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Reserve R3 — The Nuclear Order After the Iran War and New START

Reserve question: Is the global nuclear non-proliferation regime collapsing? Discuss with reference to the 2026 Iran war, the end of New START and the arms race in South Asia. (20)

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Why it is likely: nuclear issues were asked in 2017, 2021, 2022, 2024 (short note) and 2025, five times. 2026 brought an attack on an NPT state in the middle of negotiations, the expiry of New START (February 2026) and a naval nuclear race in South Asia. Probability: medium–high.

What the examiner wants

  • An assessment: is the regime collapsing?
  • Three named references: the Iran war, New START and South Asia
  • A balanced verdict and a way forward
  • Marks split: the regime ~3 · Iran war ~5 · New START and great powers ~4 · South Asia ~4 · verdict and way forward ~4

Outline

  • I. Introduction
  • II. The regime and its pillars
  • III. Pressure 1: the Iran war
  • IV. Pressure 2: the collapse of great-power arms control
  • V. Pressure 3: South Asia's arms race
  • VI. Signs the regime survives
  • VII. Verdict and way forward
  • VIII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

  • The non-proliferation regime rests on the NPT (1968/1970), IAEA safeguards, test bans, export controls and US–Russia arms control.
  • Thesis: the regime isn't collapsing outright, but it is badly eroding. An NPT state was attacked while negotiating, great-power arms control has ended, and regional arms races are accelerating. Its credibility now depends on whether major powers return to rules rather than force.

II. The regime's pillars

  • The NPT's three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament (Article VI) and peaceful use.
  • The IAEA and the Additional Protocol; the CTBT (not in force); the NSG and MTCR; nuclear-weapon-free zones; the TPNW (2021).

III. The Iran war

  • Background: the JCPOA collapsed (US exit 2018) and UN snapback came in September 2025. The June 2025 strikes hit Iranian sites.
  • 2026: the US–Israeli war began 28 February 2026, during nuclear talks. Natanz and other sites were bombed, and Khamenei was killed.
  • Effects on the regime:
    • Iran suspended IAEA cooperation, and inspectors have no access to bombed sites.
    • The status of Iran's enriched-uranium stockpile is unknown.
    • The precedent: an NPT member was attacked while negotiating, while non-NPT nuclear states remain safe. That strengthens the argument for acquiring a bomb.
    • The June MoU's promise never to build nuclear weapons is unverifiable without inspections.

IV. The collapse of great-power arms control

  • The INF ended in 2019; Open Skies in 2020–21; Russia suspended New START (2023) and "de-ratified" the CTBT (2023).
  • New START lapsed in February 2026 without a binding replacement treaty. Check whether any informal limits are being observed.
  • China's arsenal is growing fast (around 600 warheads by SIPRI 2025), and it refuses trilateral talks.
  • Result: the first period since the 1970s with no binding limits on the largest arsenals, and talk of resumed nuclear testing.

V. South Asia's arms race

  • India and Pakistan each have around 170–180 warheads (SIPRI).
  • Sea-based race:
    • India commissioned new nuclear-armed submarines (2024–26).
    • Pakistan inducted its first Hangor-class submarine (June 2026) and is developing a sea-based second strike (Babur-3).
  • The May 2025 conflict showed conventional war under the nuclear shadow; the 2026 naval collision added risk at sea.
  • The India–US partnership and India's NSG bid deepen Pakistan's concerns about discrimination.

VI. Signs the regime survives

  • No new nuclear-armed state since North Korea (2006).
  • Most states still value the NPT; the testing norm largely holds.
  • Iran committed on paper never to build weapons.
  • IAEA verification still functions in most countries.

VII. Verdict and way forward

  • Verdict: eroding, not collapsing. The norm survives, but rules are increasingly bent by power.
  • Way forward:
    1. Restore IAEA access in Iran; replace "zero enrichment" demands with monitored limits.
    2. Revive US–Russia–China strategic stability talks.
    3. Bring the CTBT into force; keep the testing moratorium.
    4. South Asia: nuclear risk-reduction measures, including notification of cruise-missile tests and an incidents-at-sea agreement.
    5. Non-discriminatory, criteria-based rules for non-NPT states, Pakistan's long-standing position.

VIII. Conclusion

  • The nuclear order is being tested as never before since the Cold War.
  • If states conclude that only nuclear weapons protect them, the regime will fail. Preventing that requires great powers to rebuild arms control and to treat all states by the same rules.

Key facts

  • NPT: 1968, in force 1970. CTBT: 1996 (not in force). TPNW: 2021.
  • New START: signed 2010; extended 2021; Russia suspended 2023; expired February 2026.
  • Iran war: 28 February 2026. Snapback: September 2025.