CSS 2025 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

CSS 2025 — GK-III (Pakistan Affairs) · Part-I: 20 MCQs (20 marks, 30 minutes) · Part-II: attempt any 4 of 7 questions (20 marks each).

Themes this year: Indus Waters Treaty (Q2), 1971 (Q3), CPEC (Q4), diversity and integration (Q5), Bhutto's nationalisation (Q6), Kashmir policy (Q7), media (Q8).

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Part-I — MCQs with Answer Key

Unofficial key — items marked "verify" have disputed or unconfirmed answers.

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Q2. How did the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) affect water distribution and relations between Pakistan and India? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Background (1947–48 water dispute) → Negotiations and main provisions → Effects on water distribution → Effects on relations (cooperation and disputes) → Recent crisis (2016–2025) → Evaluation → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed on 19 September 1960 in Karachi by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan, with the World Bank as a signatory and mediator. It divided the six rivers of the Indus system between the two countries and created mechanisms for cooperation. It survived three wars and is often cited as a rare success in Pakistan-India relations — until India declared it "in abeyance" in April 2025.

1. Background

• Partition divided the Indus basin: Pakistan became the lower riparian while the headworks (Madhopur on the Ravi, Ferozepur on the Sutlej) went to India.
• On 1 April 1948, India stopped water to Pakistani canals, threatening crops; the Inter-Dominion Accord (May 1948) was a temporary arrangement.
• David Lilienthal (1951) proposed a joint approach; the World Bank mediated for about nine years.

2. Main Provisions

1. Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) allocated to India for unrestricted use (about 33 MAF annually).
2. Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) allocated to Pakistan (about 135 MAF, roughly 80% of the system's flow); India must "let flow" these waters, with limited rights for domestic use, non-consumptive use, agriculture on a small scale and run-of-river hydropower under design restrictions; limited storage (about 3.6 MAF).
3. Transition period (1960–70) for Pakistan to build replacement works.
4. Indus Basin Development Fund: financed replacement works (World Bank, US, UK and others; India contributed about £62 million).
5. Permanent Indus Commission: one commissioner from each country; annual meetings, data exchange, inspections.
6. Dispute resolution: questions to the Commission → differences to a Neutral Expert → disputes to a Court of Arbitration.
7. No provision for unilateral termination; modification only by a duly ratified treaty (Article XII).

3. Effects on Water Distribution

For Pakistan

• Secured the bulk of the system's water; built Mangla (1967), Tarbela (1976), 5 barrages, 1 siphon and 8 link canals to transfer water from the western to the eastern rivers' command areas.
• Loss of the eastern rivers dried up stretches of the Ravi and Sutlej, affecting groundwater and ecosystems.

For India

• Full use of eastern rivers through the Bhakra-Nangal system and the Indira Gandhi Canal; hydropower on western rivers under restrictions.

4. Effects on Relations

Cooperation

• Survived the wars of 1965, 1971 and Kargil (1999) and many crises.
• The Permanent Indus Commission met regularly for decades — a model of technical cooperation.

Disputes

• Salal Dam (resolved bilaterally, 1978).
• Wullar Barrage/Tulbul (unresolved).
• Baglihar Dam (Chenab): Neutral Expert decision (2007) allowed the dam with some design modifications.
• Kishanganga (Neelum): Court of Arbitration (2013) allowed diversion but required a minimum environmental flow.
• Ratle and Kishanganga (2016 onward): parallel processes — Pakistan sought a Court of Arbitration, India a Neutral Expert; both started in 2022.
• India's notices seeking modification (January 2023, September 2024).

5. Recent Crisis (2025)

• After the Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025), India announced it was holding the treaty "in abeyance" and stopped data sharing and Commission meetings.
• Pakistan declared that any attempt to stop or divert its share of water would be considered an act of war, and said it could hold other bilateral agreements, including the Simla Agreement, in abeyance.
• The Court of Arbitration ruled in 2025 that India cannot unilaterally hold the treaty in abeyance and that the treaty remains binding; India rejected the court's legitimacy.
• Concerns: India's capacity to manipulate flows (flushing or storage on the Chenab and Jhelum) during critical sowing periods.

6. Evaluation

• Strengths: clear allocation, durable framework, legal mechanisms that have worked, World Bank role.
• Weaknesses: gave up eastern rivers entirely; did not anticipate climate change, groundwater issues or India's hydropower expansion on western rivers; vulnerable to politicisation.
• The treaty turned water into a stabilising factor for six decades; its weakening now makes water a potential flashpoint between nuclear states.

7. Way Forward

1. Use the treaty's legal mechanisms and the World Bank's role; build international support for the treaty's sanctity.
2. Strengthen Pakistan's technical and legal capacity (Indus Commissioner's office, data monitoring, satellite hydrology).
3. Build storage (Diamer-Bhasha, Mohmand) and improve water efficiency at home.
4. Advocate climate-related cooperation (glacier monitoring, floods data sharing) under the treaty.
5. Keep water separate from other disputes; resume Commission meetings.

Conclusion

The Indus Waters Treaty gave Pakistan secure access to the western rivers and helped keep water out of Pakistan-India wars for over six decades. Its division of rivers shaped Pakistan's irrigation and dam infrastructure. India's attempt in 2025 to hold it in abeyance has turned a symbol of cooperation into a source of tension. Preserving the treaty through international law, diplomacy and domestic water reform is vital for Pakistan's survival.

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Q3. Examine the causes and consequences of the 1971 separation of East Pakistan, highlighting the role of regional and international players. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Causes (political, economic, linguistic-cultural, administrative, military action) → Events of 1970–71 → Role of India → Role of the USSR → Role of the US → Role of China → Role of the UN and others → Consequences (for Pakistan, region) → Lessons → Conclusion

Introduction

On 16 December 1971, the Pakistani forces in Dhaka surrendered and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Pakistan lost more than half its population. The separation resulted from long-standing political, economic and cultural grievances, a military crackdown, and India's intervention supported by the Soviet Union. It was the greatest tragedy in Pakistan's history.

1. Causes

a) Political

• East Pakistan had the majority (about 55%) but was denied proportional power: parity in the 1956 Constitution, One Unit (1955), and prolonged military rule dominated by West Pakistani elites.
• Dismissal of Bengali governments (e.g., the United Front ministry, 1954).
• Refusal to transfer power after the 1970 elections, in which the Awami League won 160 of 162 general seats in East Pakistan and a national majority (PPP won 81 in the West).

b) Economic

• Jute exports earned much of the foreign exchange, but investment went mostly to the West; the per capita income gap widened in the 1960s; East Pakistan's share of development spending lower.
• Economists (the "two economies" thesis) highlighted disparity.

c) Linguistic and cultural

• Declaration of Urdu as the sole national language (1948); Language Movement (21 February 1952); Bengali recognised only in 1956.
• Perception of cultural arrogance by the West Pakistani elite.

d) Administrative and military

• Under-representation of Bengalis in the civil service and army (a small share of officers).
• Neglect during the 1965 war (East was left undefended) and the 1970 Bhola cyclone (slow relief).

e) Political mobilisation

• Six Points (1966) of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman; Agartala Conspiracy Case (1968) made him a hero.

f) Military action

• Postponement of the National Assembly session (1 March 1971) triggered civil disobedience; Operation Searchlight (25 March 1971); widespread violence; about 10 million refugees fled to India.

2. Role of Regional and International Players

India

• Trained and armed the Mukti Bahini; used the refugee crisis to justify intervention; Indira Gandhi's diplomatic campaign.
• Launched a full-scale war after Pakistan's air strikes on 3 December 1971; captured Dhaka in 13 days.

Soviet Union

• Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (9 August 1971); arms to India; vetoed UNSC ceasefire resolutions in December 1971.

United States

• President Nixon and Kissinger "tilted" toward Pakistan, partly because Pakistan facilitated Kissinger's secret visit to China (July 1971); sent the USS Enterprise task force to the Bay of Bengal; but provided little practical help (arms embargo continued).

China

• Diplomatic support to Pakistan and condemnation of India, but no military intervention.

United Nations

• The General Assembly passed a ceasefire resolution by a large majority (7 December 1971), but the Security Council was blocked by Soviet vetoes.

Muslim world

• Sympathy for Pakistan but little practical help.

3. Consequences

For Pakistan

• Loss of the eastern wing; about 90,000 POWs; national trauma.
• End of military rule: Bhutto came to power; 1973 Constitution with a federal parliamentary system.
• Simla Agreement (1972).
• Hamoodur Rahman Commission report on political and military failures.
• Nuclear programme accelerated (Multan meeting, January 1972).
• Strategic shift toward the Muslim world and China.

For the region

• India emerged as the dominant South Asian power.
• Bangladesh became independent; Pakistan recognised it in 1974.
• Deepened Pakistan-India hostility.

4. Lessons

• Respect democratic verdicts and majority rights.
• Genuine federalism and provincial autonomy (reflected in the 1973 Constitution and the 18th Amendment).
• Economic justice and cultural respect for all regions.
• Military solutions to political problems fail.

Conclusion

The separation of East Pakistan was caused by political exclusion, economic disparity, cultural insensitivity and a disastrous military crackdown, and was completed by India's intervention backed by the Soviet Union, while the US and China offered limited support to Pakistan. Its lessons — democracy, federalism and justice for all regions — remain central to Pakistan's unity today.

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Q4. Explore the significance of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) for the economic development of Pakistan. What are its potential challenges and opportunities? (20)

Outline: Introduction → CPEC overview → Significance (energy, infrastructure, Gwadar, industry, trade, jobs, regional connectivity, investment) → Achievements to date → Challenges → Opportunities → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in April 2015 as the flagship of China's Belt and Road Initiative, is the largest foreign investment programme in Pakistan's history, valued at about $62 billion. It connects Kashgar to Gwadar and aims to transform Pakistan's energy, infrastructure and industry. A decade on, it has delivered significant infrastructure but its industrial promise remains largely unrealised.

1. Significance for Economic Development

1. Energy: projects adding about 8,000 MW helped end the chronic load-shedding of the early 2010s (Sahiwal, Port Qasim, Hub, Thar coal, Karot hydropower, wind and solar).
2. Infrastructure: motorways (M-5 Multan–Sukkur), KKH Phase II (Havelian–Thakot), Orange Line Metro, Gwadar airport; planned ML-1 railway upgrade.
3. Gwadar Port: a deep-sea port with potential as a regional trade and logistics hub.
4. Industrialisation: Special Economic Zones (Rashakai, Dhabeji, Allama Iqbal Industrial City, Bostan) and potential relocation of Chinese industries.
5. Trade and exports: reduced transport costs; access to Chinese and Central Asian markets.
6. Employment: tens of thousands of direct jobs in Phase I; much larger potential in SEZs.
7. Regional connectivity: gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan; transit revenue.
8. Investment climate: signalled confidence to other investors; Chinese technology and expertise.
9. Balanced development: projects in all provinces including Balochistan and GB.

2. Achievements to Date

• Energy capacity added; major roads completed; Gwadar port operational; cross-border fibre optic cable.
• Phase II (agriculture, industry, science, social sector) launched but slow.

3. Challenges

1. Security: attacks on Chinese nationals (Dasu 2021, Karachi 2022, Besham 2024, Karachi airport 2024); Baloch insurgency.
2. Financial: debt servicing on CPEC loans; unpaid dues to Chinese IPPs; capacity payments raise electricity costs.
3. Slow implementation: SEZs lack utilities; ML-1 financing delayed.
4. Governance: policy inconsistency, bureaucratic delays, transparency concerns.
5. Local grievances: Gwadar residents' concerns about water, fishing rights and jobs (Haq Do Tehreek).
6. Geopolitical opposition: India objects (route through Gilgit-Baltistan); US criticism of debt and transparency.
7. Economic constraints: Pakistan's balance-of-payments crises limit new investment.

4. Opportunities

1. Industrial relocation from China as wages rise there — textiles, electronics, footwear.
2. Agriculture modernisation and food processing for Chinese markets.
3. Mining and minerals (copper, gold, coal) with Chinese investment.
4. IT and digital cooperation (data centres, fibre optics).
5. Tourism along the KKH.
6. Third-party participation: Saudi Arabia, Gulf states and others investing in Gwadar and CPEC projects.
7. Green energy under CPEC (solar, hydro).
8. Extension to Afghanistan and Central Asia (trilateral discussions).

5. Way Forward

• Comprehensive security plan with community engagement; address Baloch grievances.
• Complete SEZs with utilities; attractive incentives for Chinese and Pakistani firms.
• Resolve IPP payment arrears; renegotiate expensive contracts where possible.
• Transparency: publish project details and costs.
• Local benefits in Gwadar and Balochistan: water, electricity, fishing protection, jobs and training.
• Policy continuity through the CPEC Authority and SIFC.
• Focus on export-oriented industries to repay loans.

Conclusion

CPEC has already changed Pakistan's energy and infrastructure landscape and holds the potential to industrialise the economy and connect the region. Its success now depends on security, economic reform, transparency and local ownership. If Pakistan can move from roads to industries, CPEC can become a genuine engine of economic development.

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Q5. Analyze the demographic and cultural diversity of Pakistan and its impact on national integration and policymaking. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Demographic profile (population, age, urbanisation, provinces) → Ethnic and linguistic diversity → Religious diversity → Cultural diversity → Impact on national integration (positive and negative) → Impact on policymaking → Measures → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan is the world's fifth most populous country (241.5 million, Census 2023) and one of its most diverse: dozens of languages, several major ethnic groups, a young population and growing cities. This diversity enriches national life but also shapes politics and policy — from resource distribution to language and education policy. Managing it well is central to national integration.

1. Demographic Profile

• Population growth about 2.55% (2017–23); about two-thirds under 30.
• Urban population about 39%; rapid growth of Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi and Peshawar.
• Provincial shares (approx.): Punjab about 53%, Sindh about 23%, KP about 17%, Balochistan about 6%, ICT about 1%.

2. Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity (mother tongues, approx., Census 2023)

• Punjabi about 37%, Pashto about 18%, Sindhi about 14%, Saraiki about 12%, Urdu about 9%, Balochi about 3%; also Hindko, Brahui, Kashmiri, Shina, Balti, Khowar and others.
• Ethnic groups: Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Saraikis, Muhajirs (Urdu-speakers), Baloch, Brahuis, Hazaras, Kashmiris, Gilgit-Baltistanis.

3. Religious Diversity

• Muslims about 96% (Sunni majority, significant Shia minority); Hindus about 1.6%, Christians about 1.4%, Sikhs, Ahmadis, Parsis and others.

4. Cultural Diversity

• Distinct regional traditions: Punjabi (Bhangra, Sufi poetry), Sindhi (ajrak, Shah Latif), Pashtun (Pashtunwali, jirga), Baloch (tribal traditions, embroidery), northern cultures (Kalash, Shandur polo).
• Unifying elements: Islam, Urdu, shared history, Sufism, national institutions.

5. Impact on National Integration

Positive

• Rich national culture and soft power.
• Economic complementarity between regions.
• Traditions of tolerance through Sufism and shared values.

Negative (when mismanaged)

• Language controversies: 1948–52 Bengali movement; 1972 Sindh language riots.
• Ethnic politics and violence: Karachi in the 1980s–90s.
• Perception of Punjabi dominance in the army and bureaucracy.
• Baloch alienation and insurgencies; Pashtun grievances (merged districts, PTM).
• Sectarian tensions and treatment of minorities.
• Separation of East Pakistan (1971) — the extreme outcome of mismanaging diversity.

6. Impact on Policymaking

1. Federal structure: diversity led to provincial autonomy (18th Amendment) and the CCI.
2. Resource distribution: NFC formula debates (population vs backwardness).
3. Census politics: disputes over census results (2017, 2023) because they determine seats and resources.
4. Language policy: Urdu national language; provinces promote regional languages (Article 251(3)); English as official language.
5. Education and curriculum: Single National Curriculum (2020) debates on uniformity vs diversity.
6. Quotas: regional quotas in federal jobs; reserved seats for minorities.
7. Security policy: handling ethnic insurgencies and sectarian violence.
8. New provinces: demands for South Punjab and Hazara provinces.
9. Population policy: different fertility and literacy rates across regions require tailored policies.

7. Measures

• Genuine federalism and empowered local governments.
• Fair and transparent census and resource sharing.
• Inclusive curriculum and media representing all cultures.
• Protection of minorities and interfaith harmony.
• Regional development to reduce disparities.
• Political dialogue with alienated groups.
• Promote Urdu as the link language while respecting regional languages.

Conclusion

Pakistan's demographic and cultural diversity is a source of strength but also a test of governance. When diversity has been ignored or suppressed, the country has faced alienation and conflict; when accommodated through federalism, fair resource sharing and respect for identities, it has strengthened unity. Policies that treat diversity as an asset are the surest path to national integration.

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Q6. Critically evaluate the impact of Bhutto's nationalization policy on the economy of Pakistan. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Background (22 families, inequality, PPP's socialism) → Phases of nationalisation → Objectives → Positive impacts → Negative impacts → Critical evaluation → Reversal (denationalisation) → Lessons → Conclusion

Introduction

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power in December 1971 promising "Islamic socialism" and roti, kapra aur makan. Between 1972 and 1976 his government nationalised major industries, banks, insurance and even agro-processing units. The policy aimed to end the concentration of wealth and give the state control over the economy. While it reduced the power of big business, it damaged private investment and industrial growth for decades.

1. Background

• The 1960s "decade of development" produced growth but high inequality; Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq (1968) claimed that 22 families controlled about two-thirds of industrial assets and most banking and insurance.
• The PPP's manifesto promised socialism; public anger after 1971.

2. Phases of Nationalisation

1. January 1972 — Economic Reforms Order: government took over management of 31 industrial units in 10 basic industries (iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, heavy electrical, motor vehicles, tractors, heavy chemicals, petrochemicals, cement, public utilities such as electricity and gas).
2. March 1972: life insurance nationalised (later State Life Insurance Corporation).
3. 1973: vegetable ghee industry nationalised; shipping and petroleum distribution taken over.
4. January 1974: banks nationalised (Banks Nationalisation Act).
5. July 1976: about 2,000 cotton-ginning, rice-husking and flour mills nationalised (many later returned).
6. Public sector expanded through new projects: Pakistan Steel Mills (founded 1973 with Soviet help), Port Qasim.

3. Objectives

• Reduce concentration of wealth and economic power.
• Direct investment toward basic industries and national priorities.
• Protect workers' rights; control prices of essentials.
• Ensure credit reached small borrowers, farmers and neglected regions.

4. Positive Impacts

1. Broke the power of the 22 families and reduced monopolies.
2. Credit expansion to agriculture, small businesses and less developed areas through nationalised banks.
3. Labour reforms: workers' participation, better wages and job security.
4. Heavy industry foundations: Pakistan Steel Mills, fertiliser and cement plants in the public sector.
5. Branch expansion of banks into rural areas.

5. Negative Impacts

1. Collapse of private investment: private industrial investment fell sharply; investors lost confidence.
2. Capital flight and migration of industrialists (many moved to the Gulf or abroad).
3. Slower industrial growth: large-scale manufacturing growth fell from about 8–10% in the 1960s to about 3–4% on average in the 1970s.
4. Inefficiency and losses: overstaffing, political appointments, poor management; state enterprises became a fiscal burden.
5. Corruption and politicisation of banks (politically motivated loans) and industries.
6. Agro-industry nationalisation (1976) affected small entrepreneurs and was widely seen as a political move.
7. Long-term legacy: loss-making SOEs (e.g., Pakistan Steel Mills) still drain the budget.

6. Critical Evaluation

• External shocks also hurt the economy in the 1970s: the 1973 oil price shock, floods (1973, 1976), the loss of East Pakistan's market, and a global recession. Not all poor performance can be blamed on nationalisation.
• Nevertheless, the policy was implemented hastily, without managerial capacity, and extended to small units, which destroyed business confidence — the key ingredient for investment.
• It achieved its social objective (reducing concentration of wealth) at a heavy economic cost.

7. Reversal

• Zia (1977–88): denationalised agro-units and some industries; restored confidence gradually.
• 1990s onward: privatisation of banks (MCB 1991, UBL, HBL 2004), industries and telecommunications (PTCL 2006).

8. Lessons

• The state should regulate markets and ensure equity through taxation and social protection, not run businesses it cannot manage.
• Policy stability and investor confidence are essential for growth.
• Reform of loss-making SOEs remains an unfinished task.

Conclusion

Bhutto's nationalisation broke the grip of a few families and expanded credit and workers' rights, but it discouraged private investment, slowed industrial growth and created inefficient state enterprises whose losses Pakistan still bears. It remains a key lesson in how well-intentioned economic policy, implemented without capacity and consistency, can damage long-term development.

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Q7. The Kashmir dispute is an unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition. Evaluate Pakistan's Kashmir policy for the solution of the problem. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Why an unfinished agenda → Phases of Pakistan's Kashmir policy → Strengths → Weaknesses → Current situation (2019–2025) → Evaluation → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Under the partition plan, Muslim-majority areas contiguous to Pakistan were expected to join it. Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state bordering Pakistan, was instead taken by India through a disputed accession in October 1947. The UN promised a plebiscite that never took place. For Pakistan, Kashmir is therefore the unfinished agenda of partition. Its Kashmir policy has combined war, diplomacy, bilateral talks and support for the Kashmiri struggle — with mixed results.

1. Why an "Unfinished Agenda"

• Principle of partition (contiguity and Muslim majority) not applied to Kashmir.
• UNSC resolutions (1948–49) for a plebiscite unimplemented.
• Kashmiris' continued resistance shows the issue is unresolved.

2. Phases of Pakistan's Kashmir Policy

1. 1947–65: military and UN track — 1947–48 war; reliance on UN resolutions; the 1965 war (Operation Gibraltar) failed to change the status quo.
2. 1972–89: bilateralism — the Simla Agreement (1972); low profile of the issue.
3. 1989–2001: support for the uprising — political, diplomatic and moral support to Kashmiris; Kargil (1999).
4. 2001–08: dialogue and flexibility — composite dialogue (2004), cross-LoC bus and trade (2005, 2008), Musharraf's four-point formula (soft borders, demilitarisation, self-governance, joint mechanism).
5. 2008–19: stalemate — Mumbai attacks froze talks; LoC tensions; Burhan Wani uprising (2016).
6. 2019 onward: diplomatic and legal campaign after India revoked Article 370 — UNSC consultations, downgraded ties, political map (2020), dossiers.
7. 2025: after the Pahalgam attack and May 2025 conflict, Pakistan welcomed US offers of mediation and sought internationalisation; India rejected third-party roles.

3. Strengths of Pakistan's Policy

• Consistent principled position based on UN resolutions and self-determination.
• Kept the issue alive internationally (UN, OIC, human-rights forums).
• Flexibility shown in the 2000s (back-channel), which came close to a framework.
• Solidarity with Kashmiris maintained.

4. Weaknesses

1. Military adventures (1965 Operation Gibraltar, Kargil 1999) failed and weakened Pakistan's diplomatic standing.
2. Association with militancy: support for armed groups allowed India to label the struggle as terrorism, especially after 9/11; FATF pressure.
3. Inconsistency: shifts between hard-line and flexible positions with changes of government.
4. Weak economy: limited diplomatic leverage compared to India's growing market.
5. Muslim world's limited support: Gulf states prioritise economic ties with India.
6. Emotional rhetoric rather than sustained strategy; limited engagement with international civil society.
7. Governance in AJK and GB not always showcased as a model.

5. Current Situation

• India has integrated the region administratively (2019); its Supreme Court upheld the change (2023).
• Human-rights concerns documented by the UN.
• The May 2025 conflict and IWT suspension raised global concern about nuclear escalation, briefly internationalising the issue.

6. Evaluation

Pakistan's policy has succeeded in keeping the dispute alive and preventing its legal settlement on India's terms, but it has not brought a solution. Military options failed, militancy damaged the cause, and diplomatic influence is limited by economic weakness. The most promising period was the 2004–07 dialogue, which combined flexibility with principle.

7. Recommendations

1. Economic strength as the foundation of diplomatic influence.
2. Human-rights-centred diplomacy with credible documentation and engagement of Western parliaments, media and civil society.
3. Legal avenues: UN human-rights mechanisms; highlight violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention (demographic change).
4. Kashmiri voices at the centre of advocacy.
5. Dialogue readiness with India when possible, building on the four-point formula framework without abandoning UN resolutions.
6. Third-party facilitation where available (US, Gulf, China).
7. Model governance in AJK and GB to strengthen Pakistan's moral position.
8. Clear distinction between political support and militancy.

Conclusion

Kashmir remains the unfinished business of partition. Pakistan's policy has kept the flame alive but has not achieved a solution, partly because of its own mistakes and partly because of India's intransigence and growing global weight. A strategy based on economic strength, credible human-rights diplomacy, Kashmiri participation and principled flexibility offers the best chance of moving toward a just settlement.

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Q8. Is media a curse or blessing? Critically evaluate its role in shaping public opinion and influencing political events in Pakistan in the 21st century. (20)

Outline: Introduction and stance → Evolution of media in the 21st century → Media as a blessing → Media as a curse → Role in political events (case studies) → Constraints on media freedom → Evaluation → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Media is often called the fourth pillar of the state. In the 21st century Pakistan's media landscape has been transformed: from a few state channels to over 100 private TV channels and a massive social-media population. Media has empowered citizens and held power to account, but also spread sensationalism, polarisation and misinformation. It is neither purely a curse nor a blessing; its effect depends on professionalism, regulation and media literacy.

1. Evolution of Media

• PEMRA Ordinance (2002) opened broadcasting to private channels (Geo, ARY, Express, Dunya, Samaa and others).
• Social media boom: tens of millions of users on Facebook, YouTube, X, TikTok and WhatsApp; political parties' digital wings.
• Digital journalism and YouTube-based commentators.

2. Media as a Blessing

1. Accountability and transparency: exposed corruption and governance failures.
2. Democratisation: amplified the Lawyers' Movement (2007–09), contributing to the restoration of the judiciary.
3. Public awareness: health campaigns (polio, COVID-19), climate awareness, disaster reporting (2005 earthquake, 2010 and 2022 floods).
4. Voice for marginalised groups: women's rights, minorities, missing persons.
5. Political participation: youth mobilisation, debates, election coverage.
6. Economic and cultural contribution: jobs, entertainment, Pakistani dramas and music with international audiences.
7. Social media gives ordinary citizens a platform.

3. Media as a Curse

1. Sensationalism and ratings race: breaking news culture, lack of verification.
2. Polarisation: partisan channels and social-media echo chambers deepen political divides.
3. Misinformation and fake news: propaganda, deepfakes and coordinated campaigns.
4. Media trials: prejudging cases.
5. Irresponsible coverage of terrorism (live coverage aiding terrorists, e.g., during attacks).
6. Commercial and political influence: owners' interests and advertising pressure.
7. Hate speech and incitement (sectarian or political).

4. Role in Political Events (Case Studies)

• 2007–09 Lawyers' Movement: live coverage mobilised the public; Musharraf's emergency (November 2007) shut channels.
• Memogate (2011) and the Panama Papers (2016–17): media-driven political crises leading to the disqualification of PM Nawaz Sharif.
• 2014 PTI-PAT dharnas: round-the-clock coverage shaped public perception.
• 2018 and 2024 elections: controversies over coverage, censorship and social-media campaigns.
• 2022 no-confidence and "cipher" narrative: social media drove a powerful political narrative; intense polarisation followed.
• 9 May 2023 events: social media mobilisation and later crackdowns.
• May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict: information warfare on both sides; Pakistani media and social media played a major role in shaping the domestic and international narrative.

5. Constraints on Media Freedom

• Pressure and censorship: channel suspensions, restrictions on coverage of certain leaders, journalists' harassment.
• Journalists' safety: killings (e.g., Arshad Sharif, 2022) and attacks.
• Legal controls: PEMRA directives; PECA (2016) and its 2025 amendments criminalising "false information" and creating a Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority — criticised by journalists' unions.
• Platform blocking: the X (Twitter) ban from February 2024 to May 2025.
• Pakistan ranks low on international press freedom indices (RSF).

6. Evaluation

Media has been a blessing in expanding accountability, awareness and democratic participation, and a curse when it spreads misinformation, polarisation and sensationalism. Excessive state control and irresponsible reporting are both harmful. The balance depends on ethical journalism, fair regulation and an informed public.

7. Recommendations

1. Independent regulation (PEMRA reform with professional, non-partisan leadership).
2. Journalists' protection laws (Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals Act 2021) implemented.
3. Code of ethics and self-regulation by media houses; fact-checking desks.
4. Media literacy in schools and universities.
5. Transparent social-media regulation targeting coordinated disinformation, not dissent.
6. Financial sustainability of independent media; transparent government advertising.
7. Right to Information laws to promote evidence-based journalism.

Conclusion

In 21st-century Pakistan, media has reshaped politics — empowering citizens and exposing wrongdoing, while also fuelling polarisation and misinformation. It is a blessing when free and responsible, and a curse when captured or reckless. Strengthening journalistic ethics, fair regulation, safety for journalists and public media literacy will allow media to serve democracy rather than divide it.