CSS 2016 — Solved Current Affairs Paper

📋 Questions in this paper

1. Q2 — Efficacy of counter-terrorism measures, especially the National Action Plan
2. Q3 — Improving Pakistan's economy: debt reduction and export capacity
3. Q4 — Pakistan–India comprehensive dialogue: possibilities and constraints
4. Q5 — CPEC: prospects, challenges and its role as a regional game changer
5. Q6 — Middle East developments, Saudi–Iran tensions and Pakistan's role
6. Q7 — China–US strategic competition and its impact on global order
7. Q8 — Climate change's adverse impacts and the Paris Conference measures

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Click any question in the contents box below to jump to its answer. Each answer follows the question's exact demand and marks, and has a 🆕 box with developments up to 2026.

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Marks plan: attempt 4 questions × 20 marks, about 35–40 minutes each.

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Q2. Efficacy of counter-terrorism measures and NAP

Discuss in detail the efficacy of counter terrorism measures adopted by the government, especially with reference to the National Action Plan.

What the examiner wants

• Counter-terrorism measures in general
• NAP in particular
• Efficacy: how effective, with evidence
• Note: CSS 2017 Q2 is similar; this one asks about all CT measures, not only NAP.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Counter-terrorism measures adopted
  1. Military operations
  2. Legal measures
  3. Institutional measures
  4. NISP 2014
• III. The National Action Plan
• IV. Efficacy
  • A. Successes
  • B. Limitations
• V. Way forward
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Between 2002 and 2014, Pakistan suffered tens of thousands of civilian and security deaths from terrorism.
• After the Karachi airport attack (June 2014) and the APS massacre (December 2014), the state adopted its most comprehensive counter-terrorism response.
• Thesis: the measures, led by military operations and backed by NAP, were highly effective in reducing violence. But they relied too much on force and too little on civilian institutions.

II. Counter-terrorism measures

• 1. Military operations:
  • Rah-e-Rast (Swat, 2009); Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan, 2009).
  • Zarb-e-Azb (North Waziristan, June 2014).
  • The Karachi operation (2013, by the Rangers).
• 2. Legal measures:
  • The Protection of Pakistan Act (2014).
  • The 21st Amendment (2015): military courts for terrorism cases.
  • Lifting the death-penalty moratorium (December 2014).
• 3. Institutional measures:
  • Activating NACTA (created in 2009).
  • Provincial counter-terrorism departments.
  • Apex committees.
• 4. Policy: the first National Internal Security Policy (2014–18).

III. The National Action Plan

• 20 points agreed by all parties (24 December 2014), covering:
  • Executions and military courts.
  • Terror financing.
  • Banned outfits.
  • Hate speech.
  • Madrassa regulation.
  • FATA reforms.
  • The Karachi operation.
  • Balochistan reconciliation.
  • Afghan refugees.
  • Communication networks.

IV. Efficacy

• A. Successes
  • Sharp drop in terrorist violence after 2014: by 2016–17, fatalities were a fraction of 2013 levels.
  • Terrorist safe havens in North Waziristan dismantled.
  • Karachi's security transformed.
  • SIM re-verification of millions of connections.
  • National consensus against terrorism.
• B. Limitations
  • Civilian points lagged: police reform, criminal justice, NACTA's empowerment and madrassa reform.
  • Banned groups resurfaced under new names.
  • Military courts were a short-term fix that raised fair-trial concerns.
  • Root causes (poverty, governance gaps in FATA and Balochistan) weren't fully addressed.
  • Afghan sanctuaries remained.

V. Way forward

1. Civilian capacity: police, prosecution and forensics.
2. An empowered NACTA and intelligence sharing.
3. Counter-extremism education and narratives.
4. Development and governance in vulnerable regions.
5. Border management and Afghan engagement.

🆕 Recent developments (2021–26)

• Terrorism resurged after 2021, peaking in 2024.
• The revised NAP (2021) and Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (2024).
• The TTP and BLA remain the main threats; the Pakistan–Afghanistan border clashes (October 2025) linked counter-terrorism to foreign policy.

VI. Conclusion

• Pakistan's counter-terrorism drive after 2014 was among the most effective campaigns in the region at reducing violence.
• Its incomplete civilian agenda explains the later resurgence. Lasting security needs institutions, not just operations.

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Q3. Improving the economy: debt reduction and exports

What measures would you suggest to improve the economy of Pakistan particularly in the areas of debt reduction and enhancing export capacity?

What the examiner wants

• Measures to improve the economy
• With particular focus on debt reduction and export capacity

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Diagnosis: debt and exports
• III. Measures for debt reduction
• IV. Measures to enhance export capacity
• V. Supporting reforms
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Pakistan's economy repeatedly hits two walls: rising debt and weak exports. Both force it back to the IMF.
• Thesis: debt can be reduced only by fixing the fiscal deficit at its source (low taxes, losses in state enterprises, untargeted subsidies). Exports can grow only by making Pakistani industry competitive and diversified.

II. Diagnosis

• Debt: public debt of around 70% of GDP today (it was about 65% in 2016); interest payments are the largest budget item.
• Exports: stuck around $20–32 billion for a decade; about 10% of GDP; dominated by low-value textiles.

III. Measures for debt reduction

1. Increase tax revenue: widen the base (retail, agriculture income, property); cut exemptions; digitise the FBR.
2. Cut losses: reform or privatise loss-making state enterprises (PIA, Pakistan Steel Mills, the power distribution companies).
3. Target subsidies: use the BISP database instead of blanket energy subsidies.
4. Reduce circular debt in power and gas.
5. Debt management: lengthen maturities, cut costly short-term borrowing, and develop the domestic debt market.
6. Primary surpluses and a fiscal responsibility law with teeth.
7. Growth: debt falls as a share of GDP when the economy grows faster.

IV. Measures to enhance export capacity

1. Competitive energy prices for export industries.
2. A market-based exchange rate to avoid overvaluation.
3. Tariff rationalisation: lower duties on raw materials and machinery to remove the anti-export bias.
4. Diversification: value-added textiles, IT services, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, surgical goods, sports goods, halal food and minerals.
5. Productivity: technology upgrades, skills and research.
6. Market access: use GSP+ (from 2014); FTAs with China (phase II), Central Asia and Africa.
7. Trade facilitation: faster tax refunds, digital customs, lower logistics costs.
8. FDI in export sectors: SEZs, including CPEC zones.

V. Supporting reforms

• Political stability and policy continuity (a Charter of Economy).
• An improved business climate.
• Human capital: education and technical training.
• Agriculture productivity, which reduces food imports.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• The IMF Extended Fund Facility (2024) demands tax and energy reform.
• A current account surplus in FY2024-25, helped by record remittances.
• IT exports reached about $3.8 billion (FY2024-25).
• The Uraan Pakistan plan targets $60 billion in exports by 2029.
• PIA's privatisation (2025) is a test of state-enterprise reform.

VI. Conclusion

• Debt and weak exports are two sides of the same problem: an economy that spends and imports more than it earns.
• Fixing taxes, state enterprises and competitiveness can break this cycle and give Pakistan sustainable growth.

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Q4. Pakistan–India comprehensive dialogue

Discuss the possibilities of progress under the recently agreed rubric of comprehensive dialogue between Pakistan and India. In your opinion what are the major constraints at present?

What the examiner wants

• Possibilities of progress under the 2015 "Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue"
• Your opinion on the major constraints

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Background: composite dialogue to comprehensive dialogue
• III. Possibilities of progress
• IV. Major constraints (in my opinion)
• V. Way forward
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• In December 2015, Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Islamabad, and the two sides agreed a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. Days later, PM Modi made a surprise stop in Lahore (25 December 2015).
• Thesis: the dialogue offered real possibilities, especially on trade, people-to-people ties and confidence-building. But the main constraints were terrorism-related crises, the Kashmir dispute and domestic politics, and the dialogue collapsed after the Pathankot attack (January 2016).

II. Background

• The Composite Dialogue (1997/2004): eight baskets, including Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, water, terrorism and trade. It made real progress in 2004–07 (bus links, trade across the Line of Control).
• It was suspended after the Mumbai attacks (2008).
• The Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (2015) revived the baskets with new names.

III. Possibilities of progress

• Trade: normalising trade (MFN/non-discriminatory market access); the World Bank saw large potential.
• Sir Creek and Siachen: technically close to settlement in the past.
• Confidence-building measures: nuclear and missile notifications; the LoC ceasefire.
• People-to-people contacts: visas, religious tourism, sports and culture.
• Water: cooperation within the Indus Waters Treaty.
• Kashmir: building on the "four-point formula" back-channel ideas of 2004–07.

IV. Major constraints (in my opinion)

1. Terrorism and spoilers: attacks such as Pathankot (January 2016) and Uri (September 2016) derail talks immediately.
2. Kashmir: India sees it as internal; Pakistan sees it as the core dispute; the 2016 Kashmir uprising after Burhan Wani's killing.
3. Domestic politics: Hindu nationalism in India; civil–military dynamics and anti-India sentiment in Pakistan.
4. Trust deficit after decades of war and accusations.
5. India's preconditions: "terror and talks can't go together".
6. Balochistan and Jadhav (2016): Pakistan's allegations of Indian interference.
7. The outside factor: the US–India partnership reduced India's incentive to engage.

V. Way forward

1. Insulate dialogue from terror attacks ("uninterrupted and uninterruptible", as the 2004 language said).
2. Start with easier issues (trade, Sir Creek, visas) to build trust.
3. Back-channel diplomacy for Kashmir.
4. Joint counter-terrorism mechanisms.
5. Keep crisis hotlines and CBMs working.

🆕 Recent developments (2016–26)

• No structured dialogue since 2016; Uri (2016), Pulwama and Balakot (2019).
• India's revocation of Article 370 (2019), after which Pakistan downgraded ties.
• The February 2021 LoC ceasefire was a rare success of quiet talks.
• The Pahalgam attack, the Indus Waters Treaty abeyance and the May 2025 conflict pushed relations to their lowest point. The same constraint (terrorism-triggered crises) is still blocking progress.

VI. Conclusion

• The 2015 Comprehensive Dialogue showed that both countries can talk when leaders want to.
• But without mechanisms to survive terror attacks and a minimum consensus on Kashmir, every opening will close. A decade later, those constraints are stronger than ever.

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Q5. CPEC: prospects, challenges and regional game changer

Discuss the prospects and challenges to the construction of "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor". How will CPEC become a game changer for the region?

What the examiner wants

• Prospects and challenges to construction
• How CPEC is a game changer for the region, not just for Pakistan. This regional part is what sets 2016 apart from 2018 and 2023.

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. CPEC: what it is
• III. Prospects
• IV. Challenges to construction
• V. How CPEC can be a regional game changer
  1. China's western regions
  2. Central Asia and Afghanistan
  3. Iran and the Gulf
  4. Connectivity and trade flows
  5. Geopolitics
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• CPEC was formally launched during President Xi's visit to Pakistan (April 2015), with agreements worth about $46 billion.
• Thesis: CPEC's prospects for Pakistan are enormous, in energy, infrastructure and industry, but construction faces security, political and financial challenges. Its regional impact lies in connecting China, Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East through Pakistan.

II. What it is

• A corridor of roads, railways, pipelines, power plants, fibre optics and SEZs linking Kashgar to Gwadar.
• Early harvest: energy projects to end load-shedding.

III. Prospects

• Energy: thousands of megawatts to end shortages.
• Infrastructure: motorways, the ML-1 railway, Gwadar port and airport.
• Industrialisation: SEZs; Chinese industry relocation.
• Jobs and growth: estimates at the time suggested CPEC could add 2–2.5 percentage points to growth.
• Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan development.

IV. Challenges to construction

• Security: militancy in Balochistan and KP; threats to Chinese workers. Pakistan created a Special Security Division (2016).
• Political disputes: the western vs eastern route controversy (2015–16); provinces' share of projects.
• Financing and debt concerns; transparency.
• Bureaucratic delays and land acquisition.
• External opposition: India objects to the route through Gilgit-Baltistan; Pakistan accuses hostile agencies of sabotage.
• Local concerns in Gwadar: water, fishing rights and demographic change.

V. How CPEC can be a regional game changer

• 1. China: a short route to the Arabian Sea for Xinjiang and western China; it avoids the Malacca chokepoint and cuts transport distances to the Middle East.
• 2. Central Asia and Afghanistan: the landlocked states gain access to the sea through Gwadar and Karachi; trade corridors via Afghanistan.
• 3. Iran and the Gulf: potential links to Iran's network and Gulf investment in Gwadar (Saudi interest in a refinery).
• 4. Trade flows: a north–south corridor connecting the Belt (Eurasia) and the Road (the Indian Ocean).
• 5. Geopolitics: shifts the regional balance, strengthening the China–Pakistan partnership and drawing other states into economic cooperation. It could reduce conflict through shared interests, if it remains open and inclusive.

🆕 Recent developments (2023–26)

• CPEC 2.0's "five corridors" (2024); the New Gwadar International Airport (2025).
• Security incidents (2024) and China's demands for protection.
• The 2025 China–Pakistan–Afghanistan understanding to extend CPEC to Afghanistan.
• The Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway framework (2025) supports the regional vision.

VI. Conclusion

• CPEC is Pakistan's biggest economic opportunity and a key regional connector.
• Its success depends on overcoming security, political and financial hurdles. If it does, it can turn Pakistan from a security-focused state into a trade crossroads for the whole region.

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Q6. The Middle East, Saudi–Iran tensions and Pakistan's role

How do you see recent developments in the Middle East, particularly with reference to deteriorating relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran? What role, if any, Pakistan could play in reducing the tensions between the two Muslim countries?

What the examiner wants

• Recent Middle East developments (as of 2016), especially Saudi–Iran deterioration
• Pakistan's possible role in reducing tensions

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Middle East developments (2011–16)
• III. Deteriorating Saudi–Iran relations
  1. Roots: religion, politics, geopolitics
  2. Proxy conflicts
  3. The January 2016 rupture
  4. The nuclear deal factor
• IV. Pakistan's stakes
• V. What role Pakistan could play
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• After the Arab Spring (2011), the Middle East slid into civil wars and proxy conflicts, with Saudi Arabia and Iran at the centre.
• Thesis: Saudi–Iran rivalry, rooted in geopolitics more than theology, became the main driver of regional instability. Pakistan, close to both and home to both Sunni and Shia communities, could play a facilitation role, though not as a decisive mediator.

II. Middle East developments (2011–16)

• Arab Spring uprisings; civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen.
• The rise of ISIS (2014).
• The Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA, July 2015), which worried Saudi Arabia.
• The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (March 2015).
• Falling oil prices straining Gulf budgets.

III. Deteriorating Saudi–Iran relations

• 1. Roots: competition for regional leadership since the 1979 Iranian revolution; a Sunni–Shia framing; different alliances (the US and Saudi Arabia vs Iran and its partners).
• 2. Proxy conflicts: Syria (Iran backing Assad; Saudi Arabia backing rebels); Yemen (Houthis vs the Saudi-backed government); Lebanon; Iraq; Bahrain.
• 3. The January 2016 rupture: Saudi Arabia executed Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr; protesters attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran; Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties (3 January 2016).
• 4. The nuclear deal: sanctions relief for Iran heightened Saudi fears of Iranian influence.

IV. Pakistan's stakes

• Saudi Arabia: financial support, remittances, oil and religious ties.
• Iran: a neighbour, the gas pipeline and border security.
• Domestic sectarian peace: rivalry can spill into Pakistan's society.

V. What role Pakistan could play

• Real step: in January 2016, PM Nawaz Sharif and General Raheel Sharif visited Riyadh and Tehran to defuse tensions, a shuttle diplomacy effort.
• Possible roles:
  1. Facilitator: offer a neutral venue and channel messages.
  2. Stay neutral: the 2015 parliamentary resolution not to join the Yemen war set the tone.
  3. OIC platform: push for intra-Muslim dialogue.
  4. Promote trade and connectivity with both (ECO, CPEC).
  5. Domestic harmony to avoid becoming a proxy battlefield.
• Limits: Pakistan's economic dependence on Saudi Arabia; its limited leverage over Iran; the big role of the US and Russia.

🆕 Recent developments (2017–26)

• China brokered the Saudi–Iran deal (10 March 2023), achieving what others had tried; embassies reopened.
• Pakistan welcomed it, and its balancing became easier.
• The Israel–Iran war (June 2025) tested the détente, which held.
• The Pakistan–Saudi defence agreement (September 2025): Pakistan must reassure Iran that it isn't aimed at Tehran.

VI. Conclusion

• In 2016, Saudi–Iran rivalry was tearing the Middle East apart.
• Pakistan was well placed to facilitate dialogue, and it tried, but the breakthrough came through China in 2023.
• Pakistan's lasting role is to stay neutral, keep friendships with both, and support every effort for Muslim unity.

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Q7. China–US strategic competition and global order

Examine the emerging strategic competition between China and the US and its impact on global order.

What the examiner wants

• Examine the competition across its areas
• Its impact on global order

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Areas of competition
  1. Economic and trade
  2. Military and the Asia-Pacific
  3. Technology
  4. Institutions and governance
  5. Ideology and influence
• III. Impact on global order
• IV. Implications for Pakistan
• V. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• China's rise is the biggest shift in world power since the Cold War. By 2016, China was the world's second-largest economy and the largest trading nation.
• Thesis: China–US competition is broad, covering trade, military, technology and institutions. It is moving the world from US unipolarity toward a contested, more multipolar order, with risks of conflict and opportunities for middle powers.

II. Areas of competition

• 1. Economic: a large US trade deficit with China; disputes over intellectual property and market access. The trade war began in 2018.
• 2. Military: the US "rebalance" vs China's naval build-up and South China Sea claims; tension over Taiwan.
• 3. Technology: 5G (Huawei), semiconductors, AI and space. The tech race intensified after 2018.
• 4. Institutions: China founded the AIIB (2016) and BRI; it sought a bigger voice in the IMF and World Bank (IMF quota reform, 2016; the renminbi joined the SDR basket in 2016).
• 5. Ideology and influence: democratic liberalism vs China's state-led model; competition for influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

III. Impact on global order

• Power transition: from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar order (the "Thucydides Trap" warning, Graham Allison).
• Weaker multilateral institutions: rival forums and paralysed bodies.
• Economic fragmentation: supply-chain shifts and trade blocs.
• Pressure on smaller states to choose; many hedge.
• Risk of conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
• Cooperation still needed on climate (the 2014 US–China climate deal helped make Paris possible), pandemics and finance.

IV. Implications for Pakistan

• China is Pakistan's closest strategic partner (CPEC); the US is a key market and lender.
• Pakistan must balance: avoid blocs; use economic diplomacy with both.

🆕 Recent developments (2017–26)

• Trade war (2018 onward) and the tech war under Biden.
• Trump's tariffs in 2025, then the Busan truce (October 2025).
• China's global initiatives and BRICS and SCO expansion.
• The US–Pakistan thaw (2025) alongside a deep China–Pakistan partnership shows balancing in action.

V. Conclusion

• The China–US competition is reshaping the global order.
• The challenge for the world, and for Pakistan, is to make sure rivalry doesn't become war, and that cooperation on shared problems survives.

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Q8. Climate change and the Paris Conference

Discuss the adverse impact of climate change on the world and the measures recently adopted by the Paris Conference to address this issue.

What the examiner wants

• Adverse impacts of climate change on the world
• Measures adopted at Paris (COP-21, December 2015)

Outline

• I. Introduction
• II. Adverse impacts
  1. Rising temperatures and heatwaves
  2. Extreme weather
  3. Sea-level rise
  4. Water and glaciers
  5. Food security
  6. Health
  7. Biodiversity
  8. Migration and security
• III. The Paris Agreement measures
• IV. Assessment
• V. Pakistan's case
• VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

• Climate change, driven by greenhouse gas emissions from human activity, is one of the defining challenges of this century.
• Thesis: its impacts are already severe and unequal, hitting poor countries like Pakistan hardest. The Paris Agreement (December 2015) created the first universal framework to address it, though its voluntary nature limits its strength.

II. Adverse impacts

• 1. Temperature: the world has warmed about 1.1–1.2°C since pre-industrial times; record-hot years keep coming.
• 2. Extreme weather: stronger storms, floods, droughts and wildfires.
• 3. Sea-level rise threatens small islands and coastal cities (Karachi, Dhaka).
• 4. Glaciers and water: melting Himalayan glaciers threaten the rivers that feed billions.
• 5. Food security: lower crop yields in hot regions.
• 6. Health: heatstroke (Karachi's 2015 heatwave killed over 1,000 people), spread of vector-borne diseases.
• 7. Biodiversity: coral bleaching and species loss.
• 8. Migration and security: climate refugees; conflicts over water and land (the Sahel).

III. The Paris Agreement measures

• Goal: hold warming well below 2°C, pursuing 1.5°C.
• NDCs: every country sets its own emissions targets, updated every five years with rising ambition (the "ratchet" mechanism).
• Transparency framework: regular reporting and review.
• Global stocktake every five years (the first in 2023).
• Finance: developed countries to mobilise $100 billion a year by 2020, continuing to 2025.
• Adaptation: a global goal on adaptation; support for vulnerable countries.
• Loss and damage: recognised (Article 8), though without liability.
• Entry into force: 4 November 2016.

IV. Assessment

• Strengths: universal participation, flexible and durable.
• Weaknesses:
  • Targets are voluntary and not enforceable.
  • The pledges at the time added up to about 3°C of warming.
  • Finance promises lagged.

V. Pakistan's case

• Among the most vulnerable countries despite low emissions (under 1%).
• Its NDC pledged emissions cuts conditional on finance.
• It needs adaptation funds for floods, heat and glacier melt.

🆕 Recent developments (2016–26)

• The US left Paris twice (2017/2020 and 2025).
• COP-27 created the Loss and Damage Fund (2022); COP-28 called for a transition away from fossil fuels; COP-29 set a $300 billion finance goal; COP-30 called for tripling adaptation finance.
• Pakistan's 2022 and 2025 floods showed the human cost of the gap between pledges and action.

VI. Conclusion

• Climate change is already damaging lives and economies, most of all in vulnerable countries.
• The Paris Agreement gave the world a shared framework, but its success depends on countries raising ambition and rich nations keeping their finance promises.
• For Pakistan, global action is not a choice but a matter of survival.