CSS 2020 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved) | CSS Solved Past Papers

CSS 2020 — GK-III (Pakistan Affairs) · Part-II: attempt any 4 of 7 questions (20 marks each). Part-I MCQs were not included in the source PDF.

Themes this year: Sirhindi (Q2), SCO and China-Russia (Q3), Simla Agreement (Q4), proxy war (Q5), political culture (Q6), energy governance (Q7), Pak-US and the Afghan peace process (Q8).

Q2. How the reform movement of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi influenced the history of Muslim India? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Life → Conditions under Akbar (Din-i-Ilahi, Sulh-i-Kul) → Reform programme (letters to nobles, Naqshbandi order, Wahdat-ul-Shuhud, opposition to bid'ah) → Imprisonment under Jahangir → Influence on Mughal policy → Influence on Muslim identity and later movements → Criticism → Conclusion

Introduction

Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), known as Mujaddid Alf Thani (Renewer of the Second Millennium), challenged Emperor Akbar's syncretic religious policies and revived orthodox Islam in the Mughal Empire. His movement protected the distinct identity of Indian Muslims at a time when it was being diluted by state policy. Its influence extended through the Mughal court to later reformers and ultimately to the Two-Nation Theory.

1. Life

Born in Sirhind (Punjab) in 1564; educated in Quran, hadith, fiqh and philosophy; studied in Sialkot.
Joined the Naqshbandi Sufi order under Khwaja Baqi Billah in Delhi (1599) and became its leading figure in India.
His Maktubat (over 500 letters) to nobles, scholars and disciples are the main source of his ideas.

2. Conditions Under Akbar

Din-i-Ilahi (1582): a syncretic cult combining elements of different religions; prostration (sajda) before the emperor.
Sulh-i-Kul (universal tolerance) used to marginalise Islamic law.
Mahzar (1579) declared Akbar the final arbiter in religious disputes; restrictions on cow slaughter; Islamic practices discouraged in court; Hindu customs adopted.
Sufi misinterpretations (excessive Wahdat-ul-Wujud) and innovations (bid'ah) weakened orthodox practice.

3. His Reform Programme

Correspondence with nobles: letters to influential nobles (e.g., Sheikh Farid Bukhari, Khan-i-Khanan) urging them to influence the emperor to restore Sharia.
Rejection of Din-i-Ilahi and Sulh-i-Kul: insisted on the distinctness of Islam from Hinduism.
Wahdat-ul-Shuhud (Unity of Appearance) in place of Ibn Arabi's Wahdat-ul-Wujud (Unity of Being): God and creation are distinct; this restored the supremacy of Sharia over mystical speculation.
Reform of Sufism: Sufism must conform to Sharia; opposed practices contrary to the Sunnah.
Opposition to bid'ah and un-Islamic customs.
Training disciples and spreading the Naqshbandi order across India and Central Asia.

4. Imprisonment Under Jahangir

Refused to perform sajda-e-tazimi (prostration) before Emperor Jahangir; imprisoned in Gwalior Fort (1619).
Continued preaching to prisoners; released after about a year; Jahangir later treated him with respect and he accompanied the royal camp, influencing the emperor.

5. Influence on Mughal Policy

Jahangir abandoned Din-i-Ilahi practices and restored some Islamic observances.
Shah Jahan's reign saw a return toward orthodoxy.
Aurangzeb was deeply influenced by the Mujaddid's descendants (his son Khwaja Muhammad Masum was Aurangzeb's spiritual guide); Sharia-based administration and Fatawa-e-Alamgiri.

6. Influence on the History of Muslim India

Preserved Muslim identity: prevented the absorption of Islam into a syncretic Indian religion — an early foundation of the Two-Nation Theory.
Revived Sharia as the basis of Muslim life.
Reformed Sufism, making it an ally of orthodoxy.
Inspired later reformers: Shah Waliullah, Syed Ahmad Barelvi, and the ulema of Deoband drew on his thought.
Iqbal's praise: called him "the guardian of the Muslim community's spiritual wealth" in Bal-e-Jibril.

7. Criticism

Critics argue his views increased religious exclusivism; others note the political causes of Mughal policy change.
Response: his aim was to protect the integrity of Islam, not to persecute others; he worked through persuasion and letters, not rebellion.

Conclusion

Mujaddid Alf Thani turned the tide against Akbar's religious eclecticism and restored the distinct identity of Indian Muslims. Through the Mughal court, the Naqshbandi order and later reformers, his influence shaped Muslim India for centuries. By insisting that Islam and Muslim identity were distinct, he laid an early intellectual foundation on which the Two-Nation Theory later stood.

Q3. China, Pakistan-Russia cooperation will find suitable support mechanism in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Elaborate. (20)

Outline: Introduction → SCO background → Changing geopolitics → Pakistan-China ties → Pakistan-Russia rapprochement → China-Russia partnership → How the SCO supports trilateral cooperation (security, Afghanistan, economy and connectivity, energy, political) → Limitations → Way forward → Conclusion

Introduction

The shifting global order — US-China rivalry, the US Indo-Pacific strategy with India, and Russia's pivot to Asia — has brought China, Russia and Pakistan closer. The SCO, which includes all three as full members (Pakistan since 2017), provides an institutional framework where their interests converge on regional security, Afghanistan, connectivity and a multipolar order.

1. SCO Background

Founded June 2001; members include China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus and four Central Asian states.
Focus: countering terrorism, separatism and extremism (RATS), economic cooperation, connectivity.

2. Geopolitical Context

US-India strategic partnership (Quad, defence agreements) pushed Pakistan toward China and Russia.
US withdrawal from Afghanistan (2021) created a security vacuum needing regional management.
Russia's isolation from the West after 2022 increases its focus on Asia.

3. Bilateral Foundations

Pakistan-China: all-weather partnership; CPEC; defence cooperation (JF-17, J-10C); diplomatic support at the UN.
Pakistan-Russia: from Cold War hostility to rapprochement — Russia lifted its arms embargo (2014); defence cooperation agreement; joint exercises (Druzhba since 2016); the Pakistan Stream (North-South) gas pipeline agreement; Russian oil purchases (2023); PM Imran Khan's Moscow visit (February 2022).
China-Russia: "no-limits" strategic partnership; coordination in the SCO and BRICS.

4. How the SCO Provides a Support Mechanism

a) Security and counter-terrorism

RATS enables intelligence sharing; joint Peace Mission exercises.
All three face threats from militants linked to Afghanistan (ETIM for China, ISKP for Russia and Pakistan, TTP for Pakistan).

b) Afghanistan

SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group; Moscow Format; China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue — coordinated regional approach to the Taliban government.

c) Economic cooperation and connectivity

Alignment of CPEC/BRI with Russia's Eurasian Economic Union; Gwadar as an outlet for Central Asia and Russia.
Trade in local currencies; SCO interbank consortium.

d) Energy

Russia and Central Asia as energy suppliers; CASA-1000, TAPI; Russian crude and LNG.

e) Political and diplomatic

Shared support for a multipolar world, non-interference and UN-based order.
SCO provides legitimacy for cooperation without forming a military alliance.

f) Defence and technology

Platform for defence dialogue and exercises alongside bilateral arms deals.

5. Limitations

India's presence in the SCO and its close ties with Russia limit an anti-India orientation; Russia balances between India and Pakistan.
SCO decisions require consensus; it is not a military alliance.
Pakistan's limited economic weight and trade with Russia.
Security problems hinder connectivity projects.
Western sanctions on Russia complicate transactions.

6. Way Forward

Use SCO forums for concrete projects: trans-Afghan railway, energy corridors, local-currency trade.
Trilateral consultations on Afghanistan and counter-terrorism.
Expand Pakistan-Russia trade (agriculture, textiles, energy) and banking channels.
Maintain balanced relations with the West while deepening Eurasian ties.

Conclusion

Converging interests in regional stability, counter-terrorism, Afghanistan and connectivity make China, Pakistan and Russia natural partners, and the SCO gives this partnership an institutional home. While the SCO cannot turn them into an alliance, it can support practical cooperation that strengthens Pakistan's security and economic prospects in Eurasia.

Q4. What are the major provisions of Simla Agreement (1972) between Pakistan and India? How it was helpful for establishment of durable peace in the region? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Background (1971 war) → Negotiations → Major provisions → Implementation (withdrawal of troops, POWs, Delhi Agreement) → Contribution to peace → Limitations and violations → Evaluation → Conclusion

Introduction

The Simla Agreement was signed on 2 July 1972 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi after the 1971 war, in which East Pakistan became Bangladesh and about 90,000 Pakistani soldiers and civilians became prisoners of war. It aimed to end conflict and establish durable peace. It achieved important immediate results and prevented a full-scale war for decades, but it did not resolve the core issue of Kashmir.

1. Background

The 1971 war: India occupied about 5,000 square miles of West Pakistani territory and held about 93,000 prisoners.
Bhutto needed the return of territory and POWs; India wanted a bilateral framework on Kashmir.

2. Major Provisions

Both countries resolved to end conflict and work for friendly and harmonious relations and durable peace.
Principles of the UN Charter to govern relations.
Differences to be settled by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon.
Respect for each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.
Hostile propaganda to be prevented.
Normalisation: restoration of communications, postal, telegraph, sea, land and air links; trade and cooperation; exchanges in science and culture.
Withdrawal of forces to their side of the international border.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 to be respected by both sides without prejudice to their recognised positions; neither side to alter it unilaterally.
Heads of government to meet again for a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir, repatriation of POWs and diplomatic relations.

3. Implementation

Troops withdrawn and occupied territory returned (1972).
Delhi Agreement (August 1973) and tripartite agreement with Bangladesh (1974): repatriation of POWs completed by 1974.
Pakistan recognised Bangladesh (February 1974) at the OIC Lahore summit.
Diplomatic relations restored (1976).

4. Contribution to Durable Peace

Ended the state of war and restored normal relations.
Returned territory and POWs without further conflict — a diplomatic success for Pakistan.
The LoC replaced the ceasefire line and reduced border incidents.
No full-scale India-Pakistan war for over 25 years (until the limited Kargil conflict of 1999).
Created a framework for later dialogue: Lahore Declaration (1999), composite dialogue (2004).
Pakistan's position on Kashmir preserved: the agreement stated "without prejudice to the recognised position of either side" and called for a "final settlement" — so UN resolutions were not superseded.

5. Limitations and Violations

Kashmir unresolved: the promised final settlement never happened.
India's interpretation: uses "bilateralism" to block UN and third-party involvement.
Siachen (1984): India occupied the glacier, violating the spirit of the agreement (LoC was not demarcated beyond NJ9842).
Kargil (1999), frequent LoC violations, the 2001–02 standoff, and later crises (2016, 2019, 2025).
5 August 2019: India's unilateral changes in the status of Jammu and Kashmir contradicted the commitment not to alter the situation unilaterally; Pakistan stated it would review bilateral agreements. In April 2025, after India held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, Pakistan announced it could hold the Simla Agreement in abeyance.

6. Evaluation

The Simla Agreement succeeded as a post-war settlement — recovering territory and prisoners and creating a framework for peace — and helped avoid major war for decades. It failed as a conflict-resolution mechanism because the core issue of Kashmir remained unresolved and bilateralism became a tool for avoiding settlement.

Conclusion

The Simla Agreement brought Pakistan and India back from war, restored territory and prisoners, and set principles for peaceful relations. It contributed to relative stability but not to durable peace, because Kashmir was postponed rather than resolved. Lasting peace in South Asia still depends on a just settlement of Kashmir in line with UN resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

Q5. What is meant by the term "Proxy War"? Are there any extrinsic factors at play in the internal security situation of Pakistan? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Definition and features of proxy war → Historical examples → Pakistan's internal security situation → Extrinsic factors (India, Afghanistan, great-power rivalry, Iran-Saudi rivalry, CPEC-related hostility, hybrid warfare) → Intrinsic factors → Evaluation → Measures → Conclusion

Introduction

A proxy war is a conflict in which a state pursues its objectives against an adversary not directly but through third parties — insurgents, militants, or other states — which it supports with money, weapons, training, intelligence or propaganda. It allows the sponsor to hurt its rival while denying responsibility. Pakistan's internal security has been shaped by such external involvement, although internal weaknesses have made it possible.

1. Features of Proxy War

Indirect conflict; deniability; low cost for the sponsor.
Exploits local grievances, ethnic or sectarian divisions.
Uses hybrid tools: terrorism, insurgency, propaganda, cyber attacks, economic pressure.

2. Examples

Cold War: Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan (1979–89).
Middle East: Syria and Yemen (Iran vs Saudi Arabia and others).

3. Pakistan's Internal Security Situation

Terrorism by the TTP and ISKP; Baloch insurgency (BLA, BLF); sectarian violence; attacks on CPEC projects and Chinese nationals.

4. Extrinsic Factors

India:
- Arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav (March 2016), an Indian naval officer, who confessed to espionage and sabotage in Balochistan and Karachi; the ICJ (2019) granted consular access but did not dispute his arrest.
- Pakistan's dossiers (2020) alleging Indian support to the TTP and Baloch militants.
- Indian officials' statements about using Balochistan as a pressure point.
Afghanistan:
- Sanctuaries for the TTP and Baloch militants; the Taliban government's reluctance to act.
- In the past, alleged use of Afghan soil by hostile intelligence agencies.
Great-power rivalry: CPEC's strategic value makes it a target; attacks on Chinese nationals (Dasu 2021, Karachi 2022, Besham 2024) aim to damage Pakistan-China ties.
Iran-Saudi rivalry: funding of sectarian groups in Pakistan in the 1980s–2000s.
Hybrid and information warfare: disinformation networks (the EU DisinfoLab's "Indian Chronicles" report, 2020, exposed a network of fake media and NGOs targeting Pakistan).
Global jihadist networks: al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates.

5. Intrinsic Factors

Weak governance and justice; poverty and unemployment in border areas.
Past state patronage of certain militant groups.
Ethnic grievances in Balochistan; unfulfilled development promises.
Madrasa radicalisation and sectarianism.
Porous borders and weapons proliferation.

6. Evaluation

Extrinsic factors are clearly at play: hostile states and networks exploit Pakistan's vulnerabilities to wage a low-cost proxy war. But proxies can only operate where internal weaknesses provide space. Blaming outsiders alone would ignore the need for reform; ignoring outsiders would underestimate the threat.

7. Measures

Strengthen intelligence and counter-intelligence; implement the National Action Plan.
Border management (fencing of the Afghan border, controls on the Iran border).
Address Baloch grievances politically and economically.
Protect CPEC through dedicated security forces and community involvement.
Counter disinformation with a proactive information strategy.
Diplomatic exposure of state sponsorship at international forums (UN, FATF).
Regional cooperation against terrorism (SCO RATS).

Conclusion

Proxy war is a reality of Pakistan's security environment. External actors — hostile states and transnational networks — fuel terrorism and insurgency to weaken Pakistan and its partnerships. Defeating proxy war requires closing the internal gaps these actors exploit: good governance, justice, economic inclusion and national cohesion, backed by strong security and diplomacy.

Q6. Discuss the main features of Political culture of Pakistan. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Concept of political culture → Features (with examples) → Causes shaping it → Positive trends → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, values and practices that shape how citizens and leaders view politics and authority (Almond and Verba classified political cultures as parochial, subject and participant). Pakistan's political culture is a mix of subject and parochial features, with a growing participant element, shaped by feudal structures, military rule, religion, ethnicity and a young, increasingly urban population.

1. Main Features

Personality-centred politics: loyalty to leaders rather than programmes (Bhutto, Sharif, Imran Khan); charismatic populism.
Dynastic politics: parties led by families (Bhuttos, Sharifs, Chaudhrys); few intra-party elections.
Feudal and tribal influence: landlords, pirs and tribal chiefs (electables) control rural votes; biradari (kinship) voting.
Civil-military imbalance: four direct military regimes and continued influence of the establishment; politicians seeking military support.
Confrontational politics: zero-sum rivalry; protests, dharnas, long marches; little tolerance of opposition; accusations of treason.
Patronage and clientelism: votes exchanged for jobs, development funds and favours.
Religion in politics: Islamic slogans, religious parties' street power, blasphemy-related mobilisation.
Ethnic and regional politics: parties with provincial bases (ANP, MQM, BNP); demands for autonomy and new provinces.
Weak institutions and rule of law: decisions made by individuals; institutions politicised.
Low participation and awareness: turnout often around 50%; women's participation low in some areas.
Role of the judiciary and media: active courts and a vibrant media shape political outcomes; social media increasingly important.
Youth and urban middle class: growing political awareness and activism, especially online.
Corruption and accountability politics: accountability often seen as selective.

2. Causes

Colonial legacy of bureaucratic rule; feudal land structure.
Early deaths of founding leaders; delays in constitution-making.
Military interventions interrupting democratic learning.
Low literacy and economic dependence of voters.
Weak party organisation.

3. Positive Trends

Democratic continuity since 2008; peaceful transfers of power (2013, 2018).
18th Amendment and Charter of Democracy (2006) show consensus-building.
Rising civic engagement, independent media and social media activism.
Women and minorities' reserved seats; increased youth voting.

4. Recommendations

Intra-party democracy and merit-based tickets.
Civic education in schools; media literacy.
Strong local governments to train future leaders.
Electoral reforms against money and patronage.
Respect for constitutional roles by all institutions; politics of dialogue.

Conclusion

Pakistan's political culture is marked by personality cults, dynasties, feudal influence, confrontation and civil-military imbalance, but also by increasing participation and democratic continuity. Transforming it into a mature participant culture requires education, institution-building and political parties that practise democracy internally.

Q7. Pakistan's energy crisis was due to the lack of strategy and political will. Discuss. (20)

Outline: Introduction and stance → Evolution of the crisis → Evidence of lack of strategy → Evidence of lack of political will → Other (non-policy) factors → Recent reforms → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan has the resources to generate cheap energy: rivers, sunshine, wind, coal and uranium. Yet for two decades it suffered load-shedding and now some of the region's highest tariffs. The crisis stems largely from the absence of a long-term strategy and the reluctance of governments to take unpopular but necessary decisions. External shocks contributed, but policy failure was the main cause.

1. Evolution of the Crisis

1990s: IPP policy (1994) attracted private thermal plants with guaranteed returns.
2007–13: shortfalls of 5,000–6,000 MW; load-shedding of up to 18 hours.
2013–18: CPEC and other projects added capacity; shortages ended.
2018 onward: overcapacity, capacity payments, circular debt; tariffs rose sharply (2022–24).

2. Lack of Strategy

No integrated energy plan for decades; separate ministries for power and petroleum until 2017; policies changed with governments.
Wrong fuel mix: shift from hydro (about 60% in the 1980s) to imported oil and gas; later dependence on LNG and imported coal.
Neglect of hydropower: no major dam since Tarbela; Kalabagh politicised.
Generation without transmission: new plants added without upgrading grids.
Capacity-based contracts guaranteeing payments in dollars regardless of demand.
Ignoring demand-side management and efficiency.
Late adoption of renewables until the 2019 ARE Policy.

3. Lack of Political Will

Tariff politics: governments delayed tariff adjustments and subsidised consumers for votes, feeding circular debt.
Tolerating theft and non-payment in politically sensitive areas; weak action against defaulters.
Political appointments in distribution companies; resistance to privatisation.
Failure to build consensus on dams and gas pricing through the CCI.
Short-termism: quick-fix rental power (2008–10) instead of long-term investment.

4. Other Factors (Qualifying the Statement)

Global oil and LNG price shocks (2008, 2022).
Rupee depreciation increasing dollar-linked costs.
Security problems affecting gas pipelines and projects.
Declining domestic gas reserves.
Rapidly rising demand due to population and urbanisation.

5. Recent Reforms (Signs of Strategy)

ARE Policy 2019 and IGCEP plans favouring renewables and hydro.
CTBCM (competitive power market) approved.
Renegotiation of IPP contracts and closure of expensive plants (2024–25).
Rooftop solar boom driven by consumers.
IMF-backed tariff and subsidy reforms.

6. Recommendations

A single, consensus-based national energy strategy approved by the CCI and Parliament.
Shift to indigenous and renewable sources; complete dams.
Depoliticise distribution companies; privatise or professionalise them.
Targeted subsidies; cost-reflective tariffs with protection for the poor.
Grid modernisation and storage.
Energy conservation and efficiency programmes.

Conclusion

Pakistan's energy crisis is primarily a governance crisis. External shocks and resource depletion played a part, but the absence of long-term planning and the lack of political will to reform tariffs, contracts and distribution turned manageable problems into a chronic crisis. The recent reforms show the way forward; their success will again depend on political will and continuity.

Q8. Discuss revival of Pak-US relations in context of present US-Taliban peace process. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Background of strained relations (2011–18) → US-Taliban peace process → Pakistan's role → How this revived relations → Limits of revival → Developments after the Doha Agreement (2021 withdrawal and after) → Opportunities → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

By 2018, Pakistan-US relations had reached a low point: President Trump accused Pakistan of "lies and deceit", security assistance was suspended and Pakistan was placed on the FATF grey list. The US decision to negotiate with the Taliban to end its longest war changed the dynamics. Pakistan's role in bringing the Taliban to the table revived the relationship, culminating in the Doha Agreement (29 February 2020).

1. Background of Strained Relations

Abbottabad raid, Salala attack (2011); accusations regarding the Haqqani network.
Trump's South Asia strategy (August 2017) and tweet (January 2018); aid cuts; US tilt toward India.

2. The US-Taliban Peace Process

US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad appointed (September 2018).
Talks in Doha from 2018; Doha Agreement (29 February 2020): US troop withdrawal within 14 months in exchange for Taliban guarantees against terrorism from Afghan soil and intra-Afghan negotiations.
Intra-Afghan negotiations began in Doha (September 2020).

3. Pakistan's Role

Facilitated contacts and travel of Taliban leaders to Doha.
Released Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (October 2018), who led the Taliban negotiating team.
Encouraged the Taliban to reduce violence and join talks.
Consistently advocated a political solution ("Afghan-owned, Afghan-led").

4. How It Revived Relations

Trump sought Pakistan's help (letter to PM Imran Khan, December 2018).
PM Imran Khan's White House visit (July 2019); Trump offered to mediate on Kashmir.
Restoration of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme (2019).
Improved tone; appreciation of Pakistan's role after the Doha Agreement.
Talk of broadening ties to trade and investment.

5. Limits of the Revival

Relations remained Afghanistan-centred and transactional.
US strategic partnership with India continued; US opposition to CPEC.
Pakistan remained on the FATF grey list until 2022.

6. After the Doha Agreement (for context)

The US withdrew in August 2021; the Taliban took Kabul. Pakistan's importance to Washington declined; relations cooled (2021–22).
Engagement continued on counter-terrorism, climate and economic support; improvement after 2023 and particularly in 2025 (counter-terrorism cooperation, trade and minerals, high-level engagement).

7. Opportunities

Economic partnership: trade (the US is Pakistan's largest export market), IT, energy, minerals.
Regional connectivity with Central Asia.
Counter-terrorism cooperation against ISKP and al-Qaeda.

8. Recommendations

Move beyond Afghanistan to a broad-based relationship (trade, investment, education, diaspora).
Maintain balance between the US and China.
Consistent Afghan policy to prevent terrorism.
Institutionalised dialogue mechanisms.

Conclusion

The US-Taliban peace process revived Pakistan-US relations by making Pakistan indispensable once again. The revival was real but narrow and tied to Afghanistan. For relations to endure beyond the Afghan question, both countries must build an economic and strategic partnership based on mutual interests rather than short-term needs.