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XXIII. The Kashmir Issue

📂 START HERE — How This Page Is Organised

No child pages here — read the sections below in order, then the solved past papers at the end.

📝 Actual CSS questions from this chapter

  • CSS 2016 Q7 — Kashmir problem: background and possible solutions
  • CSS 2021 Q2 — Pakistan's measures after 5 August 2019
  • CSS 2025 Q7 — Evaluating Pakistan's Kashmir policy
  • CSS 2026 Q7 — Kashmir and the UNSC's structural weakness

📺 Directly Relevant YouTube Lecture Sources

📌 Topic Contents

  1. 📖 Origins
  2. 📖 UN Involvement
  3. 📖 Key Developments
  4. 📖 August 2019 — Major Turning Point
  5. 📖 Pakistan's Position Today
  6. 📖 Role of the UN Security Council (CSS 2026, Q7)
  7. 📖 Record of UNSC involvement
  8. 📖 Why the UNSC has failed (structural weaknesses)
  9. 📖 What the UNSC has achieved
  10. 📖 Way forward
  11. 📖 Answer structure (20 marks)
  12. 📖 Exam angle
  13. 📖 ✍️ Model Answer (20 marks)
  14. 📖 Outline
  15. 📖 1. Introduction
  16. 📖 2. Background
  17. 📖 3. The UNSC's Role

CSS focus: identify the examiner's demand, show a clear argument, cite dated evidence and qualify contested claims.

Origins

  • 1947: Maharaja Hari Singh (Hindu ruler of Muslim-majority princely state) acceded to India amid tribal invasion from Pakistan — accession disputed by Pakistan
  • First India-Pakistan war (1947-48) resulted in ceasefire line (later LoC) dividing Kashmir

UN Involvement

  • UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) — called for plebiscite to let Kashmiris decide accession; never implemented
  • UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group) established to monitor ceasefire line — still nominally active
  • Pakistan's consistent position: implement UN resolutions, right to self-determination for Kashmiris

Key Developments

  • 1965 & 1999 (Kargil) wars fought substantially over Kashmir
  • Simla Agreement (1972) — converted ceasefire line into Line of Control (LoC); bilateral resolution principle emphasized (reduced UN's role going forward)
  • Insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir intensified from late 1980s

August 2019 — Major Turning Point

  • India revoked Article 370 (special autonomous status) and Article 35A of J&K; bifurcated state into two Union Territories (J&K and Ladakh)
  • Pakistan condemned as illegal, downgraded diplomatic ties with India, suspended trade
  • India frames it as internal constitutional matter; Pakistan and UN maintain Kashmir remains a disputed territory pending final settlement

Pakistan's Position Today

  • Consistently raises issue at UN, OIC, bilateral forums
  • Advocates for self-determination/plebiscite per original UN resolutions
  • Human rights concerns in Indian-administered Kashmir frequently cited (communication blackouts, demographic change concerns post-2019)

Role of the UN Security Council (CSS 2026, Q7)

Record of UNSC involvement

  • January 1948: India itself took the issue to the UNSC under Article 35 of the UN Charter.
  • Resolutions 38 and 39 (1948): called for restraint; created the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).
  • Resolution 47 (21 April 1948): ceasefire, withdrawal of forces, then a free and impartial plebiscite.
  • UNCIP resolutions (13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949): ceasefire and plebiscite framework, accepted by both states; ceasefire took effect 1 January 1949.
  • Resolution 80 (1950) and 91 (1951): appointed mediators (Sir Owen Dixon, then Frank Graham); Resolution 91 said the J&K Constituent Assembly could not decide the state's future.
  • Resolution 122 (1957): reaffirmed that any action by the J&K Constituent Assembly would not constitute final disposition of the state.
  • Resolutions 209, 210, 211 (1965) and 307 (1971): ceasefires during the wars.
  • UNMOGIP (1949 onward) still present on the LoC; India says its role lapsed after Simla.
  • 16 August 2019: first UNSC closed consultations on Kashmir in about five decades, at the request of Pakistan and China, after India revoked Article 370; further sessions in January and August 2020.
  • May 2025: after the Pahalgam attack (22 April) and India's decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty "in abeyance", the UNSC held closed consultations at Pakistan's request (Pakistan is a non-permanent member for 2025–26). The ceasefire of 10 May 2025 came through US and other diplomacy, not the UNSC.

Why the UNSC has failed (structural weaknesses)

  • Chapter VI, not Chapter VII: Kashmir resolutions are recommendations for pacific settlement, with no enforcement mechanism.
  • Veto politics: Soviet vetoes (1957, 1962) blocked stronger resolutions; today India's strategic partnerships with the US, France, Russia and the UK shield it.
  • Great-power interest over principle: Cold War alignments then; US–India strategic partnership and Indo-Pacific strategy now.
  • Sequencing deadlock: disagreement over demilitarisation (who withdraws first) stalled every mediation plan (Dixon, Graham, McNaughton).
  • Bilateralism as a shield: India uses the Simla Agreement (1972) to argue the UN has no role, and the UNSC has accepted this in practice.
  • Selective enforcement: the UNSC acted decisively in Kuwait (1990) and East Timor (1999) but not in Kashmir or Palestine — exposing the gap between principle and power.
  • No accountability for human rights: OHCHR reports (2018, 2019) on Indian-administered Kashmir produced no Council action.

What the UNSC has achieved

  • Kept Kashmir legally recognised as a disputed territory — the resolutions remain on record and have never been rescinded.
  • Brokered ceasefires (1949, 1965, 1971) and maintained UNMOGIP.
  • Provides Pakistan a legal and diplomatic basis for its position; the 2019 and 2025 sessions show the issue remains on the international agenda.

Way forward

  • Use Pakistan's 2025–26 UNSC term and the OIC Contact Group on Kashmir to keep the issue on the agenda.
  • Press the UN Secretary-General to use his good offices and appoint a special envoy.
  • Document human rights violations through the UN Human Rights Council and special rapporteurs.
  • Support UNSC reform (Pakistan leads the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent members such as India).
  • Pursue back-channel diplomacy and confidence-building measures alongside the UN track; build on third-party interest in mediation (US offer after May 2025).
  • Link Kashmir to regional stability: the nuclear dimension and the Indus Waters Treaty make it an international security issue.

Answer structure (20 marks)

  1. Introduction — Kashmir as the oldest unresolved dispute on the UNSC agenda.
  2. UNSC resolutions and mediation efforts (chronological).
  3. Structural weaknesses of the UNSC exposed by Kashmir.
  4. Achievements and limited relevance.
  5. Recent developments — 2019 and 2025.
  6. Critical evaluation — power over principle.
  7. Way forward.
  8. Conclusion.

Exam angle

  • Three pillars of any Kashmir answer:
    1. UNSC Resolution 47 (1948)
    2. Simla Agreement (1972)
    3. Revocation of Article 370 (5 August 2019)

✍️ Model Answer (20 marks)

Question (CSS 2026): "The unresolved Kashmir issue exposes the inherent weakness in the United Nations Security Council's architecture." Critically examine the role of the UNSC in resolving the Kashmir issue.

Outline

  1. Introduction
  2. Background of the dispute
  3. The UNSC's role: resolutions and mediation
  4. Why the UNSC has failed: structural weaknesses
  5. What the UNSC has achieved
  6. Recent developments (2019–2025)
  7. Way forward
  8. Conclusion

1. Introduction

  • One of the oldest disputes on the UNSC agenda.
  • In 1948 the Council promised a free and impartial plebiscite — still unfulfilled.
  • Thesis: when great powers protect a state and resolutions are only recommendations, the Council can't deliver justice.
  • Yet UN involvement has kept Kashmir legally a disputed territory.

2. Background

  • October 1947: Maharaja Hari Singh (Hindu ruler of a Muslim-majority state) acceded to India amid a tribal uprising.
  • Pakistan disputed the accession; war followed.
  • 1 January 1948: India itself took the matter to the UNSC under Article 35.

3. The UNSC's Role

  • Resolutions 38 and 39 (January 1948): called for restraint and created the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).
  • Resolution 47 (21 April 1948): ceasefire, withdrawal of forces and a free and impartial plebiscite.
  • UNCIP resolutions (13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949): accepted by both states; ceasefire from 1 January 1949.
  • UNMOGIP: military observers deployed from 1949 to monitor the ceasefire line.
  • Mediators: Sir Owen Dixon (Resolution 80, 1950), Frank Graham (Resolution 91, 1951), and General McNaughton before them. All plans failed over the sequencing of demilitarisation.
  • Resolutions 91 (1951) and 122 (1957): the Kashmir Constituent Assembly could not determine the state's final status.
  • Resolutions 209, 210 and 211 (1965) and 307 (1971): ceasefires during the wars.

4. Why the UNSC Has Failed: Structural Weaknesses

  1. Chapter VI, not Chapter VII: the Kashmir resolutions were adopted under the pacific settlement provisions, so they are recommendations without enforcement.
  2. The veto: Soviet vetoes in 1957 and 1962 blocked stronger action. Today India's strategic partnerships with the US, France, the UK and Russia shield it.
  3. Great-power interests over principle: Cold War alignments then, and the US–India partnership and Indo-Pacific strategy now.
  4. Deadlock over demilitarisation: disagreement over who would withdraw first stalled every mediation plan.
  5. Bilateralism as a shield: India cites the Simla Agreement (1972) to deny the UN any role, and the Council has accepted this in practice. India also says UNMOGIP's mandate has lapsed.
  6. Selective enforcement: the Council acted decisively in Kuwait (1990) and East Timor (1999) but not in Kashmir or Palestine.
  7. No accountability for rights abuses: OHCHR reports on Kashmir (2018, 2019) produced no Council action.

5. What the UNSC Has Achieved

  • Kashmir remains legally recognised as a disputed territory; the resolutions have never been rescinded.
  • Ceasefires were brokered in 1949, 1965 and 1971; UNMOGIP remains present.
  • The resolutions give Pakistan and the Kashmiris a legal basis for their claim.

6. Recent Developments (2019–2025)

  • August 2019: after India revoked Article 370, the Council held closed consultations on Kashmir (16 August) for the first time in about five decades, at the request of Pakistan and China; further sessions followed in 2020.
  • May 2025: after the Pahalgam attack and India's decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, the Council held closed consultations at Pakistan's request. Pakistan was a non-permanent member (2025–26). The ceasefire of 10 May came through US diplomacy, not the Council.
  • These sessions produced no resolutions, which illustrates both the issue's continuing relevance and the Council's paralysis.

7. Way Forward

  1. Use Pakistan's Council term and the OIC Contact Group on Kashmir to keep the issue on the agenda.
  2. Press the Secretary-General to use his good offices and appoint a special envoy.
  3. Document human rights violations through the Human Rights Council and special rapporteurs.
  4. Link Kashmir to international peace: the nuclear dimension and the Indus waters make it a global security issue.
  5. Support Security Council reform. Pakistan leads the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats, including for India.
  6. Combine the UN track with back-channel diplomacy and third-party facilitation.
  7. Give the Kashmiri people a central voice in any process.

8. Conclusion

The Security Council's failure on Kashmir is not a failure of law but of power. Its resolutions remain valid, but a Council built on the veto and great-power interests cannot enforce them against a state its permanent members wish to protect. Kashmir therefore exposes the gap between the UN's principles and its practice. Resolving it will require not only Council reform but sustained diplomacy, international pressure and, above all, respect for the will of the Kashmiri people.

📝 CSS Past Papers 2014–2026 — This Chapter (Solved)

📊

Asked so far: 4 subjective questions (2016, 2021, 2025, 2026), including both of the last two years · 3 MCQs (2015, 2020, 2023). Dates to learn: the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), the disputed accession (26 or 27 October 1947), UNSC Resolution 47 (21 April 1948) and 5 August 2019.

2014–2023 MCQs come from published answer keys (the FPSC copies only contain Part-II), so their options are rewritten but the keyed answer is kept and checked.

Part-I — Past MCQs

1. (CSS 2015) The British sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh in:

  • (A) 1819
  • (B) 1839
  • (C) 1849
  • (D) 1846
  • ✅ (D) 1846 — Treaty of Amritsar (16 March 1846), after the First Anglo-Sikh War.
    • Gulab Singh paid 7.5 million Nanakshahi rupees; founded the Dogra dynasty.

2. (CSS 2020) India revoked Article 370 of its Constitution (special status of IIOJK) on:

  • (A) 15 August 2019
  • (B) 5 August 2019
  • (C) 31 October 2019
  • (D) 14 February 2019
  • ✅ (B) 5 August 2019 — Article 35-A removed too.
    • Split into two union territories (J&K and Ladakh) from 31 October 2019.
    • Upheld by India's Supreme Court (11 December 2023).
    • Pakistan marks 5 August as Youm-e-Istehsal.

3. (CSS 2023) The UN Security Council's resolution on Kashmir calling for a plebiscite (Resolution 47) is dated:

  • (A) 1 January 1948
  • (B) 21 April 1948
  • (C) 13 August 1948
  • (D) 5 January 1949
  • ✅ (B) 21 April 1948 — ceasefire, withdrawal of forces, free and impartial plebiscite.
    • Other dates: India's complaint 1 January 1948; UNCIP resolutions 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

Part-II — Past Subjective Questions

1. CSS 2016 Q7 — Discuss the Kashmir problem in its entirety, throwing light on its background and prospects of possible solutions to this core issue between India and Pakistan. (20)

Outline

  1. Introduction
  2. Historical background
  3. The accession dispute
  4. The role of the United Nations
  5. Wars and agreements
  6. The Kashmiri freedom struggle
  7. Positions of the parties
  8. Possible solutions
  9. Prospects
  10. Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

  • Kashmir is the oldest unresolved dispute on the agenda of the United Nations and the main cause of hostility between Pakistan and India. Pakistan regards it as the unfinished business of partition.

2. Historical background

  • Under the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846 the British sold Kashmir to the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh.
  • For the next century a Hindu dynasty ruled a population that was about 77 per cent Muslim.
  • Muslim discontent erupted in the uprising of 1931, and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was formed in 1932.

3. The accession dispute

  • In 1947 a revolt broke out in Poonch, and tribesmen from the North-West Frontier entered the state in October.
  • Maharaja Hari Singh then signed an Instrument of Accession to India on 26 or 27 October 1947, a document whose circumstances Pakistan has always disputed.
  • The Radcliffe Award had given most of Gurdaspur district to India, which provided India with a land route into Kashmir.

4. The role of the United Nations

  • India took the dispute to the Security Council on 1 January 1948.
  • Resolution 47 of April 1948 and the UNCIP resolutions of 1948 and 1949 called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of forces and a free and impartial plebiscite.
  • UN military observers (UNMOGIP) were deployed, but the missions of Sir Owen Dixon and Frank Graham failed over the question of demilitarisation.

5. Wars and agreements

  • The two countries fought over Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965, the latter ending with the Tashkent Declaration.
  • After the 1971 war, the Simla Agreement turned the ceasefire line into the Line of Control.
  • India occupied the Siachen Glacier in 1984, and the Kargil conflict followed in 1999.

6. The Kashmiri freedom struggle

  • A popular uprising began in 1989 and was met with heavy repression.
  • After the killing of Burhan Wani in 2016, protests were met with pellet guns and long curfews. UN human rights reports in 2018 and 2019 documented serious abuses.

7. Positions of the parties

  • Pakistan calls for a settlement under the UN resolutions and the right of self-determination.
  • India claims Kashmir is an integral part of its territory and accepts only bilateral talks.
  • Many Kashmiris seek either independence or union with Pakistan.

8. Possible solutions

  • A plebiscite under the UN resolutions. This is Pakistan's principled position, but India has refused it.
  • A regional plebiscite, as suggested by Sir Owen Dixon, under which different regions would decide separately.
  • The Chenab formula, which would divide the state roughly along the Chenab river.
  • Turning the Line of Control into the international border. Pakistan rejects this because it would freeze the status quo.
  • Musharraf's four-point formula, which proposed soft borders, gradual demilitarisation, self-governance and a joint supervisory mechanism.
  • Independence, a third option that neither India nor Pakistan accepts.
  • Special arrangements modelled on Andorra or Trieste.

9. Prospects

  • Without flexibility from India, the prospects are poor. Even so, the back-channel talks of 2004 to 2007 showed that a workable framework can be found when both sides are willing.

10. Conclusion

  • Any lasting solution must reflect the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Sustained dialogue, supported where possible by international facilitation, remains the only peaceful route to such a solution.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2016 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

2. CSS 2021 Q2 — Enumerate the measures adopted by Pakistan to spotlight the plight of Kashmiri people in IIOJK after 5th August 2019. (20)

Outline

  1. Introduction
  2. Diplomatic and bilateral measures
  3. Measures at the United Nations
  4. Engagement with the OIC and other states
  5. Domestic and symbolic measures
  6. Media and legal measures
  7. Evaluation
  8. Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

  • On 5 August 2019 India revoked Articles 370 and 35-A of its Constitution, ending the special status of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. It also imposed a lockdown and a communication blackout across the region. Pakistan responded with a campaign on several fronts to draw attention to the situation.

2. Diplomatic and bilateral measures

  • Pakistan downgraded diplomatic relations, expelling the Indian High Commissioner and withdrawing its own.
  • It suspended bilateral trade.
  • It stopped the Samjhauta Express and the Thar Express.

3. Measures at the United Nations

  • With China's support, the Security Council held closed consultations on Kashmir on 16 August 2019, the first such meeting in about fifty years. Further consultations followed in January and August 2020.
  • Prime Minister Imran Khan made Kashmir the centrepiece of his address to the General Assembly in September 2019.
  • Pakistan wrote repeatedly to the Secretary-General and used UN human rights mechanisms to highlight abuses.

4. Engagement with the OIC and other states

  • Pakistan called meetings of the OIC Contact Group on Kashmir and secured OIC statements on the issue.
  • China, Turkey and Malaysia expressed support.
  • Pakistan reached out to members of the European Parliament, the US Congress and the British Parliament, and the issue was raised at hearings in Washington.

5. Domestic and symbolic measures

  • A weekly Kashmir Solidarity Hour was observed on Fridays.
  • From 2020, 5 August has been marked as Youm-e-Istehsal, a day of protest against the occupation.
  • A new political map, released on 4 August 2020, showed the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as disputed territory.
  • The Srinagar Highway in Islamabad was renamed Kashmir Highway, and Kashmir Day continues to be observed on 5 February.

6. Media and legal measures

  • Pakistan published dossiers on human rights violations in 2020 and 2021.
  • It engaged international media to report on conditions in the region.
  • It argued that India's new domicile rules, which allow outsiders to settle in Kashmir, violate the Fourth Geneva Convention by changing the region's demography.

7. Evaluation

  • These efforts kept the issue in the international spotlight and placed India's abuses on record.
  • They did not, however, lead to any reversal of India's decision. Gulf states, with large economic interests in India, were cautious, and Pakistan's own economic weakness limited its influence.

8. Conclusion

  • Pakistan has kept the plight of Kashmiris on the world's agenda since 2019. To achieve more, it needs sustained and credible diplomacy based on human rights, backed by the economic strength that gives a country's voice real weight.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2021 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

3. CSS 2025 Q7 — The Kashmir dispute is an unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition. Evaluate Pakistan's Kashmir policy for the solution of the problem. (20)

Outline

  1. Introduction
  2. Why Kashmir is the unfinished agenda of partition
  3. Phases of Pakistan's Kashmir policy
  4. Strengths of the policy
  5. Weaknesses of the policy
  6. The present situation
  7. Recommendations
  8. Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

  • For Pakistan, Kashmir is not simply a territorial dispute. It represents a promise of partition that was never fulfilled. Pakistan's policy over nearly eight decades has combined war, diplomacy, bilateral talks and support for the Kashmiri people, with mixed results.

2. Why Kashmir is the unfinished agenda of partition

  • Partition was based on the principle that Muslim-majority areas contiguous to Pakistan would join it. Kashmir met both conditions but was taken by India.
  • The plebiscite promised by the United Nations has never been held.
  • The continuing resistance of Kashmiris shows that the issue is still alive.

3. Phases of Pakistan's Kashmir policy

  • 1947 to 1965. Pakistan relied on the UN resolutions and on military means. Operation Gibraltar in 1965 failed to change the situation.
  • 1972 to 1989. After the Simla Agreement, the issue was handled mainly through bilateral channels and received less attention.
  • 1989 to 2001. Pakistan gave political, diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiri uprising. The Kargil conflict of 1999 damaged its standing.
  • 2001 to 2008. The composite dialogue, General Musharraf's four-point formula and the opening of cross-LoC bus and trade routes in 2005 and 2008 marked the most flexible period of policy.
  • 2008 to 2019. The Mumbai attacks froze talks and relations stagnated.
  • 2019 onwards. After India revoked Article 370, Pakistan launched a diplomatic and legal campaign. In 2025, after the May conflict, it welcomed American offers of mediation.

4. Strengths of the policy

  • Pakistan has held a consistent and principled position based on the UN resolutions.
  • It has kept the issue alive in international forums.
  • During the back-channel talks of 2004 to 2007 it showed that it could be flexible without abandoning principle.

5. Weaknesses of the policy

  • Military adventures in 1965 and 1999 failed and harmed Pakistan's diplomatic position.
  • The association of the Kashmir cause with militancy allowed India to brand it as terrorism, and brought pressure from the FATF.
  • Policy has shifted with changes of government.
  • A weak economy has limited Pakistan's influence.
  • Gulf states have offered little practical support because of their ties with India.
  • Emotional rhetoric has too often replaced a sustained strategy.
  • Governance in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan has not been presented as a model.

6. The present situation

  • India has absorbed the territory administratively since 2019, and its Supreme Court upheld the change in 2023.
  • The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and the conflict of May 2025 have raised international concern about the risk of escalation between two nuclear states.

7. Recommendations

  • Building economic strength must be the foundation of Pakistan's diplomacy.
  • Diplomacy should centre on human rights and be backed by credible documentation.
  • Legal avenues in international forums should be pursued.
  • Kashmiri voices should be at the front of the campaign.
  • Pakistan should remain ready for dialogue, building on the framework of the four-point formula.
  • Third-party facilitation should be welcomed where available.
  • Governance in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan should be made a model for the region.

8. Conclusion

  • Pakistan's Kashmir policy has kept the cause alive but has not brought a solution. A combination of economic strength, credible diplomacy and principled flexibility offers the best chance of moving towards a just settlement.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2025 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

4. CSS 2026 Q7 — "The unresolved Kashmir issue exposes the inherent weakness in the UN Security Council's architecture." Critically examine the role of UNSC in resolving the Kashmir issue. (20)

Outline

  1. Introduction
  2. Background
  3. What the Security Council did
  4. Why it failed: weaknesses in its structure
  5. What it achieved
  6. Recent developments
  7. Critical examination
  8. Way forward
  9. Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

  • In 1948 the UN Security Council promised the people of Kashmir a free and impartial plebiscite. Nearly eight decades later that promise has still not been kept. The record shows how the Council's design limits its ability to resolve disputes involving powerful states.

2. Background

  • After the disputed accession of October 1947 and the fighting that followed, India took the matter to the Security Council on 1 January 1948.

3. What the Security Council did

  • Resolutions 38 and 39 of 1948 called for restraint and set up the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).
  • Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948 called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces and a plebiscite.
  • The UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 were accepted by both countries, and a ceasefire came into effect on 1 January 1949. UN military observers (UNMOGIP) were deployed.
  • The Council appointed General McNaughton, then Sir Owen Dixon in 1950 and Frank Graham in 1951, to work out how demilitarisation and a plebiscite could take place.
  • Resolution 122 of 1957 declared that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly could not decide the state's final status.
  • Later resolutions arranged ceasefires in 1965 and 1971.

4. Why it failed: weaknesses in its structure

  • The resolutions were adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, so they were recommendations without any means of enforcement.
  • The Soviet Union vetoed resolutions on Kashmir in 1957 and 1962. Today India's close ties with several permanent members give it similar protection.
  • Members have put their strategic interests ahead of principle, first during the Cold War and now in the US-India partnership.
  • No mediator was able to break the deadlock over the sequence of demilitarisation.
  • After 1972 India cited the Simla Agreement to argue that the UN had no further role.
  • The Council enforced its decisions firmly in Kuwait in 1990 and East Timor in 1999, but not in Kashmir or Palestine.
  • UN human rights reports in 2018 and 2019 produced no action by the Council.

5. What it achieved

  • Kashmir remains a disputed territory in international law, and the resolutions have never been withdrawn.
  • The Council arranged ceasefires in 1949, 1965 and 1971, and UN observers are still present.
  • Its resolutions give Pakistan and the Kashmiris a firm legal basis for their claims.

6. Recent developments

  • On 16 August 2019, at the request of Pakistan and China, the Council held its first closed consultations on Kashmir in about fifty years, with further meetings in 2020.
  • In May 2025, while serving as a non-permanent member, Pakistan requested consultations after the Pahalgam attack and India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. The ceasefire of 10 May, however, came through American diplomacy rather than through the Council.

7. Critical examination

  • The statement is largely true. Kashmir shows how the veto and great-power politics limit the Council.
  • At the same time, the failure also reflects India's refusal to hold a plebiscite, disagreement between the parties over demilitarisation and the shift to bilateral talks after 1972.

8. Way forward

  • Pakistan should use its seat on the Council and the OIC Contact Group to keep Kashmir on the agenda.
  • It should urge the Secretary-General to offer his good offices or appoint a special envoy.
  • Human rights violations should be pursued through the Human Rights Council and special rapporteurs.
  • Pakistan should link Kashmir to wider concerns about nuclear escalation and the Indus waters.
  • It should support the Uniting for Consensus group's approach to Security Council reform.
  • Kashmiri voices should be heard directly in international forums.

9. Conclusion

  • The Council's resolutions on Kashmir remain valid in law, but a body built around the veto cannot enforce them against a state that powerful members wish to protect. A just solution will need both reform of the Council and patient diplomacy that puts the wishes of the Kashmiri people first.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2026 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)