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Forecast Q8 — Short Notes: Gaza Board of Peace · US–China Managed Rivalry · COP-31 and Climate Finance

Forecast question: Write short notes on any TWO of the following: (10 each) (20)

(a) The Gaza Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force

(b) US–China "managed rivalry" after the 2026 Washington summit

(c) COP-31 and the climate finance gap for vulnerable countries

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Why it is likely: short notes appeared in 2017, 2022, 2024 and 2026, usually mixing one Middle East topic, one great-power topic and one climate or social topic. Each note is 10 marks: about 15–18 minutes. Attempt only two; all three are solved here for practice.

(a) The Gaza Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force

Outline

  • I. Background: Trump's 20-point plan and UNSC Resolution 2803
  • II. The Board of Peace and the NCAG
  • III. The ISF
  • IV. Status: "paper peace vs ground reality"
  • V. Pakistan's position
  • VI. Conclusion

Short note

  • Background: Trump's 20-point plan (29 September 2025) led to a ceasefire on 10 October 2025, endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2803 (17 November 2025). Phase One ended with the return of the last hostage's remains (January 2026).
  • The Board of Peace:
    • A transitional authority chaired by President Trump; inaugural meeting on 19 February 2026 in Washington.
    • Its executive board includes Rubio, Witkoff, Kushner, Tony Blair, Ajay Banga, Türkiye's Hakan Fidan and Qatar's Ali Al-Thawadi.
    • Under it, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG): 15 Palestinian technocrats to run services.
  • The International Stabilization Force (ISF):
    • Authorised by Resolution 2803 to secure Gaza, under US Lt Gen Jasper Jeffers.
    • Planned at up to 20,000 troops, but pledges stalled. Indonesia's 8,000 are on hold; only Egypt, Morocco, Albania and Kosovo have committed. Israel vetoed Turkish troops.
  • Status (autumn 2026):
    • Hamas signed a disarmament document (30 July 2026) but hasn't disarmed.
    • The NCAG hasn't entered Gaza, and Israel still controls about 60% of the territory.
    • Over 1,288 Palestinians were killed during the "ceasefire".
    • The Board's envoy Nickolay Mladenov warned of a "point of no return" (26 August 2026).
  • Criticism: foreign supervision of Gaza's governance has been called a "colonial structure"; statehood is only a vague "pathway".
  • Pakistan's position: support for an independent, contiguous Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders with Al-Quds as its capital. Pakistan voted for Resolution 2803 as a UNSC member, but insists the plan must lead to statehood.
  • Conclusion: the Board of Peace has an architecture, a mandate and money, but not the two things that make peace real: disarmament and troops on the ground. Without a credible path to statehood, it risks becoming another interim arrangement that collapses.

(b) US–China "managed rivalry" after the 2026 Washington summit

Outline

  • I. Background: the trade and tech war since 2018
  • II. 2025: tariff escalation and the Busan truce
  • III. The Washington summit (September 2026)
  • IV. Why it is "managed rivalry", not resolution
  • V. Implications for Pakistan
  • VI. Conclusion

Short note

  • Background:
    • The trade war began in 2018; the tech war deepened under Biden (chip export controls).
    • In 2025, Trump's tariffs on China went above 100% before the Busan truce (October 2025).
  • The Washington summit: Xi Jinping's state visit to Washington, 23–25 September 2026, his first US state visit since 2015.
    • Topics: trade, AI and "superintelligence", the Iran war (Trump asked Xi not to help Tehran) and Taiwan.
    • Outcomes: few concrete deals. The trade truce was extended to 10 January 2027. Xi urged the US to formally oppose Taiwan's independence, a request rather than an agreement.
    • Next meetings: APEC (Shenzhen, November 2026) and the G20 (Miami, December 2026).
  • Why "managed rivalry":
    • Summits and truces lower the risk of escalation.
    • But the core disputes remain: Taiwan, technology controls, tariffs and influence in the Global South.
    • Both sides need stability: the US before its midterms, China amid slowing growth.
  • Implications for Pakistan:
    • A thaw eases pressure to choose between China (CPEC, defence) and the US (trade, minerals).
    • Renewed rivalry would increase that pressure.
    • Stable trade helps Pakistan's exports.
  • Conclusion: US–China relations in 2026 are neither a new cold war nor a partnership. They are a rivalry kept under control by regular summits. For Pakistan, a calm rivalry is the best environment for balanced diplomacy. (Update with APEC and G20 outcomes before the exam.)

(c) COP-31 and the climate finance gap for vulnerable countries

Outline

  • I. The COP process and recent outcomes (COP-29, COP-30)
  • II. COP-31: host and agenda
  • III. The finance gap: scale and causes
  • IV. Why it matters for Pakistan
  • V. Solutions
  • VI. Conclusion

Short note

  • Recent COPs:
    • COP-29 (Baku, 2024): a New Collective Quantified Goal of at least **300billionayearby2035∗∗,aimingfor300 billion a year by 2035**, aiming for 1.3 trillion.
    • COP-30 (Belém, 2025): a call to triple adaptation finance by 2035, and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility, but no fossil-fuel roadmap in the final text.
  • COP-31 (Antalya, Türkiye, November 2026): Türkiye hosts, with Australia leading negotiations. The focus is on turning finance pledges into delivery, adaptation indicators, and new NDCs, amid the US absence from Paris and an energy crisis pushing some states back to fossil fuels.
  • The finance gap:
    • Developing countries need hundreds of billions a year for adaptation alone (UNEP Adaptation Gap reports), while actual flows are a small fraction.
    • Most climate finance comes as loans, worsening debt.
    • The Loss and Damage Fund (created at COP-27, operational since 2023) has very limited money.
    • 2025–26 aid cuts by the US and some European donors widened the gap.
  • Why it matters for Pakistan:
    • Under 1% of global emissions, yet among the most climate-vulnerable countries: the 2022 floods (about $30 billion in losses) and 2025 floods.
    • The 2026 energy shock showed its dependence on imported fuel.
    • Pakistan needs grant-based adaptation money, debt-for-climate swaps and access to the Loss and Damage Fund.
  • Solutions:
    • Grants over loans.
    • Reform of multilateral development banks.
    • Levies on fossil-fuel windfall profits or shipping.
    • Simpler access for vulnerable states.
    • Debt-for-climate swaps.
    • Pakistan preparing bankable adaptation projects.
  • Conclusion: the COP process has created goals and funds, but the money still doesn't reach the people who need it most. For countries like Pakistan, COP-31's success will be measured in floods prevented, not pledges announced. (Add COP-31's actual outcomes after November 2026.)

Possible variations of short notes

  • The Makkah Defence Alliance
  • Pakistan's mediation in the Iran war
  • The Moscow Format on Afghanistan
  • Trump's tariffs and developing countries
  • Global Terrorism Index 2026 and Pakistan
  • AI governance and the militarisation of AI
  • Depopulation and ageing (East Asia, Europe)