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Forecast Q4 — Pakistan–Afghanistan Conflict: From Strategic Depth to Strategic Dilemma

Forecast question: "Pakistan's search for strategic depth in Afghanistan has turned into a strategic dilemma." Critically evaluate this statement in the light of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations since 2021, and suggest a viable way forward. (20)

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Why it is likely: Afghanistan was asked in 2019, 2021, 2022 and 2025 but not in 2026, so it is overdue. In 2026 relations reached "open war" (27 February 2026), trade has been frozen since October 2025, and terrorism hit a 12-year monthly high in September 2026. The 2026 statement-based style suits it. Probability: very high.

What the examiner wants

  • Critically evaluate the statement: agree, disagree or partly agree
  • Events since 2021, with evidence
  • A viable (realistic) way forward
  • Marks split: background ~3 · evaluation of the statement (causes of the dilemma) ~8 · counter-view ~2 · way forward ~5 · conclusion ~2

Outline

  • I. Introduction: largely agree
  • II. What "strategic depth" meant
  • III. Why it became a dilemma (since 2021)
    1. TTP sanctuaries and the terrorism surge
    2. The Durand Line dispute
    3. From ceasefire to "open war" (2025–26)
    4. Trade and transit collapse
    5. Refugees and humanitarian pressure
    6. Kabul's new alignments (India, Iran, Russia)
  • IV. Counter-view: is the statement overstated?
  • V. Mediation attempts and why they failed
  • VI. A viable way forward
  • VII. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

  • For decades, Pakistan's Afghan policy aimed at strategic depth: a friendly government in Kabul that would secure Pakistan's western flank against India.
  • When the Taliban returned in August 2021, many in Pakistan saw that goal achieved. Five years later, the two countries have fought an undeclared war, trade is frozen and talks are deadlocked.
  • Thesis: the statement is largely true. The Taliban government Pakistan once hoped for has become its biggest security problem. But the dilemma isn't permanent: a mix of pressure, regional diplomacy and economic engagement can still manage it.

II. What strategic depth meant

  • Rooted in the 1980s Afghan jihad and the 1990s support for the first Taliban government (Pakistan was one of three states to recognise it).
  • The aims: a pro-Pakistan Kabul, no Indian influence, a secure western border and access to Central Asia.

III. Why it became a dilemma

  • 1. TTP sanctuaries
    • The Afghan Taliban kept ideological and tribal ties with the TTP and refused to act against them. The TTP ended its ceasefire in November 2022.
    • Violence rose every year: the TTP caused over half of terrorism deaths in 2025, and attacks reached 225 in September 2026, a 12-year monthly high. Pakistan ranked first on the Global Terrorism Index 2026.
  • 2. The Durand Line
    • The Taliban, like every Afghan government, reject the 1893 border and object to fencing, which causes repeated clashes.
  • 3. From ceasefire to open war
    • October 2025: Pakistani strikes in Kabul and heavy clashes; the Doha ceasefire (19 October, Qatar and Türkiye); the Istanbul talks collapsed in November.
    • 6 February 2026: a suicide bombing at an Islamabad mosque killed 31.
    • 27 February 2026: Pakistan struck Kabul, Kandahar and Paktia, and the defence minister declared "open war".
    • September–October 2026: further strikes and clashes in Kurram and Paktia.
  • 4. Trade and transit collapse
    • Torkham, Chaman and other crossings have been closed for trade since October 2025, with losses estimated at about $2.5 billion (Khyber Chamber of Commerce).
    • The APTTA transit trade is frozen, and Afghanistan has shifted to Iranian ports and Central Asia.
  • 5. Refugees
    • Under the Illegal Foreigners' Repatriation Plan (2023), over 2 million Afghans returned by early 2026. Kabul calls it collective punishment, and the UNHCR warns of refoulement.
  • 6. New alignments
    • India–Taliban engagement upgraded in 2025.
    • Russia recognised the Taliban (July 2025).
    • Afghanistan diversified away from Pakistan.
  • Result: instead of depth, Pakistan faces a hostile western border at the same time as a frozen eastern one (India) and a war next door (Iran): a triple-front dilemma.

IV. Counter-view: is the statement overstated?

  • Strategic depth was already discarded in official thinking after 2014 (the "no favourites" policy).
  • The TTP problem has domestic roots: governance gaps in the merged districts and the failure to complete the NAP.
  • Pakistan still has leverage: trade routes, refugees and ties with China and Russia, which also want Kabul to curb militants.
  • So: it's less that strategic depth "failed" than that the policy wasn't updated to the reality of an independent-minded Taliban.

V. Mediation attempts

  • Qatar and Türkiye (Doha, Istanbul, 2025).
  • Saudi Arabia (release of soldiers, February 2026).
  • China (Urumqi talks, April 2026).
  • Russia (the Moscow Format, 5 October 2026, ended without a joint statement).
  • Why they failed:
    • No mediator can force the Taliban to act against the TTP.
    • Kabul denies that the networks exist.
    • Pakistan insists on a verifiable mechanism.

VI. A viable way forward

  1. Security with precision: targeted action against TTP leadership; border management (fencing, surveillance); stronger police and CTDs in KP and Balochistan.
  2. A verifiable mechanism: a joint monitoring body guaranteed by China, Qatar and Türkiye, with clear benchmarks for TTP relocation and disarmament.
  3. Regional pressure: use the SCO, the Moscow Format and the China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral, since all neighbours fear Afghan-based militancy.
  4. Separate trade from security: a phased reopening of Torkham and Chaman for essential goods, which protects border livelihoods and Pakistan's market share.
  5. Humane refugee policy: documented, phased returns in line with international law.
  6. Win the Afghan people, not just the regime: scholarships, health care and trade links.
  7. Internal consensus: a single national Afghan policy agreed by Parliament, the provinces and the military, avoiding the federal–KP split seen in 2026.

VII. Conclusion

  • Pakistan sought a friendly Kabul and got a hostile frontier.
  • Strategic depth has become a strategic dilemma, but geography can't be changed. The answer isn't permanent war or blind engagement: it is firmness on terrorism, flexibility on trade and people, and partnership with the region.

Key facts to memorise

  • Durand Line: 1893, about 2,640 km.
  • Doha ceasefire: 19 October 2025 (Qatar and Türkiye). "Open war": 27 February 2026.
  • Urumqi talks: April 2026. Moscow Format: 5 October 2026 (no joint statement).
  • Trade frozen since October 2025; about $2.5 billion in losses.
  • IFRP: October 2023; over 2 million returned. GTI 2026: Pakistan ranked 1st.

Possible variations

  • Causes of tension in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations since 2021; suggest a way forward.
  • Impact of the border closure on trade and regional connectivity.
  • The TTP challenge: is military force enough?