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2023 · Q7 · Viability of New Public Management in developing countries (20 marks)
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CSS 2023 · Q7 · 20 marks · Topic: I.6 New Public Management (section 4: NPM in developing countries)
Same idea asked again: 2020 Q2 (bureaucracy vs NPM in Pakistan) · 2025 Q2(b) (concept of NPM)
1. Question
New Public Management has been hailed as the dominant paradigm for public service in the last two decades. In your opinion, how viable is NPM for developing countries taking into account the distinct and complex environment of public sector organizations in such countries?
2. What the examiner wants
- "In your opinion" — a clear position in the introduction and a verdict at the end.
- What NPM is (about 4 marks).
- The developing-country environment and how it affects NPM (about 8 marks) — this is the heart of the question.
- Evidence, risks and a viable path (about 8 marks).
3. Outline
- I. Introduction — position: conditionally viable
- II. What NPM is and why it spread
- III. What NPM promises
- IV. The distinct environment of developing countries
- A. Riggs' prismatic society
- B. Seven features and their effect on NPM (table)
- V. Evidence
- A. Scholars: Schick, Polidano, Manning
- B. Pakistan: successes and failures
- VI. Risks
- VII. A viable path
- VIII. Conclusion
4. Model answer
I. Introduction
- NPM rose in the UK, New Zealand and Australia in the 1980s and was exported worldwide by donors in the 1990s.
- It promised to turn slow, rule-bound bureaucracies into results-driven, customer-focused organisations.
- My position: NPM is conditionally viable in developing countries — useful as a selective toolkit, harmful as a ready-made blueprint.
II. What NPM is and why it spread
- Definition: a family of reforms that moves government from process control to managerial freedom, measurable results and competition.
- Hood's seven doctrines (1991): professional management, explicit standards, output controls, disaggregation, competition, private-sector styles, parsimony.
- Osborne and Gaebler (1992): "steering rather than rowing."
- Why it spread: fiscal crises, IMF and World Bank structural adjustment, and frustration with state failure.
III. What NPM promises
- Service standards that expose delay.
- Managerial autonomy that cuts approval chains.
- Competition and contracting that challenge lazy monopolies.
- Customer focus that improves courtesy and responsiveness.
- Decentralisation that brings decisions closer to citizens.
IV. The distinct environment of developing countries
- Fred Riggs' "prismatic society": formal rules look modern on paper, but real behaviour follows family, caste and patronage ties ("formalism"). NPM assumes the formal rules actually work.
| Feature of the environment | Effect on NPM |
|---|---|
| Weak Weberian base — politicised postings, uneven merit | More managerial discretion means more room for favouritism |
| Thin markets, weak regulators | Outsourcing turns a public monopoly into a private one |
| Poor data and records | Performance targets are unreliable or faked |
| Low capacity to write and monitor contracts | Contractors under-deliver without penalty |
| Multiple goals — equity, security, legitimacy | Narrow output targets distort priorities |
| Poverty and inequality | "Customer" language excludes those who cannot pay or choose |
| Donor-driven reform | Little local ownership; reforms collapse when funding ends |
V. Evidence
- Allen Schick (1998): "Why most developing countries should not try New Zealand's reforms" — first build basic budget and rule-based controls.
- Charles Polidano (1999): NPM in developing countries is applied patchily; politics and capacity decide outcomes.
- Nick Manning (2001): NPM did not become the dominant model in developing countries; it was used in pieces.
- Pakistan — where NPM-type tools worked:
- NADRA's autonomous, fee-based, target-driven model;
- FBR's IRIS e-filing;
- Punjab Education Foundation's vouchers and school partnerships;
- Rescue 1122 as a performance-focused service.
- Pakistan — where they struggled:
- K-Electric privatisation (2005) brought mixed results and constant complaints;
- power distribution companies remain loss-making;
- the 2001 Devolution Plan's decentralisation was later rolled back by the provinces.
VI. Risks
- Fragmentation: autonomous agencies fail to coordinate on shared problems like health and nutrition.
- Gaming: managers chase easy targets and skip hard cases.
- Hollowing out: government loses the skill to run or supervise services.
- Accountability gaps: when a contractor fails, citizens do not know whom to blame.
- Paper reforms: performance systems without real authority produce reports, not results.
VII. A viable path
- Sequence: fix the basics first — merit, audit, procurement integrity, reliable records.
- Select: use NPM tools where outputs are measurable (licences, tax, ID cards); avoid them where they are not (policing, justice).
- Pilot and evaluate before scaling.
- Measure access and equity, not cost alone, with independent checks and citizen feedback.
- Regulate before outsourcing.
- Adopt a hybrid: Pollitt and Bouckaert's neo-Weberian state — a strong, lawful bureaucracy made responsive and results-aware.
VIII. Conclusion
- NPM is not dead, but not universal. In the complex environment of developing countries it is viable only when sequenced, selected and supported by state capacity.
- For Pakistan, the right formula is "Weber first, NPM next" — build the foundation, then add flexibility.
5. 🎯 CSS Exam Perspective
- Time and length: about 30 minutes, three to four pages.
- High-scoring touches: state your opinion in line three; use Riggs to explain the "distinct environment"; the effect table; "Weber first, NPM next" as a memorable verdict.
- Must-cite: Hood, Osborne and Gaebler, Riggs, Schick, Polidano, Manning, Pollitt and Bouckaert.
- Common mistakes: one-sided praise or attack; no Pakistan evidence.
- Reuse: sections IV–VII also answer the second half of 2020 Q2.