CSS 2016 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

CSS 2016 — GK-III (Pakistan Affairs) · Part-II: attempt any 4 of 7 questions (20 marks each). Part-I MCQs were not included in the source PDF.

Themes this year: Shah Waliullah and Aligarh (Q2–Q3), 1937–39 and the Lahore Resolution (Q4–Q5), post-9/11 foreign policy (Q6), Kashmir (Q7), Afghanistan and non-state actors (Q8).

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Q2. Give an account of the life and services of Shah Waliullah. How did he save the Indian Muslims from political annihilation and religious degeneration? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Life → Conditions of Muslims in the 18th century → Religious services → Educational and intellectual services → Social and economic thought → Political services (letters to Abdali, Panipat) → How he saved Muslims → Legacy → Conclusion

Introduction

Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) lived when the Mughal Empire was collapsing after Aurangzeb's death (1707). Marathas, Sikhs and Jats threatened Muslim power; Muslims were divided by sectarianism, ignorance and moral decline. Shah Waliullah combined scholarship, reform and political vision to revive Islam and restore Muslim strength. He is rightly called the first great reformer of modern Muslim India.

1. Life

• Born in Delhi on 21 February 1703 (Qutb-ud-Din Ahmad); son of Shah Abdur Rahim, a scholar who helped compile the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri and founded the Madrasa-e-Rahimia.
• Memorised the Quran at seven; completed education by fifteen; taught at Madrasa-e-Rahimia after his father's death (1719).
• Performed Hajj and studied in Makkah and Madinah (1730–32), especially hadith under Shaikh Abu Tahir al-Madani.
• Wrote over 50 works in Arabic and Persian; died in Delhi in 1762.

2. Conditions of Muslims in His Time

• Political: weak Mughal emperors; court intrigues; Maratha raids reached Delhi; Sikhs in Punjab; Jats near Agra.
• Religious: sectarian conflict (Sunni-Shia), blind following (taqlid), un-Islamic customs, ignorance of the Quran.
• Social and economic: luxury of the elite, heavy taxation on peasants, idle nobility, moral decay.

3. Religious Services

• Translation of the Quran into Persian (Fath-ur-Rahman, 1737–38) so ordinary educated Muslims could understand it directly — revolutionary at a time when ulema opposed translation. His sons Shah Rafiuddin and Shah Abdul Qadir later translated it into Urdu.
• Emphasised Quran and Hadith as the sources of guidance; wrote on the principles of tafsir (Al-Fauz-ul-Kabir).
• Tatbiq (reconciliation): sought to reconcile the four schools of Sunni fiqh and reduce sectarian conflict; stressed ijtihad within limits.
• Wrote Izalat-ul-Khifa on the caliphate to counter sectarian polemics.

4. Intellectual Services

• Hujjat-Allah al-Baligha (his masterpiece): explained the wisdom behind Islamic injunctions rationally, covering ethics, society, economics and politics.
• Reformed the madrasa curriculum, emphasising hadith and the Quran.
• Trained a generation of scholars; his sons Shah Abdul Aziz, Shah Rafiuddin and Shah Abdul Qadir, and grandson Shah Ismail Shaheed, continued his mission.

5. Social and Economic Thought

• Condemned extravagance of the nobility and exploitation of peasants and artisans.
• Argued that economic justice and fair taxation are necessary for a stable society; warned that economic injustice leads to collapse (an early theory of social decline).
• Called for moral reform of every class — rulers, soldiers, ulema, Sufis.

6. Political Services

• Wrote letters to Muslim nobles (e.g., Najib-ud-Daulah, Nizam-ul-Mulk) urging unity against the Marathas.
• Invited Ahmad Shah Abdali, King of Afghanistan, to save the Muslims; Abdali defeated the Marathas at the Third Battle of Panipat (14 January 1761), breaking Maratha power in the north.

7. How He Saved Muslims from Political Annihilation

• Panipat prevented a Maratha takeover of Delhi and the complete destruction of Muslim political power in north India.
• His call for unity inspired later Muslim resistance movements (e.g., Syed Ahmad Barelvi's Jihad Movement).

8. How He Saved Muslims from Religious Degeneration

• Direct access to the Quran through translation.
• Reduced sectarianism through reconciliation of schools.
• Revived the study of hadith and rational understanding of Islam.
• Created an intellectual tradition that kept Muslim identity alive under British rule.

9. Legacy

• The Waliullahi school influenced Deoband (1867), the Ahl-e-Hadith, Syed Ahmad Barelvi's movement, and even Sir Syed's rational approach.
• Allama Iqbal praised him as the first Muslim to feel the urge of rethinking Islam in the modern age.

Conclusion

Shah Waliullah stood at the crossroads of Muslim decline in India. Through his translation of the Quran, reconciliation of schools, reform of education and society, and his strategic appeal to Abdali, he preserved both the faith and the political existence of Indian Muslims. The intellectual and religious revival he began shaped every later Muslim reform movement and ultimately the consciousness that led to Pakistan.

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Q3. The Aligarh Movement was a pure educational venture but it had deep impacts on Indian politics. Discuss. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Origins and objectives → Educational institutions and activities → Associates → Political impacts → Social, literary and religious impacts → Criticism → Conclusion

Introduction

The Aligarh Movement, led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and his associates from the 1860s, began with the aim of spreading modern Western education among Muslims. It was, at first, an educational and social reform movement. But the educated class it produced, the institutions it built and the political ideas of its founder shaped Muslim politics for the next seventy years — up to the creation of Pakistan.

1. Origins and Objectives

• Muslims were backward after 1857: excluded from jobs, suspicious of English education.
• Objectives: (1) remove British mistrust; (2) promote modern education while preserving Islamic values; (3) social reform; (4) promote Urdu.

2. Educational Activities

• Schools at Moradabad (1859) and Ghazipur (1862/63); Scientific Society (1864) translated Western books into Urdu.
• Aligarh Institute Gazette (1866) and Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq (1870).
• MAO High School (1875) and College (1877), modelled on Oxford and Cambridge, combining science, English, Islamic studies and residential discipline; became Aligarh Muslim University (1920).
• Muhammadan Educational Conference (1886): annual sessions across India spread the movement.

3. Associates

Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali, Maulana Shibli Nomani, Deputy Nazir Ahmad, Maulana Chiragh Ali; British principals Theodore Beck and Theodore Morison.

4. Political Impacts (Despite Being Educational)

1. Two-Nation consciousness: Sir Syed's statements after the Hindi-Urdu controversy (1867) and his speeches at Lucknow and Meerut (1887–88) presented Hindus and Muslims as separate nations with separate interests.
2. Separate political path: his advice to avoid the Congress kept Muslims away from a Hindu-dominated platform; the Patriotic Association (1888) and Defence Association (1893) were early Muslim political bodies.
3. Simla Deputation (1906): organised by Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Secretary of Aligarh College.
4. All-India Muslim League (1906): founded at the Dhaka session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference; Aligarh alumni formed its core.
5. Leadership of the Pakistan Movement: Aligarh produced leaders such as Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and many League organisers.
6. Students as political workers: in the 1945–46 elections, Aligarh students campaigned throughout India for the League; Jinnah called Aligarh "the arsenal of Muslim India".
7. Defence of Urdu as a symbol of Muslim identity made language a political issue.

5. Social, Literary and Religious Impacts

• Rational interpretation of Islam; reform of customs; Urdu prose modernised; Hali's Musaddas inspired Muslim revival.
• Emergence of a Muslim middle class in services and professions.

6. Criticism

• Accused of loyalty to the British and of serving mainly the Muslim elite of north India.
• Religious scholars opposed its rationalism (Sir Syed called naturi).
• Its political advice (stay out of Congress) was later questioned by some Muslims.

Conclusion

The Aligarh Movement set out to educate, but education proved to be politics by other means. It gave Muslims a modern leadership, political self-awareness and the conviction that they were a separate nation. From the Simla Deputation to the Muslim League to the elections of 1946, Aligarh's influence runs through the entire Pakistan Movement — a clear demonstration of how an educational venture reshaped the politics of a subcontinent.

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Q4. Critically analyze the elections of 1937 and the sufferings and grievances of the Muslims under the Congress rule in the provinces (1937–1939). How much did it help in popularizing the idea of a separate Muslim state in India? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Government of India Act 1935 → Elections of 1937: results and analysis → Congress refusal of coalition → Grievances under Congress rule → Muslim reports → Resignation and Day of Deliverance → Impact on the idea of Pakistan → Critical evaluation → Conclusion

Introduction

The provincial elections of 1937, held under the Government of India Act 1935, brought the Congress to power in most provinces. Its 27 months in office (July 1937 – October/November 1939) are regarded by Muslims as a period of majority domination. The experience convinced many Muslims that, in a united India, democracy would mean permanent Hindu rule — a key reason why the League adopted the Lahore Resolution only three months after the Congress resigned.

1. Government of India Act 1935

• Introduced provincial autonomy with elected ministries, retained separate electorates, and expanded the franchise (about 30 million voters).

2. Elections of 1937: Results

• Congress: won an absolute majority in five provinces (UP, Bihar, CP, Madras, Orissa) and was the largest party in Bombay; later formed ministries in eight provinces including NWFP and Assam. Out of about 1,585 seats it won around 711, but contested few Muslim seats and won only about 26 of them.
• Muslim League: won only about 108 of 482 Muslim seats; failed to form a government anywhere. In Punjab the Unionist Party and in Bengal Fazlul Haq's Krishak Praja Party dominated.

3. Analysis of the Results

• The League was poorly organised, lacked mass contact and faced strong provincial parties.
• The Congress interpreted its victory as proof that only two parties existed — the British and the Congress (Nehru). Jinnah replied that there was a third party — the Muslims.
• In UP, the Congress refused a coalition with the League unless League members merged into the Congress — a decisive humiliation.

4. Grievances Under Congress Rule

1. Bande Mataram made the anthem and the Congress tricolour flown on public buildings.
2. Wardha Scheme (Gandhi's basic education) and Vidya Mandir Scheme (CP) promoted Hindu culture, ignored Islamic teaching and downgraded Urdu.
3. Hindi promoted at the expense of Urdu.
4. Restrictions on cow slaughter and interference in religious practices; disturbances during prayers and processions.
5. Discrimination in jobs and services; police partiality in communal riots.
6. Muslim Mass Contact Movement tried to weaken the League by recruiting Muslims directly into the Congress.

5. Reports Documenting Grievances

• Pirpur Report (1938) — League inquiry under Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur.
• Shareef Report (1939) — on Bihar.
• Fazlul Haq's "Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule" (1939).

6. Resignation and Day of Deliverance

• The Congress ministries resigned (October–November 1939) to protest India's entry into the Second World War without consultation.
• Jinnah declared 22 December 1939 a Day of Deliverance and Thanksgiving, celebrated across Muslim India.

7. Impact on the Idea of a Separate State

1. Proof of majority rule: Muslims saw how a Hindu-majority government would treat them.
2. Revival of the League: the Lucknow session (October 1937) reorganised the party; membership grew rapidly; provincial leaders (Sikandar Hayat, Fazlul Haq) signed the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact.
3. Shift from safeguards to separation: just three months later, the Lahore Resolution (23 March 1940) demanded independent states.
4. Mass support: the League won all Muslim seats in the Central Assembly and most provincial Muslim seats in 1945–46.

8. Critical Evaluation

• Some historians argue that the grievances were exaggerated for political purposes and that the Congress also introduced reforms (e.g., agrarian relief).
• Nonetheless, the Congress's refusal to share power in UP and its cultural policies created a genuine sense of exclusion. Perception mattered politically: Muslims believed their identity was threatened.
• Other factors (Iqbal's ideas, Jinnah's leadership, the war) also contributed, but the 1937–39 experience gave the idea of Pakistan practical urgency.

Conclusion

The elections of 1937 exposed the League's weakness, but the Congress's conduct in office became the League's strongest argument. Its refusal of coalition, cultural policies and discrimination convinced Muslims that constitutional safeguards within a united India were worthless. The Congress rule of 1937–39 thus transformed the idea of a separate Muslim state from a poet's vision into a mass political demand.

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Q5. Jinnah in his Presidential Address to the annual session of All India Muslim League in March 1940 said, "The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character, but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such." Write a note on the Two Nation Theory and the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 in the light of this statement. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Meaning of Jinnah's statement → Two-Nation Theory: meaning and evolution → Lahore session and Jinnah's address → Text and main points of the Lahore Resolution → Reaction → Significance → Conclusion

Introduction

On 22 March 1940 at Minto Park, Lahore, Quaid-e-Azam argued that Hindus and Muslims were not two communities but two nations, and therefore the Indian problem was international, requiring a solution between nations rather than minority safeguards. The next day the League adopted the Lahore Resolution demanding independent states. The statement captures the essence of the Two-Nation Theory and explains why the Resolution demanded territorial separation.

1. Meaning of the Statement

• An inter-communal problem can be solved by safeguards within one state (separate electorates, reserved seats).
• An international problem exists between nations; it requires sovereignty and self-determination.
• By 1940 Jinnah concluded that safeguards had failed (Nehru Report 1928, Congress ministries 1937–39); only separate statehood could protect Muslims.

2. The Two-Nation Theory

• Meaning: Muslims and Hindus are two separate nations by any definition — religion, culture, history, language, law, customs, heroes, and outlook on life.
• Jinnah's words (1940): they "belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine… their aspects on life and of life are different… to yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction."
• Evolution: Al-Biruni's observations; Mujaddid Alf Thani's defence of Muslim identity; Shah Waliullah; Sir Syed ("two nations"); separate electorates (1909); Iqbal's Allahabad Address (1930); Chaudhry Rahmat Ali (1933); Jinnah's articulation (1940).
• Basis: Islam as a complete code of life and the historical experience of Muslims as a separate community.

3. The Lahore Session and Resolution

• Session of 22–24 March 1940; resolution moved by A.K. Fazlul Haq (Bengal) on 23 March, seconded by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman and others; adopted 24 March.
• Main points:
  1. No constitutional plan would be acceptable unless designed on the principle that geographically contiguous units be demarcated into regions with territorial readjustments.
  2. Areas where Muslims are in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones, be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
  3. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities in these units and regions.
  4. Rejection of the federal scheme of the 1935 Act.
• The Hindu press called it the "Pakistan Resolution"; the League adopted the name. The Delhi Convention (April 1946) clarified the demand as one state, Pakistan.

4. Reaction

• Congress called it a vivisection of India; Gandhi called it an "untruth".
• British responded with the August Offer (1940), acknowledging that power would not be transferred to a system whose authority was denied by large elements of national life.
• Muslims welcomed it as a clear goal; the League grew into a mass party.

5. Significance

1. Turned the Two-Nation Theory into a concrete political programme.
2. Gave Muslims a clear destination within seven years.
3. Changed the League's strategy from seeking safeguards to demanding sovereignty.
4. Became the basis of the 1945–46 election campaign, which the League won decisively.
5. 23 March is now Pakistan Day; Minar-e-Pakistan marks the site.

6. Evaluation of the Statement

Jinnah's framing was strategic and accurate: once Muslims were accepted as a nation, the logic of self-determination applied. The failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946) and the violence of 1946–47 confirmed that the problem could not be solved within one state.

Conclusion

Jinnah's statement redefined the Indian question: not a minority seeking protection but a nation seeking statehood. The Two-Nation Theory supplied the justification and the Lahore Resolution the programme. Within seven years this "international" solution became reality in the form of Pakistan.

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Q6. Write a note on the post 9/11 foreign policy of Pakistan. What role do you foresee for Pakistan in regional and global politics in the near future? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Determinants → Phase 1 (2001–08) → Phase 2 (2008–14) → Phase 3 (2014–21) → Phase 4 (2021 onward) → Relations with key states → Achievements and failures → Future role (regional, global) → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

The attacks of 11 September 2001 changed Pakistan's foreign policy overnight. From a sanctioned state supporting the Taliban, Pakistan became a frontline US ally. Since then it has balanced security imperatives, economic needs and great-power rivalry — from the War on Terror to CPEC, and from US dependence to a closer partnership with China while re-engaging Washington. Its future role depends on converting its geography into connectivity and its security experience into regional stability.

1. Determinants

• Geography (between South Asia, Central Asia, China and the Gulf), hostility with India, the Afghan conflict, nuclear status, economic dependence, and Islamic identity.

2. Phases of Post-9/11 Foreign Policy

Phase 1 (2001–08): Frontline state

• Joined the War on Terror; sanctions lifted; major non-NATO ally (2004); composite dialogue with India (2004) and back-channel on Kashmir; Musharraf's "enlightened moderation".

Phase 2 (2008–14): Strained alliance

• Drone strikes, Raymond Davis, Abbottabad raid (2011), Salala (2011) and closure of NATO routes; Kerry-Lugar aid; Mumbai attacks (2008) froze dialogue with India.

Phase 3 (2014–21): Pivot to China and the region

• CPEC (2015); full membership of the SCO (2017); Zarb-e-Azb; Trump's accusations (January 2018) and aid cuts; FATF grey list (2018–22); facilitation of the US-Taliban Doha Agreement (February 2020); Kartarpur Corridor (2019); response to India's revocation of Article 370 (2019).

Phase 4 (2021 onward): Geo-economics and balancing

• Taliban return (2021) and growing tension with Kabul over the TTP; the first National Security Policy (2022) emphasising economic security.
• IMF programmes; reliance on China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• May 2025 conflict with India and ceasefire; improved ties with the Trump administration in 2025 (tariff agreement, cooperation on minerals and counter-terrorism).
• Hosting the SCO Heads of Government meeting (Islamabad, October 2024); UNSC non-permanent member 2025–26; Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (September 2025).

3. Relations with Key States (brief)

• US: transactional; cycles of engagement and estrangement.
• China: all-weather strategic partnership; CPEC; defence cooperation.
• India: hostility with brief dialogue windows; Kashmir core issue.
• Afghanistan: from strategic depth to open tension over the TTP.
• Gulf and Muslim world: financial support, remittances, OIC diplomacy; mediation roles (Saudi–Iran, US–Iran contacts).
• Russia and Central Asia: improved ties; energy and trade corridors.

4. Achievements and Failures

Achievements: survived isolation; CPEC; SCO membership; exit from FATF grey list (October 2022); nuclear deterrence maintained; role in the Afghan peace process.

Failures: image as a terrorism-linked state; dependence on aid; inconsistent Afghan policy; limited economic diplomacy; poor relations with neighbours.

5. Future Role in Regional Politics

1. Connectivity hub: CPEC, Gwadar, trade corridors to Central Asia and Afghanistan (Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway).
2. Stabiliser in Afghanistan: through regional mechanisms (China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral, SCO).
3. Balancing India: strategic deterrence and diplomacy on Kashmir.
4. Bridge between China and the Gulf, and between Iran and the Arab world.

6. Future Role in Global Politics

1. Balancer in US–China rivalry: avoid bloc politics; maintain ties with both.
2. Voice of the Muslim world: OIC leadership, Palestine and Kashmir advocacy.
3. UN peacekeeping: one of the largest troop contributors.
4. Climate diplomacy: leading voice for vulnerable states (loss and damage fund, COP27).
5. Counter-terrorism experience to share with others.

7. Recommendations

• Economic diplomacy at the centre: exports, investment, IT.
• Internal stability and good governance as foundations of foreign policy.
• Consistent Afghan policy; regional connectivity.
• Improve image through soft power (culture, sports, diaspora).
• Institutionalised policymaking with parliamentary oversight.

Conclusion

Since 9/11 Pakistan's foreign policy has moved from crisis-driven alignment with the US to a more diversified, geo-economic approach centred on China, the Gulf and regional connectivity. Its future role can be significant — as a bridge, a connectivity hub and a stabilising force — provided it achieves economic strength and internal stability. A nation's weight abroad reflects its strength at home.

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Q7. Discuss the Kashmir problem in its entirety; throwing light on its background and prospects of possible solutions to this core issue between India and Pakistan. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Geography and importance → Historical background (1846–1947) → Accession dispute and 1947–48 war → UN resolutions → Wars and agreements → Freedom struggle since 1989 → 5 August 2019 and after → Pakistan's stance → India's stance → Possible solutions → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

Kashmir is the oldest unresolved dispute on the UN agenda and the core issue between Pakistan and India. Quaid-e-Azam called it the jugular vein of Pakistan. It has caused three wars (1947–48, 1965, 1999 Kargil) and continuous crises, most recently the May 2025 conflict. Its resolution according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people is essential for peace in South Asia.

1. Geography and Importance

• About 222,000 km²; India holds about 45%, Pakistan about 35% (Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan), China about 20% (Aksai Chin, Shaksgam).
• Rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — Pakistan's lifeline — flow from Kashmir.
• Strategic location bordering China and Afghanistan (via the Wakhan).

2. Historical Background

• Treaty of Amritsar (1846): the British sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh Dogra for Rs 7.5 million; a Muslim-majority population (about 77%) under Hindu Dogra rule.
• Oppression: heavy taxes, forced labour; the 1931 uprising (13 July martyrs); Muslim Conference (1932).

3. Accession Dispute (1947)

• Under the partition plan, princely states were to accede to India or Pakistan considering geography and population. Maharaja Hari Singh delayed; signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan.
• Poonch uprising and entry of tribal lashkars (October 1947).
• Instrument of Accession (claimed 26 October 1947); Indian troops landed in Srinagar on 27 October. Pakistan disputes its legitimacy; even Mountbatten's acceptance was conditional on a reference to the people.
• 1947–48 war; India took the matter to the UN (1 January 1948); ceasefire on 1 January 1949.

4. UN Resolutions

• UNSC Resolution 47 (21 April 1948) and UNCIP resolutions (13 August 1948, 5 January 1949): the question of accession to be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices.
• UNMOGIP established to monitor the ceasefire line.
• Later resolutions (80, 91, 122) reaffirmed that a constituent assembly cannot decide the final status.

5. Wars and Agreements

• 1965 war → Tashkent Declaration (1966).
• 1971 war → Simla Agreement (1972): bilateral resolution; the ceasefire line became the Line of Control; but it did not supersede UN resolutions ("final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir" still pending).
• Lahore Declaration (1999), then Kargil (1999); Agra Summit (2001); composite dialogue (2004) and back-channel talks.

6. The Kashmiri Freedom Struggle (1989 onward)

• Rigged elections of 1987 triggered an uprising (1989); massive Indian military deployment (about 700,000–900,000 personnel).
• Human rights abuses documented by the UN OHCHR reports (2018, 2019): extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, pellet-gun injuries, laws like AFSPA and PSA.
• Burhan Wani (2016) uprising.

7. 5 August 2019 and After

• India revoked Articles 370 and 35-A, split the state into two union territories, imposed a long communication blackout; new domicile rules (2020) raise fears of demographic change.
• Pakistan downgraded ties, suspended trade and raised the issue at the UNSC (first closed consultations in about 50 years, August 2019).
• India's Supreme Court upheld the revocation (December 2023).
• Pahalgam attack (April 2025) → India held the Indus Waters Treaty "in abeyance" → May 2025 military conflict and ceasefire; the US offered mediation, which Pakistan welcomed and India rejected.

8. Positions

• Pakistan: Kashmir is a disputed territory; resolution by plebiscite under UNSC resolutions; political, diplomatic and moral support to Kashmiris.
• India: claims Kashmir as an integral part; bilateral only (Simla); calls the issue terrorism-related.

9. Possible Solutions

10. Way Forward

1. Keep the dispute internationalised through the UN, OIC and human-rights forums.
2. Highlight human-rights violations through documented evidence.
3. Support dialogue with Kashmiri participation (All Parties Hurriyat Conference).
4. Confidence-building measures: ceasefire on the LoC (2021 understanding), trade and travel across the LoC.
5. Strengthen Pakistan's economy and diplomacy — the strongest foundation for its Kashmir policy.
6. Engage third parties willing to facilitate (US, China, Gulf states).

Conclusion

Kashmir is not a territorial dispute alone but a question of the right of self-determination of millions of people, recognised by UN resolutions. Seventy-five years of wars and failed talks show that no military solution exists. A just settlement — through dialogue involving Kashmiris and in line with UN resolutions — is the only path to lasting peace between two nuclear neighbours.

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Q8. Write a note on the Afghan War since 1979 and its impacts on Pakistan. How far can the emergence of "Non-State Actors" and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan be attributed to the decades-long warfare in Afghanistan? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Phases of the Afghan war (1979–2026) → Impacts on Pakistan (security, economic, social, political) → Non-state actors and NTS threats defined → Link with the Afghan war → Other (internal) causes → Evaluation → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

Since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan has been at war almost continuously. Pakistan, as its neighbour and frontline state, has absorbed the consequences — refugees, weapons, drugs, extremism and terrorism. Much of Pakistan's non-state militancy can be traced to this war, though internal factors also played a major role.

1. Phases of the Afghan War

• 1979–89 Soviet occupation: Pakistan, with US and Saudi support, backed the mujahideen; about 3 million refugees arrived; the Geneva Accords (14 April 1988) led to Soviet withdrawal (1989).
• 1989–96 civil war among mujahideen factions.
• 1996–2001 Taliban rule; Pakistan among three countries recognising it; al-Qaeda sheltered.
• 2001–21 US/NATO war after 9/11; Taliban insurgency; Pakistan a frontline ally.
• 2021 onward: Taliban return; TTP resurgence; Pakistan–Afghanistan border clashes (October 2025, February 2026) and mediation by Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and China.

2. Impacts on Pakistan

Security

• Militancy and terrorism; emergence of the TTP (2007); sanctuary on both sides of the border; suicide attacks.
• Kalashnikov culture — weapons flooded the country.

Economic

• Losses estimated above $120 billion during the War on Terror alone; damage to investment and tourism.
• Informal economy, smuggling and transit-trade misuse.

Social

• Millions of refugees (about 3 million at peak), pressure on services and jobs.
• Drug addiction: heroin trade from Afghanistan created millions of addicts in Pakistan.
• Radicalisation through a jihadi culture and unregulated madrasas; sectarianism.

Political

• Strengthened military rule (Zia, Musharraf) through Western support.
• Strained relations with the US and Afghanistan; image problems.

3. Non-State Actors and Non-Traditional Security Threats

• Non-state actors (NSAs): groups not part of a state that use force or influence — militant groups (TTP, ISKP, sectarian groups, Baloch insurgents), criminal networks.
• Non-traditional security threats: terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, cyber threats, refugee flows, climate and water stress.

4. How Far the Afghan War Is Responsible

Strong link:

1. The anti-Soviet jihad created trained, armed networks and an ideology of armed struggle that later turned inward.
2. Weapons and drugs from Afghanistan financed and armed militants.
3. Sanctuaries across the porous border allowed the TTP and ISKP to operate.
4. Blowback after 2001: Pakistan's alliance with the US turned some militants against the state.
5. Refugee camps became recruiting grounds.
6. Post-2021: the Taliban takeover emboldened the TTP; attacks surged (2025 among the most violent years).

Other causes:

• State policies: patronage of certain militant groups for regional objectives; tolerance of sectarian outfits.
• Governance vacuum in FATA (Frontier Crimes Regulation), poverty and illiteracy.
• Sectarian polarisation influenced by Iran–Saudi rivalry.
• Ethnic grievances in Balochistan (largely indigenous, with alleged external support).
• Weak criminal justice and police systems.

5. Evaluation

The Afghan war is the principal external factor behind Pakistan's non-state actors and NTS threats — it supplied the ideology, weapons, drugs, training and sanctuaries. But internal policy choices and governance failures allowed these threats to take root. Attributing the problem entirely to Afghanistan would ignore Pakistan's own responsibility; ignoring Afghanistan would miss the main source.

6. Way Forward

• Implement the National Action Plan (2014) fully; strengthen NACTA, police and CTDs.
• Border management, refugee registration and orderly repatriation.
• Development and governance in merged districts.
• Counter-extremism: madrasa reform, curriculum, Paigham-e-Pakistan.
• Regional cooperation against TTP and ISKP; engagement with Kabul.
• Counter-narcotics and anti-smuggling enforcement.

Conclusion

Four decades of war in Afghanistan have shaped Pakistan's security like no other factor, planting the seeds of militancy, drug trafficking and extremism. The emergence of non-state actors can largely be attributed to this war, but its growth was also enabled by Pakistan's own policies and governance gaps. Lasting security requires both a stable Afghanistan and internal reform in Pakistan.