XXIV. The War in Afghanistan Since 1979 — Pakistan Affairs

📂 START HERE — How This Page Is Organised

No child pages here — read the sections below in order, then the solved past papers at the end.

📝 Actual CSS questions from this chapter

CSS 2016 Q8 — Afghan war since 1979, its impact and non-state actors
CSS 2021 Q3 — "Afghan-owned, Afghan-led" solution
CSS 2026 Q3 — Afghan instability and Pakistan's security, diplomacy and CT strategy

📺 Directly Relevant YouTube Lecture Sources

Zia-ul-Haq Regime (1977–1988) — Zia era: the Afghan jihad and Geneva Accords
Political History 1988–1999 — Decade Between Two Martial Laws — 1988–99: civil war and the Taliban's rise
The Musharraf Era (1999–2008) — Musharraf: the post-9/11 U-turn
Pakistan's Internal Security Situation — Threats to Internal Security — internal security: TTP spillover
Current Tenure — Coalition Governments (2022–Present) — current tenure: 2025–26 Pakistan–Afghanistan clashes

📌 Topic Contents

📖 Soviet Invasion Era (1979-1989)
📖 Civil War & Taliban Rise (1989-2001)
📖 Post-9/11 US Invasion (2001-2021)
📖 Post-2014 Drawdown Impact
📖 Taliban Return (Aug 2021)
📖 2021–2026: From "Friendly Kabul" to Open Conflict
📖 Impact on Pakistan (use for "critically examine" questions)
📖 Internal security
📖 Regional diplomacy
📖 Counter-terrorism strategy
📖 Policy Measures (way forward)
📖 Answer structure (20 marks)
📖 Exam angle
📖 ✍️ Model Answer (20 marks)
📖 Outline
📖 1. Introduction
📖 2. Historical Background

20-mark technique: frame a thesis; explain causes and consequences; substantiate claims; assess alternative explanations.

Soviet Invasion Era (1979-1989)

USSR invaded Afghanistan Dec 1979 to prop up communist govt
Pakistan (under Zia) became frontline state for US/Saudi-backed Afghan resistance (Mujahideen) — Cold War proxy conflict
ISI played central role in organizing/training Mujahideen; massive influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan
Soviet withdrawal 1989 — but left Afghanistan in civil war, Pakistan deeply entangled

Civil War & Taliban Rise (1989-2001)

Mujahideen factions fought each other post-Soviet withdrawal — chaos, warlordism
Taliban emerged mid-1990s, captured Kabul 1996 — Pakistan among only 3 countries to recognize Taliban govt
Pakistan's "strategic depth" policy — sought friendly Kabul govt as buffer against India influence

Post-9/11 US Invasion (2001-2021)

US toppled Taliban after 9/11 (Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden)
Pakistan became frontline ally again — but accused of double game (alleged covert support to Taliban/Haqqani network while officially allied with US)
20-year US/NATO presence — massive spillover effects on Pakistan (refugees, militancy, TTP emergence)

Post-2014 Drawdown Impact

"Post-2014 era" (per syllabus) refers to aftermath of NATO combat mission drawdown (2014) — rise of instability, Pakistan intensified internal operations (Zarb-e-Azb) as spillover grew

Taliban Return (Aug 2021)

US/NATO withdrawal, Taliban swiftly retook Kabul
Pakistan initially cautiously optimistic (hoped for stability, trade); relations soon strained over TTP sanctuaries, border clashes, refugee repatriation disputes (2023-24)

2021–2026: From "Friendly Kabul" to Open Conflict

TTP resurgence after the Taliban takeover: prisoners freed from Afghan jails, TTP regrouped in eastern Afghanistan. Talks with the TTP (2021–22, with Afghan Taliban mediation) collapsed; the TTP ended its ceasefire in November 2022.
2025 was one of the most violent years in over a decade — ACLED recorded more than 1,000 TTP incidents in Pakistan, concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (especially merged districts) and Balochistan.
Refugee repatriation: Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan (October 2023), later extended to PoR/ACC card holders — hundreds of thousands returned, straining relations with Kabul.
October 2025 clashes: a Pakistani strike in Kabul targeting TTP leadership triggered Afghan retaliation and the deadliest border fighting in years. Ceasefire agreed in Doha (18–19 October 2025) with Qatari and Turkish mediation; follow-up rounds in Istanbul (25–30 October and November 2025) tried to set up a monitoring mechanism but failed.
February 2026 escalation: after an Afghan cross-border offensive (26 February), Pakistan struck military targets in Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Khost and other provinces. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif called it an "open war".
Urumqi talks (China, 1–7 April 2026) — China-mediated effort to restore a ceasefire.
September 2026 position: the Pakistan military rules out any talks with the TTP (which the state calls Fitna al-Khawarij), says fixing relations depends on Kabul acting against militants, and reserves the right of self-defence. Kabul denies harbouring the TTP and welcomes Saudi mediation.

Impact on Pakistan (use for "critically examine" questions)

Internal security

Sanctuaries across a porous 2,600 km border let the TTP strike and retreat; attacks on security forces, police and CPEC-linked targets.
Spillover of weapons left behind by US forces, and cooperation between the TTP, ISKP and Baloch insurgent groups.
Pressure on the merged ex-FATA districts, where development and governance lag.

Regional diplomacy

"Strategic depth" policy has failed: Kabul now tilts toward diversifying partners — India upgraded ties (Taliban FM Muttaqi's New Delhi visit, October 2025) and Russia became the first state to formally recognise the Taliban (July 2025).
China has become the key mediator (trilateral mechanism, extension of CPEC into Afghanistan discussed in 2025; Urumqi talks 2026). Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia also act as mediators.
Connectivity projects at risk: Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway, CASA-1000, TAPI; Afghan transit trade shifting toward Iran's Chabahar and Central Asia after repeated Torkham and Chaman closures.

Counter-terrorism strategy

Shift from negotiation to kinetic deterrence: operations under Azm-e-Istehkam (2024), cross-border strikes, and a no-talks policy.
Risk: cross-border strikes can cause civilian casualties, harden Afghan nationalism, and push the Taliban closer to India.

Policy Measures (way forward)

Two-track policy: firm action against the TTP combined with sustained diplomacy with Kabul; avoid a break in communication channels.
Multilateral guarantee mechanism: institutionalise Chinese, Qatari, Turkish and Saudi mediation into a verifiable monitoring and verification mechanism for TTP activity.
Border management: complete fencing (already largely complete), biometric crossings, border markets to give local communities a legal economy.
Economic leverage and interdependence: use transit trade, electricity and railway projects as incentives for cooperation rather than using closures as punishment.
Internal consolidation: revive the National Action Plan, strengthen KP police and CTD capacity, fast-track development and local governance in the merged districts.
Counter-narrative: build on Paigham-e-Pakistan (2018 fatwa against terrorism); madrassa registration and curriculum reform.
Humane, orderly refugee policy: documented, phased repatriation to reduce Afghan resentment.
Regional forums: use the SCO, Moscow Format and China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral dialogue to build regional consensus against terrorism.

Answer structure (20 marks)

Introduction — Afghanistan as Pakistan's most persistent security variable since 1979.
Historical background in brief (1979, 1990s, 2001, 2021).
Impact on internal security — TTP, ISKP, data from 2025–26.
Impact on regional diplomacy — India–Taliban warming, Russia, China mediation, trade and connectivity.
Impact on CT strategy — from talks to Azm-e-Istehkam and cross-border strikes.
Critical evaluation — limits of both the "strategic depth" and "kinetic-only" approaches.
Policy measures (6–8 points).
Conclusion — security of Pakistan and stability of Afghanistan are inseparable.

Exam angle

The syllabus names the "post-2014 era" specifically.
Keep the 2014 NATO drawdown separate from the 2021 withdrawal — either can be tested.

✍️ Model Answer (20 marks)

Question (CSS 2026): "The instability in Afghanistan continues to influence Pakistan's internal security, regional diplomacy and counter-terrorism strategy." Critically examine the statement and suggest policy measures.

Outline

Introduction
Historical background (1979–2021)
Afghanistan since 2021
Impact on internal security
Impact on regional diplomacy
Impact on counter-terrorism strategy
Critical examination
Policy measures
Conclusion

1. Introduction

Since the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghanistan has been the single most persistent variable in Pakistan's security. For four decades Pakistan sought a friendly government in Kabul to secure its western flank. When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, many in Pakistan expected that goal had been achieved. Instead, relations have deteriorated into open conflict. The statement is therefore accurate: Afghan instability now shapes Pakistan's internal security, its diplomacy and its counter-terrorism strategy more directly than at any time since 2001.

2. Historical Background

1979–89: Pakistan became the frontline state against the Soviet occupation, receiving US and Saudi support and millions of refugees, but also weapons, drugs and militancy.
1990s: civil war and the rise of the Taliban, whom Pakistan recognised; the policy of "strategic depth".
2001–21: Pakistan joined the War on Terror; the TTP emerged as blowback; the NATO drawdown in 2014 increased pressure and prompted Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

3. Afghanistan Since 2021

The Taliban takeover freed TTP prisoners and allowed the group to regroup.
Talks with the TTP (2021–22) failed; its ceasefire ended in November 2022.
Pakistan began repatriating undocumented Afghans (October 2023).
October 2025: a Pakistani strike in Kabul triggered the deadliest border clashes in years; a ceasefire was agreed in Doha (18–19 October), and talks in Istanbul failed to create a monitoring mechanism.
February 2026: after an Afghan offensive, Pakistan struck targets in Kabul, Kandahar and other provinces; the Defence Minister spoke of "open war".
April 2026: China-mediated talks in Urumqi.
September 2026: Pakistan's military rules out talks with the TTP and says fixing relations depends on Kabul's action against militants; Kabul denies harbouring the group and welcomes Saudi mediation.

4. Impact on Internal Security

Terrorism: the TTP carried out over 1,000 attacks in 2025, one of the most violent years in a decade; Pakistan ranked second on the Global Terrorism Index 2025.
Sanctuaries: militants attack and retreat across a porous 2,600 km border.
Weapons: arms left behind by US forces have reached militants.
Nexus: the TTP, ISKP and Baloch groups sometimes cooperate.
Merged districts: development and governance in former FATA remain fragile.

5. Impact on Regional Diplomacy

Strategic depth has failed: the Taliban are diversifying; India upgraded ties (Foreign Minister Muttaqi's visit to New Delhi, October 2025) and Russia recognised the Taliban (July 2025).
New mediators: China, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia now shape Pakistan–Afghanistan relations.
Connectivity at risk: the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway, CASA-1000 and TAPI depend on Afghan stability; Afghan trade is shifting towards Iran's Chabahar port and Central Asia after repeated border closures.
Refugee policy has become a diplomatic irritant.

6. Impact on Counter-Terrorism Strategy

A shift from negotiation to kinetic deterrence: Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (2024), cross-border strikes and a no-talks policy.
New framing: the TTP is labelled Fitna al-Khawarij, delegitimising it religiously.
Border fencing and tighter crossing controls.

7. Critical Examination

The statement is largely valid, with two qualifications:
1. Not the only cause — weak governance in the merged districts, slow justice and unresolved grievances also feed militancy.
2. Pakistan's own past policies — support for the Taliban and tolerance of some militants helped create today's problem.
A purely kinetic approach risks civilian casualties and pushes Kabul towards Pakistan's rivals.
A purely diplomatic approach has already failed.
Neither strategic depth nor force alone is enough.

8. Policy Measures

Two-track policy: firm action against the TTP combined with sustained diplomacy with Kabul.
Multilateral guarantee mechanism: institutionalise mediation by China, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia into a verifiable monitoring system.
Border management: complete fencing, biometric crossings and border markets for local communities.
Economic leverage: use trade, transit, electricity and railway projects as incentives rather than closures as punishment.
Internal consolidation: revive the National Action Plan; strengthen KP police and CTDs; fast-track development in the merged districts.
Counter-narrative: build on Paigham-e-Pakistan; madrassa registration and curriculum reform.
Humane refugee policy: orderly, documented and phased returns.
Regional forums: the SCO, the Moscow Format and the China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral.

9. Conclusion

Afghanistan's instability has become Pakistan's instability: it fuels terrorism at home, weakens Pakistan's regional diplomacy and has forced a hard shift in counter-terrorism strategy. Four decades of experience show that Pakistan cannot secure its western border either by choosing Kabul's rulers or by force alone. A durable solution will combine firm counter-terrorism, internal reform and a regionally backed framework with Kabul. The security of Pakistan and the stability of Afghanistan are inseparable.

📝 CSS Past Papers 2014–2026 — This Chapter (Solved)

📊

Asked so far: 3 subjective questions (2016, 2021, 2026) · 3 MCQs (2019, 2020, 2025). Geneva Accords and Soviet withdrawal dates are favourite MCQs.

2024–2026 MCQs are from the FPSC papers with original options. 2014–2023 MCQs come from published answer keys (the FPSC copies only contain Part-II), so their options are rewritten but the keyed answer is kept and checked.

Part-I — Past MCQs

1. (CSS 2019) How many Afghan Mujahideen factions signed the Islamabad Accord (March 1993)?

(A) 4
(B) 5
(C) 6
(D) 8
✅ (C) 6 as keyed (verify — some sources list eight).
- Accord of 7 March 1993: Rabbani President, Hekmatyar PM; collapsed within months.

2. (CSS 2020) The Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan began on:

(A) 14 April 1988
(B) 15 February 1989
(C) 15 May 1988
(D) 27 December 1979
✅ (C) 15 May 1988 — began under the Geneva Accords; completed 15 February 1989.
- The invasion began 24–27 December 1979.

3. (CSS 2025) The Geneva Accords were signed on:

(A) 14 May 1988
(B) 14 April 1988
(C) 14 June 1988
(D) None of these
✅ (B) 14 April 1988 — signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan; USA and USSR as guarantors.
- Junejo signed despite Zia's reservations — one reason for his dismissal (May 1988).

Part-II — Past Subjective Questions

1. CSS 2016 Q8 — Write a note on the Afghan war since 1979 and its impacts on Pakistan. How far can the emergence of "non-state actors" and non-traditional security threats in Pakistan be attributed to the decades-long warfare in Afghanistan? (20)

Outline

Introduction
Phases of the war in Afghanistan since 1979
Impact on Pakistan
The rise of non-state actors and non-traditional threats
How far the Afghan war is responsible
Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

Few countries have been affected by a neighbour's wars as deeply as Pakistan has by the conflict in Afghanistan. Since 1979 that conflict has shaped Pakistan's security, economy and society.

2. Phases of the war in Afghanistan since 1979

The Soviet Union invaded in December 1979, and the resistance was supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia through Pakistan.
The Geneva Accords of 1988 led to Soviet withdrawal, but a civil war followed from 1989 to 1996.
The Taliban ruled most of the country from 1996 to 2001.
The US-led war began in 2001, and NATO reduced its forces in 2014.

3. Impact on Pakistan

Security. Weapons flooded the country, producing what came to be called a "Kalashnikov culture". Militancy spread, the TTP was formed in 2007 and cross-border attacks became common.
Refugees. At their peak, more than three million Afghan refugees lived in Pakistan.
Drugs. The heroin trade grew and drug addiction spread.
The economy. Pakistan received aid in the 1980s, but between 2001 and 2018 it suffered losses estimated at about 126 billion dollars.
Society. Sectarian tension, the rapid growth of madrassas and radicalisation all increased.
Politics. The wars strengthened military rule under both Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf.
Diplomacy. Pakistan became known as a frontline state but was also accused of playing a double game.

4. The rise of non-state actors and non-traditional threats

Groups trained for jihad in the 1980s later turned their guns on Pakistan itself.
Al-Qaeda and the TTP used the tribal areas as bases.
Smuggling and drug money financed terrorism.
Small arms became widely available.
Sectarian militancy grew, fuelled by the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
More recently, ISKP has emerged as a new threat.

5. How far the Afghan war is responsible

The Afghan war is largely responsible, because it supplied the weapons, the training, the networks and the ideology on which these groups depend.
It would be wrong, however, to blame Afghanistan alone. Pakistan's own policies, including the pursuit of strategic depth, patronage of certain militant groups and the neglect of the tribal areas under the colonial-era FCR, allowed these threats to take root.

6. Conclusion

The war in Afghanistan has been the single biggest external source of Pakistan's insecurity. Lasting security, however, requires both a stable Afghanistan and reform at home. Military action against militants must be combined with better governance, as the National Action Plan of 2014 recognised.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2016 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

2. CSS 2021 Q3 — Explain the "Afghan-owned, Afghan-led" solution of the Afghanistan crisis. (20)

Outline

Introduction
Meaning of the concept
Why solutions imposed from outside failed
The main Afghan stakeholders
The peace process
Pakistan's position and role
The regional dimension
Challenges
Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

The phrase "Afghan-owned, Afghan-led" became the guiding principle of efforts to end the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan was among its strongest supporters.

2. Meaning of the concept

It means that peace must be negotiated and agreed by Afghans themselves, including all major groups. Outside powers may help and facilitate, but they should not dictate the terms.

3. Why solutions imposed from outside failed

For forty years foreign powers tried to impose their own arrangements. The Soviet occupation failed, rival foreign backing fuelled the civil war of the 1990s, and the governments set up with US support after 2001 never won full legitimacy.
The Bonn Conference of 2001 excluded the Taliban altogether, which left a major group outside the political settlement.

4. The main Afghan stakeholders

The Taliban.
The government in Kabul, led at the time by Ashraf Ghani.
Leaders of the former Northern Alliance.
The Hazara community and other minorities.
Women's groups and civil society.

5. The peace process

The United States and the Taliban signed the Doha Agreement on 29 February 2020.
After an exchange of about 5,000 Taliban prisoners for 1,000 government personnel, intra-Afghan negotiations began in Doha on 12 September 2020.

6. Pakistan's position and role

Pakistan consistently argued that only an Afghan-led settlement could last.
It helped bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and supported the talks in Doha.
It took part in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (2016), the "Troika Plus" of the United States, China, Russia and Pakistan, the Moscow Format and trilateral talks with China and Afghanistan.
It also worked on border management and the return of refugees.

7. The regional dimension

China, Russia, Iran and the Central Asian states all wanted a stable Afghanistan. Pakistan, for its part, was concerned about India's influence in the country.

8. Challenges

Deep mistrust between the Afghan parties.
Continued violence during the talks.
Disagreement over how power would be shared.
Questions about the rights of women and minorities.
The presence of spoilers such as ISKP.
In the end, the Taliban refused to accept the Kabul government and took the capital by force on 15 August 2021.

9. Conclusion

An inclusive settlement negotiated by Afghans remains the only lasting formula for peace in Afghanistan. The events of August 2021 showed what happens when such a settlement is not reached.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2021 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)

3. CSS 2026 Q3 — "The instability in Afghanistan continues to influence Pakistan's internal security, regional diplomacy, and counter-terrorism strategy." Critically examine and suggest policy measures. (20)

Outline

Introduction
Background
Developments since 2021
Impact on Pakistan's internal security
Impact on regional diplomacy
Impact on counter-terrorism strategy
Critical examination
Policy measures
Conclusion

Answer

1. Introduction

When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, many in Pakistan expected a friendly government in Kabul. Instead, relations have descended into open hostility over the TTP. The statement is largely valid, since Afghan instability now affects Pakistan's security, diplomacy and counter-terrorism policy more directly than at any time since 2001.

2. Background

Since 1979 Afghanistan's wars have brought refugees, weapons, drugs and militancy into Pakistan, and the policy of seeking "strategic depth" there has repeatedly backfired.

3. Developments since 2021

The TTP regrouped in Afghanistan, and its ceasefire with Pakistan ended in November 2022.
Pakistan began repatriating undocumented Afghans in October 2023.
In October 2025 a Pakistani strike in Kabul was followed by the worst border clashes in years. A ceasefire was agreed in Doha on 18 and 19 October with Qatari and Turkish mediation, but follow-up talks in Istanbul failed.
In February 2026, after attacks from across the border, Pakistan struck targets in several Afghan provinces.
China mediated talks in Urumqi in April 2026, and in September 2026 Pakistan ruled out talks with the TTP.

4. Impact on Pakistan's internal security

2025 was one of the most violent years in a decade, with more than a thousand TTP-linked incidents.
Militants use sanctuaries along a porous border of about 2,600 km and weapons left behind by US forces.
Cooperation among the TTP, ISKP and Baloch militants has made the threat more complex.

5. Impact on regional diplomacy

Kabul has diversified its relations. Its foreign minister visited New Delhi in October 2025, and Russia recognised the Taliban government in July 2025.
China, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have emerged as mediators between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Connectivity projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway, CASA-1000 and TAPI have stalled.

6. Impact on counter-terrorism strategy

Pakistan has moved from negotiation to military pressure, launching Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in 2024 and carrying out cross-border strikes.
The state now calls the TTP "Fitna al-Khawarij" to deny it religious legitimacy.
Border fencing and stricter crossing rules have been introduced.

7. Critical examination

Afghanistan is a major cause of Pakistan's insecurity, but not the only one. Weak governance in the merged districts, a slow justice system and past tolerance of certain militant groups also sustain militancy.
Relying on force alone risks civilian casualties and pushes Kabul closer to Pakistan's rivals, while diplomacy alone has already failed.

8. Policy measures

Pakistan should combine firm action against the TTP with sustained diplomacy towards Kabul.
A multilateral mechanism involving China, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia could guarantee and verify any agreement.
Border management should be improved through fencing, biometric checks and border markets.
Trade, transit and energy projects can be offered as incentives for cooperation.
At home, the National Action Plan should be revived and police counter-terrorism units strengthened in KP.
The Paigham-e-Pakistan counter-narrative and madrassa reform should be pursued.
Refugee repatriation should be orderly and humane.
Regional forums such as the SCO and the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral should be used fully.

9. Conclusion

Four decades of experience show that Pakistan cannot secure its western border either by choosing who rules in Kabul or by force alone. A combination of firm counter-terrorism, reform at home and a regionally supported framework for relations with Afghanistan offers the most durable path.

Full 20-mark answer: CSS 2026 — Pakistan Affairs Paper (Solved)