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Forecast Q7 — India–Pakistan: No War, No Peace, and the Indus Waters Treaty

Forecast question: Since the May 2025 conflict, India–Pakistan relations have been described as "no war, no peace". Analyse the implications of India's decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance for strategic stability in South Asia, and suggest crisis-management measures. (20)

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Why it is likely: India, Kashmir or South Asian nuclear stability appeared in 2016, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2025. Water was asked in 2019 and 2020. 2026 brought a Court of Arbitration ruling (31 August), a naval collision and border killings. Probability: high. It may come as a Kashmir, water or nuclear-stability question.

What the examiner wants

  • "No war, no peace" since May 2025: briefly
  • Implications of the IWT abeyance for strategic stability: legal, water, military, nuclear
  • Crisis-management measures
  • Marks split: context and May 2025 ~4 · IWT background and abeyance ~4 · implications for stability ~7 · crisis management ~4 · conclusion ~1

Outline

  • I. Introduction
  • II. The May 2025 conflict and its "new normal"
  • III. The Indus Waters Treaty
    1. The 1960 treaty: terms
    2. The April 2025 abeyance
    3. Legal position: the Court of Arbitration (August 2026)
  • IV. Implications for strategic stability
    1. Water as a weapon and a casus belli
    2. A lower threshold for war
    3. The nuclear shadow and the stability–instability paradox
    4. Arms race and new domains (sea, drones)
    5. No channels of communication
    6. Outside powers
  • V. Crisis-management measures
  • VI. Conclusion

Model Answer

I. Introduction

  • After the Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025), India struck Pakistan (Operation Sindoor, 7 May) and Pakistan responded (Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos, 10 May). A ceasefire came the same day.
  • What followed is a state of "no war, no peace": no dialogue, no trade, closed airspace, and India's decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) "in abeyance".
  • Thesis: by turning water into a weapon, India has added a new and dangerous trigger to a rivalry between two nuclear states. With no channels of communication, the risk of a fast, unintended escalation is higher than at any time since 1999. Crisis-management mechanisms are urgently needed, even without a political settlement.

II. The new normal after May 2025

  • India's doctrine now treats any major terror attack as an act of war, leaving little room for de-escalation.
  • The diplomatic freeze: no trade, airspace bans (Pakistan's ban extended to 24 November 2026), visas halted, and even no handshakes in cricket.
  • 2026 incidents:
    • An Indian and Pakistani naval collision in the Arabian Sea (17 September).
    • Two Pakistani civilians killed in the Bedian sector (2 October).
    • The Indian defence minister threatened a "stronger response" (October).

III. The Indus Waters Treaty

  • 1. Terms (1960, World Bank-brokered):
    • The eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) go to India.
    • The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) go to Pakistan, with limited Indian use (run-of-river hydropower).
    • A Permanent Indus Commission, data sharing, and dispute mechanisms (a neutral expert and a Court of Arbitration).
    • It survived the 1965, 1971 and 1999 wars.
  • 2. Abeyance (23 April 2025): India stopped data sharing and commission meetings, and signalled faster projects on the western rivers.
  • 3. Legal position: the Court of Arbitration ruled (August 2025 to 31 August 2026) that the treaty "remains fully in force" and can't be suspended unilaterally. India rejects the court as illegally constituted.
  • Pakistan's stance: water is a "red line", and stopping its flow would be an "act of war" (PM Shehbaz, 14 August 2026).

IV. Implications for strategic stability

  • 1. Water as a weapon and a casus belli
    • About 80% of Pakistan's irrigated agriculture depends on the Indus system. Any visible manipulation of flows (timing releases, storage) could be read as an existential threat and trigger a military response.
    • India's physical ability to stop the western rivers is limited in the short term, but uncertainty and lack of data alone create alarm, especially during floods or the sowing season.
  • 2. A lower threshold for war: Pahalgam-type attacks plus water disputes mean more possible triggers, and less time to decide.
  • 3. The nuclear shadow: both sides have roughly 170–180 warheads. The stability–instability paradox (Glenn Snyder; applied to South Asia by Michael Krepon) explains why limited conflicts keep happening: each side believes nuclear weapons cap escalation, so it takes more conventional risks.
  • 4. Arms race and new domains:
    • India: nuclear-armed submarines, missile tests.
    • Pakistan: Chinese J-10Cs, Hangor submarines, HQ-17AE air defence.
    • Naval encounters and drone warfare add new escalation paths.
  • 5. No communication channels: high commissions downgraded since 2019, no IWT commission, minimal hotline use. Misreading in a crisis is likely.
  • 6. Outside powers: the US, Saudi Arabia and others helped end the May 2025 crisis. India rejects mediation (the Simla Agreement, 1972), Pakistan welcomes it, and that dispute itself complicates crisis management.
  • 7. Broader damage: a broken treaty undermines the norm of water cooperation across the world's shared rivers, and sets a worrying precedent (China upstream of India on the Brahmaputra).

V. Crisis-management measures

  1. Restore the IWT mechanisms: resume data sharing and commission meetings; involve the World Bank as the treaty's facilitator; respect the Court of Arbitration and the neutral expert processes.
  2. Hotlines that work: a DGMO hotline with agreed use in crises; a new naval incidents-at-sea agreement after the 2026 collision.
  3. Expand existing CBMs:
    • The 1988 non-attack agreement on nuclear facilities.
    • Pre-notification of ballistic missile tests (2005), extended to cruise missiles and drones.
  4. A joint mechanism on terror allegations: evidence-sharing and joint investigation offers, as Pakistan proposed after Pahalgam, to avoid instant military retaliation.
  5. Back-channel diplomacy through trusted third parties (Gulf states, the US, the UK).
  6. Small steps to rebuild contact: the Kartarpur Corridor, religious visas, humanitarian prisoner releases, sport.
  7. Domestic water resilience for Pakistan: storage (Diamer-Bhasha, Mohmand), telemetry and efficiency, which reduce vulnerability to coercion.

VI. Conclusion

  • The Indus Waters Treaty survived three wars; its abeyance in peacetime shows how far relations have fallen.
  • In a nuclear neighbourhood, "no war, no peace" is not stability: it is a crisis waiting for a trigger. Until a political settlement on Kashmir is possible, both states need the basic tools of crisis management, and water must be put back under law, not power.

Key facts to memorise

  • Pahalgam: 22 April 2025. IWT abeyance: 23 April 2025.
  • Operation Sindoor: 7 May 2025 (India). Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos and ceasefire: 10 May 2025 (Pakistan).
  • Court of Arbitration: IWT "fully in force" (31 August 2026).
  • Naval collision: 17 September 2026. Bedian killings: 2 October 2026.
  • IWT (1960): eastern rivers to India; western rivers to Pakistan; brokered by the World Bank.

Possible variations

  • Is a durable India–Pakistan peace possible without resolving Kashmir?
  • Legal and strategic implications of the IWT abeyance for Pakistan.
  • The May 2025 conflict and nuclear deterrence in South Asia.