CSS 2025 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Ethnicity in Pakistan and national integration
2. Q3 — Fragility of Pakistan's economic stability and remedies
3. Q4 — Pakistan's strategic relations with India and Afghanistan; future security challenges
4. Q5 — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and the India–US strategic partnership
5. Q6 — SCO and BRICS as a challenge to US dominance; US counter-measures
6. Q7 — Peace in South Asia: the Kashmir conflict and the nuclear arms race
7. Q8 — Environmental degradation in Pakistan and remedial measures

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump straight to its answer. Every answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and includes developments up to 2026.

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⏱️

Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each. Give each part of the question the share of time its weight deserves. Where the question says "with scholarly evidence", name at least 3 scholars or reports, or you lose marks.

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The 2025 paper focused on Pakistan's internal cohesion, the economy, its neighbours, nuclear issues and the SCO/BRICS challenge. Two questions demanded "scholarly evidence", so each answer names the scholars to quote. Answers are updated with 2025–26 developments.

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Q2. Ethnicity and national integration

What do you know about ethnicity in Pakistan? Do you think its emergence as a serious threat to national integration of Pakistan? Explain your opinion with reference to various scholarly evidences and suggest your recommendations to deal with it.

What the examiner wants

• Explain ethnicity in Pakistan
• Give your opinion: is it a serious threat?
• Back it with named scholars
• Offer recommendations

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Definition of ethnicity
  • B. Thesis: ethnicity itself isn't the threat; the threat comes from political and economic exclusion along ethnic lines
• II. Ethnic map of Pakistan
• III. Historical evolution of ethnic politics
  1. Language movement and 1971
  2. Sindhi nationalism and MQM
  3. Baloch insurgencies
  4. Pashtun movements (PTM)
  5. Saraiki and Hazara province demands
• IV. What the scholars say
• V. Is it a serious threat? A balanced opinion
  • A. Why yes
  • B. Why not existential
• VI. Recommendations
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Ethnicity is a shared identity based on language, culture, descent or region. It becomes political when a group feels its interests depend on that identity.
• Pakistan is one of the most diverse states in South Asia. Its founders hoped Islam would bind its many nations together. The separation of East Pakistan in 1971 showed that religion alone couldn't hold the country together when people felt excluded.
• Thesis: ethnicity isn't a threat in itself. Diversity becomes dangerous only when it combines with political exclusion, economic deprivation and heavy-handed security responses. Today ethnic grievance is a serious challenge, especially in Balochistan, but not an existential one if Pakistan practises real federalism.

II. The ethnic map

• Punjabis (about 38–45%, depending on how Saraikis are counted)
• Pashtuns (about 18%)
• Sindhis (about 14%)
• Saraikis (about 12%)
• Muhajirs / Urdu speakers (about 7%)
• Baloch (about 3–4%)
• Plus Hazaras, Brahuis, Kashmiris, Gilgit-Baltistan's communities and others.
• The imbalance: Punjab's demographic weight dominates the army, the bureaucracy and the National Assembly, which smaller provinces resent.

III. Historical evolution

1. Bengali language movement (1948–52) and 1971: the refusal to recognise Bengali, economic disparity and denial of the 1970 election result led to secession. This is the clearest proof that exclusion breaks states.
2. Sindh: G.M. Syed's Sindhudesh movement; the 1972 language riots; the rise of the MQM among Muhajirs in Karachi in the 1980s.
3. Balochistan: five insurgencies (1948, 1958, 1962, 1973–77 and since 2004–06, after Nawab Akbar Bugti's killing). Grievances centre on gas, minerals, missing persons and Gwadar.
4. Pashtuns: from the Pakhtunistan demand to the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) after Naqeebullah Mehsud's killing in 2018. The government banned PTM in October 2024.
5. New provinces: Saraiki and Hazara province demands; the South Punjab Secretariat (2020).

• Recent developments (2025–26)
  • The Baloch Yakjehti Committee's protests, and the arrest of Dr Mahrang Baloch in March 2025.
  • The BLA's Jaffar Express hijacking (March 2025).
  • Sindh's protests against the Cholistan canals project, which the CCI shelved in April 2025.
  • Internet shutdowns and security operations in Balochistan.

IV. What the scholars say

• Hamza Alavi ("salariat" thesis): ethnic movements are led by educated middle classes competing for state jobs. Muslim nationalism itself was a salariat movement.
• Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan (1988): these movements grow from uneven development and the centralised state, not from ethnic hatred.
• Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity (2005): the state's coercive response has turned manageable grievances into separatist ones.
• Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (1998): Punjabi-dominated centralisation drove Sindhi, Baloch and Muhajir alienation.
• Alyssa Ayres, Speaking Like a State (2009): language policy, especially the imposition of Urdu, has shaped identity conflicts.
• Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (2011): kinship and ethnic networks also act as a source of stability. Pakistan is weak as a state but resilient as a society.
• Common thread: most scholars blame centralisation and exclusion, not diversity.

V. Is ethnicity a serious threat? A balanced opinion

• A. Why it is serious
  • Armed separatism in Balochistan targets Chinese nationals and CPEC, which raises economic and diplomatic costs.
  • Hostile states exploit grievances; Pakistan accuses India of backing the BLA and TTP.
  • Water and resource disputes between provinces (the canals row, the NFC) inflame identities.
  • Disinformation on social media spreads ethnic anger quickly.
• B. Why it is not existential
  • The 1973 Constitution and the 18th Amendment (2010) devolved powers. The 7th NFC Award (2010) gave smaller provinces more money and introduced multiple criteria for distribution.
  • Most ethnic parties work within the system: ANP, PPP in Sindh, MQM, BNP.
  • The merger of FATA into KP (2018) and growing inter-provincial migration have built cross-ethnic ties.
  • Shared institutions such as the army, cricket, the media and the market bind people together.
• Opinion: ethnicity is a serious governance challenge that could become a security threat in Balochistan if mishandled. It is not currently a threat to Pakistan's existence. The bigger risk is the state's response, as 1971 taught.

VI. Recommendations

1. Implement the 18th Amendment fully: a working CCI, provincial control over resources (Article 172(3)), and the NFC formula.
2. Empower local governments so people feel they govern themselves (Article 140-A).
3. Political dialogue in Balochistan: resolve the missing-persons issue, consult local leaders and bring development with local ownership (Gwadar, Reko Diq).
4. Fair representation: respect the federal job quota, and give smaller provinces a voice in the military and the bureaucracy.
5. Language and culture: promote regional languages in education alongside Urdu and English.
6. New administrative units: consider them through consensus, based on administrative logic rather than purely ethnic lines.
7. Counter hostile narratives with credible information, not blanket bans.

VII. Conclusion

• Pakistan's ethnic diversity is a fact, not a flaw.
• History shows that when the centre listens, shares power and spends fairly, ethnic demands soften. When it excludes and suppresses, they harden into separatism.
• National integration will come from inclusive federalism, not from denying identities.

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Q3. Fragility of Pakistan's economic stability

Discuss in detail the reasons for fragility of economic stability of Pakistan and suggest pragmatic remedial measures for ensuring smooth and sustainable economic growth.

What the examiner wants

• Reasons for fragility, in detail and structural, not just recent
• Pragmatic remedies for sustainable growth

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. The boom-and-bust cycle
  • B. Thesis: Pakistan's instability is structural; growth is consumption- and import-led, financed by debt, and every boom ends in a balance-of-payments crisis
• II. Reasons for fragility
  1. Low savings and investment
  2. Narrow tax base
  3. Weak exports, twin deficits
  4. The energy sector and circular debt
  5. Loss-making state enterprises
  6. Debt burden
  7. Political instability and policy inconsistency
  8. Climate shocks
  9. Low human capital and productivity
• III. Recent stabilisation (2023–26)
• IV. Pragmatic remedies
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Since the 1980s, Pakistan has followed a familiar pattern. Growth picks up, imports surge, foreign reserves run out, and the country turns to the IMF. It has had more than 20 IMF programmes.
• The 2022–23 crisis was the sharpest in decades: inflation near 38%, reserves enough for barely a few weeks of imports, and default fears.
• Thesis: this fragility is structural. Pakistan consumes more than it produces, imports more than it exports, and spends more than it taxes. Until those three gaps close, every recovery will be short.

II. Reasons for fragility

• 1. Low savings and investment
  • Investment is around 13–14% of GDP, among the lowest in Asia (India is over 30%).
  • Low investment means slow growth in capacity and productivity.
• 2. Narrow tax base
  • Tax-to-GDP is about 10–11%, against roughly 18% needed.
  • Retail, agriculture income and real estate are under-taxed. The burden falls on salaried people and manufacturers.
• 3. Weak exports and twin deficits
  • Exports of around $30–32 billion, stuck in low-value textiles.
  • Imports are energy- and machinery-heavy, so growth quickly widens the current account deficit.
• 4. Energy sector
  • Circular debt of over Rs 2 trillion, expensive capacity payments to independent power producers, and high transmission losses and theft.
  • Expensive power makes industry uncompetitive.
• 5. State-owned enterprises
  • PIA, Pakistan Railways, Pakistan Steel Mills and the power distribution companies lose hundreds of billions of rupees every year.
• 6. Debt burden
  • Public debt is around 70% of GDP. Interest takes roughly half of federal spending.
  • Heavy short-term rollovers from China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• 7. Political instability and policy reversals
  • Frequent changes of government and policy U-turns scare investors.
• 8. Climate shocks
  • The 2022 floods cost about $30 billion; the 2025 floods damaged crops again.
• 9. Human capital
  • Around 26 million out-of-school children, high stunting and low female labour participation (about 22–25%) limit productivity.
• Scholarly lens: Dr Ishrat Husain (Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State, 1999; Governing the Ungovernable, 2018) argues that elite capture and weak institutions, not a lack of resources, explain Pakistan's failures. UNDP's 2021 National Human Development Report estimated elite privileges at about $17.4 billion a year.

III. Recent stabilisation (2023–26)

• A $3 billion Stand-By Arrangement** (2023), then a **$7 billion Extended Fund Facility (September 2024), plus a $1.4 billion climate Resilience and Sustainability Facility (2025).
• Inflation fell to low single digits in 2025. The policy rate dropped from 22% to around 11%.
• Current account surplus in FY2024-25, the first in over a decade, helped by record remittances of about $38 billion.
• SIFC created (2023) to attract Gulf investment; the Uraan Pakistan plan (December 2024) set export and growth targets.
• The catch: growth remains weak at around 2.5–3%, and stability has been bought partly by squeezing imports. That isn't the same as sustainable growth.

IV. Pragmatic remedies

• 1. Tax reform
  • Bring retailers, agriculture income and property into the net through digital tracking.
  • Cut exemptions (worth trillions of rupees); simplify rates.
• 2. Energy reform
  • Renegotiate IPP contracts (several were renegotiated or ended in 2024–25).
  • Privatise or professionally manage the distribution companies.
  • Expand cheap local renewables; the rooftop solar boom is a start.
• 3. Export-led growth
  • Diversify beyond textiles into IT, engineering, agri-processing and minerals.
  • Keep a market-based exchange rate and offer stable incentives.
• 4. State enterprise reform
  • Privatise PIA (the deal was completed in late 2025) and other loss-makers; follow the SOE Act 2023 governance rules.
• 5. Debt management
  • Lengthen maturities, reduce short-term rollovers and run primary surpluses.
• 6. Agriculture productivity
  • Better seeds, water efficiency and market reforms, since agriculture employs about 37% of the workforce.
• 7. Human capital
  • Invest in education, health and women's work.
• 8. Policy continuity
  • A Charter of Economy agreed across parties, so reforms survive changes of government.
• 9. Climate resilience
  • Climate-proof infrastructure and use of climate finance.

V. Conclusion

• Pakistan's economy isn't poor in resources. It is poor in reform continuity.
• The 2024–25 stabilisation shows that discipline works, but stability without structural change only delays the next crisis.
• Sustainable growth needs Pakistan to tax fairly, export more, fix energy, and keep doing so after the IMF programme ends.

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Q4. Pakistan's strategic relations with India and Afghanistan

Discuss the contours of Pakistan's strategic relations with India and Afghanistan in detail. Do you foresee any serious security challenges from these neighbours in near future? Explain your opinion with scholarly evidences.

What the examiner wants

• The contours of relations with both neighbours
• A forecast of security challenges
• An opinion backed by scholars

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. A two-front dilemma
  • B. Thesis: both neighbours pose serious near-term challenges: a conventional and water threat from India, and a terrorism threat linked to Afghanistan
• II. Pakistan–India: contours
  1. Kashmir and the 2019 revocation of Article 370
  2. Nuclear deterrence
  3. The 2025 crisis: Pahalgam, the Indus Waters Treaty and the May conflict
  4. Frozen diplomacy and trade
• III. Pakistan–Afghanistan: contours
  1. History: the Durand Line, refugees, strategic depth
  2. The Taliban's return in 2021
  3. TTP sanctuaries; the October 2025 border clashes
  4. Trade and transit
• IV. Future security challenges
• V. Scholarly evidence
• VI. Way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan sits between a much larger hostile neighbour to the east and an unstable one to the west. This two-front problem has shaped its security policy since 1947.
• 2025 made both fronts hot at the same time: a short war with India in May and border fighting with Afghanistan in October.
• Thesis: yes, Pakistan faces serious security challenges from both in the near future. India is the bigger conventional and strategic threat; Afghanistan is the more immediate source of terrorism. Managing both needs deterrence plus diplomacy.

II. Pakistan–India relations

• 1. Kashmir: the core dispute. India's revocation of Article 370 in August 2019 ended Kashmir's special status. Pakistan downgraded ties and suspended trade.
• 2. Nuclear deterrence: both have nuclear arsenals (SIPRI estimates roughly 170–180 warheads each). Pakistan relies on full-spectrum deterrence, including short-range systems.
• 3. The 2025 crisis
  • Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025): India blamed Pakistan, which denied involvement and offered a neutral inquiry.
  • India put the Indus Waters Treaty "in abeyance", the first such step since 1960. Pakistan said stopping its water would be "an act of war".
  • May 2025 conflict: Indian strikes (Operation Sindoor) and Pakistan's response (Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos, 10 May). Air combat, missile and drone strikes, then a ceasefire on 10 May that the US said it helped broker.
  • Pakistan claimed it downed several Indian jets. The crisis showed that conventional escalation under the nuclear shadow is now more likely than before.
• 4. Frozen diplomacy: no composite dialogue since 2015, SAARC paralysed, minimal trade, and the Kartarpur Corridor as one of the few links.

III. Pakistan–Afghanistan relations

• 1. History: Kabul's rejection of the Durand Line, decades of refugees (over 3 million at peak), and Pakistan's "strategic depth" policy.
• 2. The Taliban's return (August 2021): Pakistan expected a friendly government. Instead, the Afghan Taliban refused to act against the TTP.
• 3. Terrorism surge: 2024 was Pakistan's deadliest year in about a decade. Pakistan says TTP fighters operate from Afghan soil, which Kabul denies.
• 4. October 2025 clashes: heavy border fighting and Pakistani strikes, followed by a Doha ceasefire (mediated by Qatar and Türkiye) and talks in Istanbul. Border crossings (Torkham, Chaman) closed for long periods.
• 5. Refugees and trade: mass deportations of undocumented Afghans since 2023; trade disrupted. Pakistan worries about India–Taliban engagement, including Indian ties with Kabul upgraded in 2025.

IV. Future security challenges

• From India
  • A repeat crisis after any major attack, with a lower threshold for strikes.
  • Water coercion through the Indus Waters Treaty and upstream projects.
  • An arms race and technology gap: Rafale jets, S-400s, India–US defence ties (a 10-year defence framework, 2025).
  • Hybrid warfare and disinformation.
• From Afghanistan
  • TTP attacks in KP and Balochistan, and possible links with Baloch groups.
  • Border instability and refugee pressures.
  • The risk of an India–Afghanistan squeeze.
• My opinion: the threat is serious on both fronts. India poses the larger strategic risk, but terrorism from the west costs more Pakistani lives every year.

V. Scholarly evidence

• Christine Fair, Fighting to the End (2014): Pakistan's army sees India as an existential rival, which keeps hostility structural.
• Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), "stability–instability paradox": nuclear weapons stop full war but encourage limited conflicts, as Kargil (1999) and May 2025 show.
• Ahmed Rashid, Taliban and Descent into Chaos: the Taliban never accepted the Durand Line and have ties with the TTP.
• Ayesha Siddiqa and Hasan Askari Rizvi on the military's centrality in Pakistan's India policy.
• Abdul Basit / ICG reports (2024–25): the TTP is the biggest internal threat, and its sanctuaries are in Afghanistan.

VI. Way forward

• India
  • Keep credible deterrence.
  • Use crisis hotlines and confidence-building measures.
  • Defend the Indus Waters Treaty legally (the Court of Arbitration ruled in 2025 that the treaty can't be suspended unilaterally).
  • Keep Kashmir alive diplomatically through the UN and the OIC.
  • Open quiet backchannels.
• Afghanistan
  • Engage the Taliban, backed by trade incentives and conditional cooperation on the TTP.
  • Use regional frameworks: China–Pakistan–Afghanistan trilateral meetings, Qatar and Türkiye mediation.
  • Fence and manage the border.
  • Strengthen counter-terrorism and policing in KP and Balochistan.
• Domestic
  • Political stability and economic strength are the best long-term defence.

VII. Conclusion

• Pakistan's neighbourhood is more dangerous in 2026 than at any time in a decade.
• India is a structural rival with growing military advantages; Afghanistan is a source of persistent terrorism.
• Pakistan can't choose its neighbours, but it can reduce the risks through firm deterrence, smart diplomacy and internal strength.

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Q5. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and the India–US partnership

Discuss the major contours of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and discuss the prospects of their sucesss/failure with reference to India-United States Strategic Partnership.

What the examiner wants

• The contours (components) of the non-proliferation regime
• Its success or failure prospects
• Specific reference to the India–US partnership and its effect on the regime

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. What the regime is
  • B. Thesis: the regime has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, but selective exceptions such as the India–US deal weaken its credibility
• II. Contours of the regime
  1. NPT (1968/1970)
  2. IAEA safeguards
  3. CTBT
  4. Export controls: NSG, MTCR, Wassenaar, Australia Group
  5. Nuclear-weapon-free zones
  6. Arms control treaties: New START
  7. TPNW (2021)
• III. Successes
• IV. Failures and stresses
• V. India–US strategic partnership and the regime
  • A. The 2005/2008 civil nuclear deal and the NSG waiver
  • B. NSG membership bid
  • C. Defence and technology ties
  • D. Effects on the regime and on Pakistan
• VI. Prospects
• VII. Pakistan's position and way forward
• VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• The nuclear non-proliferation regime is the web of treaties, organisations and export rules that tries to stop nuclear weapons spreading, while allowing peaceful nuclear energy.
• In the 1960s, President Kennedy feared there could be 15 to 25 nuclear states by the 1970s. Today there are nine, which shows the regime has largely worked.
• Thesis: the regime has been a qualified success. But its credibility is eroding because of great-power rivalry, collapsing arms control and selective exceptions, most notably the India–US nuclear deal, which rewarded a state that stayed outside the NPT.

II. Contours of the regime

• 1. NPT (signed 1968, in force 1970): the cornerstone. Its three pillars are non-proliferation, disarmament (Article VI) and peaceful use. It has 191 parties. India, Pakistan and Israel never joined; North Korea withdrew in 2003.
• 2. IAEA safeguards: inspections to make sure nuclear material isn't diverted. The Additional Protocol (1997) strengthened them.
• 3. CTBT (1996): bans all nuclear tests, but isn't in force because key states (the US, China, India, Pakistan and others) haven't ratified it.
• 4. Export-control groups: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (1974, formed after India's test), the MTCR (missiles), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group.
• 5. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Latin America (Tlatelolco), Africa (Pelindaba), Southeast Asia and others.
• 6. Bilateral arms control: INF (ended 2019) and New START, the last US–Russia treaty, due to expire in February 2026.
• 7. TPNW (2021): bans nuclear weapons outright, but no nuclear state has joined.

III. Successes

• Only nine states have nuclear weapons.
• South Africa gave up its weapons; Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan gave up inherited Soviet ones.
• Libya abandoned its programme (2003).
• A strong global norm against nuclear testing: only North Korea has tested this century.
• The IAEA has helped peaceful nuclear energy spread safely.

IV. Failures and stresses

• Discriminatory structure: five "haves" and everyone else as "have-nots". The disarmament pledge (Article VI) is largely unmet.
• North Korea's weapons programme.
• Iran: the JCPOA (2015) collapsed after the US withdrew in 2018. Israeli and US strikes on Iran's nuclear sites (June 2025) and UN "snapback" sanctions (September 2025) raised fears that Iran might leave the NPT.
• Arms control collapse: the end of INF, Russia "de-ratifying" the CTBT (2023), and the expiry of New START.
• Modernisation: all nuclear states are upgrading. China is expanding rapidly, to around 600 warheads by SIPRI's 2025 estimate.
• NPT Review Conferences in 2015 and 2022 failed to agree a final document.

V. The India–US strategic partnership and the regime

• A. The civil nuclear deal
  • The 2005 framework and 2008 "123 Agreement": the US opened nuclear trade with India although India never signed the NPT.
  • The US pushed through an NSG waiver (2008) for India.
  • India separated civilian and military facilities and put only civilian ones under safeguards, leaving its weapons programme untouched.
• B. NSG membership bid
  • The US backs India's full NSG membership. China blocks it, insisting on criteria that would apply to all non-NPT states, including Pakistan.
• C. Wider defence and technology ties
  • Foundational agreements: LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018), BECA (2020).
  • iCET / TRUST technology initiatives; a 10-year defence framework (2025); jet-engine co-production; the Quad.
• D. Effects on the regime
  • Selectivity: the deal says non-proliferation rules can be bent for strategic partners. That undermines the NPT's principle that only NPT members get nuclear trade.
  • Fissile material: importing fuel for civilian reactors frees India's own uranium for weapons, which Pakistan argues could expand India's arsenal.
  • Regional instability: the deal pushed Pakistan to expand its own programme and deepened China–Pakistan nuclear cooperation (Chashma, K-2 and K-3).
  • Precedent: others can ask for similar treatment, such as China supplying Pakistan.
  • The US argument: bringing India into the mainstream improves safeguards and India's export controls. India has a strong non-proliferation record (it hasn't spread technology).

VI. Prospects: success or failure?

• Failure risks:
  • Great-power competition is replacing arms control.
  • Double standards weaken universal rules.
  • A possible Iranian breakout could spark a Middle East cascade.
  • New technologies (hypersonics, AI in command systems) are outpacing treaties.
• Success factors:
  • The anti-nuclear norm is still strong.
  • No new nuclear state since North Korea (2006).
  • Most states value the NPT.
• Likely outcome: the regime will survive, but as a weaker, more politicised system.

VII. Pakistan's position and way forward

• Pakistan's stance: a non-NPT nuclear state that rejects discrimination; supports a criteria-based, non-discriminatory approach to NSG membership; proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime with India; argues against an FMCT that ignores existing stocks.
• Way forward
  1. Universal, criteria-based rules for non-NPT states.
  2. Revive US–Russia–China strategic stability talks.
  3. Bring the CTBT into force.
  4. Regional confidence-building in South Asia: missile-test notifications and nuclear-risk reduction.
  5. Strengthen IAEA verification.

VIII. Conclusion

• The non-proliferation regime has kept the nuclear club small for half a century.
• But the India–US partnership shows that strategy now often trumps rules. When the regime treats states differently, it loses moral authority.
• Its future depends on whether major powers return to universal standards and real arms control.

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Q6. SCO and BRICS vs. American dominance

Discuss the emergence of SCO and BRICS as a challenge to American politico-ecomic dominance in world politics. What measures can be taken by the US to counter them?

What the examiner wants

• Emergence of SCO and BRICS
• How far they challenge US dominance: political and economic
• US counter-measures (answer from the US perspective)

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. A shift toward multipolarity
  • B. Thesis: SCO and BRICS challenge US dominance more symbolically and economically than militarily; internal divisions limit them
• II. Emergence and expansion
  • A. SCO (2001)
  • B. BRICS (2009)
• III. How they challenge the US
  1. Economic weight
  2. Alternative finance: NDB, de-dollarisation
  3. Political voice of the Global South
  4. Security cooperation (SCO)
  5. Energy power
• IV. Limits of the challenge
• V. US counter-measures
• VI. Implications for Pakistan
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• After the Cold War, the US led a largely unipolar world through its military, the dollar, Bretton Woods institutions and alliances.
• SCO and BRICS have emerged as platforms where non-Western powers coordinate outside US-led structures.
• Thesis: they are a real challenge to US economic and political dominance, especially in finance and Global South diplomacy. But they are not anti-American military alliances, and rivalries such as India–China limit how far they can go.

II. Emergence and expansion

• A. SCO
  • Grew out of the "Shanghai Five" (1996); founded in 2001.
  • Members: China, Russia, the Central Asian states, India and Pakistan (2017), Iran (2023) and Belarus (2024).
  • Focus: security (counter-terrorism through RATS), connectivity and trade.
  • The Tianjin summit (2025) was one of its largest, with a China–Russia–India photo-op that drew global attention.
• B. BRICS
  • Coined as "BRIC" by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill (2001). First summit in 2009; South Africa joined in 2010.
  • Expansion: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joined in 2024; Indonesia in January 2025. Saudi Arabia has been invited, with an unclear status. A new "partner country" category added more states.
  • The Rio summit (July 2025) criticised unilateral tariffs and military strikes.

III. How they challenge US dominance

• 1. Economic weight: BRICS now accounts for around 40%+ of world population and, by purchasing-power measures, a larger share of world GDP than the G7.
• 2. Alternative finance
  • The New Development Bank (2015) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement.
  • More trade in local currencies (rupee–ruble, yuan settlements).
  • Payment systems outside SWIFT, such as China's CIPS and talk of BRICS Pay.
  • De-dollarisation talk, sharpened by Western sanctions on Russia after 2022.
• 3. Political voice: the Global South uses these forums to demand reform of the UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank. On Ukraine and Gaza, many members took positions different from Washington's.
• 4. Security cooperation (SCO): joint counter-terrorism exercises; Central Asia increasingly outside Western influence.
• 5. Energy: with Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia (prospective) and the UAE, an expanded BRICS links major oil producers with major consumers (China, India).

IV. Limits of the challenge

• India–China rivalry: India resists turning BRICS into an anti-Western bloc and stays in the Quad with the US.
• No common currency: a BRICS currency is far off; the dollar still dominates around 58% of reserves and most trade.
• Very different political systems and interests (democracies alongside autocracies).
• No military alliance: the SCO isn't NATO.
• Members' dependence on US markets and technology.
• Verdict: the challenge is real but gradual. It looks more like hedging than replacement.

V. Measures the US can take

1. Strengthen its alliances: the G7, NATO, the Quad and AUKUS, while offering partners real benefits, not only pressure.
2. Offer better economics: compete with BRI and the NDB through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the IMEC corridor (India–Middle East–Europe, 2023), and expand the DFC.
3. Reform Bretton Woods: give emerging economies more IMF and World Bank voting share, removing a key reason for alternatives.
4. Use the dollar wisely: overusing sanctions drives countries to de-dollarise. Targeted rather than broad sanctions protect the dollar's appeal.
5. Divide by engagement: deepen ties with India, Brazil, Indonesia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia so they keep the groups moderate. Threatening extra tariffs on BRICS members, as in 2025, can backfire by pushing members together.
6. Technology leadership: chips, AI and clean energy partnerships with friendly states.
7. Engage the Global South: climate finance, debt relief and health cooperation.

VI. Implications for Pakistan

• Pakistan is an SCO member and has applied for BRICS (2023); India's opposition is a hurdle.
• Benefits: regional connectivity, Central Asian trade, counter-terrorism cooperation and Chinese finance.
• Challenge: balancing China and the US without being forced to pick a side.

VII. Conclusion

• SCO and BRICS show that the world is moving toward multipolarity. Power is spreading, and many states want options beyond Washington.
• They are not yet able to replace the US-led order, but they can erode it.
• The US's best response is not to punish members but to offer a better deal, so they don't need alternatives.

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Q7. Peace in South Asia: Kashmir and the nuclear arms race

Discuss the prospects of peace in South Asia with reference to Kashmir Conflict and Nuclear Arms-race between India and Pakistan.

What the examiner wants

• Prospects of peace: realistic and balanced
• With reference to Kashmir and the nuclear arms race

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. South Asia: among the world's least integrated, most militarised regions
  • B. Thesis: prospects are dim in the near term; nuclear deterrence prevents total war, but Kashmir and the 2025 crisis make limited conflict more likely
• II. Kashmir: the core dispute
  1. 1947 and UN resolutions
  2. Wars: 1948, 1965, 1999
  3. August 2019
  4. Pahalgam and May 2025
• III. The nuclear arms race
  1. 1974 and 1998 tests
  2. Doctrines: Cold Start vs full-spectrum deterrence
  3. Delivery systems and new technologies
  4. The stability–instability paradox
• IV. Obstacles to peace
• V. Factors favouring peace
• VI. Prospects and way forward
• VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• South Asia has nearly a quarter of humanity but is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. Intra-regional trade is around 5% of total trade.
• The reason is political: the unresolved Kashmir dispute and a nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan.
• Thesis: peace prospects are poor in the short run. Nuclear weapons rule out a full-scale war, but they haven't prevented crises, as May 2025 proved. Lasting peace needs a political process on Kashmir and nuclear risk-reduction measures.

II. Kashmir: the core dispute

• 1947: the accession dispute; the first war; UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) called for a plebiscite, which never happened.
• Wars and crises: 1965; the Siachen conflict (since 1984); Kargil (1999); Mumbai (2008); Pulwama–Balakot (2019).
• August 2019: India revoked Article 370 and split the state into union territories, followed by a long lockdown. Pakistan calls this a violation of UN resolutions and the Simla Agreement.
• 2025: the Pahalgam attack (April) led to the May conflict, India's move to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, and a ceasefire on 10 May. India rejects third-party mediation; Pakistan welcomed US involvement.
• Lesson: every major India–Pakistan crisis has had a Kashmir link.

III. The nuclear arms race

• Tests: India's 1974 "Smiling Buddha", then the tit-for-tat 1998 tests (Pokhran-II and Chagai).
• Arsenals: roughly comparable, around 170–180 warheads each (SIPRI 2025). India's is growing, partly with China in mind.
• Doctrines
  • India: No First Use with "massive retaliation", plus Cold Start or proactive strategy for quick conventional strikes.
  • Pakistan: no No First Use pledge; full-spectrum deterrence, including the short-range Nasr missile to offset India's conventional advantage.
• Delivery and new technology
  • India: Agni-V with multiple warheads (MIRV, tested 2024), the Arihant-class submarines, the S-400.
  • Pakistan: Ababeel (MIRV), Babur cruise missiles and a sea-based second strike.
  • Hypersonics, drones and AI are shortening decision time.
• The stability–instability paradox (Glenn Snyder, applied by Michael Krepon): because full war is unthinkable, limited conflicts become more thinkable. In 2025, both sides struck each other's territory with missiles and drones under the nuclear shadow.

IV. Obstacles to peace

• Opposing positions on Kashmir; India treats it as an internal matter.
• Terror attacks that trigger crises, and blame politics.
• Domestic nationalism in both countries rewards hard lines.
• Water: the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty adds a new flashpoint.
• No structured dialogue since 2015; SAARC frozen since 2016.
• The arms race and the China factor in India's planning.
• Crisis management relies on outside powers (the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE) rather than bilateral mechanisms.

V. Factors favouring peace

• Nuclear deterrence stops all-out war; both sides know the cost.
• Existing CBMs: the 1988 non-attack agreement on nuclear facilities (lists exchanged every 1 January), pre-notification of ballistic missile tests (2005), and the DGMO hotline.
• The 2003 and 2021 ceasefire understandings on the Line of Control show that deals are possible.
• Past near-breakthroughs: the Lahore Declaration (1999), the Agra summit (2001) and Musharraf's four-point formula (2004–07), which came close.
• Economic logic: the World Bank estimates South Asian trade could be several times higher with normal relations.
• The Kartarpur Corridor (2019) shows that people-to-people links still work.

VI. Prospects and way forward

• Near term: dim. Expect "no war, no peace", with a real risk of repeated limited conflict.
• Way forward
  1. Restore diplomatic channels: high commissioners, and a backchannel.
  2. Kashmir: a phased approach covering human rights relief, a stable Line of Control ceasefire, trade and travel across it, and dialogue including Kashmiris, building toward a solution consistent with UN resolutions.
  3. Nuclear risk reduction: extend notifications to cruise missiles; a Strategic Restraint Regime; talks on doctrines; agreements on AI and drones.
  4. Water: restore the Indus Waters Treaty and use its dispute mechanisms.
  5. Counter-terrorism cooperation to prevent spoilers from triggering war.
  6. Revive SAARC and regional trade.
  7. Constructive third-party facilitation (the US, Gulf states) for crisis management.

VII. Conclusion

• Nuclear weapons have kept South Asia from total war, but not from danger. Kashmir remains the fuse.
• Real peace needs India and Pakistan to move from crisis management to conflict resolution.
• Until then, the region will stay one of the world's most dangerous nuclear flashpoints.

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Q8. Environmental degradation in Pakistan

Discuss the reasons of environmental degradation in Pakistan and suggest remedial measures for sustainable environmental rehabilitation.

What the examiner wants

• Reasons for environmental degradation: forms, causes and drivers
• Remedial measures, practical and specific

Outline

• I. Introduction
  • A. Pakistan's environmental crisis
  • B. Thesis: degradation comes from population pressure, poor governance and an unsustainable growth model, made worse by climate change
• II. Forms of degradation
  1. Air pollution and smog
  2. Water scarcity and pollution
  3. Deforestation
  4. Land degradation and desertification
  5. Waste and plastics
  6. Biodiversity loss
  7. Climate stress
• III. Root causes
• IV. Policy efforts so far
• V. Remedial measures
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries, but much of its environmental damage is home-grown.
• Lahore regularly ranks among the most polluted cities in the world; in November 2024 its air quality index crossed 1,000. The Indus is one of the most polluted rivers, and forest cover is among the lowest in the region.
• Thesis: degradation is driven by rapid population growth, weak enforcement and a growth model that ignores environmental costs. Climate change multiplies the damage. Rehabilitation needs enforcement, investment and a change in behaviour.

II. Forms of degradation

• 1. Air pollution and smog
  • Vehicles, brick kilns, industry, crop-residue burning (on both sides of the border) and coal.
  • Punjab now has a winter "smog season", with school closures. Air pollution cuts several years off life expectancy in Punjab (University of Chicago's Air Quality Life Index).
• 2. Water
  • Per-person availability is below 1,000 cubic metres (scarcity level).
  • Groundwater over-pumping; arsenic and bacterial contamination; untreated industrial and municipal waste in rivers.
• 3. Deforestation
  • Forest cover is only around 5%, far below the roughly 25% recommended.
  • Timber mafias, fuelwood demand and urban sprawl.
• 4. Land degradation
  • Waterlogging and salinity, soil erosion and desertification (Thar, Cholistan).
  • Sea intrusion in the Indus Delta, where large areas of farmland have been lost.
• 5. Waste and plastics
  • Karachi generates thousands of tonnes of solid waste daily, much of it uncollected; plastic clogs drains and worsens urban flooding.
• 6. Biodiversity loss: Indus dolphins, mangroves and the snow leopard are under pressure.
• 7. Climate stress: glacier melt, heatwaves and floods (2022, 2025) speed up degradation.

III. Root causes

• Population growth (2.55%) and rapid, unplanned urbanisation.
• Weak governance: Environmental Protection Agencies with too little staff, low penalties and poor monitoring.
• Development without environmental costing: environmental impact assessments are often ignored.
• Energy mix: reliance on furnace oil and coal; inefficient vehicles and kilns.
• Agricultural practices: flood irrigation, stubble burning, overuse of fertiliser.
• Poverty and low awareness: fuelwood use, littering.
• Post-18th Amendment gaps: the environment was devolved to provinces, but capacity didn't follow.

IV. Policy efforts so far

• Constitution: Article 9A (2024) recognises the right to a clean and healthy environment; courts already treated it as part of the right to life (the Shehla Zia case, 1994).
• Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997; National Climate Change Policy (2012, updated 2021); National Adaptation Plan (2023).
• Billion Tree Tsunami (KP) and the Ten Billion Tree Tsunami, recognised by the UN; the Living Indus Initiative, named a UN World Restoration Flagship in 2024; Recharge Pakistan.
• Punjab's anti-smog measures: converting kilns to zig-zag technology, vehicle checks, an anti-smog squad and artificial rain trials (2024).
• Electric vehicle policy; the rooftop solar boom.
• Gaps: weak enforcement, poor coordination and limited funding.

V. Remedial measures for sustainable rehabilitation

• 1. Air quality
  • Enforce Euro-5 fuel and vehicle standards; electric public transport (buses, rickshaws).
  • Convert all kilns to zig-zag technology; subsidise alternatives to stubble burning (Happy Seeder).
  • A joint South Asian smog mechanism with India, since smog crosses borders.
• 2. Water
  • Efficient irrigation (drip, laser levelling), metering and water pricing.
  • Treat industrial waste; protect the Indus Delta with environmental flows.
  • Recharge aquifers; build small dams and storage.
• 3. Forests and land
  • Continue planting with survival audits; protect mangroves.
  • Community forestry; strict action against timber mafias.
• 4. Waste
  • Ban single-use plastics with enforcement; recycling and waste-to-energy.
  • Proper landfill sites in major cities.
• 5. Governance
  • Strengthen provincial EPAs with staff, labs and real-time monitoring.
  • Raise penalties and make environmental impact assessments mandatory and public.
  • Use green courts and Article 9A litigation.
• 6. Finance
  • Use climate finance, green bonds, carbon markets (Article 6) and debt-for-nature swaps.
• 7. Awareness
  • Environmental education in schools, and public campaigns such as Clean Green Pakistan.

VI. Conclusion

• Pakistan's environment is collapsing under human pressure and weak enforcement, and climate change makes every problem worse.
• The country has good laws and some globally praised projects. What it lacks is consistent implementation.
• Sustainable rehabilitation is not a luxury. Clean air, water and soil are the foundation of Pakistan's health, economy and survival.