Pakistan's Relations with Neighbours: China, Iran, Afghanistan

Pakistan shares borders with four states: India to the east, Afghanistan to the north-west, Iran to the west, and China to the north. Pakistan-India relations are treated separately as a distinct topic; this lesson covers the three remaining border relationships, each of which carries its own historical arc and current dynamic.

Pakistan and China — the iron friendship

The Pakistan-China relationship is, by general consensus, the most stable bilateral relationship in modern South Asian diplomacy. Both governments routinely describe it in terms reserved for no other relationship — "all-weather strategic cooperative partnership", "higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, stronger than steel".

Origins and consolidation

• 1950: Pakistan was among the first Muslim-majority states to recognise the People's Republic of China.
• 1962: The Sino-Indian War created the strategic logic of partnership; Pakistan and China both faced an Indian challenge.
• 1963: A boundary agreement settled the Sino-Pakistani frontier in the Karakoram.
• 1971: Construction of the Karakoram Highway began, completed in 1979 — the world's highest paved international border crossing at Khunjerab Pass (4,693m).
• 1976: Pakistan facilitated the Kissinger secret visit to Beijing, opening the path to Sino-American rapprochement.

Strategic and military cooperation

The relationship has matured into deep institutional cooperation across dimensions:

Dimension	Examples
Co-production aircraft	JF-17 Thunder, K-8 Karakorum
Tank programmes	Al-Khalid (MBT-2000)
Naval cooperation	Hangor-class submarines, Type-054A frigates
Civil nuclear	Chashma reactors I–IV; Karachi K-2, K-3
Joint exercises	Shaheen series (air force), Friendship series (army), naval exercises
Diplomatic shielding	China's UN Security Council positions on Kashmir, opposition to Indian NSG membership

CPEC — the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Announced in April 2015 during Xi Jinping's visit to Islamabad, CPEC was originally projected at $46 billion in investment, later expanded to over $62 billion. Its components included:

• Gwadar port development, with a 40-year operational lease to a Chinese state-owned firm.
• Energy projects — Sahiwal coal, Hub coal, Port Qasim coal, Karot hydropower, Suki Kinari hydropower, Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park.
• Infrastructure — Karakoram Highway upgrades, Lahore Orange Line metro, motorway segments.
• Special Economic Zones — Rashakai (KP), Allama Iqbal (Punjab), Dhabeji (Sindh) and others.
• Western Route development for the corridor through Balochistan.

CPEC's first phase (2015–2020) delivered most of the energy projects but only some of the planned industrial zone build-out. The second phase, focused on industrial cooperation and SEZ development, has slowed considerably amid security concerns (multiple attacks on Chinese personnel in Pakistan, including the 2021 Dasu attack and the 2024 Karachi airport attack), debt sustainability concerns, and Pakistan's broader macroeconomic stress.

Recent strains

While the strategic partnership remains intact, recent strains have surfaced:

• Security of Chinese personnel — repeated militant attacks have led to Chinese demands for enhanced protection, including reportedly direct Chinese security presence.
• CPEC debt servicing — Pakistan owes approximately $26 billion to Chinese lenders, with annual servicing pressuring the balance of payments.
• CPEC second phase delays — Chinese investors have been cautious about new project initiation pending security and macroeconomic stabilisation.

Pakistan and Iran — the constrained partnership

The Pakistan-Iran relationship is structurally significant — they share an 905-kilometre border — but operationally constrained by external pressures and internal sectarian dynamics.

Origins

• 1947: Iran was the first state to recognise Pakistan after independence.
• 1950s–60s: Both members of CENTO; close cooperation under the Shah.
• 1965 and 1971: Iran provided diplomatic and military support to Pakistan.
• 1979: The Iranian Revolution transformed the regional environment. Iran's Shia revolutionary identity created tensions with Pakistan's Sunni-majority politics, complicated further by Pakistan's deepening Saudi relationship.

Recurring frictions

Three structural frictions have constrained the relationship:

1. Saudi-Iran rivalry

Pakistan's deep economic and security ties with Saudi Arabia (tens of billions in financial support, Pakistani military advisers, the 5+ million Pakistani diaspora in Gulf countries) make balance with Iran difficult. The 2015 Yemen vote — when Pakistan's Parliament refused to send troops to support the Saudi-led coalition — was an effort to maintain balance, with mixed reception in both Riyadh and Tehran.

2. Sectarian violence

The Pakistani Shia community (~15-20% of the population) has been the target of recurring sectarian attacks, with state-sponsored Iranian Shia institutions historically a part of the political-religious landscape. Anti-Iran sentiment in some Sunni hardline circles, and anti-Saudi sentiment in some Shia quarters, periodically translate into diplomatic friction.

3. Border security and Baluch insurgency

The Pakistan-Iran border passes through restive Baloch territory on both sides. Cross-border movement of Baloch insurgents, militants of Jaish ul-Adl (a Sunni Baluch group active in Iranian Sistan-Balochistan), and the smuggling economy have produced repeated incidents, including the rare cross-border airstrikes of January 2024 — Iran struck a Jaish ul-Adl target inside Pakistan; Pakistan responded with strikes in Iran. The crisis was de-escalated diplomatically within days but exposed the underlying tension.

Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline

The proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline — under discussion since the 1990s — would supply Pakistan with up to 1 billion cubic feet per day from Iran's South Pars field. Construction has been blocked by:

• US sanctions on Iran (since 2010 onwards), which threaten Pakistan with secondary sanctions.
• Pakistan's preference, under American pressure, for the alternative TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline.
• Iranian completion of its segment and demands that Pakistan complete its segment or pay penalties.

The 2024 government decision to begin construction of an 80km segment was a long-deferred move, though full project execution remains uncertain pending sanctions clarity.

Areas of cooperation

Despite the frictions, the relationship is not adversarial. Areas of cooperation include:

• Border trade (formal and informal).
• Religious tourism (Pakistani pilgrims to Iranian shrines).
• Energy trade (limited electricity import from Iran to Balochistan).
• Counter-terrorism dialogue (post-2024 strikes).

Pakistan and Afghanistan — the burden of geography

If China is Pakistan's most stable relationship and Iran the most constrained, Afghanistan is the most consequential and the most contested.

Pre-1979

• 1947: Afghanistan was the only state to vote against Pakistan's UN admission, citing the Durand Line dispute.
• 1950s–70s: Periodic tensions over the Durand Line (which Afghanistan has never formally accepted as the international border) and over Pashtun nationalism.
• 1973: Daoud Khan's Republican coup in Kabul intensified tensions; Pakistan supported anti-Daoud Islamist groups.

The Soviet war and the strategic-asset framework (1979–1989)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 transformed the relationship. Pakistan became:

• The principal sanctuary for the Afghan Mujahideen.
• The conduit for the largest covert operation in CIA history (estimated $3 billion in arms over the decade).
• Host to 3+ million Afghan refugees at the war's peak.

The strategic-asset framework — using Islamist proxies to project power into Afghanistan — produced short-term gains (Soviet withdrawal in 1989) but long-term costs (the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, the Taliban's emergence in 1994, the post-2001 conflict).

The Taliban era and the post-9/11 reset (1994–2021)

Pakistan was one of three states to recognise the Taliban government (1996–2001), alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The 9/11 attacks forced Pakistan to publicly reverse, joining the US-led intervention while reportedly maintaining contacts with Taliban factions through ISI channels — a position that produced sustained American pressure throughout the 2001–2021 period.

The 2009–2011 period saw the deepest US-Pakistan strain, including the OBL raid (May 2011), the Salala incident (November 2011), and persistent allegations of Pakistani sanctuary for Taliban leadership.

The 2021 Taliban return and after

The Taliban's August 2021 return to Kabul was initially received in Pakistan with a measure of strategic satisfaction. Two years later the assessment had soured:

• TTP resurgence: The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) regained Afghan-side sanctuary, leading to a sharp rise in attacks on Pakistani security forces since 2022.
• Border tensions: Repeated firing incidents along the Durand Line, including major clashes in 2022–2024.
• Refugee deportations: Pakistan's late-2023 decision to deport unregistered Afghan refugees (over 500,000 returned by mid-2024) strained the bilateral relationship.
• Divergent strategic interests: The expectation of Taliban-mediated TTP restraint has not materialised; the Afghan Taliban and TTP share ideology and a fluid leadership.

The bilateral relationship in late 2024 is at one of its lowest points since the 1970s.

What CSS questions on this topic typically demand

Three shapes:

1. Bilateral focus — "Discuss Pakistan-China relations in the post-CPEC era."
2. Comparative — "Compare Pakistan's relations with its western neighbours (Iran and Afghanistan)."
3. Strategic — "How have Pakistan's relations with its neighbours (excluding India) shaped its national security?"

A strong answer combines historical grounding, current developments and structural analysis.

What you take from this lesson

Pakistan's neighbour relations exhibit three different patterns: deep strategic partnership (China), constrained but non-adversarial (Iran), and historically central but increasingly difficult (Afghanistan). The next lesson examines Pakistan's wider regional environment — the Gulf, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.