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Reserve R4 — Resurgence of Terrorism in Pakistan

Reserve question: Pakistan was ranked the country most affected by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index 2026. Analyse the causes of the resurgence of terrorism since 2021 and evaluate the effectiveness of the state's counter-terrorism response, including Azm-e-Istehkam. (20)

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Why it is likely: terrorism and NAP were asked in 2016, 2017 and 2019, but not in 2020–2026, while violence has reached decade highs. "Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism" is a syllabus item. Probability: medium–high.

What the examiner wants

  • Causes of the resurgence since 2021
  • Evaluation of the counter-terrorism response
  • Marks split: scale ~3 · causes ~7 · response and evaluation ~7 · way forward and conclusion ~3

Outline

  • I. Introduction
  • II. Scale of the resurgence
  • III. Causes
    1. The Taliban's return and TTP sanctuaries
    2. Failed talks with the TTP (2021–22)
    3. Baloch insurgency
    4. Governance gaps in the merged districts
    5. Political polarisation and civil–military friction
    6. Weapons left in Afghanistan
    7. Regional and hostile involvement
  • IV. The state's response
  • V. Evaluation
  • VI. Way forward
  • VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

  • After the 2014–18 counter-terrorism gains, Pakistan's violence fell sharply. Since 2021 it has returned.
  • Thesis: the resurgence comes mainly from TTP sanctuaries in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and the Baloch insurgency, made worse by governance gaps and political division at home. The state's response is militarily strong but civilian-weak and politically divided, which limits results.

II. Scale

  • 2024 was the deadliest year in about a decade; Pakistan was ranked first in the Global Terrorism Index 2026.
  • ISPR cited 3,811 incidents in KP and 1,557 in Balochistan (January 2026 briefing).
  • Attacks reached 225 in September 2026, a 12-year monthly high.
  • Major attacks:
    • The Jaffar Express hijacking (March 2025).
    • Islamabad mosque bombing, 31 killed (6 February 2026).
    • Attacks on Chinese nationals (2024).

III. Causes

  • 1. TTP sanctuaries: the Afghan Taliban refuse to act against the TTP, which ended its ceasefire in November 2022.
  • 2. Failed talks (2021–22): the return of fighters to the merged districts let the TTP regroup.
  • 3. Baloch insurgency: the BLA and BLF exploit grievances over resources, missing persons and CPEC. The US designated the BLA a terrorist organisation (2025).
  • 4. Governance gaps: the merged districts' promised funds, courts and police remain weak.
  • 5. Political polarisation: the federal–KP dispute over operations (Tirah) and dialogue, leading to the KP emergency (October 2026).
  • 6. Weapons: US arms left in Afghanistan have reached militant hands.
  • 7. Hostile involvement: Pakistan accuses India of backing the TTP and BLA ("Fitna al-Khawarij" and "Fitna al-Hindustan" in official language).

IV. The state's response

  • Azm-e-Istehkam (June 2024): a national campaign combining military operations, intelligence and counter-extremism.
  • The revised NAP (2021) and NACTA.
  • Cross-border strikes in Afghanistan (2024–26), and the February 2026 "open war".
  • Refugee repatriation (the IFRP, 2023).
  • Diplomacy: the Doha, Istanbul, Urumqi and Moscow processes.
  • Governance: the Area Development Secretariat for 12 terror-hit districts (October 2026).

V. Evaluation

  • Strengths:
    • Military capability.
    • Many militant leaders killed.
    • International support (the BLA designation, a US counter-terrorism dialogue).
  • Weaknesses:
    • Over-reliance on force; civilian institutions (police, CTDs, courts) remain under-resourced.
    • Political division: no shared counter-terrorism ownership between the centre and KP.
    • Cross-border strikes haven't changed Kabul's behaviour and risk wider war.
    • Displacement (Tirah) and heavy-handedness alienate local people.
    • Root causes in Balochistan remain unaddressed.
  • Verdict: a strong military response that keeps militants under pressure but can't win without political unity and civilian capacity.

VI. Way forward

  1. National consensus: an all-parties counter-terrorism charter, like NAP 2014, including PTI.
  2. Civilian capacity: police reform, forensics, prosecution and faster trials.
  3. Afghanistan: a verifiable regional mechanism on the TTP (China, Qatar, Türkiye, Russia).
  4. Balochistan: political dialogue, development and justice on missing persons.
  5. Merged districts: release funds, and build courts, schools and jobs.
  6. Counter-narrative: Paigham-e-Pakistan, madrassa reform and online counter-messaging.
  7. Terror financing: sustain FATF-level vigilance.

VII. Conclusion

  • The resurgence shows that terrorism defeated by force alone comes back.
  • Pakistan needs the unity of 2014 and the civilian follow-through it lacked then. Without political consensus at home and a reliable deal on the Afghan side, military operations will keep buying time, not victory.

Key facts

  • GTI 2026: Pakistan 1st. TTP ceasefire ended: November 2022.
  • Azm-e-Istehkam: June 2024. Islamabad mosque bombing: 6 February 2026 (31 killed).
  • September 2026: 225 attacks (12-year monthly high).