CSS 2026 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

CSS 2026 — GK-III (Pakistan Affairs) · Part-I: 20 MCQs (20 marks, 30 minutes) · Part-II: attempt any 4 of 7 questions (20 marks each).

Themes this year: Iqbal vs Jinnah (Q2), Afghanistan (Q3), 27th Amendment (Q4), youth and civil-military relations (Q5), economy and IMF (Q6), UNSC and Kashmir (Q7), 18th Amendment and social sectors (Q8). A heavily current-affairs paper.

For paper analysis and study links, see CSS 2026 Past Paper — Analysis, Answer Map & MCQ Key. Longer versions of Q3, Q4, Q5 and Q7 are on the linked topic pages.

---

Part-I — MCQs with Answer Key

Unofficial key — items marked "verify" have disputed or unconfirmed answers.

---

Q2. Conduct a comprehensive appraisal of the similarities and differences between Iqbal's philosophical ideas and Jinnah's political interpretation of the Pakistan ideology. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Iqbal's philosophical vision → Jinnah's political interpretation → Similarities → Differences (table) → Convergence (Iqbal's letters) → Contemporary debate (Islamic vs secular readings) → Appraisal → Conclusion

Introduction

The ideology of Pakistan was shaped by two figures: Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the philosopher who conceived a Muslim homeland, and Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the statesman who achieved it. Iqbal gave the idea its spiritual and intellectual foundation; Jinnah translated it into a constitutional and political programme. Their visions largely converged on the Two-Nation Theory and a democratic state inspired by Islamic principles, but differed in emphasis, method and language.

1. Iqbal's Philosophical Ideas

• Islam as a complete social order: religion and politics are inseparable; the Muslim community (millat) is based on faith, not territory or race.
• Rejection of territorial nationalism and Western secular materialism.
• Khudi (selfhood): individual and collective self-realisation through faith and action.
• Ijtihad: reconstruction of Islamic thought; in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1930) he proposed that ijtihad be exercised by an elected legislative assembly.
• Critique of Western democracy: "a form of government in which men are counted, not weighed"; favoured spiritual democracy.
• Allahabad Address (1930): a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state; later letters to Jinnah (1936–37) included Bengal and emphasised Sharia as the solution to Muslim poverty.

2. Jinnah's Political Interpretation

• Two-Nation Theory stated in political terms (Lahore, 1940): Hindus and Muslims are two nations by any definition; the problem is international.
• Constitutional democracy: a parliamentary system; the Constitution to be framed by the people's representatives.
• Islamic principles of equality, justice and fair play: "Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy" (1948).
• Rights of minorities and equal citizenship: the 11 August 1947 speech — "You are free to go to your temples… religion has nothing to do with the business of the State" (in the sense of equal citizenship).
• Rejection of theocracy: "Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission" (broadcast to the US, February 1948).
• Pragmatism: negotiation, law and organisation; willingness to consider the Cabinet Mission Plan.

3. Similarities

1. Both upheld the Two-Nation Theory and Muslim nationhood.
2. Both saw Islam as the basis of Muslim identity and of the new state's values.
3. Both rejected the Congress's territorial nationalism and majority rule over Muslims.
4. Both supported democracy in some form (Iqbal's elected assembly for ijtihad; Jinnah's parliamentary democracy) and opposed theocracy.
5. Both emphasised social justice and the welfare of the Muslim masses.
6. Both saw a separate homeland as the solution; Jinnah acknowledged that Iqbal's views were "substantially in consonance with my own" (preface to Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, 1943).

4. Differences

5. Convergence

• Iqbal's letters (1936–37) urged Jinnah to lead and to demand separate Muslim states; Jinnah's Lahore Resolution (1940) followed this direction.
• Jinnah's emphasis on Islamic democracy and social justice echoes Iqbal's call for a modern interpretation of Islam.
• The difference was largely one of role: the thinker supplied the "why"; the statesman the "how".

6. Contemporary Debate

• Islamic interpretation (citing Iqbal and Jinnah's speeches referring to Islam) vs secular/liberal interpretation (citing the 11 August speech).
• The Objectives Resolution (1949) and the 1973 Constitution synthesised both: sovereignty of Allah, democracy, and minority rights.

7. Appraisal

• Iqbal's vision was broader and more spiritual; Jinnah's more concrete and inclusive in citizenship.
• Their ideas are complementary rather than contradictory: an Islamic, democratic, welfare state with equal rights for all citizens.
• Pakistan's later ideological disputes arise from selective readings of each.

Conclusion

Iqbal conceived Pakistan as a spiritual and civilisational project; Jinnah realised it as a constitutional democracy with equal citizenship. Both grounded it in Islam and the Two-Nation Theory, and both rejected theocracy. Read together, their ideas describe a modern democratic state guided by Islamic principles of justice and equality — an ideal that remains Pakistan's guiding compass.

---

Q3. "The instability in Afghanistan continues to influence Pakistan's internal security, regional diplomacy, and counter-terrorism strategy." Critically examine the above statement and suggest policy measures to address the issue/challenge. (20)

Full version: XXIV. The War in Afghanistan Since 1979

Outline: Introduction → Background (1979–2021) → Afghanistan since 2021 → Impact on internal security → Impact on regional diplomacy → Impact on CT strategy → Critical examination → Policy measures → Conclusion

Introduction

Since 1979 Afghanistan has been the most persistent variable in Pakistan's security. When the Taliban returned in August 2021, many expected a friendly western neighbour; instead relations have deteriorated into open conflict over the TTP. The statement is largely valid: Afghan instability now shapes Pakistan's internal security, diplomacy and counter-terrorism policy more directly than at any time since 2001.

1. Background

• 1979–89: Pakistan as frontline state against the Soviets — refugees, weapons, drugs, militancy.
• 1990s: civil war, rise of the Taliban; "strategic depth".
• 2001–21: War on Terror; TTP emerged; NATO drawdown in 2014; Zarb-e-Azb.

2. Afghanistan Since 2021

• TTP prisoners freed and regrouped; talks failed; TTP ceasefire ended (November 2022).
• Repatriation of undocumented Afghans (from October 2023).
• October 2025: Pakistani strike in Kabul; deadliest border clashes in years; Doha ceasefire (18–19 October) with Qatari and Turkish mediation; Istanbul talks failed to create a monitoring mechanism.
• February 2026: after an Afghan cross-border offensive, Pakistan struck targets in several Afghan provinces; talk of "open war".
• April 2026: China-mediated talks in Urumqi.
• September 2026: Pakistan's military rules out talks with the TTP; Kabul denies harbouring it and welcomes Saudi mediation.

3. Impact on Internal Security

• 2025 was one of the most violent years in a decade (over 1,000 TTP incidents recorded).
• Sanctuaries across a porous 2,600 km border; weapons left by US forces; TTP–ISKP–Baloch militant nexus.
• Fragile merged districts of KP; attacks on police, army and CPEC targets.

4. Impact on Regional Diplomacy

• Strategic depth failed: Kabul diversifies ties — India upgraded relations (Muttaqi's New Delhi visit, October 2025); Russia recognised the Taliban (July 2025).
• China, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia emerge as mediators.
• Connectivity projects (Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway, CASA-1000, TAPI) stalled; Afghan trade shifting to Chabahar and Central Asia after border closures.

5. Impact on Counter-Terrorism Strategy

• From negotiation to kinetic deterrence: Azm-e-Istehkam (2024), cross-border strikes, no-talks policy.
• TTP labelled Fitna al-Khawarij to delegitimise it religiously.
• Border fencing and stricter crossing regimes.

6. Critical Examination

• The statement is valid, but Afghanistan is not the only cause: weak governance in the merged districts, slow justice and past tolerance of some militant groups also sustain militancy.
• A purely kinetic approach risks civilian casualties and pushes Kabul closer to rivals; a purely diplomatic approach has already failed.

7. Policy Measures

1. Two-track policy: firm action against the TTP plus sustained diplomacy with Kabul.
2. Multilateral guarantee mechanism (China, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) with verifiable monitoring.
3. Border management: fencing, biometric crossings, border markets.
4. Economic leverage: trade, transit, electricity and rail projects as incentives.
5. Internal consolidation: NAP revival, KP police and CTD capacity, development in merged districts.
6. Counter-narrative (Paigham-e-Pakistan), madrasa reform.
7. Orderly, humane refugee policy.
8. Regional forums: SCO, Moscow Format, China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral.

Conclusion

Afghan instability has become Pakistan's instability — driving terrorism at home, weakening regional diplomacy and forcing a hard counter-terrorism turn. Four decades show that Pakistan cannot secure its western border by choosing Kabul's rulers or by force alone. Firm counter-terrorism, internal reform and a regionally backed framework with Kabul offer the only durable path.

---

Q4. To what extent does the 27th Constitutional Amendment strengthen or weaken constitutionalism and rule of law in Pakistan? Justify your stance with valid arguments. (20)

Full version: XXVII. The Recent Constitutional and Legal Debates

Outline: Introduction and stance → Concepts → Background (18th → 26th → 27th) → Key provisions → Arguments it strengthens → Arguments it weakens → Comparative perspective → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

The 27th Amendment, signed on 13 November 2025, is the most significant restructuring of Pakistan's constitutional order since the 18th Amendment. It created a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), moved the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction to it, and created the post of Chief of Defence Forces. This answer argues that the idea of a constitutional court is sound, but the amendment's design weakens constitutionalism and the rule of law in the short term.

1. Concepts

• Constitutionalism: government limited by a constitution through separation of powers and independent judicial review.
• Rule of law (Dicey): supremacy of law, equality before law, independent courts.

2. Background

• 18th Amendment (2010): parliamentary supremacy; Judicial Commission.
• Judicial activism (2007–2022): suo motu actions; disqualification of PMs (2012, 2017); Article 63-A ruling (2022).
• Practice and Procedure Act (2023) limited the Chief Justice's powers.
• 26th Amendment (October 2024): parliamentarians in the Judicial Commission; CJP chosen from three senior-most judges by a parliamentary committee, three-year tenure; constitutional benches; suo motu curtailed.

3. Key Provisions of the 27th Amendment

• FCC with judges from all provinces hears constitutional cases and federal-provincial disputes; suo motu only on petition.
• First FCC Chief Justice and judges appointed by the President on the PM's advice; later chief justices chosen by a parliamentary committee without prescribed criteria.
• Chief of Defence Forces post created; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee abolished; lifetime rank for Field Marshal and equivalents.
• Changes touching provincial subjects and NFC-related provisions.
• Protest resignations by Justices Mansoor Ali Shah and Athar Minallah and LHC Justice Shams Mehmood Mirza.

4. Arguments That It Strengthens Constitutionalism

1. Specialised constitutional courts are a global model (Germany, Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia).
2. Promised in the Charter of Democracy (2006).
3. Frees the Supreme Court to clear a huge backlog of ordinary appeals.
4. Curbs judicial overreach and restores parliamentary supremacy.
5. Provincial parity in constitutional adjudication strengthens federalism.
6. Procedurally lawful (two-thirds majority, Article 239).
7. Unified defence command reflecting lessons of May 2025.

5. Arguments That It Weakens Constitutionalism (stronger)

1. Separation of powers: the executive and parliamentary majority now control appointments to and leadership of top courts — contrary to the spirit of Article 175(3) and the Al-Jihad Trust case (1996).
2. Rights enforcement: Article 184(3) jurisdiction now lies with a court whose composition the executive shapes.
3. Basic structure: the District Bar Association Rawalpindi case (2015) recognised judicial independence as a salient feature; the Supreme Court can no longer test this.
4. Military entrenchment: constitutionalising the CDF and lifetime ranks contradicts civilian supremacy.
5. Process: hurried passage with limited debate; part of a pattern after the 26th Amendment.
6. Institutional costs: judicial resignations, lawyers' strikes, criticism by the ICJ, Chatham House and rights groups.
7. Federalism: reopening devolved subjects revives fears of recentralisation.

6. Comparative Perspective

• Germany: constitutional judges elected by a two-thirds majority of both houses — cross-party consensus.
• South Africa: an independent Judicial Service Commission interviews candidates publicly.
• Pakistan's model lacks both safeguards — the problem is design, not the concept.

7. Way Forward

• Transparent appointment criteria with a judicial majority in the Judicial Commission.
• Public hearings for nominees.
• Security of tenure; no transfers without consent.
• Cross-party review of the amendment after an agreed period.
• Parliamentary oversight of the defence command.

Conclusion

The 27th Amendment addressed real problems — judicial overreach and delay — with a legitimate tool, but by concentrating appointment power in the executive and entrenching the military's role it weakens the checks that constitutionalism requires. On balance it weakens the rule of law in the short term; its legacy will depend on reforms that restore judicial independence while retaining the benefits of a specialised court.

---

Q5. Critically assess how youth perspectives, digital activism, and civil society movements are influencing civil-military relations. (20)

Full version: VI. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Outline: Introduction → Theoretical framework → Background → Youth and the digital landscape → Channels of influence → State responses → Critical assessment → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

Civil-military relations in Pakistan have long been marked by military dominance — about three decades of direct rule and continued influence under civilian governments. A new variable has entered: a young, digitally connected population. With about 64% of Pakistanis under 30 and around 161 million broadband users, social media has become a primary political arena. Youth, digital activists and civil society have changed the terms of debate about the military's role, but not yet the balance of power.

1. Theoretical Framework

• Huntington: objective control (apolitical professional military) vs subjective control (military embedded in politics) — Pakistan is closer to the latter.
• Hybrid regime literature: civilian facade with the military as final arbiter.
• Civil society theory: an active citizenry and free information raise the cost of military intervention.

2. Background

• Four military regimes; hybrid arrangements after 2008; the 2018–22 "same page" era; rift after April 2022.

3. Youth and the Digital Landscape

• Young voters (18–35) about 45% of roughly 128 million registered voters in 2024.
• About 207 million mobile subscribers and 161 million broadband users (2026).
• X, YouTube, TikTok and diaspora networks bypass traditional media controls.

4. Channels of Influence

1. Breaking taboos: the military's political role is openly debated online.
2. Electoral resistance: in February 2024 PTI-backed independents won the largest bloc of seats despite losing their party symbol, using TikTok, virtual rallies and AI-generated speeches of their jailed leader.
3. Diaspora activism lobbying foreign legislatures and media.
4. Rights movements: PTM (banned October 2024), Baloch Yakjehti Committee, Aurat March.
5. Legal and professional civil society: bar councils, HRCP and journalists' bodies resisting the 26th/27th Amendments and PECA — building on the Lawyers' Movement precedent.
6. Nationalist counter-mobilisation: during the May 2025 conflict with India, the same digital space rallied behind the armed forces; the army chief was promoted to Field Marshal. Influence runs both ways.

5. State Responses

• PECA amendments (January 2025) criminalising "fake news"; a social media regulatory authority.
• X blocked from February 2024 to May 2025; internet shutdowns; VPN restrictions.
• Narrative management ("digital terrorism"); extensive official social media presence.
• Military trials of civilians after 9 May 2023; cases against journalists and activists.
• 27th Amendment (2025) formalised the military's role (CDF).

6. Critical Assessment

Positive: transparency and scrutiny of institutions; higher youth participation; higher political cost of direct intervention.

Negative: polarisation, disinformation, hate speech and personality cults; attacks on institutions (9 May); shrinking civic space from heavy-handed responses.

Net effect: digital activism has changed the terms of debate but not the balance of power — the military's public image is contested even as its formal role has grown.

7. Way Forward

• Structured dialogue among Parliament, judiciary and military (a "Charter of Governance").
• Rights-respecting digital regulation with judicial oversight and clear definitions.
• Restore student unions (banned since 1984); strengthen party youth wings.
• Digital and media literacy.
• Parliamentary oversight of defence and intelligence budgets.
• Political engagement with rights movements.

Conclusion

Pakistan's youth and digital public sphere have ended the era in which civil-military relations were a closed conversation among elites. But voice is not power. Whether this activism strengthens democracy or deepens polarisation depends on whether the state opens legitimate channels for participation and whether citizens use their voice responsibly. Lasting civilian supremacy will come through strong institutions, not trending hashtags.

---

Q6. Undertake a concise assessment of the key economic challenges currently confronting Pakistan. Illustrate how IMF's conditions can shape the country's path towards economic stabilization and long-term financial sustainability? (20)

Data source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2025-26 and Budget FY27 — see XXVI. Economic Conditions of Pakistan (Latest Survey & Budgets)

Outline: Introduction → Current snapshot → Key challenges → The IMF programme → How IMF conditions shape stabilisation → How they can support long-term sustainability → Limitations and criticism → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan came close to default in 2023. Since then, under IMF programmes (a $3 billion Stand-By Arrangement in 2023 and a **37-month Extended Fund Facility of about$7 billion approved in September 2024**, later supplemented by a Resilience and Sustainability Facility), the economy has stabilised: FY26 growth reached 3.7%, the fiscal deficit fell to 0.7% of GDP, and reserves rose to about $21 billion. But stabilisation is not yet transformation. IMF conditions can anchor reform — if Pakistan owns them.

1. Current Snapshot (Economic Survey 2025-26)

• GDP about $452 billion**; per capita income **$1,901.
• Inflation about 6% (FY26 average) after a 2023 peak near 38%.
• Record remittances (above $30 billion) and a small current-account surplus.
• Poverty about 28.9% (2024-25), up from 21.9% (2018-19).

2. Key Economic Challenges

1. Low tax-to-GDP (about 10%) and a narrow tax base; burden on salaried and indirect taxes.
2. Debt burden: debt servicing about Rs 8 trillion in FY27 — the largest budget item (over 40% of outlay).
3. Low investment and savings; weak FDI.
4. Narrow exports dominated by textiles; food exports fell in FY26.
5. Energy sector: circular debt and high tariffs.
6. Loss-making SOEs (power DISCOs, PIA historically, railways).
7. Human development: education spending about 0.8% of GDP (Survey figure); 26 million out-of-school children; rising poverty.
8. Population growth of 2.55% outpacing job creation.
9. Climate shocks: 2022 and 2025 floods.
10. External risks: oil prices (2026 Iran conflict), US tariffs, dependence on rollovers.
11. Policy inconsistency and political instability.

3. The IMF Programme — Main Conditions

• Fiscal: primary surplus (FY27 target 2% of GDP); broaden the tax base; provincial agricultural income taxes; National Fiscal Pact with provinces.
• Energy: cost-reflective tariffs; reduce circular debt; renegotiate IPPs; targeted subsidies.
• Monetary and exchange rate: inflation targeting; market-determined exchange rate.
• SOEs: governance reforms and privatisation.
• Social protection: protect and expand BISP.
• Governance: anti-corruption and transparency (governance and corruption diagnostic).
• Climate (RSF): climate-resilient public investment and disaster risk financing.

4. How IMF Conditions Shape Stabilisation

1. Fiscal discipline cut the deficit and restored a primary surplus.
2. Market exchange rate ended the dual-rate distortion and rebuilt reserves.
3. Tight monetary policy brought inflation down; policy rates then eased, reducing interest costs.
4. Credibility: IMF approval unlocked financing from the World Bank, ADB, China, Saudi Arabia and UAE; credit-rating upgrades.
5. Energy tariff reform reduced the flow of new circular debt.

5. How They Can Support Long-Term Sustainability

• Tax reform can create fiscal space for development.
• SOE reform and privatisation stop fiscal bleeding.
• Energy reform can make industry competitive.
• Social protection cushions the poor during adjustment.
• Climate conditions build resilience.
• Policy anchor: IMF commitments provide continuity across governments.

6. Limitations and Criticism

1. Austerity costs: higher taxes and tariffs squeeze households; poverty rose.
2. Growth sacrifice: tight policies slow growth; stabilisation without expansion.
3. Repeated programmes: Pakistan has had over 20 IMF programmes — conditions are often met temporarily then reversed.
4. Burden on the formal sector: tax measures hit salaried and documented businesses more than untaxed sectors.
5. Limited ownership: reforms seen as imposed rather than national.
6. Development cuts: debt and defence crowd out PSDP, education and health.

7. Way Forward

• Own the reforms through a Charter of Economy.
• Tax the untaxed: retail, real estate, agriculture; digitalise FBR.
• Export-led growth: IT, value-added textiles, minerals, agriculture; SIFC for investment.
• Energy transition to cheaper indigenous and renewable sources.
• Protect human development spending.
• Debt management: lengthen maturities; lower interest costs; reduce reliance on short-term rollovers.
• Population and climate policies integrated into economic planning.

Conclusion

Pakistan's economy has regained balance but not momentum. IMF conditions have been effective in restoring stability — lower deficits, higher reserves, lower inflation — and can guide long-term sustainability through tax, energy and SOE reforms. But the IMF can only prescribe; Pakistan must reform. Lasting financial sustainability depends on national ownership of reforms that shift the economy from borrowing and consumption to investment, exports and people.

---

Q7. "The unresolved Kashmir issue exposes the inherent weakness in United Nations Security Council's Architecture." Critically examine the role of UNSC in resolving the Kashmir issue. (20)

Full version: XXIII. The Kashmir Issue

Outline: Introduction → Background → UNSC's role (resolutions, mediation) → Why it failed (structural weaknesses) → What it achieved → Recent developments (2019, 2025) → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

Kashmir is one of the oldest disputes on the UNSC's agenda. In 1948 the Council promised Kashmiris a free and impartial plebiscite; nearly eight decades later, that promise is unfulfilled. The record shows that when a dispute involves states shielded by great-power interests and resolutions are only recommendations, the Council cannot deliver justice — though it has kept Kashmir legally recognised as disputed.

1. Background

• Disputed accession (October 1947); war; India took the issue to the UNSC on 1 January 1948 under Article 35.

2. The UNSC's Role

• Resolutions 38 and 39 (1948): restraint; UNCIP created.
• Resolution 47 (21 April 1948): ceasefire, withdrawal, free and impartial plebiscite.
• UNCIP resolutions (13 August 1948, 5 January 1949): accepted by both; ceasefire 1 January 1949.
• UNMOGIP from 1949.
• Mediators: McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon (Res. 80, 1950), Frank Graham (Res. 91, 1951) — failed over demilitarisation sequencing.
• Resolutions 91 (1951) and 122 (1957): the Kashmir Constituent Assembly cannot decide final status.
• Resolutions 209–211 (1965), 307 (1971): ceasefires.

3. Why the UNSC Failed — Structural Weaknesses

1. Chapter VI, not Chapter VII: recommendations without enforcement.
2. Veto: Soviet vetoes (1957, 1962); today India's partnerships with the US, France, UK and Russia shield it.
3. Great-power interests over principle: Cold War alignments then; US-India strategic partnership now.
4. Demilitarisation deadlock in every mediation plan.
5. Bilateralism as a shield: India cites Simla (1972) to deny a UN role; says UNMOGIP's mandate lapsed.
6. Selective enforcement: decisive in Kuwait (1990) and East Timor (1999), not in Kashmir or Palestine.
7. No accountability for human rights: OHCHR reports (2018, 2019) produced no Council action.

4. What the UNSC Achieved

• Kashmir remains legally a disputed territory; resolutions never rescinded.
• Ceasefires (1949, 1965, 1971); UNMOGIP still present.
• Legal basis for Pakistan's and Kashmiris' claims.

5. Recent Developments

• 16 August 2019: first closed consultations on Kashmir in about five decades (Pakistan and China's request); more in 2020.
• May 2025: closed consultations at Pakistan's request (Pakistan a non-permanent member 2025–26) after the Pahalgam attack and India's IWT abeyance; the 10 May ceasefire came through US diplomacy, not the Council.
• No resolutions — showing continued relevance but paralysis.

6. Critical Examination

The statement is largely correct: Kashmir exposes the veto-based design and power politics of the Council. But the Council's failure is also a result of the parties' positions (India's refusal of a plebiscite, disagreements on demilitarisation) and of the shift to bilateralism after 1972. The UN remains valuable as a legal and diplomatic reference point.

7. Way Forward

1. Use Pakistan's UNSC term and the OIC Contact Group to keep the issue on the agenda.
2. Press the Secretary-General for good offices and a special envoy.
3. Document rights violations through the Human Rights Council and special rapporteurs.
4. Link Kashmir to international peace (nuclear dimension, Indus waters).
5. Support UNSC reform through Uniting for Consensus (opposing new permanent seats including for India).
6. Combine the UN track with back-channel diplomacy and third-party facilitation.
7. Give Kashmiris a central voice.

Conclusion

The UNSC's failure on Kashmir is a failure of power, not of law. Its resolutions remain valid, but a Council built on the veto and great-power interests cannot enforce them against a state its permanent members wish to protect. Resolving Kashmir requires both Council reform and sustained diplomacy grounded in the will of the Kashmiri people.

---

Q8. Critically assess the performance of health and education sectors after being handed over to the provinces under the 18th Amendment and suggest way forward. (20)

Outline: Introduction → What the 18th Amendment changed → Education: reforms and performance → Health: reforms and performance → Provincial comparison → Achievements → Problems → Recent federal-provincial debates (including the 27th Amendment) → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

The 18th Amendment (2010) abolished the Concurrent List and made education and health provincial subjects, while adding Article 25-A (free and compulsory education for children aged 5–16). The logic was that provinces, closer to the people, would deliver better services. Fifteen years later, the record is mixed: some provinces introduced notable reforms, but outcomes remain poor, spending is low, and coordination gaps persist.

1. What Changed

• Federal Ministries of Education and Health devolved (2011); provinces took over policy, curriculum (for schools), service delivery and budgets.
• Federal roles retained: international commitments, standards (Federal List Part II), HEC (higher education), DRAP (drug regulation), a federal Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination (recreated 2013).
• Provinces received a larger NFC share (57.5%) to finance these responsibilities.

2. Education: Performance

Reforms

• Punjab: school reforms, data-driven monitoring, public-private partnerships (Punjab Education Foundation; outsourcing of low-performing schools).
• KP: merit-based teacher recruitment (NTS), Independent Monitoring Unit, Right to Education Act.
• Sindh: Right to Education Act (2013), SELD reforms, public-private partnerships (SEF).
• Balochistan: Education Sector Plans, but weak implementation.
• All provinces passed Right to Education laws under Article 25-A.

Outcomes

• About 26 million children out of school — among the highest in the world.
• Literacy about 60–63%; large gender and rural-urban gaps.
• Learning poverty very high (most 10-year-olds cannot read a simple text — World Bank estimates about three-quarters).
• Education spending around 1.5–2% of GDP (the Economic Survey 2025-26 cited about 0.8%) — below the 4% target.
• Curriculum disputes: the Single National Curriculum (2020) was resisted by Sindh as a federal encroachment.

3. Health: Performance

Reforms

• Sehat Card / Sehat Sahulat Programme: universal health insurance in KP (2020) and Punjab (2021–22); coverage later adjusted due to fiscal pressures.
• Provincial health care commissions (regulating quality).
• Lady Health Workers programme devolved and regularised in provinces.
• COVID-19 response (2020–21): the National Command and Operation Centre coordinated federal and provincial action — a successful example of cooperative federalism.

Outcomes

• Health spending about 1% of GDP.
• High maternal and infant mortality; stunting about 40% of children under five.
• Polio: Pakistan remains one of two endemic countries; cases rose sharply in 2024.
• Shortage of doctors and nurses in rural areas; absenteeism.
• Drug pricing and quality problems (DRAP-provincial coordination).

4. Provincial Comparison (general picture)

• Punjab and KP have made more visible reforms (data systems, insurance, merit recruitment).
• Sindh and Balochistan lag, with governance and capacity problems (ghost schools, weak monitoring).

5. Achievements

• Innovation and experimentation by provinces (health insurance, monitoring units, PPPs).
• Greater provincial ownership and budgets.
• Rights-based framework (Article 25-A).

6. Problems

1. Low spending relative to needs; development budgets cut in fiscal crises.
2. Capacity gaps in planning, data and management.
3. Governance: political recruitment, ghost schools, absenteeism, corruption.
4. No devolution to local governments, though services are local.
5. Coordination gaps: national standards, curriculum, data, disease surveillance.
6. Population growth outpacing capacity.
7. Federal overlap and recentralisation debate: the federal government retained or recreated bodies in devolved areas; the 27th Amendment (2025) revisited federal-provincial responsibility for subjects such as education and population planning, reopening the debate.

7. Critical Assessment

• Poor outcomes pre-date devolution; the 18th Amendment did not cause them, but it has not yet solved them.
• Devolution enabled useful provincial innovations, but uneven capacity and low spending limited results.
• Recentralisation is not the answer; better funding, governance and coordination are.

8. Way Forward

Education

1. Raise spending toward 4% of GDP; protect education budgets.
2. Focus on learning outcomes: foundational literacy and numeracy, teacher training, assessments.
3. Target out-of-school children: stipends (BISP Waseela-e-Taleem), non-formal schools, girls' education.
4. Merit-based teacher recruitment and accountability.
5. National minimum standards agreed through the CCI, with provincial flexibility.

Health

1. Increase health spending; strengthen primary health care.
2. Sustainable financing for health insurance.
3. Polio eradication through community engagement and security.
4. Health workforce incentives for rural areas.

Governance

1. Empower local governments to manage schools and clinics.
2. Data systems and third-party monitoring.
3. Institutionalised federal-provincial coordination (as with the NCOC model).
4. Link population policy with health and education.

Conclusion

The transfer of health and education to the provinces was a sound constitutional choice, and some provinces have innovated successfully. But low spending, weak governance, capacity gaps and poor coordination have kept outcomes among the worst in the region. The solution lies not in rolling back devolution but in completing it — with adequate funding, accountability, empowered local governments and cooperative federalism focused on results for citizens.