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CSS 2022 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

CSS 2022 — GK-III (Pakistan Affairs) · Part-II: attempt any 4 of 7 questions (20 marks each). Part-I MCQs were not included in the source PDF.

Themes this year: regional parties (Q2), 18th Amendment (Q3), early factional politics (Q4), ideology in foreign policy (Q5), foreign aid and loans (Q6), Western pacts (Q7), US-Pakistan after Afghanistan (Q8).

Q2. Discuss the role of regional and nationalist political parties in Pakistani politics. How far these parties are necessary for the political system? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Definitions → Major regional/nationalist parties → Roles (positive) → Negative aspects → Are they necessary? (arguments) → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic federation. Alongside national parties (PML-N, PPP, PTI), regional and nationalist parties represent particular provinces, ethnic groups or regions. They have shaped debates on provincial autonomy, resource distribution and identity. While sometimes accused of divisiveness, they are an essential channel for representing diversity in a federal democracy.

1. Definitions

  • Regional parties: base and agenda confined largely to one province or region.
  • Nationalist (ethno-nationalist) parties: advocate the rights and identity of a particular ethnic group (Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi, Muhajir).

2. Major Regional and Nationalist Parties

  • Awami National Party (ANP): Pashtun nationalist, roots in Khudai Khidmatgar (Bacha Khan); led campaigns for renaming NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
  • Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM): urban Sindh, Urdu-speaking Muhajirs; strong in Karachi and Hyderabad.
  • Balochistan National Party (BNP-Mengal) and National Party (NP): Baloch rights, control over resources.
  • Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP): Pashtuns of Balochistan.
  • Sindhi nationalist groups (e.g., Jeay Sindh parties, Sindh United Party).
  • Balochistan Awami Party (BAP): provincial party in Balochistan.
  • Regional parties in GB and AJK; religious parties with regional bases (JUI-F strong in KP and Balochistan).

3. Roles and Contributions

  1. Representation of diversity: give voice to groups that feel under-represented in national parties.
  2. Champions of provincial autonomy: played a key role in the 18th Amendment (2010) and the 7th NFC Award; the renaming of KP; recognition of provincial rights over resources (Article 172(3)).
  3. Coalition-makers: often decisive in forming federal and provincial governments (MQM, BAP, BNP in 2018 and 2022–24 coalitions).
  4. Bringing alienated groups into the mainstream: participation of Baloch nationalists in elections channels grievances into democratic politics rather than insurgency.
  5. Checks on centralisation: resist rollback of provincial powers.
  6. Local issues: water, gas royalties, jobs, language, missing persons.

4. Negative Aspects

  1. Ethnic polarisation: politics based on ethnicity can divide society (e.g., ethnic violence in Karachi in the 1980s–90s).
  2. Violence and militancy associated with some parties' past (MQM's militant wing, as alleged by courts and commissions).
  3. Narrow agendas that sometimes ignore national interests.
  4. Opportunistic coalition politics and bargaining for ministries.
  5. Weak internal democracy and dynastic leadership (like national parties).

5. Are They Necessary?

Yes, largely:

  • In a federation with diverse ethnic and linguistic groups, national parties cannot represent every regional interest.
  • They provide a democratic outlet for grievances; excluding them pushes discontent toward violence (Balochistan's insurgencies grew when nationalist parties were sidelined, e.g., after 2006).
  • They strengthen federalism and accountability of the centre.
  • Indian example: regional parties (DMK, TMC) are integral to Indian democracy.

But with conditions:

  • They must operate within the Constitution, reject violence and promote inter-ethnic harmony.
  • Stronger national parties with provincial organisations reduce the need for purely ethnic politics.

6. Recommendations

  • Genuine provincial autonomy and fair resource sharing to address grievances.
  • Inclusion of regional parties in national decision-making (CCI, parliamentary committees).
  • Electoral rules that discourage violence and hate speech.
  • National parties to build broad-based provincial leadership.
  • Intra-party democracy across all parties.

Conclusion

Regional and nationalist parties are an essential part of Pakistan's federal democracy. They represent diversity, defend provincial rights and integrate alienated groups into the political process. Their negative tendencies can be controlled by constitutional discipline and fair federalism. A political system that accommodates them is more stable than one that tries to exclude them.

Q3. Discuss the Federal Structure of 1973 Constitution of Pakistan after 18th Amendment. Why criticism on 18th Amendment started recently? (20)

Outline: Introduction → 18th Amendment: background → Federal structure after the amendment (legislative, executive, fiscal, institutional, judicial) → Other changes → Achievements → Why criticism started (fiscal, governance, education/health, security, national cohesion, political motives) → Counter-arguments → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

The 18th Amendment (April 2010), passed unanimously, was the most comprehensive change to the 1973 Constitution. It restored parliamentary democracy, removed the President's power to dissolve assemblies, and transformed Pakistan's federal structure by devolving major powers and resources to the provinces. A decade later, it came under criticism — mainly over fiscal pressures on the federation and weak provincial service delivery.

1. Background

  • The Charter of Democracy (2006) between the PPP and PML-N promised to undo centralising changes of military rule.
  • The Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms (chaired by Senator Raza Rabbani) drafted it.

2. Federal Structure After the 18th Amendment

a) Legislative

  • Concurrent Legislative List abolished; subjects such as education, health, labour, environment, tourism and population welfare devolved.
  • Federal Legislative List Part II expanded (subjects with shared oversight through the CCI, e.g., electricity, major ports, national planning).
  • Residuary powers with provinces (Article 142).

b) Executive and administrative

  • Seventeen federal ministries devolved (2011).
  • Emergency on internal disturbance requires the provincial assembly's resolution (Article 232).
  • Provincial consent for federal hydro projects (Article 157).

c) Fiscal

  • Provincial share in the NFC award protected from reduction (Article 160(3A)); 7th NFC Award: 57.5% to provinces.
  • Oil and gas jointly and equally owned (Article 172(3)).
  • Provinces can borrow within limits (Article 167) and collect sales tax on services.

d) Institutional

  • CCI strengthened (permanent secretariat, meetings every 90 days, reports to Parliament).
  • NEC and NFC with greater provincial role.

e) Other key changes

  • Article 58-2(b) removed; PM as chief executive; President ceremonial.
  • Article 6 strengthened (courts cannot validate abrogation of the Constitution).
  • Article 25-A (free and compulsory education for ages 5–16), Article 19-A (right to information), Article 10-A (fair trial).
  • Judicial Commission for appointments (modified by the 19th Amendment).
  • Independent Election Commission and caretaker arrangements (with the 20th Amendment).
  • NWFP renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

3. Achievements

  • Restored parliamentary supremacy; strengthened democracy and federalism.
  • Provinces gained resources and responsibilities; regional grievances reduced.
  • Parliaments completed terms (2008–13, 2013–18, 2018–23).

4. Why Criticism Started Recently

  1. Fiscal squeeze on the federation: after transferring 57.5% of the divisible pool, the centre must pay for debt servicing and defence from a smaller share; federal deficits and borrowing rose. The PTI government (2019–20) and later governments argued the NFC formula is unsustainable.
  2. Poor service delivery: education and health outcomes did not improve markedly; about 26 million children remain out of school; polio persists.
  3. Capacity gaps: some provinces lacked the capacity to handle devolved subjects.
  4. No devolution to local governments: provinces centralised power at the provincial level, ignoring Article 140-A.
  5. National standards: concerns about uniform curriculum, higher education (HEC) and drug regulation; COVID-19 (2020) highlighted coordination problems.
  6. Population and water: national policies became harder to coordinate.
  7. Security establishment's concerns over resources for defence (reported comments by military leadership in 2018).
  8. Political motives: critics accused federal governments of wanting to recentralise power; supporters of the amendment (PPP, nationalist parties) resisted.
  9. The 27th Amendment (2025) later revisited some provincial subjects and NFC provisions, confirming the debate.

5. Counter-Arguments

  • Federal fiscal problems stem mainly from low tax collection, loss-making SOEs and expenditure growth, not only the NFC.
  • Devolution needs time and capacity building; rollback would revive provincial alienation.
  • The problem is implementation, not the amendment itself.

6. Way Forward

  • A new NFC award with shared national obligations (debt, defence, merged districts) and incentives for provincial revenue.
  • Build provincial capacity; enforce Article 140-A with guaranteed local government funds.
  • National minimum standards through the CCI (curriculum frameworks, health regulation).
  • Improve federal revenue through tax reform rather than cutting provinces' share.
  • Any change only through consensus in the CCI and Parliament.

Conclusion

The 18th Amendment transformed Pakistan into a genuinely decentralised federation and strengthened democracy. Criticism arose from real fiscal pressures and weak provincial delivery, but also from centralising political instincts. The solution is to complete the reform — local governments, fiscal responsibility and cooperative federalism — rather than to roll it back.

Q4. Evaluate the factional politics of early years (1947–58) and its impact on the democratic process of Pakistan. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Context at independence → Nature of factional politics (Muslim League split, provincial factions, bureaucratic intrigues) → Key events → Causes → Impact on the democratic process → Lessons → Conclusion

Introduction

In its first eleven years Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers, four Governors-General/Presidents and no general election, and it took nine years to frame a constitution. Politics was dominated by personal rivalries, provincial factions and palace intrigues. This factionalism discredited politicians, empowered the bureaucracy and army, and ended with the first martial law in October 1958.

1. Context

  • Deaths of Quaid-e-Azam (September 1948) and Liaquat Ali Khan (assassinated October 1951) removed unifying leaders.
  • The Muslim League, a mass movement, lacked organisation and programme after independence.
  • Two wings; refugees; administrative weakness; Kashmir war.

2. Nature of Factional Politics

  1. Decline of the Muslim League: splits and new parties — Awami League (1949), Jinnah Awami League, Republican Party (1956).
  2. Provincial factionalism: in Punjab (Mamdot vs Daultana), Sindh (Khuhro vs others), NWFP (Khan Qayyum Khan); frequent changes of provincial ministries; governor's rule in Punjab (1949).
  3. Bureaucratic dominance: Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad (a bureaucrat) and later Iskander Mirza manipulated politicians.
  4. Palace intrigues: governments formed and dismissed through defections and pressure rather than elections.

3. Key Events

  • 1953: Ghulam Muhammad dismissed PM Khawaja Nazimuddin despite his majority in the Assembly.
  • 1954: United Front defeated the Muslim League in East Bengal elections; Governor-General dissolved the Constituent Assembly (24 October 1954) to stop it curbing his powers; the Federal Court validated the dissolution (Tamizuddin case, 1955).
  • 1955: One Unit created, merging the western provinces.
  • 1956 Constitution adopted; Iskander Mirza became President.
  • Prime Ministers: Liaquat (1947–51), Nazimuddin (1951–53), Muhammad Ali Bogra (1953–55), Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1955–56), Suhrawardy (1956–57), I.I. Chundrigar (Oct–Dec 1957), Feroz Khan Noon (1957–58).
  • 7 October 1958: Mirza abrogated the Constitution and imposed martial law; Ayub Khan removed Mirza (27 October).

4. Causes of Factionalism

  • Absence of strong leadership and party organisation.
  • Landed elite dominating politics; personal ambitions.
  • Delay in constitution-making and elections.
  • East-West rivalry and the parity question.
  • Interference by the bureaucracy (Ghulam Muhammad, Mirza) and growing ambition of the army.

5. Impact on the Democratic Process

  1. No general elections until 1970 (the 1959 elections planned under the 1956 Constitution never took place).
  2. Delay in constitution-making (1956) and its rapid abrogation (1958).
  3. Rise of the civil-military bureaucracy as the real power; precedent for military intervention.
  4. Weak parliamentary traditions and a culture of defections and horse-trading.
  5. Judicial legitimation of unconstitutional acts (doctrine of necessity).
  6. East Pakistan's alienation: dismissal of Nazimuddin and the United Front government, One Unit and parity fuelled Bengali grievances.
  7. Public disillusionment with politicians, making martial law acceptable to many at the time.

6. Lessons

  • Strong, democratic political parties are essential.
  • Timely constitution-making and elections build legitimacy.
  • Institutions must respect constitutional limits.

Conclusion

The factional politics of 1947–58 turned Pakistan's early democracy into a game of intrigues, allowing unelected power centres to dominate and paving the way for martial law in 1958. Its legacy — weak parties, civil-military dominance and East Pakistan's alienation — shaped Pakistan's political history for decades.

Q5. Every state designs its foreign policy on its national interests rejecting feelings and emotions. Why did Pakistan prefer emotions, feelings and ideology in its foreign policy? Also analyze its impact. (20)

Outline: Introduction → National interest vs ideology (realism) → Why ideology and emotion shaped Pakistan's foreign policy → Examples → Positive impact → Negative impact → Evaluation (ideology and interest intertwined) → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Realist theory (Hans Morgenthau) holds that states act in terms of national interest defined as power, not moral sentiment. Pakistan, created in the name of Islam, has often framed its foreign policy in ideological and emotional terms: Islamic solidarity, Kashmir, and support for Muslim causes. This has brought some gains but also costs when emotion overrode interest.

1. Why Pakistan Emphasised Ideology and Emotion

  1. Ideological basis of the state: the Two-Nation Theory and Islamic identity; Article 40 of the Constitution requires strengthening ties with the Muslim world.
  2. Security dilemma with India: Islamic solidarity sought as diplomatic and material support against a larger neighbour.
  3. Kashmir: seen as an unfinished agenda of partition and a matter of identity — "jugular vein".
  4. Domestic politics: leaders used religious and emotional slogans for legitimacy; public opinion is strongly pro-Muslim causes (Palestine, Afghanistan).
  5. Military regimes' needs: Zia used Islamic ideology to justify the Afghan jihad and his rule.
  6. Historical memory: Khilafat movement and pan-Islamic sentiments among Indian Muslims.

2. Examples

  • Support to Palestine: non-recognition of Israel; consistent support at the UN.
  • OIC diplomacy: hosting the Islamic Summit in Lahore (1974).
  • Afghan jihad (1979–89): framed as a religious duty; "strategic depth".
  • Recognition of the Taliban (1997).
  • Kashmir policy: emotional rhetoric, sometimes over pragmatic options.
  • Positions on Bosnia, Chechnya, Rohingyas.
  • Strains when emotional expectations from the Muslim world were not met (e.g., limited OIC support on Kashmir in 2019–20).

3. Positive Impact

  1. Strong Muslim-world ties: financial support and oil facilities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE; millions of Pakistani workers in the Gulf sending remittances.
  2. Diplomatic support at the OIC on Kashmir and other issues.
  3. Soft power and leadership role in the Muslim world (nuclear-armed Muslim state).
  4. Moral consistency on issues like Palestine and Kashmir.

4. Negative Impact

  1. Afghan policy: support for the mujahideen and Taliban led to militancy, drugs, weapons and refugees in Pakistan; "strategic depth" failed.
  2. Sectarianism: involvement in Middle Eastern rivalries and foreign funding for sectarian groups.
  3. Isolation and image problems: Pakistan associated with extremism; FATF pressures.
  4. Unrealistic expectations from Muslim countries, which act on their own interests (e.g., Gulf states' ties with India).
  5. Missed economic opportunities: foreign policy focused on security and ideology rather than trade.

5. Evaluation

  • Pakistan's foreign policy has not been purely emotional: alliances with the US (SEATO, CENTO) and China were pragmatic, interest-based choices.
  • Ideology and national interest often overlap (Muslim-world ties bring economic benefits).
  • The problem arises when ideology or emotion is used instead of analysis (Afghanistan) or when it drives commitments beyond capacity.

6. Recommendations

  • Define national interest clearly through institutional policymaking (National Security Policy 2022 emphasises economic security).
  • Pursue geo-economics: trade, investment, connectivity.
  • Maintain principled positions (Kashmir, Palestine) but through realistic diplomacy.
  • Avoid entanglement in sectarian and regional rivalries; balanced ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
  • Parliamentary oversight and public debate on foreign policy.

Conclusion

Pakistan's foreign policy has been shaped by ideology and emotion because of its founding identity, rivalry with India, and domestic politics. This brought close ties with the Muslim world but also costly entanglements, especially in Afghanistan. The lesson is not to abandon principles but to pursue them within a clear, realistic calculation of national interest centred on security and economic strength.

Q6. What is the volume of grants, aid and loans in Pakistan's economy in the last ten years to stimulate the growth? Discuss. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Definitions (grants, aid, loans) → Volume and trends (debt growth, IMF, bilateral, multilateral, grants) → Where the money went → Impact on growth → Problems (debt trap, conditionality, dependency) → Recommendations → Conclusion

Figures below are approximate for 2012–2022 (the ten years before the exam) with later context; update with the latest Economic Survey and SBP data before the exam.

Introduction

Pakistan has relied heavily on external assistance — grants, concessional aid and loans — to finance its deficits and development. Between 2012 and 2022, its external debt and liabilities roughly doubled from about 60–65billiontoabout60–65 billion to about 130 billion. Yet growth remained modest and volatile, showing that borrowed money was used mainly to finance consumption and repay old debts rather than to build productive capacity.

1. Definitions

  • Grants: non-repayable transfers (e.g., USAID grants, flood relief).
  • Aid: concessional assistance, including soft loans and technical assistance.
  • Loans: repayable credit from multilateral (IMF, World Bank, ADB), bilateral (China, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and commercial sources (Eurobonds, Sukuk, Chinese commercial banks).

a) Overall debt

  • External debt and liabilities: about 60–65billion(2012)→about60–65 billion (2012) → about 130 billion (2022).
  • Public debt (domestic and external): about Rs 13 trillion (2012) → about Rs 49 trillion (June 2022), later above Rs 70 trillion.

b) IMF programmes

  • 2013 Extended Fund Facility: about $6.6 billion (completed 2016).
  • 2019 EFF: about 6billion(laterextendedtoabout6 billion (later extended to about 6.5 billion; not fully disbursed).
  • 2023 Stand-By Arrangement: 3billion;∗∗2024EFF:∗∗about3 billion; **2024 EFF:** about 7 billion (37 months).

c) Multilateral

  • World Bank and ADB lending of several billion dollars a year (budget support, energy, infrastructure, social protection); COVID-19 relief (2020).

d) Bilateral

  • China: CPEC financing (government and IPP loans), SAFE deposits and commercial loans — China became Pakistan's largest bilateral creditor.
  • Saudi Arabia: $3 billion deposit and deferred oil facility (2018 and after); UAE and Qatar deposits.
  • US: Kerry-Lugar-Berman civilian aid (announced $7.5 billion for 2010–14; actual disbursements lower) and Coalition Support Fund (ended 2018).

e) Commercial borrowing

  • Eurobonds and Sukuk (e.g., 2.5billionin2017;2.5 billion in 2017; 2.5 billion in 2021).

f) Grants

  • Relatively small; the largest recent flows were flood relief after 2022 (pledges of about $10.9 billion at the Geneva conference, January 2023, mostly loans).

3. Where the Money Went

  • Financing budget and current account deficits.
  • Repaying earlier loans (rollover); by the early 2020s a large share of new borrowing went to debt service.
  • Energy projects (CPEC IPPs), infrastructure (motorways, metro), and some social programmes (BISP).

4. Impact on Growth

Positive

  • Prevented default in crises (2013, 2019, 2023).
  • Financed energy capacity that ended load-shedding; infrastructure improvements.
  • Social protection expanded.

Negative

  • Growth remained low and volatile: average about 3–4%; boom-bust cycles (5.8% in FY18, contraction in FY20 and FY23).
  • Debt servicing crowds out development: interest payments became the largest budget item.
  • Consumption-led growth: loans financed imports rather than exports.
  • Conditionality: IMF programmes required tax increases, energy tariff hikes and tight monetary policy, slowing growth in the short term.
  • Dependency: repeated bailouts reduced incentives for structural reform.

5. Problems

  1. Debt trap: borrowing to repay old debt.
  2. Low tax-to-GDP ratio forces borrowing.
  3. Poor project selection and governance.
  4. Exchange-rate depreciation increases the rupee cost of external debt.
  5. Strategic vulnerability to lenders' leverage.

6. Recommendations

  • Raise tax-to-GDP to at least 15% by broadening the base.
  • Use loans only for productive, export-generating investments.
  • Increase exports and FDI rather than debt-creating flows.
  • Debt management office with transparent reporting; fiscal responsibility law enforcement.
  • Reform SOEs and energy sector to stop fiscal leakages.
  • Seek concessional climate finance and grants.

Conclusion

In the last decade Pakistan received large volumes of loans and aid — doubling its external debt — but growth remained weak because much of the money financed deficits, consumption and debt repayment. External assistance can stabilise the economy but cannot substitute for domestic reform. Sustainable growth requires self-reliance: higher taxes, exports, investment and efficient use of borrowed resources.

Q7. Why did Pakistan join Western Defence Pacts? What cost it had to pay for that? Explain. (20)

Outline: Introduction → The pacts (Mutual Defence Agreement, SEATO, Baghdad Pact/CENTO, 1959 bilateral agreement) → Reasons for joining → Benefits gained → Costs → Withdrawal → Evaluation → Conclusion

Introduction

In the 1950s Pakistan aligned itself with the US-led Western bloc by signing the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1954) and joining SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), later CENTO. The main aim was security against India and economic assistance. Pakistan gained arms and aid, but paid a heavy price in terms of relations with the Soviet Union and the Muslim/non-aligned world, and the pacts failed to help it in its wars with India.

1. The Pacts

  • Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US (May 1954).
  • SEATO (Manila Pact, September 1954): US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan — to contain communism in Southeast Asia.
  • Baghdad Pact (Pakistan joined September 1955): Turkey, Iraq, Iran, UK, Pakistan; after Iraq left (1959), renamed CENTO.
  • Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the US (March 1959).

2. Reasons for Joining

  1. Security against India: Kashmir war (1947–48), Indian military superiority and hostility; Pakistan needed arms.
  2. Weak defence: Pakistan received a small share of military stores at partition.
  3. Economic needs: aid for development, food (wheat) and budget support.
  4. Afghanistan's hostility: Pashtunistan issue; Afghanistan voted against Pakistan's UN membership.
  5. Ideological opposition to communism and Western orientation of the ruling elite (bureaucracy and army).
  6. Soviet Union's pro-India tilt and lack of Soviet interest in Pakistan.
  7. US desire for allies to contain the Soviet Union and China; Pakistan's location near both.

3. Benefits

  • Large-scale military aid (tanks, F-86 Sabre and later F-104 aircraft, training) modernised the armed forces.
  • Economic aid: US assistance supported development in the 1950s–60s (Ayub's decade of development).
  • Diplomatic support in some forums.

4. Costs

  1. Soviet hostility: the USSR began vetoing UNSC resolutions on Kashmir (1957, 1962), supported Afghanistan's Pashtunistan claims and India; Khrushchev's threats after the U-2 incident (1960) — the US spy plane flew from the Badaber base near Peshawar.
  2. Failure in wars with India: the pacts were directed against communism, not India; in 1965 the US imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, hurting Pakistan more; in 1971, SEATO/CENTO offered no help as East Pakistan was lost.
  3. Isolation from the non-aligned and Muslim world: Egypt (Nasser) and Arab nationalists criticised Pakistan's role in the Baghdad Pact, especially during the Suez Crisis (1956).
  4. Loss of foreign-policy independence and dependence on the US.
  5. Domestic impact: strengthened the military and bureaucracy relative to politicians; contributed to authoritarianism.
  6. China: initially complicated relations (although Pakistan later improved ties with China from 1962).

5. Withdrawal

  • Pakistan left SEATO in 1972–73 (after the 1971 war) and CENTO in 1979, joining the Non-Aligned Movement (1979).

6. Evaluation

  • Joining was a rational choice in the security environment of the 1950s; Pakistan obtained arms and aid it could not get elsewhere.
  • However, it misjudged the alliances' purpose: the West would not fight India for Pakistan. The costs — Soviet hostility and isolation — outweighed benefits by the 1960s.
  • The lesson: alliances must match national interests; diversification (China from the 1960s) is safer than dependence on one power.

Conclusion

Pakistan joined Western defence pacts mainly to secure itself against India and to obtain economic and military aid. It gained arms and development assistance, but paid with Soviet hostility on Kashmir, isolation from non-aligned and Arab states, and disillusionment when the pacts did not help in 1965 or 1971. The experience shaped Pakistan's later preference for a balanced, diversified foreign policy.

Q8. Discuss the issues and mistrust in US-Pakistan relations after the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Background → Issues after August 2021 (Afghanistan blame, TTP, bases, China, India, Russia visit, cipher, FATF/IMF, human rights) → Sources of mistrust → Areas of continued cooperation → Later developments (2023–25) → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan (August 2021) and the Taliban takeover ended the main reason for close Pakistan-US engagement over two decades. Washington blamed Pakistan in part for the Taliban's success, while Pakistan felt used and abandoned. The period 2021–22 saw some of the lowest points in relations, before a gradual thaw.

1. Background

  • Two decades of transactional cooperation (2001–21), marked by aid, drone strikes and mutual suspicion.
  • Pakistan facilitated the Doha Agreement (2020), expecting a broader relationship afterwards.

2. Issues After the Withdrawal

  1. Blame for Afghanistan: US lawmakers and officials criticised Pakistan's alleged support to the Taliban; a Senate bill (2021) proposed reviewing Pakistan's role.
  2. Refusal of bases: PM Imran Khan's "absolutely not" (June 2021) to US bases for counter-terrorism operations.
  3. Lack of high-level contact: President Biden did not call PM Imran Khan; Pakistan declined its invitation to the US-hosted Summit for Democracy (December 2021).
  4. Pakistan-China relations and CPEC: the US views CPEC and Pakistan's closeness to China with suspicion amid US-China rivalry.
  5. US-India strategic partnership: Quad, defence deals; Pakistan fears the US tilt.
  6. PM Imran Khan's visit to Moscow (24 February 2022) on the day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine; Pakistan abstained on UN votes.
  7. "Cipher" controversy (2022): Imran Khan alleged a US-backed conspiracy to remove him; the US denied it; relations became a domestic political issue.
  8. TTP resurgence from Afghanistan and Pakistan's security concerns; limited US help.
  9. Economic pressure: FATF grey list (until October 2022) and IMF negotiations where US influence matters.
  10. Human rights and democracy concerns raised by US lawmakers (2023–24).

3. Sources of Mistrust

  • US side: double-game allegations, ties with the Taliban, China alignment, nuclear programme concerns.
  • Pakistan side: history of abandonment (1965, 1990 sanctions, 2021), drone strikes, US tilt toward India, interference in domestic politics (alleged).

4. Areas of Continued Cooperation

  • Counter-terrorism against ISKP and al-Qaeda.
  • 2022 floods: US humanitarian aid and climate cooperation.
  • COVID-19 vaccines (the US donated tens of millions of doses).
  • Trade: the US remains Pakistan's largest export market.
  • F-16 sustainment package (2022).
  • Evacuation of Afghans (2021) with Pakistan's help.

5. Later Developments (for context)

  • Gradual improvement from 2023; in 2025 relations warmed notably under President Trump: counter-terrorism cooperation (arrest of an ISIS-K suspect linked to the Kabul airport attack), US role in the May 2025 India-Pakistan ceasefire, a trade agreement and interest in Pakistan's minerals and energy.

6. Recommendations

  • Broaden the relationship beyond Afghanistan: trade, investment, technology, education and diaspora links.
  • Keep Pakistan out of US-China bloc politics while engaging both.
  • Cooperate on counter-terrorism and regional stability.
  • Avoid using the relationship for domestic political narratives.
  • Institutional channels (strategic dialogue) instead of personal diplomacy.

Conclusion

After the US withdrawal, Pakistan-US relations suffered from blame over Afghanistan, divergent strategic priorities (China, India, Russia) and domestic political controversies. Mistrust rooted in history made recovery slow. Yet shared interests in counter-terrorism, trade and regional stability kept channels open and eventually enabled a thaw. A durable relationship must rest on economic partnership and mutual respect rather than on crisis-driven needs.