CSS 2024 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Creation of more provinces in Pakistan: beneficial or harmful?
2. Q3 — Pakistan's role in ECO, regional integration and future prospects
3. Q4 — US–Pakistan relations under Biden vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific strategy
4. Q5 — Balancing Saudi Arabia and Iran after China's mediation
5. Q6 — Palestine escalation since October 2023 and the big powers' reaction
6. Q7 — Ukraine war and Russia–Europe energy relations
7. Q8 — Short notes: regional integration in South Asia · UN non-proliferation efforts · climate change and big powers

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump straight to its answer. Every answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and includes developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each. Each answer below is sized to its marks. Full questions run about 1,800–2,200 words in the exam. Each short note (10 marks) is about half that.

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Q2. Creation of new provinces

The creation of more provinces is a persistent demand from some circles in Pakistan. How do you see the creation of more provinces in Pakistan; as beneficial or harmful for the people? Explain your views with solid justification.

What the examiner wants

• Your view: beneficial or harmful, stated clearly in the intro
• Solid justification: arguments, evidence, comparative examples
• Fair treatment of the opposite side
• Marks focus: a clear verdict plus balanced justification. Don't just list pros and cons.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Four provinces for 241 million people
  • B. Thesis: new provinces would be beneficial if made on administrative grounds, by consensus and with resources; ethnic or hurried division would be harmful
• II. Background
  1. Existing demands: South Punjab, Bahawalpur, Hazara, Karachi/urban Sindh
  2. Constitutional procedure: Article 239(4)
  3. Party pledges and 2012–13 assembly resolutions
• III. Why new provinces would be beneficial
  1. Administrative efficiency
  2. Balance in the federation
  3. Fairer development
  4. Better representation
  5. International examples
• IV. Why they could be harmful
  1. Ethnic polarisation
  2. Cost and capacity
  3. Resource disputes
  4. Political manipulation
  5. Constitutional hurdles
• V. My verdict and conditions
• VI. Alternatives and complements: local government
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan has just four provinces for over 241 million people. Punjab alone has about 128 million, more than most countries in the world.
• India started with fewer units and now has 28 states. Nigeria went from 3 regions to 36 states. Iran has 31 provinces and Turkey 81.
• My view: creating new provinces would be beneficial for ordinary people, but only if they are drawn on administrative and economic grounds, created by consensus under the Constitution, and given real money and institutions. A rushed or ethnically driven division would be harmful.

II. Background

• Main demands
  • South Punjab (Saraiki-majority districts) and the restoration of Bahawalpur (a province from 1952 to 1955).
  • Hazara province in KP; the KP Assembly passed a resolution in 2014.
  • Calls for a separate administrative unit for Karachi / urban Sindh, strongly opposed in Sindh.
• Constitutional route: under Article 239(4), a province's boundaries can't be changed without approval by two-thirds of that provincial assembly, plus a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament.
• Political record: the Punjab Assembly passed resolutions for South Punjab and Bahawalpur in 2012. A Senate bill in 2013 lapsed. The PTI government set up a South Punjab Secretariat (2020) instead of a province. Almost every major party has promised new provinces, but none has delivered.

III. Why new provinces would be beneficial

• 1. Governance closer to people
  • A resident of Rajanpur has to travel hundreds of kilometres to Lahore for many official matters.
  • Smaller provinces mean shorter chains of command and quicker decisions.
• 2. A more balanced federation
  • Punjab holds more than half the National Assembly seats, which creates a sense of "Punjab domination" among smaller provinces.
  • Dividing Punjab would ease that imbalance.
• 3. Fairer development
  • Southern Punjab lags behind the north on poverty, literacy and health indicators (UNDP and the Multidimensional Poverty Index).
  • A provincial government in the south would plan for local needs.
• 4. Representation and identity
  • Recognising Saraiki and Hazara identities inside the federal system can reduce alienation.
• 5. Comparative evidence
  • India's States Reorganisation (1956) and later states such as Telangana (2014) and Uttarakhand (2000) brought administration closer to people, though with mixed results.
• Scholarly support: Dr Ishrat Husain (Governing the Ungovernable, 2018) argues that oversized provinces and over-centralisation weaken service delivery.

IV. Why new provinces could be harmful

• 1. Ethnic polarisation
  • If units are drawn on language lines, they can deepen ethnic politics. A Karachi province demand could trigger violence in Sindh.
  • Bangladesh in 1971 shows how identity politics can spiral.
• 2. Cost and capacity
  • New governors, chief ministers, assemblies, secretariats and high courts mean big new costs for a state already short of money.
  • New units may lack trained staff.
• 3. Resource disputes
  • Splitting assets and debts, water shares under the 1991 Accord, NFC shares and revenue from canals and barrages would be contentious.
• 4. Political manipulation
  • Parties use the slogan for votes and rarely act. Hurried division for political gain would create weak, dependent units.
• 5. Constitutional hurdles
  • Getting two-thirds of the Punjab or Sindh assembly to agree is very hard, which makes deadlock likely.
• 6. Nigeria's warning: proliferating states led to a struggle over federal oil revenue, and many states can't pay salaries.

V. My verdict and conditions

• On balance, new provinces would benefit the people, mainly in south Punjab and Hazara, provided that:
  1. They follow administrative and economic criteria (population, area, viability), not purely ethnic ones.
  2. A national commission (like India's States Reorganisation Commission) studies them and recommends.
  3. They have cross-party consensus and follow the Article 239 process.
  4. Assets, debt, water and NFC shares are agreed in advance.
  5. They are phased in, starting with the strongest case (South Punjab).

VI. A necessary complement: local government

• Even with new provinces, real service delivery happens locally. Empowered, elected local governments (Article 140-A) can give many of the same benefits at lower cost. Provinces and local bodies should go together, not one instead of the other.

VII. Conclusion

• Pakistan's giant provinces are a legacy of history, not good design.
• More provinces, created carefully and fairly, would bring government closer to people and balance the federation.
• Created carelessly, they would add cost and conflict. The question isn't whether to reorganise, but how.

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Q3. Pakistan and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)

Discuss the Pakistan's historic role in Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and under the framework of regional integration; what are the future prospects of ECO for Pakistan?

What the examiner wants

• Pakistan's historic role in ECO
• ECO's record on regional integration
• Future prospects for Pakistan
• Marks focus: three roughly equal parts, with more weight on the role and the prospects.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. ECO's origins and membership
  • B. Thesis: Pakistan has been a founder and key driver, but ECO hasn't delivered real integration; its future depends on connectivity, Afghan stability and linking with CPEC
• II. Origins
  1. RCD (1964)
  2. ECO (1985)
  3. Expansion in 1992 to 10 members
• III. Pakistan's historic role
  1. Founding member and repeated summit host
  2. Champion of connectivity
  3. Institutional contributions
  4. Gateway to Central Asia
• IV. ECO and regional integration: record
  • A. Achievements
  • B. Shortcomings
• V. Obstacles
• VI. Future prospects for Pakistan
• VII. Recommendations
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) links ten Muslim-majority countries across West, Central and South Asia: around 500 million people over a vast, resource-rich area.
• Pakistan helped found it and has always seen it as a bridge to Central Asia.
• Thesis: Pakistan's role has been central and consistent. But ECO has underperformed because of weak institutions, sanctions on Iran, instability in Afghanistan and poor connectivity. Its future for Pakistan depends on turning plans into railways, roads and trade deals, especially by linking ECO with CPEC.

II. Origins

• 1964: Pakistan, Iran and Turkey created Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), a CENTO-era economic partnership.
• 1985: RCD was revived as the ECO, with its headquarters in Tehran.
• 1992: after the Soviet collapse, ECO added Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, making ten members.

III. Pakistan's historic role

• 1. Founder and host
  • A founding member of both RCD and ECO.
  • Hosted ECO summits (e.g., Islamabad 1995 and 2017) and pushed long-term plans such as ECO Vision 2025, adopted at the 2017 Islamabad summit.
• 2. Champion of connectivity
  • Promoted the Istanbul–Tehran–Islamabad (ITI) railway (trial 2009, relaunched as a freight service in 2021/22).
  • Backed the Transit Transport Framework Agreement (1998) and road corridors to Central Asia.
• 3. Institutions
  • Hosts the ECO Science Foundation in Islamabad, and ECO bodies on education and culture.
  • Signed the ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA), signed 2003 and in force since 2008.
• 4. Gateway role
  • Pakistan offers landlocked Central Asian states the shortest route to the sea through Gwadar and Karachi.

IV. ECO and regional integration: the record

• A. Achievements
  • Institutional framework and regular summits; the latest was in Khankendi, Azerbaijan (July 2025).
  • The ECO Trade and Development Bank (Istanbul) and some cooperation on energy and transport.
  • Demonstration rail services (ITI) and transit agreements.
• B. Shortcomings
  • Intra-ECO trade remains low, under 10% of members' total trade.
  • ECOTA is barely implemented; most members haven't cut tariffs as promised.
  • Most projects remain on paper.

V. Obstacles

• US sanctions on Iran block banking and energy deals; the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline is the clearest example.
• Instability in Afghanistan, the region's transit heart.
• Similar economies: many members export the same goods (energy, cotton), so there's less to trade.
• Rival frameworks: members also belong to the SCO, the EAEU, the Organization of Turkic States and BRI.
• Weak secretariat and funding.
• Political rivalries (Iran–Azerbaijan, Afghanistan–Pakistan).

VI. Future prospects for Pakistan

• 1. Connectivity hub: linking ECO routes with CPEC and Gwadar can make Pakistan the trade corridor between Central Asia, China and the Arabian Sea.
• 2. The Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway: a framework agreement was signed in July 2025 in Kabul. If built, it would cut freight time to Central Asia dramatically.
• 3. Energy: access to Central Asian gas and hydropower (TAPI, CASA-1000) to ease Pakistan's energy shortage.
• 4. Trade diversification: new markets for Pakistani textiles, pharmaceuticals, rice and services.
• 5. Diplomatic weight: ECO strengthens Pakistan's ties with Türkiye, Iran, Azerbaijan and Central Asia, supporting a balanced foreign policy.
• 6. Risks: dependence on Afghan stability, Iran sanctions, and competition from India's routes (Chabahar, the INSTC).

VII. Recommendations

1. Revive and fully implement ECOTA, starting with a short list of tariff cuts.
2. Prioritise three flagship projects: the ITI railway, the UAP railway and TAPI.
3. Allow trade in local currencies and barter to work around sanctions.
4. Harmonise customs and visas; create an ECO single-window system.
5. Fund the ECO bank and secretariat properly.
6. Engage Kabul on transit security.

VIII. Conclusion

• Pakistan has been one of ECO's most committed members, from RCD in 1964 to Vision 2025.
• But ECO has been an organisation of declarations more than delivery.
• Its future for Pakistan is promising only if railways, pipelines and trade rules are actually built. Linked with CPEC and backed by a stable Afghanistan, ECO could finally make Pakistan the crossroads of Asia.

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Q4. US–Pakistan relations under Biden and the Indo-Pacific strategy

Critically evaluate the US-Pakistan relations under the Joe Biden Administration vis-à-vis the US' Indo-Pacific strategy.

What the examiner wants

• Critically evaluate relations under Biden (2021–25)
• Link them to the Indo-Pacific strategy: how the China focus shaped US views of Pakistan
• Marks focus: both halves equally. Add the Trump 2.0 update to show the trend continued or changed.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. A transactional relationship
  • B. Thesis: under Biden, Pakistan was downgraded to a narrow, issue-based partner, because the Indo-Pacific strategy made India the priority and China the rival
• II. Context: decades of ups and downs
• III. US–Pakistan relations under Biden
  1. A cold start
  2. Afghanistan withdrawal
  3. Political turbulence (2022)
  4. Areas of cooperation
  5. Irritants
• IV. The Indo-Pacific strategy and Pakistan
  1. What the strategy is
  2. India's central role
  3. Pakistan's China link
  4. Pakistan's absence from the framework
• V. Critical evaluation
• VI. Update: Trump's second term
• VII. Way forward
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• US–Pakistan relations have swung between alliance (SEATO, CENTO, the Afghan jihad, the post-9/11 war) and estrangement (the 1965 and 1971 arms embargoes, the Pressler sanctions of 1990).
• Under President Biden (2021–25) the relationship was neither hostile nor warm. It was narrow and transactional.
• Thesis: the Indo-Pacific strategy put China containment and India partnership at the centre of US policy. Pakistan, as China's closest partner and outside that framework, was treated as a secondary, issue-specific partner, focused on counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, climate and economic stability.

II. Context

• Pakistan was a frontline ally in two Afghan wars, but trust broke down over allegations of "double games", the Abbottabad raid (2011) and the Salala attack (2011).
• Trump's first term began harshly (the January 2018 tweet and suspension of security aid) and later warmed when Pakistan helped bring about the Doha deal (2020).

III. Relations under Biden

• 1. A cold start: Biden didn't call Prime Minister Imran Khan, which was widely read as a snub.
• 2. The Afghan withdrawal (August 2021): Pakistan helped with evacuations, but the US blamed the Taliban's victory partly on Pakistan. Imran Khan's "absolutely not" on US bases deepened distance.
• 3. Political turbulence: Imran Khan accused the US of a "cipher" conspiracy behind his removal (April 2022), which the US denied. This poisoned public opinion.
• 4. Areas of cooperation
  • 2022 floods: US relief and support at the climate conference in Geneva (January 2023).
  • A $450 million F-16 sustainment package (September 2022), which annoyed India.
  • Support for IMF programmes (2023 Stand-By Arrangement, 2024 Extended Fund Facility).
  • The Green Alliance framework (climate, agriculture, energy); counter-terrorism dialogue; health and education.
  • 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties (2022).
• 5. Irritants
  • Biden's October 2022 remark calling Pakistan possibly "one of the most dangerous nations" over its nuclear weapons.
  • US sanctions on Chinese and Pakistani firms linked to Pakistan's missile programme (2023–24), and the December 2024 sanctions on NDC, the state body that develops missiles.
  • US criticism of the February 2024 election process.

IV. The Indo-Pacific strategy and Pakistan

• 1. What it is: the Indo-Pacific Strategy (February 2022) aims to keep the region "free and open" and to counter China's rise through alliances (Japan, Australia, South Korea), the Quad, AUKUS and economic frameworks (IPEF).
• 2. India's central role: the strategy calls India a "like-minded partner" and regional leader. The US deepened defence and technology ties (iCET 2023, GE jet-engine co-production, major defence deals).
• 3. Pakistan's China link: CPEC and China's position as Pakistan's main arms supplier make Pakistan part of China's strategic sphere in US eyes.
• 4. Pakistan's absence: Pakistan isn't part of any Indo-Pacific framework, and the strategy barely mentions it. South Asia policy was effectively run through India.
• The "de-hyphenation" result: the US treats India as a global partner and Pakistan as a regional security issue, removing the old India–Pakistan balance.

V. Critical evaluation

• Positives
  • The relationship didn't collapse.
  • Economic and IMF support helped Pakistan avoid default.
  • Climate and flood cooperation; counter-terrorism channels stayed open.
• Negatives
  • Low priority and low trust; no strategic vision.
  • An arms and technology tilt toward India increased Pakistan's security concerns.
  • US pressure over China ties left Pakistan feeling squeezed between two partners.
  • Public anti-Americanism rose after the cipher controversy.
• Pakistan's own role: political instability and economic weakness reduced its leverage. Its refusal to pick sides ("no camp politics") was sensible but limited what Washington offered.
• Verdict: under Biden, relations were stable but shallow. The Indo-Pacific lens defined Pakistan by its China connection rather than its own value.

VI. Update: Trump's second term (2025–)

• A surprising thaw:
  • Trump praised Pakistan's arrest of an ISIS-K suspect linked to the Kabul airport bombing (March 2025).
  • He claimed credit for the May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire, which upset India.
  • Field Marshal Asim Munir had an unprecedented White House lunch (June 2025).
  • A trade deal (July 2025) set a lower tariff for Pakistan than for India, with cooperation on oil and critical minerals.
• At the same time, US–India ties hit friction over tariffs on Russian oil purchases.
• Lesson: US policy toward Pakistan follows US interests of the moment, not fixed strategy. That creates openings but no guarantees.

VII. Way forward

1. Build an economic relationship (trade, IT, minerals, energy) rather than just a security one.
2. Keep balancing the US and China openly; avoid zero-sum choices.
3. Use the Pakistani diaspora in the US and congressional links.
4. Be a partner on regional stability: Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and crisis management with India.
5. Political and economic stability at home, which is the basis of leverage.

VIII. Conclusion

• The Biden years showed that in a China-focused Indo-Pacific, Pakistan was a side issue for Washington.
• The 2025 thaw proves the relationship can revive, but only when Pakistan offers something the US needs.
• Pakistan's goal should be a broad, economy-led partnership that doesn't depend on who sits in the White House or how the US sees China.

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Q5. Balancing Saudi Arabia and Iran after China's mediation

Saudi Arabia and Iran both have significant place in Pakistan's foreign policy. How Pakistan can maintain friendly relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially after the mediation of China between the two countries?

What the examiner wants

• Why both countries matter to Pakistan
• How Pakistan can stay friendly with both, which is the main part
• The specific effect of China's 2023 mediation
• Marks focus: the "how" (strategy) should carry the most weight.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Pakistan's oldest balancing act
  • B. Thesis: China's mediation lowered pressure to choose sides; Pakistan can keep both friendships through strict neutrality, economic links and an active bridge-building role
• II. Why Saudi Arabia matters
• III. Why Iran matters
• IV. The history of the balancing act
• V. China's mediation (March 2023) and its effect
• VI. Remaining challenges
• VII. How Pakistan can maintain friendly relations with both
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Saudi Arabia is Pakistan's biggest financial backer and home to its holiest sites. Iran is its western neighbour, with a 900 km border and deep cultural ties.
• Their rivalry has long put Pakistan in an awkward spot, especially with a large Shia minority at home.
• Thesis: the Beijing-brokered Saudi–Iran deal (10 March 2023) reduced the pressure to choose. Pakistan can keep both relationships healthy through strict non-alignment in their disputes, separate economic tracks with each, and a role as a bridge alongside China.

II. Why Saudi Arabia matters

• Economy: over 2 million Pakistanis work there and send billions in remittances (the largest single source). Deferred oil payments, deposits with the State Bank and rollovers.
• Investment: SIFC-led plans; Saudi interest in mining (Reko Diq) and refining.
• Defence: a long history of training and security cooperation. In September 2025 the two countries signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement: aggression against one is treated as aggression against both.
• Religion and diplomacy: the Holy Places; Saudi support at the OIC on Kashmir.

III. Why Iran matters

• Neighbour: a 900 km border, where Balochistan's security depends on cooperation.
• Energy: the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline (Iran built its section; Pakistan's is stalled by US sanctions); electricity imports to Makran.
• Trade: border markets, barter trade (allowed from 2023).
• Society: cultural and religious links, including pilgrims.
• Afghanistan: both have a shared interest in Afghan stability.

IV. The history of the balancing act

• Close to both in the 1950s–60s (CENTO, RCD).
• After 1979: the Iranian revolution and the Iran–Iraq war led to sectarian proxy funding inside Pakistan in the 1980s–90s.
• Yemen (2015): Parliament voted to stay neutral and not send troops, which irritated Riyadh but protected Pakistan.
• Islamic Military Alliance (2017): General Raheel Sharif led it, which worried Tehran.
• Mediation offers (2019–20) under Imran Khan.
• January 2024: Iran struck targets in Panjgur, and Pakistan struck back (Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar). Both sides de-escalated within days. President Raisi visited in April 2024.

V. China's mediation and its effect

• 10 March 2023: Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed in Beijing to restore relations; embassies reopened.
• Effects for Pakistan:
  • Less risk of being forced into a Saudi or Iranian camp.
  • Lower sectarian temperature regionally.
  • China, Pakistan's closest partner, now has stakes in both, so a Pakistan–China–Iran–Saudi economic link through CPEC becomes imaginable.
  • It confirms Pakistan's long preference for dialogue over blocs.

VI. Remaining challenges

• US sanctions on Iran (and UN snapback in September 2025) block energy and banking deals.
• The Israel–Iran war (June 2025): Pakistan condemned the strikes on Iran, while Saudi Arabia stayed cautious. Regional crises keep testing neutrality.
• The 2025 Saudi defence pact: Tehran may see it as Pakistan tilting toward Riyadh.
• Border insecurity: Jaish al-Adl and BLA activity on both sides of the Iranian border.
• Economic imbalance: Pakistan depends heavily on Saudi money, which limits room for manoeuvre.

VII. How Pakistan can stay friendly with both

• 1. Strict neutrality in their disputes
  • Follow the Yemen precedent: no troops or bases against either.
  • Make clear that the Saudi defence pact is defensive and not aimed at Iran.
• 2. Separate economic tracks
  • With Saudi Arabia: investment through SIFC, mining, refining and skilled labour exports.
  • With Iran: border trade, barter, electricity imports and a sanctions-compliant approach to the pipeline. Seek US waivers or explore a smaller pipeline.
• 3. Security cooperation with Iran
  • Joint border mechanisms, intelligence sharing and border markets (the 2024 agreements).
• 4. Bridge-building role
  • Work with China, Iraq and Oman as facilitators; host trilateral or quadrilateral dialogues.
  • Use the OIC to promote Muslim unity on Gaza.
• 5. Domestic sectarian harmony
  • Ban foreign funding of sectarian groups; implement NAP and the Paigham-e-Pakistan narrative, so rivalry can't be fought on Pakistani soil.
• 6. Regional connectivity
  • Link both into CPEC and ECO, so they see Pakistan as a shared asset.

VIII. Conclusion

• Pakistan can't afford to lose either Saudi Arabia or Iran.
• China's mediation opened a window in which balance is easier. Pakistan should use it through neutrality, economics and diplomacy, not by picking a side.
• A Pakistan trusted by both is more valuable to each than a Pakistan aligned with one.

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Q6. Palestine since October 2023 and the big powers' reaction

Palestine conflict is a long-standing one on the United Nations table. Discuss its recent escalation since October 2023 and critically assess the big powers' reaction to it.

What the examiner wants

• Brief background (UN history)
• The escalation since October 2023
• A critical assessment of each big power's reaction (US, China, Russia, EU/UK). This is the larger half.

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. On the UN agenda since 1947
  • B. Thesis: the big powers' response was shaped by interest, not law; US support enabled the war, while China and Russia used it diplomatically but did little on the ground
• II. Background on the UN table
• III. The escalation since October 2023
  1. The 7 October attack
  2. The Gaza war and humanitarian catastrophe
  3. Regional spillover
  4. Legal action (ICJ, ICC)
  5. Ceasefires (2025)
• IV. Big powers' reaction
  • A. United States
  • B. China
  • C. Russia
  • D. EU and UK
• V. Critical assessment
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The Palestine question has been on the UN agenda since Resolution 181 (1947). Resolutions 194 (refugees), 242 and 338 (land for peace) and 2334 (settlements) remain largely unimplemented.
• The war that began in October 2023 became the deadliest in the conflict's history.
• Thesis: the big powers reacted according to strategic interest rather than international law. The US gave Israel decisive military and diplomatic cover; China and Russia gained diplomatically but offered little practical help; Europe was divided and late. This exposed the UN Security Council's paralysis.

II. Background

• 1948: the creation of Israel and the displacement of Palestinians (the Nakba).
• 1967: occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.
• 1993 Oslo Accords: the Palestinian Authority was created, but final-status issues were left unsolved.
• 2007: Hamas took control of Gaza; the Israeli blockade followed.

III. The escalation since October 2023

• 7 October 2023: Hamas attacked southern Israel, killing about 1,200 people and taking around 250 hostages.
• The Gaza war:
  • Israel's air and ground campaign killed tens of thousands, well over 65,000 by Gaza health ministry figures by late 2025, most of them women and children according to UN data.
  • Nearly all 2.1 million Gazans were displaced; hospitals, schools and homes were largely destroyed.
  • Famine conditions were confirmed by the IPC in Gaza City (August 2025).
• Regional spillover:
  • Hezbollah–Israel war (2024), and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah killed.
  • Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.
  • Direct Iran–Israel exchanges (April and October 2024) and the June 2025 war.
  • Assad's fall in Syria (December 2024).
• Legal action:
  • ICJ: provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel (January 2024); an advisory opinion (July 2024) found the occupation unlawful.
  • ICC: arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant (November 2024).
• Ceasefires:
  • A short truce in November 2023 and a ceasefire in January 2025 that collapsed in March 2025.
  • The October 2025 ceasefire under Trump's 20-point plan, endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2803 (November 2025).

IV. Big powers' reaction

• A. United States
  • Full backing for Israel: billions in military aid, munitions and deployment of carrier groups.
  • Vetoes: the US vetoed several UNSC ceasefire resolutions (October 2023, December 2023, February 2024, November 2024 and more in 2025).
  • Some pressure: Biden abstained on Resolution 2728 (March 2024), proposed Resolution 2735 (June 2024) and briefly paused one bomb shipment.
  • Under Trump: first the "Gaza Riviera" idea (February 2025), then the 20-point plan and ceasefire (October 2025).
  • Assessment: the US was the only power with real leverage over Israel, but used it late. Its vetoes damaged US credibility on human rights and international law.
• B. China
  • Called for an immediate ceasefire and a two-state solution; voted for ceasefire resolutions.
  • Brokered the Beijing Declaration (July 2024) between Hamas, Fatah and other factions.
  • Assessment: gained goodwill in the Global South at little cost, but used no economic leverage and had little practical effect.
• C. Russia
  • Called for a ceasefire, hosted Hamas and other delegations, and criticised the US.
  • Assessment: used Gaza to highlight Western "double standards" over Ukraine, with limited real involvement. Its own war in Ukraine undercut its moral position.
• D. European Union and United Kingdom
  • First phase: strong support for Israel's right to self-defence.
  • Later: divided. Spain, Ireland and Norway recognised Palestine (May 2024); the UK, France, Canada, Australia and others recognised it in September 2025. The EU reviewed its trade agreement with Israel. Germany restricted some arms exports (August 2025).
  • Assessment: too slow and too divided to influence events, though its shift on recognition was significant.

V. Critical assessment

• The UNSC was paralysed: vetoes stopped action for over a year, while thousands died.
• Selective international law: the West sanctioned Russia over Ukraine but shielded Israel. The Global South noted the contrast.
• Humanitarian failure: aid was blocked, and UNRWA was restricted by Israeli law (2024).
• Some positives:
  • The legal track (ICJ, ICC) advanced.
  • A wave of recognitions of Palestine.
  • The eventual 2025 ceasefire framework.
• The Muslim world's weakness: OIC and Arab League summits issued statements but took little concrete action, and normalisation politics continued.
• Verdict: the reaction showed a world order in which power counts more than principle. Without equal application of the law, the conflict will keep returning.

VI. Conclusion

• The escalation since October 2023 brought the Palestine issue back to the centre of world politics at a terrible human cost.
• The big powers each acted for their own interests, and the UN's most important body was blocked.
• A lasting peace needs the same rules for everyone and a real, time-bound path to a Palestinian state.

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Q7. The Ukraine war and Russia–Europe energy relations

Evaluate the implications of Ukraine War for the Russia-Europe energy relations.

What the examiner wants

• Evaluate implications for both sides: Europe and Russia
• Pre-war dependence as background
• Long-term changes and the future

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. An energy marriage of convenience
  • B. Thesis: the war broke Europe's energy dependence on Russia, a permanent strategic divorce, costly for both but costlier for Russia in the long run
• II. Pre-war interdependence
• III. How the war changed things
  1. Sanctions and embargoes
  2. Russian supply cuts and Nord Stream sabotage
  3. End of Ukraine transit
• IV. Implications for Europe
  • A. Costs
  • B. Adjustments and gains
• V. Implications for Russia
• VI. Wider and global implications (including Pakistan)
• VII. Future outlook
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• For fifty years, Russian gas warmed European homes and powered German industry. Europe believed trade would tame Russia ("Wandel durch Handel", change through trade).
• Russia's invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022) ended that idea.
• Thesis: the war caused a structural break in Russia–Europe energy relations. Europe paid a high short-term price but diversified successfully. Russia lost its most profitable market and leverage, and became dependent on Asian buyers on worse terms.

II. Pre-war interdependence

• In 2021 Russia supplied around 40% of the EU's imported gas (about 150 billion cubic metres by pipeline), about a quarter of its oil and nearly half its coal imports.
• Pipelines: Nord Stream 1, Yamal, TurkStream and the Ukrainian transit route. Nord Stream 2 was completed but never certified.
• Germany was the most dependent; Hungary, Slovakia and Austria were close behind.
• For Russia: energy exports provided a large share of federal revenue.

III. How the war changed things

• Sanctions and embargoes:
  • EU ban on Russian coal (August 2022), crude oil by sea (December 2022) and oil products (February 2023).
  • G7 price cap of $60 a barrel, later lowered.
  • Repeated sanctions packages targeting Russia's "shadow fleet" of tankers.
• Russia's countermoves: gas cuts and rouble-payment demands. Nord Stream 1 flows were cut, then the Nord Stream pipelines were sabotaged (September 2022).
• Ukraine transit ended (1 January 2025) when Kyiv refused to renew the contract.
• REPowerEU (May 2022) and a 2025 EU plan to phase out remaining Russian gas imports by 2027.

IV. Implications for Europe

• A. Costs
  • Energy price shock in 2022: gas prices hit record highs, inflation surged and governments spent hundreds of billions on household support.
  • Industrial damage: energy-intensive industry, especially German chemicals, cut output. Germany's economy shrank in 2023 and stagnated in 2024.
  • Political strain: cost-of-living protests and populist gains.
• B. Adjustments and gains
  • Diversification: LNG from the US (now the EU's largest LNG supplier), Qatar and Norway (now the largest pipeline supplier). New LNG terminals built quickly, such as Germany's Wilhelmshaven.
  • Demand reduction: gas use fell sharply through efficiency and savings targets.
  • Faster green transition: record solar and wind growth.
  • Result: Russia's share of EU gas imports fell to around a fifth by 2024, mostly LNG and TurkStream.
  • Strategic gain: an end to Russian energy blackmail and greater unity on energy security.
• Unfinished business: Hungary and Slovakia still import Russian oil and gas, causing EU friction; Russian LNG still entered Europe until the phase-out.

V. Implications for Russia

• Loss of the European market: pipeline gas exports to Europe collapsed. Gazprom recorded heavy losses (2023).
• Pivot to Asia: oil was rerouted to China, India and Türkiye at discounted prices. India became a top buyer of Russian crude, a link the US later tried to break through tariffs (2025).
• Limited gas alternatives: Power of Siberia 1 to China; Power of Siberia 2 is still being negotiated (a memorandum in September 2025), and pipelines take years.
• Lost leverage: energy no longer gives Russia power over European politics.
• Revenue squeeze: price caps, discounts and shadow-fleet costs reduce income, although high volumes kept the war economy going.
• Greater dependence on China as a buyer, which gives Beijing the upper hand.

VI. Wider and global implications

• Global LNG competition: Europe outbid poorer buyers. Pakistan couldn't afford LNG cargoes in 2022, suppliers defaulted on contracts, and blackouts followed.
• Energy markets have regionalised into Western and Eurasian blocs.
• The US became an energy superpower exporter.
• Energy security moved to the top of every country's agenda.

VII. Future outlook

• A return to pre-war dependence is very unlikely, even after a peace deal. Europe has made diversification law.
• Russia's energy future lies in Asia, on less favourable terms.
• A Ukraine settlement might ease sanctions slightly, but trust is broken.

VIII. Conclusion

• The Ukraine war ended a fifty-year energy partnership.
• Europe paid heavily in 2022–23 but emerged more diversified and less vulnerable to blackmail.
• Russia lost its best customer and its main geopolitical lever, and now relies more on China. In energy, the war's biggest loser may be Russia itself.

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Q8. Short notes (any two of three — all three solved)

(a) Prospects of regional integration in South Asia

• Introduction: South Asia has about a quarter of the world's population but is among the least integrated regions. Intra-regional trade is only around 5% of total trade, against about 25% in ASEAN.
• Frameworks
  • SAARC (1985): eight members; SAFTA in force since 2006.
  • BIMSTEC: India's preferred alternative, which excludes Pakistan.
  • Sub-regional: the BBIN motor vehicle agreement.
• Obstacles
  • India–Pakistan hostility: no SAARC summit since Kathmandu in 2014; the 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled.
  • Non-tariff barriers, sensitive lists and poor connectivity.
  • Political mistrust of India's size among smaller states.
  • The 2025 India–Pakistan conflict and the Indus Waters Treaty abeyance hardened divisions further.
• Positives and potential
  • The World Bank estimates intra-regional trade could be several times higher.
  • Energy trade (Nepal and Bhutan hydropower to India and Bangladesh); CASA-1000; Pakistan's connectivity to Central Asia and China.
• Prospects: low in the near term at the regional level. More likely: sub-regional and bilateral deals, while Pakistan looks west (ECO, CPEC, SCO).
• Way forward:
  • Separate trade from politics.
  • Revive SAARC at ministerial level.
  • Start with climate, health and disaster cooperation, where shared threats can build trust.
• Conclusion: geography makes South Asia a natural economic region; politics keeps it divided. Integration will come only when India and Pakistan stop treating it as zero-sum.

(b) UN efforts for nuclear non-proliferation

• Introduction: the UN has worked to limit nuclear weapons since its very first General Assembly resolution (1946).
• Main efforts
  • The NPT (1968): negotiated under UN auspices; reviewed every five years (the latest Review Conference was in 2026).
  • The IAEA (1957): the UN-linked nuclear watchdog that verifies peaceful use through safeguards.
  • CTBT (1996): adopted by the General Assembly; its monitoring system (CTBTO) works even though the treaty isn't in force.
  • UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004): obliges all states to stop non-state actors getting weapons of mass destruction.
  • UNSC sanctions on North Korea (since 2006) and Iran (2006–2015, then reimposed via snapback in September 2025); Resolution 2231 endorsed the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA).
  • TPNW (2017, in force 2021): a total ban backed by the General Assembly majority.
  • Nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva).
• Limitations
  • The P5 veto shields allies.
  • The Conference on Disarmament has been stuck for decades.
  • Non-NPT states (India, Pakistan, Israel) and North Korea remain outside.
  • Nuclear states aren't disarming.
• Pakistan's position: supports non-discriminatory, criteria-based rules and complies with Resolution 1540 through the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV).
• Conclusion: the UN has built the legal backbone of non-proliferation and kept the norm alive. But great-power politics limit its reach, and disarmament remains a promise unkept.

(c) Climate change and the big powers' role

• Introduction: climate change is a global problem, but a handful of big powers account for most emissions, so their choices decide the outcome.
• Main actors
  • China: the largest emitter (about 30% of global CO₂), but also the world leader in solar, wind, batteries and EVs. Aims to peak before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Its 2035 NDC set its first absolute emissions-cut target.
  • United States: the largest historical emitter. Rejoined Paris under Biden, with the large Inflation Reduction Act (2022), then withdrew again (January 2025) under Trump and rolled back climate rules.
  • European Union: the most ambitious major actor: the Green Deal, net zero by 2050, a 2040 target, and the carbon border tax (CBAM).
  • India: the third-largest emitter with low per-capita emissions; net zero by 2070; a large renewable target (500 GW by 2030).
  • Russia: a major fossil-fuel exporter with weak climate commitment.
• Their role at COPs: they shape the deals: the US–China cooperation that enabled Paris (2015), finance pledges (the NCQG at COP-29), and fossil-fuel language (COP-28).
• Problems
  • Geopolitical rivalry undermines cooperation.
  • Finance promises to poor countries remain unmet.
  • Trade measures like CBAM can hurt developing exporters.
• Pakistan's angle: under 1% of emissions, but among the most affected. Pakistan needs big powers to deliver adaptation finance and loss-and-damage funds.
• Conclusion: without the big powers, there is no climate solution. Their competition can be useful if it is a race to build clean technology, but harmful if it becomes an excuse for inaction.