Proxy Wars: The Concept and Pakistan's Experience

Pakistan has been, for over four decades, both a theatre and an arena of proxy warfare. This lesson develops the concept of proxy war, traces the principal episodes affecting Pakistan, and identifies the external elements that have used Pakistani soil for their own strategic objectives.

What is a proxy war?

Proxy war differs from conventional war along three axes:

The classical example in modern history is the Cold War in the Third World — Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan — where the United States and the Soviet Union backed opposing local actors rather than fighting each other directly. The 1979–1989 Soviet-Afghan war is the canonical case for South Asia.

Why proxies are used

Sponsors choose proxy strategies because:

1. Cost and risk — proxies are cheaper than regular military operations and risk fewer of the sponsor's own personnel.
2. Deniability — formal denial preserves diplomatic relations with the target state.
3. Domestic political constraints — sponsors can act abroad without facing the political costs of declaring war.
4. Strategic patience — proxy campaigns can be sustained for decades at low intensity.
5. Local legitimacy — proxies can claim local roots even when externally sponsored.

The cost is a loss of control — once empowered, proxies frequently pursue their own agendas. The 1980s Mujahideen who became the 1990s Taliban, and the post-9/11 evolution of various Pakistani militant groups, illustrate this dynamic.

Pakistan as a theatre — the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 made Pakistan the central staging ground for the largest covert operation in CIA history. The principal external actors:

The United States

• Approximately $3 billion in covert assistance over the decade through CIA channels.
• Routed through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with limited direct American contact with Mujahideen factions.
• Provided weapons including Stinger surface-to-air missiles (1986 onwards), which transformed the air-defence balance.
• Coordinated with Saudi Arabia in financing.

Saudi Arabia

• Matched US funding broadly dollar-for-dollar.
• Provided ideological infrastructure through the spread of Salafist religious institutions and madrassas.
• Channelled support to specific factions aligned with Saudi religious orientation.

China

• Provided weapons, particularly Chinese-made Type 56 rifles, RPGs, and other infantry equipment.
• Less ideologically engaged than other sponsors.

The Mujahideen factions and Pakistan's role

The ISI mediated all assistance to the seven principal Mujahideen factions ("the Peshawar Seven"), which included:

• Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)
• Hezb-i-Islami Khalis
• Jamiat-i-Islami (Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud)
• Ittehad-i-Islami (Abdul Rasul Sayyaf)
• Mahaz-i-Milli Islami
• Jabha-i-Nijat-i-Milli
• Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami

Pakistan also hosted approximately 3.5 million Afghan refugees at the war's peak, providing the demographic and logistical base for the Mujahideen.

The legacy

The Soviet-Afghan war produced four legacies that have shaped Pakistan ever since:

1. The strategic-asset framework — the institutionalised use of non-state Islamist actors for foreign-policy objectives.
2. The arms proliferation — millions of small arms entered the South Asian arms bazaar; many remain in circulation.
3. The drug economy — the heroin trade through Pakistan, which surged during the 1980s, generated parallel revenue streams that outlasted the war.
4. The ideological infrastructure — madrassas, training networks, and ideological frames built during the war became the foundation for subsequent generations of militant groups.

Pakistan as a theatre — Indian intelligence and Baluchistan

A second proxy theatre, with Pakistan as the target, has involved external support for armed groups operating against the Pakistani state. Pakistan has consistently alleged Indian intelligence involvement in:

Baluchistan insurgency

• Allegations of Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) support for Baloch separatist groups (BLA, BRA, BLF).
• The 2016 arrest of Indian national Kulbhushan Yadav, charged with espionage and supporting separatist activities — Yadav remains in Pakistani custody under death sentence; the case went to the International Court of Justice.

TTP and other groups

• Allegations of Indian intelligence funding flowing to TTP and certain militant groups operating against Pakistani security forces.
• Pakistani intelligence has periodically released dossiers detailing alleged Indian sponsorship.

India has consistently denied these allegations. The international community has not formally accepted them. The dispute remains a central element of the bilateral information environment.

Pakistan as an arena — the 1980s and 1990s

In a different sense, Pakistan was an arena in which multiple external actors pursued objectives within Pakistan or through Pakistan:

• The United States and the wider West — using Pakistan as a base against the Soviet Union and later as a counter-terrorism partner.
• Saudi Arabia and the Gulf — funding ideological institutions, building diplomatic partnership.
• Iran — supporting Shia institutions, influencing political-religious discourse.
• India — supporting separatist movements (alleged) and building intelligence networks.
• Afghanistan (under various regimes) — supporting Pashtun nationalist movements (1970s) and later TTP (alleged).
• The Soviet Union — limited covert action against Pakistani targets during the Afghan war.

Pakistan's territory became, in a sense, a shared arena in which multiple proxy contests intersected.

Pakistan's own proxy use

The historical record is incomplete without acknowledging Pakistan's use of proxies in its own foreign policy:

Afghanistan

The Pakistani role in supporting the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets (with US backing) and subsequently the Taliban (1990s) has been documented in numerous sources. The post-2001 sanctuary question for Afghan Taliban leadership remained a central element of US-Pakistan tensions for two decades.

Kashmir

Pakistani support for various Kashmiri militant groups since the 1989 insurgency has been documented in Indian sources, in scholarly accounts, and in periodic Pakistani admissions. Groups including Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have operated against Indian forces in Kashmir; their ability to do so has depended on cross-border infrastructure.

The post-2002 phase — particularly after the 2008 Mumbai attacks — has seen intensified international pressure on Pakistan to curb these groups, formalised through the FATF process.

The strategic-depth doctrine

The "strategic depth" frame, articulated by General Mirza Aslam Beg in the late 1980s, conceived of Afghanistan as Pakistan's strategic hinterland in the event of war with India. The frame has since been formally retired, but its operational legacy — the use of proxies as instruments of strategic policy — has been more difficult to dismantle.

The high cost of proxy strategies

Pakistan's experience of proxy warfare illustrates the long-term cost to the host country and the sponsor alike:

Cost	Manifestation
Blowback	The TTP emergence; sectarian violence; assassination of senior officials
Loss of control	Many former proxies turned against the state
International isolation	FATF placement; sanctions; diplomatic pressure
Domestic radicalisation	Mainstreaming of extremist ideology in segments of public discourse
Economic loss	Estimated $150 billion+ in War on Terror–related costs over 2001–2020
Human loss	Over 80,000 Pakistani lives lost to militant violence since 2003

The combined cost is the principal argument for the post-2014 reorientation away from the strategic-asset framework.

What you take from this lesson

Pakistan has experienced the highest intensity of proxy warfare of any state in the modern era — both as a theatre in which multiple external actors operated, and as an arena that ultimately turned on the host. The next lesson examines the role of specific external elements in shaping Pakistan's security environment in greater detail.