CSS 2017 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Role of the National Action Plan in internal security; critical analysis of outcomes
2. Q3 — Improving Balochistan's security for CPEC; regional powers' role in sabotage
3. Q4 — US–Russia relations in the context of ISIS and Middle East security
4. Q5 — The US "rebalancing" policy and China's assertiveness in the South China Sea
5. Q6 — Impact of the US–India strategic partnership on regional and Indian Ocean security
6. Q7 — China's strategic vision behind One Belt, One Road
7. Q8 — (a) INS Arihant and K-4: effects on South Asian strategic stability · (b) LEMOA: comment

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump to its answer. Each answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and has a 🆕 box with developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each. Q8 has two compulsory parts of 10 marks each. Both must be answered, not one of them.

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Q2. The National Action Plan: role and outcomes

Highlight the role of National Action Plan (NAP) in stabilization of internal security of Pakistan. Critically analyze its outcomes?

What the examiner wants

• Highlight the role of NAP in stabilising security
• Critically analyse outcomes: successes and failures with evidence

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Background: the APS attack and the birth of NAP
• III. The 20 points of NAP (grouped)
• IV. Role of NAP in stabilisation
• V. Critical analysis of outcomes
  • A. Successes
  • B. Failures and gaps
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Army Public School attack in Peshawar (16 December 2014), which killed over 140 people, most of them children, united Pakistan's political and military leadership.
• On 24 December 2014, an all-parties conference approved the 20-point National Action Plan.
• Thesis: NAP, together with Operation Zarb-e-Azb, played a major role in bringing terrorism down sharply between 2014 and 2018. But its civilian points (police, madrassa and criminal justice reform, and FATA reforms on time) were only partly implemented, which is why terrorism returned after 2021.

II. Background

• 2007–14: the worst years of terrorism in Pakistan.
• Operation Zarb-e-Azb (June 2014) in North Waziristan had already begun; NAP added a national framework.

III. The 20 points (grouped)

• Kinetic and legal: lifting the death penalty moratorium; military courts (21st Amendment, 2015); action against armed militias.
• Institutional: strengthening NACTA; counter-terrorism forces in provinces.
• Financial: choking terror financing; action against proscribed organisations operating under new names.
• Ideological: curbing hate speech and literature; madrassa registration and regulation; ban on glorifying terrorism in the media.
• Specific regions: FATA reforms; Karachi operation; Balochistan reconciliation; Punjab action.
• Others: Afghan refugee policy; communication network control (SIM verification); sectarian action.

IV. Role in stabilisation

• Created political consensus and a national narrative against terrorism.
• Civil–military apex committees coordinated federal and provincial action.
• Legal tools (military courts, protection laws) sped up cases.
• Supported military operations (Zarb-e-Azb, the Karachi operation, Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017).

V. Critical analysis of outcomes

• A. Successes
  • Sharp fall in terrorism: deaths in terrorist violence fell dramatically from 2014 to 2018 (South Asia Terrorism Portal and PIPS data).
  • Karachi: major reductions in targeted killings and extortion.
  • SIM verification: tens of millions of SIMs biometrically re-verified.
  • Hate speech: thousands of cases registered.
  • FATA merger with KP (25th Amendment, 2018).
• B. Failures and gaps
  • NACTA stayed weak: no strong joint intelligence directorate.
  • Police and criminal-justice reform lagged; military courts were a temporary fix and ended in 2019.
  • Madrassa reform progressed slowly.
  • Terror financing continued until FATF pressure forced action (2018–22).
  • Balochistan reconciliation didn't succeed.
  • Over-reliance on the military; the civilian side didn't take ownership.

VI. Way forward

1. Make NACTA a fully empowered coordinating body.
2. Police and CTD reform, plus forensics and prosecution.
3. Complete madrassa registration and curriculum reform.
4. Development and political dialogue in Balochistan and the merged districts.
5. Regular public reporting on NAP progress.

🆕 Recent developments (2021–26)

• NAP was revised (2021) to 14 points.
• Terrorism surged after the Taliban takeover (2021); 2024 was the deadliest year in a decade.
• Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (2024) was launched as a renewed national campaign, effectively NAP 2.0.

VII. Conclusion

• NAP showed what national unity can achieve: within a few years, terrorism fell sharply.
• But its unfinished civilian agenda left the door open for terrorism's return. Military gains last only when civilian institutions hold the ground.

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Q3. Balochistan's security, CPEC and regional powers

What measures do you suggest to improve the security conditions of Balochistan in respect to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the role of regional powers to sabotage it?

What the examiner wants

• Measures to improve Balochistan's security for CPEC
• The role of regional powers in sabotage, with evidence and caution

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Balochistan's importance to CPEC
• III. Security situation
• IV. Role of regional powers
• V. Measures to improve security
  • A. Security measures
  • B. Political and economic measures
  • C. Diplomatic measures
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Balochistan is Pakistan's largest and poorest province, and Gwadar, CPEC's crown jewel, lies on its coast.
• Thesis: CPEC can't succeed without a secure Balochistan, and Balochistan can't be secured by force alone. Security needs a mix of capable forces, political reconciliation, local benefit and diplomacy against outside interference.

II. Importance to CPEC

• Gwadar port, free zone and airport; the western route; mineral wealth (Saindak, Reko Diq); its coastline.

III. Security situation

• Baloch separatist groups (BLA, BLF, BRA) attack security forces, workers and Chinese nationals.
• Sectarian violence (attacks on the Hazara community) and ISIS activity.
• Grievances: under-development, missing persons, resource control, and feelings of exclusion from CPEC's benefits.

IV. Role of regional powers

• India: Pakistan cites Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian naval officer arrested in Balochistan (March 2016), as proof of Indian sabotage aimed at CPEC. Indian officials have openly opposed CPEC because it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan.
• Afghanistan: militant sanctuaries across the border; past Afghan intelligence links alleged by Pakistan.
• Other powers: some see CPEC and Gwadar as competition (for example, Chabahar port).
• Critical note: foreign interference exploits existing grievances. Fixing those grievances is as important as blocking interference.

V. Measures to improve security

• A. Security
  • A dedicated CPEC force: the Special Security Division (army) and provincial units, well equipped.
  • Intelligence-led operations and border fencing with Afghanistan and Iran.
  • Surveillance technology (safe cities, drones) along routes.
• B. Political and economic
  • Dialogue with disaffected Baloch leaders; resolve missing-persons cases through law.
  • Local jobs and training in CPEC projects; water, electricity and schools for Gwadar residents.
  • Fair share in resources (Article 172; a royalty system).
  • Strong local government and a credible provincial government.
• C. Diplomatic
  • Raise evidence of foreign sabotage at international forums.
  • Cooperate with Iran and Afghanistan on border security.
  • Work with China on joint security arrangements.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• Attacks on Chinese nationals at Besham (March 2024) and near Karachi airport (October 2024); the Jaffar Express hijacking (March 2025).
• Gwadar's Haq Do Tehreek protests over local rights.
• The Baloch Yakjehti Committee movement and arrests (2025).
• China pressed Pakistan for stronger security guarantees as a condition for CPEC 2.0.

VI. Conclusion

• Balochistan's security is the key that unlocks CPEC.
• Force can protect projects, but only inclusion and fair development can win hearts, leaving no room for hostile powers to exploit Baloch grievances.

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Q4. US–Russia relations, ISIS and Middle East security

Critically analyze the US-Russia relations in context of ISIS and its impact on the security situation of Middle East.

What the examiner wants

• US–Russia relations in the ISIS context: cooperation and rivalry
• Impact on Middle East security

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The rise of ISIS (2014)
• III. US approach
• IV. Russian approach (Syria, 2015)
• V. US–Russia relations: rivalry with limited cooperation
• VI. Impact on Middle East security
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• In June 2014, ISIS declared a "caliphate" across Iraq and Syria. Both the US and Russia called ISIS an enemy, but they fought it with different allies and goals.
• Thesis: ISIS created a common enemy but not a common strategy. US–Russia rivalry over Syria limited cooperation, prolonged the war, and reshaped Middle East security in Russia's favour while ISIS was defeated territorially.

II. The rise of ISIS

• Grew from al-Qaeda in Iraq; exploited the Syrian civil war and Sunni grievances in Iraq.
• Took Mosul (June 2014); held territory the size of Britain at its peak; carried out attacks worldwide (Paris 2015).

III. US approach

• Global Coalition against Daesh (2014): airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.
• Support for Iraqi forces and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
• Goal: defeat ISIS, and pressure Assad to leave.

IV. Russian approach

• Military intervention in Syria (September 2015), officially against ISIS and "terrorists".
• In practice, it mainly targeted rebels threatening Assad.
• Goals: save its ally, keep its bases (Tartus, Hmeimim) and restore Russia's great-power status.

V. US–Russia relations: rivalry with limited cooperation

• Cooperation: a deconfliction hotline to avoid air clashes; the 2013 chemical weapons deal; short-lived ceasefire agreements (2016).
• Rivalry:
  • Opposite positions on Assad.
  • Accusations of bombing civilians (Aleppo, 2016).
  • US strikes on Syrian forces after chemical attacks (2017, 2018).
  • Clashes near Deir ez-Zor (2018).
• Wider context: sanctions over Ukraine (2014) and election interference allegations (2016) poisoned relations.

VI. Impact on Middle East security

• ISIS defeated territorially: Mosul (2017), Raqqa (2017), Baghuz (March 2019); but insurgent cells and affiliates (ISIS-K) remained.
• The Syrian war prolonged: hundreds of thousands killed and millions displaced.
• Russia's return: Moscow became a key power broker (the Astana process with Iran and Türkiye).
• Iran's influence grew through militias.
• Kurdish question: US support for the SDF angered Türkiye, leading to Turkish operations.
• The refugee crisis affected Europe and neighbours.

🆕 Recent developments (2022–26)

• The Ukraine war ended any US–Russia cooperation.
• Assad fell in December 2024, a major blow to Russia's Middle East position; a new Syrian government took power and the EU lifted sanctions (2025).
• ISIS remnants and ISIS-K remain threats, including to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

VII. Conclusion

• ISIS gave the US and Russia a shared enemy but couldn't overcome their rivalry.
• The result: ISIS lost its land, but Syria was devastated and the region's balance of power shifted.
• The episode shows that great-power competition can turn counter-terrorism into a geopolitical contest.

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Q5. US rebalancing and China's South China Sea policy

Explain the salient contours of the US 'rebalancing' policy and China's assertive policy in South China Sea and latter's disputes with the regional countries. Critically evaluate.

What the examiner wants

• Contours of US rebalancing
• China's assertive SCS policy and its disputes with regional countries
• Critical evaluation of both

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. US rebalancing (pivot to Asia)
• III. China's assertive policy in the South China Sea
• IV. Disputes with regional countries
• V. The 2016 arbitration ruling
• VI. Critical evaluation
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The South China Sea carries trillions of dollars of trade a year and holds fish, oil and gas. It is the main maritime flashpoint between the US and China.
• Thesis: the US "rebalance" aimed to sustain US leadership in Asia, while China pressed its territorial claims with island-building and coercion. Both policies have raised tensions. China has gained physical control, while the US and its partners have upheld legal and military challenges.

II. US rebalancing

• Announced by Hillary Clinton ("America's Pacific Century", 2011) and Obama (Canberra, November 2011).
• Military: 60% of US naval forces to the Pacific by 2020; Marines rotating in Darwin; new access in the Philippines (the EDCA agreement, 2014).
• Economic: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
• Diplomatic: deeper engagement with ASEAN, joining the East Asia Summit, and new partners (India, Vietnam, Myanmar).

III. China's assertive policy

• Claims about 90% of the sea within the "nine-dash line".
• Island-building: since 2013, China reclaimed over 3,000 acres in the Spratlys, then built runways, radars and missile sites (Fiery Cross, Subi, Mischief Reef).
• Coast guard and maritime militia pressure on other countries' fishermen and supply missions.
• Scarborough Shoal, taken from Philippine control in 2012.
• Oil rig standoff with Vietnam (2014).

IV. Disputes with regional countries

• Philippines: Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and the Spratlys.
• Vietnam: the Paracels (seized by China in 1974) and the Spratlys.
• Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia: overlapping exclusive economic zones (Indonesia's Natuna waters).
• Taiwan: claims similar to China's.

V. The 2016 arbitration ruling

• On 12 July 2016, a tribunal under UNCLOS ruled in the Philippines' case that the nine-dash line has no legal basis and that China violated Philippine rights.
• China rejected the ruling as "null and void".

VI. Critical evaluation

• US rebalancing:
  • Strengths: reassured allies; freedom-of-navigation operations challenged excessive claims.
  • Weaknesses: under-resourced, distracted by the Middle East; withdrawal from the TPP (2017) weakened the economic pillar.
• China's policy:
  • Gains: facts on the ground; stronger military position.
  • Costs: alarmed neighbours, drove them closer to the US, and damaged China's image as a "peaceful rise" power.
• ASEAN: divided, so the Code of Conduct talks drag on.
• Risk: incidents at sea could escalate.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• Repeated China–Philippines clashes at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough (2023–25), including water cannon use; the Philippines strengthened defence ties with the US and Japan.
• The US–Japan–Philippines trilateral (2024).
• The Code of Conduct remained unfinished.

VII. Conclusion

• The rebalance and China's assertiveness turned the South China Sea into a test of whether rules or power will shape Asia.
• China has won control on the water; the US and its partners hold the legal and diplomatic high ground. Without a binding code of conduct, the sea will stay a dangerous flashpoint.

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Q6. The US–India strategic partnership and regional security

The impact of burgeoning US-India strategic partnership over the security situation of the region and Indian Ocean Region.

What the examiner wants

• The impact on regional (South Asian) security
• The impact on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Contours of the partnership
• III. Impact on South Asian security
  1. Conventional imbalance
  2. Nuclear and strategic stability
  3. The China–Pakistan response
  4. Afghanistan
• IV. Impact on the Indian Ocean Region
  1. Naval cooperation and logistics
  2. Countering China's presence
  3. Militarisation and rivalry
  4. Small states' choices
• V. Pakistan's response
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• From the 2005 framework to "Major Defence Partner" status (2016), the US–India partnership has grown fast, mainly to balance China.
• Thesis: the partnership has strengthened India's military position. This deepens the conventional imbalance with Pakistan, sharpens China–India rivalry and militarises the Indian Ocean.

II. Contours

• The civil nuclear deal (2008).
• Defence sales (C-17, P-8I, Apache) and co-production.
• LEMOA (2016) for logistics, and later COMCASA and BECA.
• Malabar exercises and the Quad.

III. Impact on South Asian security

• 1. Conventional imbalance: advanced US arms and technology widen India's lead, which pushes Pakistan toward greater reliance on nuclear deterrence (tactical weapons, full-spectrum deterrence).
• 2. Nuclear stability: the nuclear deal frees Indian uranium for weapons, Pakistan argues, which drives an arms race.
• 3. The China–Pakistan response: closer China–Pakistan defence ties and CPEC; a hardening of blocs.
• 4. Afghanistan: the US backed a larger Indian role, which Pakistan saw as encirclement.

IV. Impact on the Indian Ocean Region

• 1. Naval cooperation: joint exercises, intelligence sharing and logistics access (LEMOA) extend the US Navy's reach.
• 2. Countering China: responds to China's presence (Djibouti, Gwadar, Hambantota and submarine visits).
• 3. Militarisation: more naval deployments and great-power rivalry in a once-quiet ocean.
• 4. Small states: Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh balance between India and the US on one side and China on the other.

V. Pakistan's response

• Strengthen naval capability: a sea-based second strike, new submarines and frigates from China and Türkiye.
• Diplomatic outreach to IOR states.
• Push for strategic restraint and maritime confidence-building measures.
• Avoid being seen only through the China lens.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• A 10-year US–India defence framework (2025), plus jet-engine co-production and the TRUST technology initiative.
• But trade frictions: US tariffs on India in 2025.
• The May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict showed the military balance in action, with Chinese systems on Pakistan's side.
• China's research vessels in the Indian Ocean raised Indian concerns.

VI. Conclusion

• The US–India partnership is reshaping the security map of South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
• For Pakistan, it means a tougher military balance and closer reliance on China. For the region, it means a more crowded, competitive ocean.

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Q7. China's strategic vision behind One Belt, One Road

Critically examine China's strategic vision behind its 'One Belt, One Road' venture.

What the examiner wants

• Critically examine the strategic vision: aims and a critique
• Note: almost the same as CSS 2019 Q2. Practise both in the same way.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. OBOR: the venture
• III. Strategic vision
  1. Economic
  2. Geopolitical
  3. Energy and maritime security
  4. Domestic stability (western regions)
  5. Soft power and global governance
• IV. Critical examination
• V. Implications for Pakistan
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• One Belt, One Road (OBOR), later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was launched by Xi Jinping in 2013.
• Thesis: OBOR is China's grand strategy for the 21st century. It uses infrastructure and finance to secure economic growth, energy routes and geopolitical influence. Its success is real but uneven, and it has raised concerns over debt, transparency and strategic intent.

II. The venture

• The land Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road.
• Six land corridors, including CPEC.
• Ports, railways, roads, pipelines and digital networks (the "Digital Silk Road").

III. Strategic vision

• 1. Economic: use surplus industrial capacity; open new markets; internationalise the renminbi; invest foreign reserves.
• 2. Geopolitical: "march west" into Eurasia, away from US-dominated Pacific waters; build a China-centred network.
• 3. Energy and maritime security: reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca through Gwadar, Myanmar pipelines and Central Asian gas; secure sea lanes with ports.
• 4. Domestic stability: develop Xinjiang and Tibet.
• 5. Soft power and governance: the AIIB and Silk Road Fund; presenting China as a development partner for the Global South.

IV. Critical examination

• Achievements: real infrastructure in many countries; China's trade links expanded.
• Concerns:
  • Debt: Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Zambia and Laos.
  • Transparency and corruption risks.
  • Environmental damage and local opposition.
  • Dual-use ports raising military suspicions ("string of pearls").
  • Western counter-initiatives: the PGII, EU Global Gateway, IMEC.
• Adjustments: less lending after 2017; "green" and "small and beautiful" projects.

V. Implications for Pakistan

• CPEC brings energy and infrastructure, and makes Pakistan central to China's westward strategy.
• But it also brings debt, security risks and great-power suspicion.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• The 10th anniversary forum (2023); Italy's exit (2023).
• China continues BRI with a lower-risk, higher-quality approach.
• CPEC 2.0 depends on security after the 2024 attacks.

VI. Conclusion

• OBOR is far more than a trade project. It is China's strategy to reshape the economic geography of Eurasia.
• Whether it becomes a shared prosperity network or a sphere of influence depends on how China handles debt, transparency and partners' concerns.

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Q8. Two compulsory parts (10 + 10 marks)

(a) INS Arihant, K-4 and South Asia's strategic stability (10 marks)

Outline

• I. What INS Arihant and the K-4 are
• II. Effects on strategic stability
• III. Pakistan's response
• IV. Conclusion

Answer

• What it is:
  • INS Arihant is India's first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), commissioned in 2016.
  • It carries K-15 (about 750 km) and was designed for the longer-range K-4 (about 3,500 km) missile.
  • It gives India the sea leg of its "nuclear triad" (land, air, sea).
• Effects on strategic stability
  • Second-strike assurance: India argues an SSBN strengthens deterrence stability by guaranteeing retaliation.
  • But it also creates new instability:
    • It may encourage India toward riskier conventional strategies (Cold Start), believing its deterrent is secure.
    • Command and control at sea is harder; the risk of accidents or unauthorised use rises.
    • Nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean: an arms race at sea, a shift from land-based deterrence.
    • Pakistan's insecurity grows, pushing it to match.
• Pakistan's response
  • Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (tested 2017, 2018) for a sea-based second strike.
  • Naval modernisation (Chinese Hangor-class submarines).
  • Calls for maritime confidence-building measures.
• Update: India has added INS Arighaat (2024) and continues building larger SSBNs, with the longer-range K-5 in development.
• Conclusion: Arihant completed India's triad but added a maritime dimension to the South Asian arms race. Stability now needs nuclear risk-reduction measures at sea as well as on land.

(b) LEMOA: comment (10 marks)

Outline

• I. What LEMOA is
• II. Significance for the US and India
• III. Implications for China and Pakistan
• IV. Assessment

Answer

• What it is:
  • The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, signed 29 August 2016.
  • It allows US and Indian militaries to use each other's bases for refuelling, repairs and supplies on a reimbursable basis.
  • It is the first of three "foundational agreements" (followed by COMCASA in 2018 and BECA in 2020).
• Significance:
  • For the US: extended reach in the Indian Ocean, a partner against China.
  • For India: access to US facilities (Djibouti, Diego Garcia) and closer defence ties, without a formal alliance; India insists it allows no permanent US bases.
• Implications:
  • China: sees it as part of containment, strengthening China's motivation for Gwadar and Djibouti.
  • Pakistan: sees deeper US–India military integration as a threat to the regional balance.
  • India's strategic autonomy: critics in India warned of being drawn into US conflicts.
• Assessment: LEMOA was a practical step that turned the US–India relationship into real military cooperation. It signalled India's shift toward the US, while stopping short of an alliance.
• Update: US–India defence ties deepened (a 10-year framework, 2025), even amid trade tensions. LEMOA now operates alongside growing Quad naval cooperation.
• Conclusion: LEMOA is a quiet but important building block of the Indo-Pacific balance against China, and another reason Pakistan sees the regional balance tilting.