarters in Cairo.
• Role in crises:
  • Arab–Israeli wars (1948, 1967, 1973); the Arab Peace Initiative (2002): normalisation in return for a Palestinian state on 1967 borders.
  • Lebanon: the Taif Agreement (1989) ended the civil war, with Saudi mediation.
  • Libya (2011): called for a no-fly zone, enabling NATO intervention.
  • Syria: suspended in 2011, readmitted in May 2023.
  • Gaza (2025): endorsed an Egyptian plan for Gaza's reconstruction without displacing Palestinians (March 2025).
• Assessment: weakened by rivalries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria), Abraham Accords splits and no collective defence in practice.

IV. The GCC

• Background: founded 1981 (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman), partly in response to the Iranian revolution and the Iran–Iraq war; headquarters in Riyadh.
• Role in crises:
  • Kuwait (1990–91): couldn't prevent Iraq's invasion; relied on the US-led coalition.
  • Bahrain (2011): the Peninsula Shield Force deployed during the uprising.
  • Yemen (2015 onward): Saudi- and UAE-led intervention against the Houthis.
  • Qatar blockade (2017–21): the GCC itself split; resolved by the AlUla Declaration (January 2021).
  • Saudi–Iran détente (2023) and Gulf mediation in Gaza (Qatar, with Egypt).
• Assessment: the most integrated of the three (customs union, joint projects) but split by the Qatar crisis and divergent policies on Iran, Israel and Yemen. Security depends on the US.

V. Why they underperform

• Rivalries: Saudi Arabia vs Iran; the Qatar crisis; competing leaders.
• Consensus rules and no enforcement.
• Dependence on outside powers (US security guarantees).
• Authoritarian regimes wary of interference in internal affairs.
• Different priorities on Israel (the Abraham Accords, 2020).

VI. Way forward

1. Conflict-prevention units and standing mediation mechanisms.
2. Joint positions on Palestine with real economic and diplomatic leverage.
3. A Saudi–Iran–Türkiye dialogue under the OIC.
4. Economic integration to create shared interests.
5. Regional security dialogue that includes Iran.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• Gaza: joint summits in Riyadh (2023, 2024); the Arab League's Gaza reconstruction plan (March 2025); an emergency Arab–Islamic summit in Doha (September 2025) after Israel struck Qatar.
• Syria after Assad (December 2024): the Arab League and the GCC are engaging the new authorities.
• The Saudi–Iran détente survived the June 2025 Israel–Iran war.

VII. Conclusion

• The OIC, the Arab League and the GCC have the legitimacy but not the unity or tools to manage Middle East crises.
• Their record shows that institutions are only as strong as their members' political will.
• Without overcoming internal rivalries, outside powers will keep deciding the region's fate.

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Q8. The future of globalism and multilateralism

In view of the evolving global alignments and changing nature of major-power relationships, what is the future of globalism and multilateralism? Discuss with examples.

What the examiner wants

• Define globalism and multilateralism
• Pressures from changing great-power relations
• The future, with concrete examples throughout

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Concepts
• III. Pressures on globalism and multilateralism
  1. US retreat and "America First"
  2. US–China rivalry and decoupling
  3. Russia and the Ukraine war
  4. A paralysed UN Security Council and WTO
  5. Nationalism, populism and COVID
• IV. Signs of resilience
• V. The likely future
• VI. Implications for Pakistan
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• After 1945, and especially after 1991, the world built a system of global trade and multilateral institutions (the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO) that was largely led by the US.
• Thesis: globalism and multilateralism aren't dying, but they are fragmenting. Universal institutions are weakening, while smaller, issue-based and regional forms of cooperation are growing. The future is "minilateralism" and selective globalisation.

II. Concepts

• Globalism: the worldwide integration of trade, finance, people and ideas.
• Multilateralism: states cooperating through shared rules and institutions rather than unilaterally.

III. Pressures

• 1. US retreat:
  • Trump's first term left the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the UN Human Rights Council and the TPP, and announced withdrawal from WHO.
  • His second term (2025) left WHO and Paris again and imposed broad tariffs, challenging WTO rules.
• 2. US–China rivalry: the trade and tech war; "de-risking" and supply-chain shifts.
• 3. Russia's war in Ukraine: a P5 member invading a neighbour; sanctions splitting the world economy.
• 4. Paralysis:
  • UNSC vetoes over Ukraine and Gaza.
  • The WTO's Appellate Body non-functional since 2019, after the US blocked appointments.
• 5. Nationalism, populism and COVID: vaccine nationalism; Brexit; anti-globalisation politics.

IV. Signs of resilience

• Climate: the Paris Agreement survives; COP summits continue (COP-29, COP-30).
• Health: the WHO Pandemic Agreement (2025).
• Trade: RCEP (2022); the African Continental Free Trade Area; the CPTPP's expansion.
• New multilateral forms: BRICS and SCO expansion; the G20 (with the African Union joining in 2023).
• The UN still matters for humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and norms.

V. The likely future

• From universal to plural: overlapping clubs (G7 vs BRICS), regional blocs and issue-specific coalitions (the Quad, AUKUS, the Minerals Security Partnership).
• "Selective globalisation": trade continues but with "friend-shoring" and security controls.
• Global South assertiveness: demands for UNSC and IMF reform.
• Risk: without great-power cooperation, global problems (climate, pandemics, AI) remain under-managed.

VI. Implications for Pakistan

• Pakistan relies on multilateral support: the IMF, World Bank, UN climate finance and UN peacekeeping prestige.
• It should support reforms giving developing countries more voice, and use plural forums (the SCO, ECO, OIC, BRICS application) while keeping ties with the West.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• The "UN80" reform initiative (2025) to cut costs as US funding falls.
• US tariffs (2025) and bilateral deals sidelined WTO rules.
• BRICS expanded (Indonesia, 2025), and the SCO Tianjin summit drew global attention.

VII. Conclusion

• Globalism and multilateralism are being reshaped, not replaced.
• The old, US-led universal order is giving way to a messier, multipolar mix of institutions.
• For states like Pakistan, the challenge is to stay connected to all of them while pushing for a fairer system.