CSS 2021 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty and great-power arms control
2. Q3 — Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir: similarities and differences
3. Q4 — The rise of the right in liberal democracies: causes and how states should respond
4. Q5 — Should new provinces be created in Pakistan? (with references from the debate)
5. Q6 — Afghan Peace Deal or US Withdrawal Deal? The Afghan peace process
6. Q7 — Militarisation of AI and computing: a revolution in military affairs
7. Q8 — How COVID-19 affected the contemporary world order

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump to its answer. Each answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and has a 🆕 box with developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each.

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Q2. The US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty

What will be the strategic and political implications of the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty, and how is it impacting the arms control arrangements between the great powers?

What the examiner wants

• Strategic and political implications of the US withdrawal
• Its impact on great-power arms control

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The Open Skies Treaty
• III. Why the US withdrew
• IV. Strategic implications
• V. Political implications
• VI. Impact on arms-control arrangements
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Open Skies Treaty allowed member states to fly unarmed observation flights over each other's territory, a symbol of post-Cold War trust.
• Thesis: the US withdrawal (2020), followed by Russia's (2021), removed a small but valuable transparency tool. It was part of a wider collapse of the arms-control architecture that has left great-power relations less predictable and more dangerous.

II. The Open Skies Treaty

• First proposed by Eisenhower (1955); signed in 1992; in force from 2002.
• 34 states from NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.
• More than 1,500 observation flights over its lifetime; images were shared among members.

III. Why the US withdrew

• The Trump administration announced withdrawal in May 2020; it took effect on 22 November 2020.
• Reasons given:
  • Russian violations: restricting flights over Kaliningrad and near Georgia's breakaway regions.
  • Russia allegedly using flights to map US infrastructure.
  • Satellites made the treaty less necessary for the US.
• Russia's response: withdrew in December 2021.

IV. Strategic implications

• Less transparency: smaller allies, without their own spy satellites, lost an important source of information on Russian military movements. This mattered as Russia massed troops near Ukraine in 2021–22.
• More risk of miscalculation: without observation, states rely more on worst-case assumptions.
• Erosion of confidence-building measures in Europe.

V. Political implications

• Strain within NATO: European allies opposed the US exit and tried to keep the treaty alive.
• Damage to US credibility as a reliable treaty partner.
• A signal that arms control was no longer a priority in great-power relations.

VI. Impact on arms-control arrangements

• Part of a chain of collapse:
  • ABM Treaty: US withdrew in 2002.
  • INF Treaty: ended in 2019.
  • Open Skies: 2020–21.
  • New START: Russia suspended participation in 2023; the treaty expired in February 2026.
  • CTBT: Russia withdrew ratification in 2023.
• No new framework includes China, whose arsenal is growing fast.
• Result: an unregulated three-way nuclear competition among the US, Russia and China.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• New START's suspension and expiry left no binding US–Russia limits in place.
• The Ukraine war brought repeated Russian nuclear signals, and Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus (2023).
• US talk of resuming nuclear testing (2025) raised fears for the testing moratorium.

VII. Conclusion

• Open Skies was a modest treaty, but its loss mattered. It was one of the last bridges of trust between East and West.
• Its collapse shows a world drifting from rules to raw competition. Rebuilding arms control, this time including China, is one of the most urgent tasks for global security.

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Q3. Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir: similarities and differences

What are the similarities and differences between Nagorno-Kaharabakh and Kashmir conflicts?

What the examiner wants

• Similarities and differences, best shown with a comparison table plus explanation
• Brief background of both

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Background
  • A. Nagorno-Karabakh
  • B. Kashmir
• III. Similarities
• IV. Differences (table)
• V. Lessons for Kashmir
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Both are territorial disputes born from the break-up of empires, the Soviet Union and British India. Both have caused wars and decades of hostility.
• Thesis: the two share many features, but they differ on legal status, the role of outside powers and the nuclear factor. Azerbaijan's military solution in 2020–23 can't be repeated in Kashmir. Its main lesson is that frozen conflicts don't stay frozen forever.

II. Background

• A. Nagorno-Karabakh
  • An Armenian-majority enclave inside Azerbaijan under Soviet arrangements.
  • First war (1988–94): Armenia took Karabakh and seven surrounding districts; hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were displaced.
  • UNSC resolutions (1993) demanded Armenian withdrawal.
  • The 44-day war (2020): Azerbaijan, backed by Turkish drones, regained most territory.
  • 2023: Azerbaijan took full control and the separatist entity dissolved.
• B. Kashmir
  • A Muslim-majority princely state whose Hindu ruler acceded to India in October 1947, which Pakistan disputes.
  • Wars in 1948, 1965 and 1999 (Kargil); UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) called for a plebiscite.
  • India revoked Article 370 in August 2019.

III. Similarities

1. Colonial and imperial legacies: both came from the break-up of empires.
2. Identity and religion: both mix territorial and ethno-religious identities.
3. UN resolutions exist for both and were left unimplemented for decades.
4. Displacement and human rights concerns.
5. Repeated wars and long ceasefire violations.
6. Outside involvement: Türkiye and Pakistan back Azerbaijan; India backs Armenia (arms supplies). This links the two conflicts politically.
7. Frozen peace processes: the OSCE Minsk Group for Karabakh; the stalled bilateral dialogue for Kashmir.

IV. Differences

V. Lessons for Kashmir

• Frozen conflicts can shift suddenly when the balance of power changes.
• Military solutions in Kashmir are ruled out by nuclear deterrence, so diplomacy and international pressure are the only realistic path.
• Legal and UN backing matters, but only with diplomatic strength to support it.
• Human rights and the people's wishes must be central, or any settlement will be unstable.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• Karabakh: Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive; nearly all Karabakh Armenians fled; the separatist entity dissolved (January 2024). In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace agreement in Washington, including a US-backed transit corridor through Armenia.
• Kashmir: India's Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Article 370 (December 2023); assembly elections were held in 2024; the Pahalgam attack and May 2025 conflict showed that Kashmir remains the trigger for war.

VI. Conclusion

• Karabakh and Kashmir share colonial roots, UN resolutions and long histories of war.
• But Karabakh was "solved" by force between non-nuclear states, while Kashmir sits between two nuclear powers and involves a people's right to self-determination.
• For Kashmir, the lesson is to keep the issue alive diplomatically, since the battlefield isn't an option.

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Q4. The rise of the right in liberal democracies

Last two decades have seen the rise of the right as a potent challenge to the liberal democracies throughout the world. What are the causes of this rise and how can states attend to this challenge?

What the examiner wants

• Causes of the rise of the (populist, far) right
• How states can respond
• Examples from several regions

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. What "the rise of the right" means, with examples
• III. Causes
  1. Economic: globalisation's losers, 2008 crisis, inequality
  2. Cultural: immigration and identity
  3. Political: distrust of elites
  4. Technology and social media
  5. Security: terrorism and crises
• IV. Why it challenges liberal democracy
• V. How states can respond
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Since the 2000s, right-wing populist and nationalist parties have moved from the fringes to power across Europe, the Americas and Asia.
• Thesis: the rise is driven by economic insecurity, cultural anxiety over immigration and identity, and deep distrust of mainstream elites, amplified by social media. States can't ban it away; they must address the grievances behind it while defending democratic institutions.

II. Meaning and examples

• Populist right: claims to speak for "the real people" against corrupt elites; nationalist, anti-immigration, often sceptical of global institutions.
• Examples:
  • US: Trump (2016, re-elected 2024).
  • Europe: Orbán (Hungary); Meloni (Italy, 2022); Le Pen's National Rally (France); the AfD (Germany); Wilders (Netherlands, 2023); Brexit (2016).
  • Elsewhere: Bolsonaro (Brazil), Milei (Argentina, 2023), and Hindu nationalism under Modi (India).

III. Causes

• 1. Economic insecurity
  • Globalisation moved industrial jobs to Asia, leaving "left-behind" regions.
  • The 2008 financial crisis and austerity hit ordinary people while bankers were bailed out.
  • Rising inequality (Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century).
• 2. Cultural anxiety and immigration
  • The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe; fear of losing national identity.
  • A "cultural backlash" against liberal social change (Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash, 2019).
• 3. Political distrust
  • Mainstream parties seen as alike and out of touch.
  • Technocratic EU decision-making feels distant.
• 4. Technology and media
  • Social media spreads anger and disinformation; echo chambers polarise.
• 5. Security fears
  • Terrorist attacks (Paris 2015) linked to Islamophobic narratives.
• 6. Crises: COVID-19, the cost of living, energy shocks.

IV. Why it challenges liberal democracy

• Attacks on judicial independence and free media (Hungary, Poland under PiS).
• Minority rights under pressure: Muslims, migrants.
• "Illiberal democracy": elected leaders weakening checks and balances (Fareed Zakaria; Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 2018).
• Polarisation and political violence (the US Capitol, 6 January 2021).
• Balanced view: not all right-wing parties are anti-democratic, and voters' grievances are often real. Dismissing them feeds the backlash.

V. How states can respond

1. Address economic grievances: regional development, job retraining, fair taxation and a strong social safety net.
2. Managed, fair immigration: clear rules, integration programmes and honest public debate.
3. Strengthen institutions: independent courts, a free press and electoral integrity.
4. Regulate digital platforms: counter disinformation (e.g., the EU's Digital Services Act).
5. Renew mainstream politics: responsive parties, citizen participation and anti-corruption measures.
6. Civic education: teach democratic values and media literacy.
7. Inclusive national identity: build a shared civic identity that includes minorities.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• Trump's return (2025): tariffs, immigration crackdowns and pressure on institutions.
• Europe: the AfD came second in Germany's February 2025 election; the far right gained in the 2024 European Parliament elections; Reform UK rose in British polls.
• Islamophobia and anti-migrant politics remain central themes, which matters for Pakistani diaspora communities.

VI. Conclusion

• The rise of the right reflects real anxieties about jobs, identity and trust that liberal democracies ignored for too long.
• The answer isn't to shut out voters, but to win them back by fixing what failed while protecting the institutions that keep democracy free.

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Q5. Should new provinces be created in Pakistan?

Most of the major political parties have committed to the creation of the new provinces in Pakistan. Should new provinces be created or not, in Pakistan? Elaborate your answer by giving references from the new provinces debate.

What the examiner wants

• A clear yes/no stand
• References from the debate: specific demands, party positions, resolutions, commissions and scholars. This is what sets 2021 apart from the similar 2024 question.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The new provinces debate: references
  1. Bahawalpur province (1952–55) and its restoration demand
  2. Saraiki / South Punjab movement
  3. Hazara movement (2010 onward)
  4. Karachi / urban Sindh demand
  5. Party manifestos and assembly resolutions
  6. Constitutional route: Article 239(4)
• III. Arguments for
• IV. Arguments against
• V. My stand and conditions
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• PPP, PML-N and PTI have all promised a South Punjab province in their manifestos, yet none has created one.
• My stand: yes, new provinces should be created, but on administrative grounds, through constitutional consensus, starting with South Punjab, where the case is strongest.

II. The debate: references

• 1. Bahawalpur: a separate province from 1952 until the One Unit scheme (1955). When One Unit ended in 1970, it was merged into Punjab instead of being restored, which is a long-standing grievance.
• 2. Saraiki / South Punjab: based on the Saraiki language and the region's backwardness. Parties include the Saraiki Qaumi Movement; the Junoobi Punjab Suba Mahaz (2018) merged into PTI on the promise of a province within 100 days.
• 3. Hazara: the protests of April 2010 against renaming NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in which several people were killed. The KP Assembly passed a resolution supporting a Hazara province (2014).
• 4. Karachi / urban Sindh: MQM voices periodically raise it; it is fiercely opposed by Sindhi nationalists and the PPP ("Sindh will not be divided").
• 5. Resolutions and commissions:
  • The Punjab Assembly passed resolutions for South Punjab and Bahawalpur provinces (May 2012).
  • A parliamentary commission on new provinces (2012–13) proposed a "Bahawalpur Janoobi Punjab" province.
  • The Senate passed a constitutional amendment bill for it (2013), but it lapsed in the National Assembly.
  • The South Punjab Secretariat (2020) was a halfway step.
• 6. Constitutional route: Article 239(4) requires a two-thirds vote of the affected provincial assembly, plus two-thirds of both houses of Parliament.
• 7. Scholars and experts: Dr Ishrat Husain (Governing the Ungovernable) supports smaller administrative units; critics such as Dr Ayesha Jalal warn about ethnic politics in Pakistan's federal history.

III. Arguments for new provinces

• Administrative efficiency: Punjab's population is larger than most countries'.
• Federal balance: Punjab dominates the National Assembly.
• Development: South Punjab's poverty and health indicators lag well behind the north.
• Identity recognition reduces alienation.
• International practice: India has 28 states, Nigeria 36 and Iran 31.

IV. Arguments against

• Ethnic division: risk of language-based demands multiplying.
• Cost: new assemblies, secretariats and high courts in a cash-strapped state.
• Resource disputes: water, NFC shares and assets.
• Political manipulation: slogans at election time, no follow-through.
• Sindh's opposition makes any Karachi move explosive.

V. My stand and conditions

1. Create a National Commission on Administrative Units to set criteria (population, area, economic viability, contiguity).
2. Phase it in: South Punjab first, then Hazara if consensus exists.
3. No unit on purely ethnic lines.
4. Settle water, NFC and asset division before creation.
5. Combine with strong local government under Article 140-A.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2023–26)

• The South Punjab Secretariat continued, with limited powers.
• CSS 2024 asked almost the same question, which shows its importance.
• Some 2025 discussion of administrative reorganisation followed the 27th Amendment debates, but no new province was created.

VI. Conclusion

• The debate has run for over 50 years, from Bahawalpur's lost status to the South Punjab promise.
• New provinces, made carefully and fairly, would bring governance closer to people. What's missing isn't a reason, but political will and consensus.

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Q6. Afghan Peace Deal or US Withdrawal Deal?

Some scholars term Afghan Peace Deal as the US Withdrawal Deal. Do you agree? Answer the question while discussing the contours of the Afghan peace process.

What the examiner wants

• Do you agree? State it clearly in the intro.
• Contours of the peace process
• Evidence for your position, with the counter-view

Outline

• I. Introduction: yes, I largely agree
• II. Contours of the Afghan peace process
  1. Background: the US war 2001–2018
  2. Doha talks (2018–20); Zalmay Khalilzad
  3. The Doha Agreement (29 February 2020): terms
  4. Intra-Afghan negotiations (September 2020)
  5. The withdrawal and collapse (2021)
  6. Pakistan's role
• V. Why it was a "withdrawal deal"
• VI. The counter-view: why it was a peace deal
• VII. Verdict and conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Doha Agreement (29 February 2020) between the US and the Taliban was presented as a step toward peace. Its outcome, the Taliban's return to power in August 2021 without any political settlement, supports the view that it was mainly an exit deal.
• Thesis: I largely agree. The agreement secured a timetable for US withdrawal and Taliban guarantees on terrorism against the US, but left Afghanistan's political future to talks that never succeeded.

II. Contours of the Afghan peace process

• 1. Background: after 2001, the US fought the Taliban for nearly two decades at a cost of trillions of dollars and over 2,400 US troops killed. By 2018, the war was a stalemate.
• 2. Doha talks (2018–20): led by US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad with the Taliban's political office in Qatar. Pakistan helped bring the Taliban to the table and released Mullah Baradar (2018).
• 3. The Doha Agreement (29 February 2020):
  • US and NATO troops to leave within 14 months.
  • The Taliban promised that Afghan soil wouldn't be used against the US and its allies.
  • Prisoner exchange: up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners for 1,000 government personnel.
  • Intra-Afghan negotiations to start; a ceasefire to be "an item on the agenda".
  • The Afghan government wasn't a party.
• 4. Intra-Afghan negotiations (September 2020): began in Doha but made little progress.
• 5. Withdrawal and collapse: Biden extended the deadline to 31 August 2021. Provinces fell quickly, and Kabul fell on 15 August 2021.

III. Why it was a "withdrawal deal"

• The Afghan government was excluded from the main deal.
• The binding parts were about US interests: the withdrawal timetable and counter-terrorism guarantees for the US.
• No ceasefire was required: violence continued during the talks.
• Prisoner releases strengthened the Taliban.
• No power-sharing formula or constitutional framework was agreed.
• The outcome: a military takeover, not a political settlement.
• Scholars: analysts at the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) concluded the deal undermined the Afghan government and forces. Many describe it as an "exit agreement".

IV. The counter-view: why it was a peace deal

• It ended America's longest war and US–Taliban fighting.
• It opened direct dialogue, which the Afghan government had previously blocked.
• It envisaged intra-Afghan talks; their failure was due to Afghan divisions as much as US design.
• It reduced the risk of renewed attacks on US forces.

V. Verdict

• The agreement achieved peace for the US, not for Afghanistan.
• The "withdrawal deal" label is accurate for its effect, even if its stated aims were broader.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2022–26)

• The Taliban government has ruled since 2021 without broad recognition. Russia recognised it in July 2025.
• US claims of Taliban non-compliance: al-Qaeda's leader Zawahiri was killed in Kabul (2022).
• For Pakistan, the deal's failure to address the TTP led to a terrorism surge and the October 2025 border clashes.

VI. Conclusion

• The Doha Agreement was a carefully drafted exit for the United States that left Afghanistan's future to chance.
• For Afghans and their neighbours, especially Pakistan, the costs of that "peace" are still being paid.

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Q7. Militarisation of AI and computing

How is militarization of Artificial Intelligence and Computing revolutionizing the military affairs?

What the examiner wants

• Explain the revolution in military affairs (RMA) from AI and computing
• Specific areas where change is happening
• Risks and regulation, which earn critical marks

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The concept: a revolution in military affairs
• III. How AI and computing are changing warfare
  1. Intelligence and surveillance
  2. Decision-making and command (C4ISR)
  3. Autonomous weapons and drones
  4. Cyber warfare
  5. Information warfare
  6. Logistics and maintenance
  7. Quantum and high-performance computing
• IV. Risks
• V. Regulation efforts
• VI. Pakistan's angle
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• From gunpowder to nuclear weapons, technology has repeatedly transformed war. Today AI and advanced computing are doing the same, changing how wars are seen, decided and fought.
• Thesis: AI is creating a new RMA by making warfare faster, more autonomous and more data-driven. It also brings serious risks of escalation, loss of human control and an arms race that current law can't regulate.

II. The concept: a revolution in military affairs

• An RMA is when new technology combined with new doctrine changes the nature of war. Examples: the 1991 Gulf War's precision weapons and information dominance.
• AI is described as a "third offset" (US Defense Department) and an "intelligentised" war by China's military.

III. How AI and computing are changing warfare

• 1. Intelligence and surveillance: AI sorts satellite images, drone videos and communications at a speed no human team can match. The US Project Maven (2017) used AI to analyse drone footage.
• 2. Decision-making and command: AI-assisted command systems shorten the "sensor-to-shooter" loop from hours to minutes. Israel's reported use of AI targeting systems in Gaza (such as "Lavender" and "the Gospel") raised deep ethical concerns.
• 3. Autonomous weapons and drones:
  • Swarms, loitering munitions and unmanned vessels.
  • In Ukraine, cheap AI-assisted drones now cause a large share of casualties.
  • In Nagorno-Karabakh (2020), Turkish and Israeli drones decided the war.
• 4. Cyber warfare: AI finds vulnerabilities and launches or defends against attacks at machine speed.
• 5. Information warfare: deepfakes, bots and AI-generated propaganda to shape opinion.
• 6. Logistics and maintenance: predictive maintenance and supply planning.
• 7. Quantum and high-performance computing: could break today's encryption and transform sensing, which is why the US–China chip and quantum race is fierce.

IV. Risks

• Loss of human control: "killer robots" making life-and-death decisions.
• Speed and escalation: machine-speed decisions may outpace diplomacy; risk of accidental war, including in nuclear command systems.
• Accountability gaps: who is responsible for an AI error?
• Arms race and proliferation: cheap drones are available to non-state actors (the Houthis, terrorist groups).
• Bias and error in targeting data.

V. Regulation efforts

• UN talks under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on lethal autonomous weapons (since 2014), so far without a treaty.
• UN General Assembly resolutions on autonomous weapons (2023, 2024).
• The US Political Declaration on responsible military use of AI (2023), and the REAIM summits (2023, 2024).
• A US–China agreement (November 2024) that humans, not AI, should control decisions to use nuclear weapons.

VI. Pakistan's angle

• The May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict featured extensive drone, missile and electronic warfare, a real-world example of this RMA in South Asia.
• Pakistan's National AI Policy (2025); the need for investment in cyber defence, drones and AI talent.
• Pakistan has supported calls for a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons at the UN.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2024–26)

• AI-enabled drones dominate the Ukraine battlefield on both sides.
• The US and China race in frontier AI and chips under export controls.
• India and Pakistan's 2025 clash marked the first large drone war between nuclear-armed states.

VII. Conclusion

• AI and computing are changing war as profoundly as gunpowder or the atom.
• The advantage will go to states that combine technology with doctrine and talent.
• But without rules, the same tools could make war faster, deadlier and harder to control. The world needs norms before the machines outrun the humans.

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Q8. COVID-19 and the contemporary world order

Delineate the ways in which Covid-19 has affected the contours of the contemporary world order.

What the examiner wants

• Delineate (outline clearly) the ways COVID-19 changed the world order, across political, economic, geopolitical, social and institutional areas

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Ways COVID-19 affected the world order
  1. US–China rivalry intensified
  2. Multilateralism and WHO weakened
  3. Vaccine nationalism and the North–South divide
  4. Globalisation and supply chains reshaped
  5. Economic shock and debt
  6. Rise of the state and digital governance
  7. Democracy, nationalism and misinformation
  8. Health security as national security
• III. Pakistan's experience
• IV. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• COVID-19 killed millions (WHO estimates nearly 7 million reported deaths, with far higher excess deaths) and shut down the world economy in 2020.
• Thesis: the pandemic didn't create a new world order, but it accelerated existing trends: US–China rivalry, weakening multilateralism, retreat from hyper-globalisation and a stronger role for the state.

II. Ways COVID-19 affected the world order

• 1. US–China rivalry intensified: blame games over the virus's origin (the "China virus" rhetoric, lab-leak debates); mask and vaccine diplomacy competition.
• 2. Multilateralism weakened: the US announced withdrawal from WHO (2020; reversed by Biden, then repeated by Trump in 2025). The UN Security Council failed to act jointly for months.
• 3. Vaccine nationalism: rich countries hoarded doses. COVAX fell short, and Africa received vaccines late. The North–South divide deepened.
• 4. Supply chains reshaped: shortages of masks, medicines and chips led to "reshoring", "friend-shoring" and "China plus one" strategies.
• 5. Economic shock and debt: the world economy shrank about 3% in 2020. Massive stimulus followed, then inflation. Debt crises hit poor countries (Sri Lanka defaulted in 2022). The G20 debt suspension initiative offered limited relief.
• 6. The strong state returned: lockdowns, surveillance and state-led recovery made governments more powerful.
• 7. Democracy and misinformation: some leaders used emergency powers to curb freedoms; an "infodemic" of conspiracy theories spread.
• 8. Health as security: pandemic preparedness entered national security strategies.
• Positive changes:
  • A digital leap (remote work, e-commerce, online education).
  • Scientific cooperation produced vaccines in under a year.

III. Pakistan's experience

• "Smart lockdowns" and the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC) were praised internationally.
• The Ehsaas emergency cash programme reached millions of families.
• Chinese vaccines (Sinopharm) and COVAX doses supported the vaccination drive.
• Economic slowdown and IMF programme pressures followed.

ud83cudd95 Recent developments (2023–26)

• WHO ended the global health emergency in May 2023.
• The WHO Pandemic Agreement was adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2025, a sign that lessons are being institutionalised.
• The US left WHO again (2025) and cut global health funding.
• Supply-chain diversification continues amid US–China tariffs.

IV. Conclusion

• COVID-19 was a stress test that the world order largely failed: rivalry beat cooperation and rich countries looked after themselves first.
• It left a more divided, more state-centred and more digital world. The adoption of a pandemic treaty is a small sign that cooperation remains possible.