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CSS 2019 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

CSS 2019 — GK-III (Pakistan Affairs) · Part-II: attempt any 4 of 7 questions (20 marks each). Part-I MCQs were not included in the source PDF.

Themes this year: Congress ministries (Q2), centre-province relations (Q3), economy, population, energy, dams and resources (Q4–Q8) — a heavily economy-focused paper.

Q2. Critically examine Congress Ministries of 1937 [paper printed "1973" — a typo]. How far it is correct to suggest that it paved the way for the separate Muslim homeland in India? (20)

Outline: Introduction → 1935 Act and 1937 elections → Formation of ministries and the UP coalition issue → Policies and Muslim grievances → Reports → Critical examination (Congress's case) → Impact on the demand for Pakistan → Other factors → Conclusion

Introduction

Under the Government of India Act 1935, provincial elections were held in early 1937. The Congress formed ministries in eight of eleven provinces and ruled for about 27 months (July 1937 – November 1939). Muslims experienced this period as Hindu-majority rule in practice. Within three months of the ministries' resignation, the Muslim League passed the Lahore Resolution (March 1940). The Congress rule therefore substantially paved the way for Pakistan, although it was not the only cause.

1. Elections of 1937

  • Congress won absolute majorities in UP, Bihar, CP, Madras and Orissa; later formed ministries in Bombay, NWFP and Assam (eight provinces).
  • The Muslim League won only about 108 of 482 Muslim seats; the Congress won very few Muslim seats (about 26 of the 58 it contested).
  • Muslim-majority Punjab and Bengal were governed by the Unionists and the Krishak Praja Party-led coalition.

2. Formation of Ministries: The UP Coalition Issue

  • In UP the League expected a coalition; the Congress demanded that League members dissolve their party and join the Congress. This was seen as an attempt to eliminate the League.
  • Nehru's claim that only two forces existed in India — the Congress and the British — was answered by Jinnah: there was a third, the Muslims.

3. Policies and Muslim Grievances

  1. Bande Mataram sung in assemblies and schools; the Congress tricolour hoisted on official buildings.
  2. Wardha Scheme of education (Gandhi's basic education) and Vidya Mandir Scheme (CP) promoted Hindu culture and Hindi.
  3. Hindi favoured over Urdu.
  4. Cow-slaughter restrictions and interference in Muslim religious observances.
  5. Discrimination in government jobs; bias of police in riots.
  6. Muslim Mass Contact Movement to wean Muslims away from the League.

4. Documented Reports

  • Pirpur Report (1938), Shareef Report (Bihar, 1939), A.K. Fazlul Haq's report (1939) detailed complaints.
  • Day of Deliverance (22 December 1939) after the ministries resigned.

5. Critical Examination (Other Side)

  • The Congress denied the charges and offered an inquiry by the Chief Justice of India, which the League declined.
  • The ministries introduced some useful reforms (agrarian relief, prohibition, education).
  • Some historians argue the League exaggerated grievances to build its mass base.
  • However: perception shaped politics. Even if some grievances were exaggerated, the refusal of power-sharing in UP and the cultural policies convinced Muslims that majority rule meant domination.

6. How It Paved the Way for Pakistan

  1. Practical proof of the Two-Nation Theory: Muslims saw what a Congress government would mean in a united India.
  2. Revival of the Muslim League: the Lucknow session (October 1937), the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact, and mass membership campaigns transformed the League into a popular party.
  3. Shift from safeguards to sovereignty: safeguards had failed; the Lahore Resolution (1940) demanded independent states.
  4. Unity behind Jinnah: provincial leaders who had kept their distance moved closer to the League.
  5. Mass mobilisation: by the 1945–46 elections, the League won all Muslim seats in the Central Assembly and the great majority of provincial Muslim seats.

7. Other Factors

  • Iqbal's ideas (1930), Chaudhry Rahmat Ali's scheme (1933), the Second World War and British need for Muslim support, and Jinnah's leadership. The Congress ministries acted as a catalyst rather than the sole cause.

Conclusion

The Congress ministries of 1937–39 were a turning point. By refusing power-sharing and pursuing policies Muslims saw as a threat to their identity, the Congress gave the League its most powerful argument. It is largely correct that this experience paved the way for Pakistan: it converted the idea of a separate homeland from a distant vision into an urgent popular demand.

Q3. How far the nature of centre-province relations has changed under various amendments to the 1973 constitution? Evaluate. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Original 1973 scheme → Changes under military regimes (8th, 17th) → 13th Amendment → 18th Amendment (legislative, administrative, financial, institutional) → 19th–25th → 26th and 27th → Evaluation: extent of change → Remaining issues → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

The 1973 Constitution created a federal parliamentary system but with a strong centre. Over five decades, constitutional amendments have swung the balance: military-era amendments centralised power, while the 18th Amendment (2010) transferred substantial authority to the provinces. Recent amendments (26th and 27th) have raised concerns about partial recentralisation. The nature of centre-province relations has therefore changed significantly, though not always in one direction.

1. Original 1973 Scheme

  • Federal List (67 subjects) and Concurrent List (47 subjects); federal law prevailed in conflict.
  • Council of Common Interests (CCI), National Finance Commission (NFC), NEC.
  • In practice, the centre dominated finances and administration; the concurrent list was used to expand federal influence.

2. Centralising Amendments

  • 8th Amendment (1985): Article 58-2(b) allowed the President to dismiss the National Assembly; governors could dismiss provincial assemblies; used repeatedly (1988, 1990, 1993, 1996).
  • 13th Amendment (1997): removed 58-2(b).
  • 17th Amendment (2003): restored presidential powers under Musharraf; the CCI met rarely; provinces weakened.

3. The 18th Amendment (April 2010) — the Major Change

Legislative

  • Concurrent List abolished; 40+ subjects devolved (education, health, labour, social welfare, environment, tourism, culture, population welfare).
  • Federal Legislative List Part II expanded (shared oversight through the CCI).

Administrative

  • Seventeen federal ministries devolved (2011).
  • Emergency (Article 232): provincial assembly resolution required for emergency on internal disturbance.
  • Provinces' consent required for federal hydroelectric projects in their territory; governors must be residents of the province they serve.

Financial

  • Article 160(3A): provincial share in the NFC award cannot be less than the previous award.
  • Article 172(3): oil and natural gas jointly and equally owned by the federation and province.
  • Article 157: provinces consulted before hydroelectric projects; provinces may build power grids and set tariffs within.
  • Provinces allowed domestic and international borrowing within limits.
  • 7th NFC Award (2009–10): provinces' share raised from about 47.5% to 57.5%; multi-criteria formula.

Institutional

  • CCI strengthened: permanent secretariat, meetings at least every 90 days, reports to Parliament.
  • Article 25-A: right to education (a provincial responsibility).
  • Renaming NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

4. Subsequent Amendments

  • 19th (2010): judicial appointments.
  • 20th (2012): independent ECP and caretaker governments.
  • 25th (2018): FATA merged into KP — more territory and responsibilities for the province; guaranteed additional funds (3% of divisible pool promised, not fully delivered).
  • 26th (2024) and 27th (2025): the 27th revisited provincial subjects (such as education and population planning) and NFC-related provisions, prompting fears that 18th Amendment gains could be rolled back.

5. Evaluation: How Far Has the Nature Changed?

Significant change

  • From centralised to cooperative federalism: provinces now control most social sectors and a majority of federal tax revenue.
  • Constitutional protection against arbitrary dismissal of assemblies.
  • Institutional forums (CCI) now meet more often.

Limitations

  • Fiscal strain on the centre: after transfers, the federal government bears debt servicing and defence with a shrinking share, increasing deficits — hence criticism of the 18th Amendment and the NFC award.
  • Capacity gaps in provinces; uneven delivery in health and education.
  • Provincial centralisation: provinces resisted devolving power to local governments (Article 140-A).
  • Federal overlap: federal bodies continue in devolved areas (e.g., HEC disputes, curriculum).
  • Political will: centralising tendencies return in practice and in the 27th Amendment.

6. Recommendations

  • Protect the core of provincial autonomy; resolve issues through the CCI rather than rollback.
  • New NFC award with incentives for provincial tax collection and a shared contribution to national obligations.
  • Strengthen provincial capacity and devolve to local governments through constitutionally protected elections and funds.
  • Clear federal-provincial roles in education, health and higher education through CCI decisions.

Conclusion

The nature of centre-province relations has changed more under the 1973 Constitution than under any earlier arrangement, largely because of the 18th Amendment, which turned a centralised federation into a genuinely decentralised one. The change is real but incomplete: fiscal imbalances, capacity gaps and recent centralising amendments show that federalism in Pakistan is still being negotiated. Its success depends on cooperation rather than rollback.

Q4. What major economic challenges are being faced by Pakistan? What recommendations do you suggest to deal with these issues? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Macroeconomic snapshot → Challenges (fiscal, debt, external, inflation, energy, low growth and investment, narrow exports, agriculture, industry, human capital, governance, informal economy, climate) → Root causes → Recommendations → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan's economy has followed a boom-bust cycle: short bursts of growth end in balance-of-payments crises and IMF bailouts (over 20 programmes since 1958). In 2019 Pakistan entered an IMF programme after a severe external crisis; in 2023 it came close to default. Although stabilisation has since improved (FY26 growth 3.7%, reserves around $21 billion), the structural challenges remain the same.

1. Major Economic Challenges

  1. Fiscal deficit and low tax-to-GDP: tax revenue about 9–10% of GDP, among the lowest in the world; a narrow tax base with agriculture, retail and real estate under-taxed.
  2. Debt burden: public debt around 70% of GDP; interest payments consume the largest share of the federal budget (about Rs 8 trillion in FY27).
  3. Balance of payments crises: imports exceed exports; reliance on remittances, loans and rollovers from China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
  4. Narrow export base: textiles about 55–60% of exports; low value addition; exports around 10% of GDP.
  5. Inflation: peaked near 38% (May 2023); erodes real incomes.
  6. Energy sector: circular debt, expensive IPP contracts, high tariffs making industry uncompetitive.
  7. Low investment and savings: investment about 13–15% of GDP; FDI below 1% of GDP.
  8. Loss-making state-owned enterprises: PIA, Pakistan Steel Mills, Railways, DISCOs.
  9. Agricultural stagnation: low yields, water shortage, climate shocks; food imports.
  10. Human capital deficit: 26 million out-of-school children; low skills; high population growth.
  11. Unemployment and poverty: poverty rose to about 29% (2024–25).
  12. Informal economy: a large undocumented sector evades taxes.
  13. Governance and policy inconsistency: political instability, frequent policy reversals.
  14. Climate vulnerability: 2022 floods caused about $30 billion in damages and losses.

2. Root Causes

  • An elite capture model (UNDP 2021 estimated privileges for elite groups at about $17.4 billion a year).
  • Consumption-led growth financed by borrowing rather than productivity.
  • Political instability and short-termism.

3. Recommendations

Fiscal

  1. Broaden the tax base: tax agriculture income, retail, real estate and professionals; digitise FBR; reduce exemptions.
  2. Rationalise expenditure: cut subsidies to the rich, reform pensions.
  3. Reform or privatise loss-making SOEs.

External

  1. Export-led growth: diversify into IT, value-added textiles, engineering, agriculture processing and minerals; export incentives; market-based exchange rate.
  2. Attract FDI through the SIFC, stable policies and dispute resolution.
  3. Formalise remittances (Roshan Digital Account) and diaspora investment.

Energy

  1. Renegotiate IPP contracts; reduce line losses; shift to renewables and local resources.

Real sector

  1. Agricultural modernisation: seeds, water efficiency, mechanisation, storage.
  2. SMEs and industrial policy: cheaper credit, SEZs under CPEC.

Human development

  1. Invest in education, skills and health; control population growth.

Governance

  1. A Charter of Economy among parties for policy continuity.
  2. Independent regulators, rule of law and anti-corruption.
  3. Climate-resilient infrastructure.

Conclusion

Pakistan's economic challenges are structural: low taxes, high debt, narrow exports, expensive energy, weak human capital and unstable governance. IMF programmes can stabilise the economy but cannot transform it. Sustained growth requires reforms that shift the economy from consumption and borrowing to productivity, exports and investment in people — backed by political consensus.

Q5. "The population growth in Pakistan can erupt like an atomic bomb." Comment. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Population facts → Why the "atomic bomb" metaphor fits (scale, speed, chain reaction of effects) → Consequences → Causes → Counter-view (demographic dividend) → International examples → Policy measures → Conclusion

Introduction

The metaphor compares population growth to an atomic explosion: a rapid chain reaction whose destructive effects spread far beyond the point of detonation. Pakistan's population has multiplied more than seven times since 1951 to 241.5 million (Census 2023), growing at 2.55% a year. At this pace it could exceed 400 million by 2050, overwhelming food, water, jobs and services. Unless defused, it can indeed erupt with devastating consequences.

1. Population Facts

  • 1951: 33.7 million (West Pakistan) → 1998: 132 million → 2017: 207.7 million → 2023: 241.5 million.
  • Fifth most populous country; fertility rate about 3.5–3.6.
  • About two-thirds under 30.

2. Why the Metaphor Fits

  1. Scale: about 5–6 million people added every year — roughly a new city the size of Lahore's population every two to three years.
  2. Chain reaction: each generation is larger than the last (population momentum).
  3. Multiplier of problems: unemployment, poverty, food and water shortages, urban chaos and conflict.

3. Consequences

  • Economic: per capita income stagnant; unemployment; low savings; food imports.
  • Water: per capita availability below 1,000 m³ — water scarcity; heading toward absolute scarcity.
  • Education and health: 26 million children out of school; 40% of under-five children stunted.
  • Urbanisation: mega-cities without infrastructure (Karachi's water, transport, housing crises).
  • Environment: deforestation, smog, loss of agricultural land to housing.
  • Security: unemployed youth vulnerable to crime and extremism.
  • Governance: demands exceed state capacity.

4. Causes

  • Low female literacy and empowerment; early marriage.
  • Low contraceptive prevalence (about 34%); unmet need for family planning.
  • Son preference; children as economic support.
  • Religious misconceptions; weak role of ulema in awareness.
  • Weak policy implementation; funding cuts; post-18th Amendment coordination gaps.

5. Counter-View: Demographic Dividend

  • A young workforce can drive growth if educated and employed — as in East Asia.
  • Pakistan's window of opportunity (falling dependency ratio) will last only until about 2050.
  • Without skills and jobs, the dividend becomes a demographic disaster.

6. International Examples

  • Bangladesh: fertility reduced from over 6 to about 2 through community health workers, women's empowerment and NGOs.
  • Iran: reduced fertility from over 6 in the 1980s to below 2 by the early 2000s through religious endorsement, free contraception and pre-marital counselling.
  • Indonesia and Malaysia: combined Islamic scholars' support with family-planning programmes.

7. Policy Measures

  1. Implement the CCI's 2018 recommendations (from the Supreme Court's suo motu case): targets to reduce growth to 1.5% by 2030, a Population Fund, federal and provincial task forces.
  2. Universal family-planning services through every health facility; expand Lady Health Workers.
  3. Female education and employment — the single most effective policy.
  4. Engage ulema and media for awareness.
  5. Enforce the minimum marriage age (18) nationwide.
  6. Link BISP benefits to birth spacing and child health.
  7. Invest in skills, IT and entrepreneurship to use the youth bulge.
  8. Urban planning and water conservation to cope with existing growth.

Conclusion

Pakistan's population growth is a slow-moving explosion whose shock waves already strain the economy, environment and society. The metaphor is apt: if ignored, it can erupt into mass unemployment, scarcity and instability. But unlike an atomic bomb, it can still be defused — through education, women's empowerment, family planning and investment in youth, as Bangladesh and Iran have shown.

Q6. What are the main causes of energy crisis in Pakistan? What measures do you recommend to address it? (20)

Outline: Introduction → Nature of the crisis (shortage to cost crisis) → Causes (supply mix, circular debt, IPPs, T&D losses, governance, hydro neglect, gas depletion, pricing) → Impacts → Measures (short, medium, long term) → Conclusion

Introduction

Energy drives the economy, but Pakistan has faced a chronic energy crisis for two decades. In the 2000s and early 2010s it was a shortage crisis (load-shedding of 8–18 hours). Capacity additions (including under CPEC) ended most shortages, but the crisis turned into one of cost, circular debt and inefficiency. Industry pays some of the highest tariffs in the region, and households face rising bills.

1. Causes

  1. Imported-fuel-dependent energy mix: furnace oil, LNG and imported coal make power expensive and vulnerable to global prices and exchange rates.
  2. Circular debt: unpaid dues accumulating across the power chain (over Rs 2 trillion), caused by under-recovery, subsidies and losses.
  3. IPP contracts: capacity payments guaranteed in dollars whether or not power is used; overcapacity after 2018.
  4. Transmission and distribution losses: about 16–18% losses plus poor bill recovery, especially in some DISCOs.
  5. Neglect of hydropower: failure to build large dams (Kalabagh controversy; delays in Diamer-Bhasha).
  6. Depleting domestic gas and under-priced gas encouraging waste.
  7. Weak transmission infrastructure unable to carry power from new plants.
  8. Governance issues: political interference in DISCOs, tariff delays, policy inconsistency.
  9. Theft and non-payment (kunda connections).
  10. Inefficient use and lack of conservation.

2. Impacts

  • Lost GDP (estimated 2–4% a year during the shortage years); factory closures and unemployment.
  • High import bill and pressure on reserves.
  • Fiscal burden of subsidies; IMF conditions to raise tariffs.
  • Public anger; recent protests over electricity bills (2023).

3. Measures

Short term

  1. Improve bill recovery and reduce theft using smart meters and targeted policing.
  2. Targeted subsidies for the poor only (through BISP data).
  3. Renegotiate IPP contracts; retire expensive old plants (13 IPPs closed in 2024–25).

Medium term

  1. Privatise or restructure DISCOs with independent boards.
  2. Upgrade the transmission grid and build new lines to evacuate cheaper power.
  3. Move to a competitive power market (CTBCM) instead of single-buyer guarantees.
  4. Energy efficiency standards for appliances and buildings; solar for agriculture tube-wells.

Long term

  1. Shift the energy mix to indigenous and renewable sources: hydropower (Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu, Mohmand), solar, wind, nuclear, Thar coal.
  2. Achieve the target of 60% clean energy by 2030.
  3. Gas exploration and pricing reform; regional pipelines (TAPI, Iran-Pakistan).
  4. A national energy policy through consensus in the CCI, insulated from politics.

Conclusion

Pakistan's energy crisis is caused less by a lack of resources than by a costly fuel mix, circular debt, poor governance and neglected hydropower. The solution lies in fixing the distribution system, renegotiating contracts, and shifting decisively to cheaper indigenous and renewable energy. Energy reform is the key to competitive industry and sustained growth.

Q7. Critically analyze the key causes of delaying construction of dams in Pakistan. Give some suggestions to revert this collateral loss. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Importance of dams → Current storage situation → Causes of delay (political, provincial mistrust, technical and environmental, financial, displacement, legal/international, governance) → Case studies (Kalabagh, Diamer-Bhasha) → Losses ("collateral loss") → Suggestions → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan is among the world's most water-stressed countries, yet it has built no large storage dam since Tarbela (1976) apart from Mangla's raising (2012). Its storage capacity is only about 30 days of river flow, compared with about 170 days for India and about 700 days for Egypt. The delay in building dams has cost Pakistan water, cheap electricity, flood protection and agricultural growth.

1. Importance of Dams

  • Water storage for irrigation (agriculture uses about 90% of water).
  • Cheap and clean hydroelectricity.
  • Flood control (e.g., 2010 and 2022 floods).
  • Recharge of groundwater; drinking water for cities.

2. Current Situation

  • Major dams: Mangla (1967), Tarbela (1976); storage declining due to silting.
  • Live storage about 13–14 MAF against an annual flow of about 145 MAF; large amounts of water flow into the sea during floods.
  • Projects under construction: Diamer-Bhasha (about 8.1 MAF storage, 4,500 MW), Mohmand (800 MW), Dasu (4,320 MW, run-of-river).

3. Causes of Delay

a) Political and provincial mistrust

  • Kalabagh Dam (3,600 MW, about 6.1 MAF): opposed by Sindh (fear of water shortage downstream and sea intrusion into the delta), KP (fear of flooding of Nowshera and displacement) and Balochistan; resolutions against it in three provincial assemblies. Politicised for decades.
  • Distrust over implementation of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord.

b) Financial constraints

  • Mega dams cost billions (Diamer-Bhasha estimated at over $14 billion including land); international lenders reluctant, especially where projects are in disputed areas (World Bank and ADB withdrew from financing Diamer-Bhasha due to its location in Gilgit-Baltistan).
  • Fiscal pressure; low PSDP allocations.

c) Technical and environmental issues

  • Seismic zones, sedimentation, ecological concerns, impact on the Indus delta.

d) Displacement and resettlement

  • Thousands of families to be relocated; compensation disputes; local protests.

e) Governance and policy inconsistency

  • Frequent changes in government priorities; weak project management (WAPDA delays); cost overruns.
  • Preference for quick-yield thermal IPPs in the 1990s instead of long-gestation hydro projects.

f) International and legal issues

  • India's objections to projects in Kashmir; Indus Waters Treaty disputes.

g) Lack of public awareness and consensus

4. Collateral Losses

  • About 29 MAF or more of floodwater flows into the sea in high-flow years (much more in floods) — lost for agriculture.
  • Dependence on expensive thermal power — higher tariffs and circular debt.
  • Declining agricultural productivity and food security.
  • Increased flood damage (2010, 2022).
  • Over-extraction of groundwater.
  • Water per capita below scarcity levels.

5. Suggestions

  1. National consensus through the CCI: technical studies shared transparently; guarantees to lower riparians (e.g., telemetry, IRSA monitoring, minimum environmental flows to the delta).
  2. Prioritise consensus projects: fast-track Diamer-Bhasha, Mohmand, Dasu and smaller dams (Kurram Tangi, Nai Gaj, Sindh Barrage projects).
  3. Innovative financing: public-private partnerships, Chinese financing under CPEC, green bonds, diaspora funds (the Dam Fund of 2018 raised funds symbolically but showed public interest).
  4. Fair compensation and resettlement: royalties and jobs for local communities (e.g., Gilgit-Baltistan and KP).
  5. Institutional reform: efficient WAPDA project management; timelines with accountability.
  6. Small and medium dams and rainwater harvesting across provinces.
  7. Water efficiency: canal lining, drip irrigation, crop choices — so storage gains are not wasted.
  8. National Water Policy (2018) implementation: increase storage by 10 MAF by 2030.
  9. Public awareness campaigns to depoliticise the issue.

Conclusion

Pakistan's delay in building dams results from inter-provincial mistrust, political point-scoring, financing difficulties and weak governance rather than from a lack of need or sites. The losses — in water, power, food security and flood damage — grow every year. With a consensus-based approach, fair resettlement, innovative financing and efficient water use, Pakistan can still reverse this loss and secure its water future.

Q8. Efficient use of natural resources can make Pakistan a prosperous nation. Discuss in the light of the present situation of Pakistan. (20)

Outline: Introduction → Resource base → Present situation: inefficient use in each sector → Causes of inefficiency → Examples of what efficient use could deliver → Measures for efficient use → Conclusion

Introduction

Pakistan has land, water, minerals, energy sources, a long coastline and a large young population. Yet it imports food, faces water scarcity and relies on foreign loans. The problem is less the quantity of resources than their inefficient use — waste, low productivity, poor management and lack of value addition. Efficient use could transform the economy.

1. Resource Base (Brief)

  • About 22 million hectares of cultivated land; the Indus Basin Irrigation System.
  • Minerals: Reko Diq (copper-gold), Thar coal (175 billion tonnes), salt, chromite, marble, gemstones.
  • Energy: hydropower potential about 60,000 MW; solar and wind.
  • Coastline and Exclusive Economic Zone; fisheries.
  • Forests and rangelands; tourism assets.
  • Human resources: a young population.

2. Present Situation: Inefficiency

Water

  • Flood irrigation wastes much of the water; about 40% lost in conveyance through unlined canals and watercourses.
  • Low water productivity: Pakistan produces far less crop per cubic metre than comparable countries.
  • Groundwater over-extraction; storage only about 30 days.

Agriculture

  • Yields of wheat, cotton and rice below global and regional averages; post-harvest losses of 15–20% for fruit and vegetables.
  • Fragmented landholdings, poor seeds, low mechanisation; cotton production fell sharply from its peak.

Minerals

  • Mining only about 3% of GDP; raw exports with little processing; Reko Diq stalled for years before a 2022 settlement.

Energy

  • Reliance on imported fuel despite domestic hydro, solar, wind and coal; line losses and waste.

Marine

  • Fisheries exports small (around $0.5 billion) due to poor handling and illegal fishing; coastal potential under-used.

Forests

  • Forest cover only about 5%; deforestation for fuelwood.

Human resources

  • Low education and skills; 26 million children out of school; brain drain.

3. Causes of Inefficiency

  • Weak governance, corruption and policy inconsistency.
  • Lack of technology, research and extension services.
  • Subsidised or under-priced water and energy encourage waste.
  • Security problems in resource-rich regions.
  • Federal-provincial disputes and local grievances.
  • Low investment and poor infrastructure.

4. What Efficient Use Could Deliver

  • Raising crop yields to regional averages could add billions of dollars to GDP and end food imports.
  • Drip and sprinkler irrigation could save large amounts of water.
  • Developing Reko Diq and processing minerals could generate tens of billions of dollars over its lifetime.
  • Hydropower and solar could cut the oil import bill and electricity costs.
  • Blue economy and tourism could create jobs.

5. Measures for Efficient Use

  1. Water: canal and watercourse lining, drip irrigation, water pricing, groundwater regulation, storage dams, the National Water Policy.
  2. Agriculture: certified seeds, mechanisation, cold chains, agricultural research, corporate and cooperative farming, crop diversification.
  3. Minerals: transparent investment framework (SIFC), value addition (refineries), local benefit-sharing, geological mapping.
  4. Energy: indigenous and renewable sources; energy efficiency; reduced losses.
  5. Marine: modern fishing fleets, processing plants, protection from over-fishing.
  6. Forests: afforestation (Ten Billion Tree Tsunami), fuelwood alternatives.
  7. Human capital: education, technical training, research.
  8. Governance: stable policies, rule of law, anti-corruption, federal-provincial coordination.

Conclusion

Pakistan is not a poor country in resources; it is poor in their management. Efficient use of water, land, minerals, energy and people could lift productivity, exports and incomes. With better governance, technology and investment in human capital, Pakistan's resources can become the foundation of lasting prosperity.