CSS 2019 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — China's strategic vision behind the Belt and Road Initiative
2. Q3 — Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: reasons and impacts
3. Q4 — Reasons for the emerging Pakistan–Afghanistan water conflict
4. Q5 — Critical review of Pakistan's Energy Policy 2013–2018
5. Q6 — Making anti-corruption part of Pakistan's governance system
6. Q7 — Building governance capacity to neutralise internal security threats
7. Q8 — Instruments and techniques of hybrid warfare against Pakistan

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump to its answer. Each answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and has a 🆕 box with developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each.

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Q2. China's strategic vision behind BRI

Examine China strategic vision behind 'The Bell and Road initiative (BRI)' also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR).

What the examiner wants

• Examine the strategic vision: why China launched BRI and what it hopes to gain
• A critical look at its limits

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. What BRI is
• III. China's strategic vision
  1. Economic: overcapacity, new markets, the renminbi
  2. Developing the western regions
  3. Energy and trade security (the Malacca dilemma)
  4. Geopolitical: a counter to US pivot; a Eurasian sphere
  5. Diplomatic and soft power; global governance
  6. Security interests
• IV. Criticism and limits
• V. Pakistan's place: CPEC
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic Belt in Kazakhstan (September 2013) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia (October 2013).
• Thesis: BRI is China's grand strategy. It combines economic needs (exporting capacity and capital) with geopolitical aims (securing routes, building influence, reshaping global order), presented as win-win development.

II. What BRI is

• Land "belt" corridors across Eurasia and a maritime "road" through the Indian Ocean to Africa and Europe.
• Six economic corridors, including CPEC, the New Eurasian Land Bridge and China–Central Asia–West Asia.
• Around 150 countries have signed cooperation documents; over a trillion dollars in investment and construction contracts by most estimates.

III. China's strategic vision

• 1. Economic:
  • Absorb overcapacity in steel, cement and construction after the 2008 stimulus.
  • Find new markets and investment outlets for huge foreign reserves.
  • Internationalise the renminbi.
• 2. Developing western China: Xinjiang and Tibet lag behind the coast; BRI links them to Central and South Asia.
• 3. Energy and trade security: around 80% of China's oil imports passed through the Strait of Malacca, which the US Navy could block. Pipelines and ports (Gwadar, Myanmar's Kyaukphyu) reduce this "Malacca dilemma".
• 4. Geopolitics:
  • A response to the US "pivot to Asia" (2011), building influence westward where the US is weaker ("marching west", Wang Jisi).
  • Creating a China-centred network of trade, standards and infrastructure.
• 5. Diplomacy and global governance: soft power through development; new institutions (the AIIB, the Silk Road Fund); later, the Global Development, Security and Civilisation Initiatives.
• 6. Security: stabilising neighbours through development; a naval base in Djibouti (2017); dual-use ports.

IV. Criticism and limits

• "Debt-trap" allegations: Sri Lanka's Hambantota port leased for 99 years (2017). Some researchers (such as Deborah Bräutigam) argue the "trap" story is exaggerated.
• Transparency and environmental concerns.
• Local backlash: Malaysia renegotiated projects (2018); protests in Gwadar.
• Strategic counter-moves: the G7's PGII, the EU Global Gateway and the IMEC corridor.
• Slowdown: lending fell after 2017; China shifted to "small and beautiful" projects.

V. Pakistan's place

• CPEC is BRI's flagship. It gives China its shortest route to the Arabian Sea and Pakistan energy and infrastructure. Its success or failure is a test of BRI's credibility.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• The 10th anniversary BRI Forum (October 2023) promised "high-quality" and green development.
• Italy left BRI (December 2023), the only G7 member to have joined.
• Attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan (2024) showed the security risks.
• China kept expanding influence through BRICS and SCO and its new Global Governance Initiative (2025).

VI. Conclusion

• BRI combines China's economic needs with a long-term vision of a China-centred Eurasia.
• It has built real infrastructure but also raised debt and trust concerns.
• Its future depends on whether China can make it transparent and sustainable, and on projects like CPEC delivering.

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Q3. Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement

Elaborate the reasons and impacts on Doland Trump withdrawal from climate change Paris agreement in 2015.

What the examiner wants

• Reasons for withdrawal
• Impacts: on climate action, the US, the world
• Note: the agreement was signed in 2015; Trump announced withdrawal in 2017.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. The Paris Agreement (2015)
• III. Reasons for withdrawal
• IV. Impacts
  • A. On global climate efforts
  • B. On the US
  • C. On developing countries and finance
  • D. On US leadership
• V. Counter-trends that limited the damage
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• President Trump announced on 1 June 2017 that the US would withdraw from the Paris Agreement (adopted December 2015). The withdrawal legally took effect on 4 November 2020.
• Thesis: the withdrawal was driven by economic nationalism and domestic politics. It weakened global ambition and finance, but the agreement survived, and many American states and companies kept acting.

II. The Paris Agreement

• Limit warming to well below 2°C, aiming for 1.5°C.
• Every country sets its own targets (NDCs), with five-year reviews.
• Rich countries to provide $100 billion a year in climate finance.
• The US pledged a 26–28% emissions cut by 2025 (from 2005 levels) and $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund.

III. Reasons for withdrawal

• "America First" economics: Trump claimed the deal would cost jobs and trillions of dollars, especially in coal and manufacturing.
• "Unfair" burden: he argued China and India faced weaker obligations.
• Sovereignty: opposition to international commitments.
• Climate scepticism in parts of the Republican Party.
• Domestic politics: promises to coal-mining states.
• Fossil-fuel lobby influence.

IV. Impacts

• A. Global climate efforts:
  • The second-largest emitter left, reducing pressure on others.
  • Some countries (Brazil, Australia under conservative governments) slowed their ambition.
• B. The US:
  • Rollback of the Clean Power Plan and vehicle standards.
  • Expanded fossil-fuel production.
  • But coal's decline continued for market reasons (cheap gas and renewables).
• C. Developing countries and finance:
  • The US stopped Green Climate Fund payments ($2 billion of the$3 billion pledged was never paid), hurting vulnerable countries like Pakistan.
• D. US leadership:
  • Damaged credibility.
  • Opened space for China and the EU to lead climate diplomacy.

V. Counter-trends that limited the damage

• "We Are Still In" and the US Climate Alliance: states, cities and companies kept their pledges.
• No other country followed the US out.
• Biden rejoined on 20 January 2021 and passed the Inflation Reduction Act (2022).

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• Trump withdrew again on his second inauguration day (20 January 2025), effective after a year.
• The US sent no official delegation to COP-30 (2025).
• China's 2035 target and the EU's 2040 goal show other leaders stepping up, but finance gaps grew.
• For Pakistan: reduced US climate finance at a time of repeated floods.

VI. Conclusion

• Trump's withdrawal showed how domestic politics in one country can shake global climate cooperation.
• But it also showed the Paris Agreement's resilience. The world continued, and so did many Americans.
• The repeated US exits teach a key lesson: climate action must rest on many leaders, not one.

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Q4. Reasons for the emerging Pakistan–Afghanistan water conflict

What will be the reason of emerging water conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

What the examiner wants

• Reasons (causes) for an emerging water conflict, explained analytically
• Way forward briefly

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Shared rivers: the Kabul and the Kunar (Chitral)
• III. Reasons for the emerging conflict
  1. No water treaty
  2. Afghan dam and irrigation plans
  3. Indian involvement
  4. Climate change
  5. Population and demand
  6. Political mistrust and security tensions
  7. Upstream–downstream geography
• IV. Implications for Pakistan
• V. Way forward
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan and Afghanistan share nine rivers, the most important being the Kabul River, which joins the Indus at Attock.
• Thesis: an emerging water conflict is driven by the lack of any treaty, Afghan plans to dam rivers that flow into Pakistan, Indian support for those plans, climate change and deep political mistrust.

II. Shared rivers

• The Kabul River carries roughly 16–20 million acre-feet a year into Pakistan, an important part of KP's water.
• The Kunar River (called the Chitral River in Pakistan) is unusual: it rises in Pakistan, flows into Afghanistan, then joins the Kabul River and comes back into Pakistan.

III. Reasons for the emerging conflict

• 1. No treaty: unlike the Indus Waters Treaty with India, there's no legal framework, no data sharing and no dispute mechanism.
• 2. Afghan dam and irrigation plans: Afghanistan wants to use its rivers for power and farming after decades of war. Twelve or more dams have been proposed on the Kabul basin, including the Shahtoot Dam near Kabul.
• 3. Indian involvement: India funded the Salma Dam on the Hari Rud (2016) and signed an agreement for Shahtoot (February 2021). Pakistan fears India using Afghan water as strategic leverage.
• 4. Climate change: glacier melt and erratic rain will reduce reliable flows.
• 5. Population growth: Kabul and Peshawar's demand is rising fast.
• 6. Political mistrust: the Durand Line dispute, refugees and terrorism allegations make cooperation hard.
• 7. Geography: Afghanistan is upstream on the Kabul River, but Pakistan is upstream on the Kunar, which creates mutual vulnerability.

IV. Implications for Pakistan

• Less water for Peshawar valley agriculture and reduced flows at Warsak.
• Lower Indus flows, adding to the overall water stress.
• A new security front, alongside the India water dispute.

V. Way forward

1. Negotiate a Kabul River Basin treaty, with World Bank or regional mediation, modelled on the Indus Waters Treaty and international law (the UN Watercourses Convention, 1997).
2. Joint hydropower projects with shared benefits.
3. Data sharing and joint monitoring of flows and glaciers.
4. Include water in wider Pakistan–Afghanistan economic engagement.
5. Improve water efficiency and storage in KP.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• The Taliban's Qosh Tepa canal on the Amu Darya (from 2022) alarmed Central Asian neighbours, a sign of Kabul's water ambitions.
• After the October 2025 border clashes, the Taliban announced plans to speed up a dam on the Kunar River, explicitly linking water to the dispute with Pakistan.
• India's Indus Waters Treaty abeyance (2025) means Pakistan could face water pressure from both east and west.

VI. Conclusion

• Water may become the next frontier of Pakistan–Afghanistan tension.
• Without a treaty, every new dam becomes a political weapon. A cooperative framework now is far cheaper than conflict later.

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Q5. Critical review of Pakistan's Energy Policy 2013–2018

Give a critical review of Pakistan Energy Policy 2013 – 2018.

What the examiner wants

• Critical review: the policy's goals, what it achieved and where it failed
• A balanced judgement

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Background: the energy crisis of 2013
• III. The National Power Policy 2013: goals
• IV. Achievements
• V. Failures and weaknesses
• VI. Overall assessment
• VII. Lessons
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• In 2013, Pakistan faced crippling load-shedding of up to 12–18 hours a day in many areas.
• The PML-N government launched the National Power Policy 2013.
• Thesis: the policy largely succeeded in adding generation capacity and ending most load-shedding. But it failed to fix the sector's structure, leaving behind expensive capacity payments and soaring circular debt that still burden the economy.

II. Background

• A supply–demand gap of several thousand megawatts.
• Circular debt of about Rs 500 billion, cleared in 2013.
• Heavy reliance on imported furnace oil; high transmission and distribution losses; theft.

III. Policy goals

• End load-shedding by 2017–18.
• Reduce the cost of generation through a cheaper fuel mix (coal, LNG, hydro, renewables).
• Cut transmission and distribution losses; improve collection.
• Eliminate circular debt.
• Improve governance of the power distribution companies and NEPRA.

IV. Achievements

• Capacity added: over 10,000 MW by 2018, including CPEC projects (Sahiwal, Port Qasim and Hub coal plants) and new LNG-based plants (Bhikki, Balloki, Haveli Bahadur Shah).
• LNG imports began in 2015 with a long-term Qatar deal (2016), easing gas shortages.
• Load-shedding ended for most industrial and many domestic consumers by 2018.
• Renewables started: Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park, wind farms in Jhimpir.
• Hydropower: Neelum-Jhelum (969 MW) and Tarbela extensions.

V. Failures and weaknesses

• Circular debt rose again, to over Rs 1.1 trillion by 2018.
• Capacity payments: "take-or-pay" contracts with independent power producers, with guaranteed dollar returns, meant paying for unused capacity, which became a huge burden later.
• Transmission neglected: new plants couldn't send full power through weak grids.
• Imported-fuel dependence: coal and LNG exposed Pakistan to price and currency shocks.
• Reforms delayed: distribution company privatisation and tariff rationalisation didn't happen.
• Losses and theft remained high in some distribution companies.
• Expensive electricity: tariffs kept rising, hurting industry's competitiveness.

VI. Overall assessment

• Short-term success, long-term cost: it solved the quantity problem, not the price and governance problems.
• It was a generation-heavy policy in a sector that needed structural reform.

VII. Lessons

1. Plan generation, transmission and distribution together (the Indicative Generation Capacity Expansion Plan).
2. Prefer local fuels (hydro, Thar coal, solar, wind).
3. Avoid one-sided, dollar-indexed contracts.
4. Professional, independent distribution company management or privatisation.
5. A competitive power market (the CTBCM model).

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• IPP contracts renegotiated or ended (2024–25) to cut capacity payments.
• The circular debt reduction plan (2025): a large bank-financed settlement to clear part of the stock.
• The solar boom: millions of rooftop systems reduced grid demand and created a "utility death spiral" debate.
• Distribution company privatisation and governance reform under the IMF programme.

VIII. Conclusion

• The 2013–18 policy kept the lights on and deserves credit for that.
• But by locking Pakistan into expensive, imported, dollar-linked power, it created the next crisis of high tariffs and circular debt.
• The lesson is that energy policy must aim for affordable, sustainable power, not just more megawatts.

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Q6. Making anti-corruption part of the governance system

How can the corruption elimination strategy be made part of governance system of Pakistan?

What the examiner wants

• How to build anti-corruption into the system (prevention, institutions), not just one-off campaigns
• Brief diagnosis first

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Scale and forms of corruption
• III. Why past strategies failed
• IV. Making anti-corruption part of governance
  1. Prevention by design
  2. Independent, non-partisan accountability
  3. Judicial efficiency
  4. Transparency and right to information
  5. Civil service reform
  6. Political finance reform
  7. Citizens, media and whistle-blowers
  8. International cooperation
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. Pakistan ranked 135th of 180 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2024.
• Thesis: anti-corruption campaigns in Pakistan have mostly been selective and political. The answer is to make integrity part of how the system works: reduce discretion, digitise, make institutions independent and protect accountability from politics.

II. Scale and forms of corruption

• Petty corruption: police, land records, utilities, licences.
• Grand corruption: procurement, state enterprises, real estate.
• Elite capture: tax exemptions and subsidies; UNDP (2021) estimated elite privileges at about $17.4 billion a year.
• Effects: lost revenue, poor services, investor flight, loss of trust.

III. Why past strategies failed

• Politicised accountability: NAB (1999) was widely seen as a tool against opponents; amendments (2022) and court rulings repeatedly changed its powers.
• Slow courts: very few high-profile convictions.
• Weak prevention: the focus was on punishment after the fact rather than system design.
• No continuity across governments.

IV. Making anti-corruption part of governance

• 1. Prevention by design
  • E-governance: digital land records (Punjab's PLRA), e-procurement (e-PADS), online tax filing and digital payments.
  • Reduce discretion in licences and approvals.
• 2. Independent accountability
  • One independent anti-corruption body, its head appointed by a bipartisan parliamentary committee with fixed tenure, applying equally to politicians, bureaucrats, judges and the military.
• 3. Judicial efficiency
  • Specialised anti-corruption courts with time limits; stronger prosecution services.
• 4. Transparency
  • Strong Right to Information laws in practice; public asset declarations; beneficial-ownership registers (introduced under FATF reforms).
• 5. Civil service reform
  • Merit-based appointments, decent pay, rotation and performance audits.
• 6. Political finance
  • Audit party funding; enforce election expense limits.
• 7. Citizens and media
  • Whistle-blower protection; social accountability (the Citizen Portal); a free press.
• 8. International cooperation
  • Asset recovery, tax information sharing (CRS) and the UN Convention Against Corruption review.

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• The Supreme Court restored the 2022 NAB amendments (September 2024), narrowing NAB's scope.
• IMF Governance and Corruption Diagnostic for Pakistan (published 2025) recommended institutional reforms, asset declarations and procurement transparency.
• FBR digitisation and faceless audits expanded.

V. Conclusion

• Pakistan won't defeat corruption through arrests and slogans.
• It will defeat it when honest behaviour becomes the easiest path: digital systems, independent institutions, fast courts and a vigilant public. That is how integrity becomes part of governance.

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Q7. Governance capacity against internal security threats

How can the governing structure have the capacity to neutralize threats to internal security of Pakistan?

What the examiner wants

• Identify threats briefly
• Diagnose structural gaps
• The core: how to build capacity in the governing structure

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Internal security threats
• III. Gaps in the governing structure
• IV. Building capacity
  1. A coherent national framework (NISP, NAP)
  2. Federal–provincial coordination (NACTA)
  3. Police and CTD reform
  4. Criminal justice reform
  5. Intelligence integration
  6. Governance in vulnerable areas
  7. Countering extremism and narratives
  8. Border management
  9. Cyber and financial security
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan has lost tens of thousands of people to terrorism since 2001. Military operations (Rah-e-Rast, Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad) cleared territory, but threats keep returning.
• Thesis: military force can win battles, but only a capable civilian governing structure (police, courts, coordination, service delivery) can neutralise internal threats for good.

II. Internal security threats

• Terrorism: the TTP, ISIS-K and Baloch separatists (BLA, BLF).
• Sectarian violence and extremist groups.
• Organised crime and smuggling.
• Ethnic and political violence.
• Cyber threats and disinformation.

III. Gaps in the governing structure

• Over-reliance on the military; civilian institutions under-funded.
• Weak, politicised police with poor training and equipment.
• Slow criminal justice: low conviction rates for terrorism cases.
• Poor coordination: NACTA has been under-resourced; provinces and the centre work in silos after the 18th Amendment.
• Governance vacuums in the merged districts and Balochistan.

IV. Building capacity

• 1. A coherent framework: implement the National Internal Security Policy (2022–26) and the revised National Action Plan, with clear owners and timelines.
• 2. Coordination: empower NACTA with a joint intelligence directorate; regular apex committees at federal and provincial levels.
• 3. Police reform: depoliticise appointments; modern training; forensics; well-equipped Counter Terrorism Departments; better pay.
• 4. Criminal justice: witness protection, special prosecutors, electronic evidence laws and time-bound trials.
• 5. Intelligence integration: shared databases (NADRA, the Safe City projects); fusion centres.
• 6. Governance in vulnerable areas: courts, schools, jobs and local government in the merged districts and Balochistan.
• 7. Countering extremism: madrassa reform and registration; the Paigham-e-Pakistan narrative; de-radicalisation programmes (Sabaoon).
• 8. Border management: fencing the Afghan and Iranian borders, and integrated border management.
• 9. Cyber and financial security: the National Cyber Security Policy (2021); stop terror financing (FATF reforms).

🆕 Recent developments (2024–26)

• Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (June 2024), a national counter-terrorism campaign combining military and civilian action.
• 2024 was the deadliest year in a decade; the Jaffar Express hijacking (March 2025); border clashes with Afghanistan (October 2025).
• These show that capacity gaps in KP and Balochistan remain the weak link.

V. Conclusion

• Pakistan's internal security problem is really a governance problem.
• Strong, coordinated and accountable civilian institutions are the only lasting defence. The military can clear an area, but only the state can hold and build it.

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Q8. Hybrid warfare in Pakistan's context

Discuss instrument of techniques of Hybrid warfare in context to Pakistan.

What the examiner wants

• Define hybrid warfare
• Instruments and techniques, each with Pakistani examples
• Pakistan's response

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Concept of hybrid warfare
• III. Instruments and techniques used against Pakistan
  1. Proxy and terrorist groups
  2. Information and media warfare
  3. Economic and financial pressure
  4. Diplomatic isolation and lawfare
  5. Ethnic and sectarian exploitation
  6. Cyber attacks
  7. Water as a weapon
• IV. Pakistan's vulnerabilities
• V. Pakistan's response strategy
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Wars today are often fought below the threshold of open conflict, through propaganda, proxies, economic pressure and cyber attacks.
• Thesis: Pakistan faces a sustained hybrid campaign that exploits its internal fault lines. Countering it needs a whole-of-nation approach, not just military strength.

II. Concept

• Frank Hoffman (2007): hybrid warfare blends conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal methods.
• The "Gerasimov doctrine" (2013): non-military means can be more effective than force.
• Pakistan's military calls this "fifth-generation warfare".

III. Instruments and techniques

• 1. Proxies and terrorism: support to the TTP and Baloch separatists. Pakistan cites the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav (2016) as evidence of Indian involvement.
• 2. Information warfare:
  • Fake news networks, social media bots and deepfakes.
  • The EU DisinfoLab's "Indian Chronicles" report (2020) exposed a 15-year network of fake media and NGOs targeting Pakistan.
• 3. Economic pressure: lobbying to keep Pakistan on the FATF grey list; targeting CPEC's image; credit ratings.
• 4. Diplomatic isolation and lawfare: portraying Pakistan as a terror sponsor; blocking at international forums.
• 5. Ethnic and sectarian exploitation: amplifying Baloch, Pashtun and sectarian grievances.
• 6. Cyber attacks: on government and defence networks.
• 7. Water: threats to the Indus Waters Treaty.

IV. Vulnerabilities

• Political polarisation; economic fragility; governance gaps in peripheral regions; low digital literacy.

V. Pakistan's response

1. Address real grievances: development, justice and inclusion in Balochistan and the merged districts, which takes away hostile narratives.
2. Strategic communication: credible, fact-based government communication and an independent media.
3. Cyber defence: the National Cyber Security Policy, a national CERT and digital literacy.
4. Economic resilience: documentation, FATF compliance and export growth.
5. Diplomacy: expose hostile campaigns with evidence (dossiers, UN forums).
6. National cohesion: political consensus on core security issues.

🆕 Recent developments (2025–26)

• The May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict was fought as much online as in the air, with intense disinformation on both sides.
• India's Indus Waters Treaty abeyance turned water into an open hybrid instrument.
• Pakistan's PECA amendments (2025) on online disinformation drew debate over free speech versus security.

VI. Conclusion

• Hybrid warfare attacks a nation's mind, wallet and unity, not just its borders.
• Pakistan's best defence is a strong, united, well-governed state that leaves little room for outsiders to exploit.