2026 · Q6 · Separation of powers and institutional conflict in Pakistan (20 marks) — Public Administration

Source: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2026.pdf, PDF page 2 · Answer allocation: 20 marks

Original examination question

Separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is crucial for cheeks and balances and ultimately accountable public administration. However, maintaining this balance is highly challenging and leads to institutional conflict. To what extent have these conflicts strengthened or weakened accountability and public administration in Pakistan? Critically evaluate with empirical and constitutional evidence.

Reading note: Constitutional references distinguish historical decisions from the Constitution as amended through 21 November 2025. The paper’s “cheeks and balances” is read as “checks and balances.”

Bullet outline

Parliamentary government combines executive–legislative links with judicial independence.
Use Articles 90–91, 95, 175 and the updated judicial framework.
Positive evidence: 2022 no-confidence ruling and 2009 rejection of emergency measures.
Negative effects: unconstitutional interventions, noncompliance and institutional substitution.
Judge conflict by rights, lawful procedure and durable administrative accountability.

Full exam-ready answer

Introduction

Separation of powers prevents concentrated authority by assigning functions and establishing checks among institutions. Pakistan's parliamentary system does not impose an absolute separation between executive and legislature: ministers operate within a framework of parliamentary responsibility. Judicial independence and lawful review remain essential. Institutional conflict has consequently produced both important restraints on abuse and damaging interruptions to accountable administration.

Constitutional framework

Articles 90 and 91 establish the federal executive and Cabinet framework, while Article 95 provides the National Assembly's no-confidence mechanism. Legislative authorisation of expenditure and scrutiny of executive conduct add further checks. Article 175 addresses courts and separation of the judiciary from the executive.

The framework has changed over time. The Twenty-seventh Amendment in 2025 established the Federal Constitutional Court; Article 175E now addresses its original jurisdiction, while Article 184 has been omitted. Historical Supreme Court decisions must therefore be analysed under the constitutional arrangements applicable when they were delivered, rather than presented as descriptions of unchanged current jurisdiction.

When conflict strengthened accountability

The April 2022 no-confidence dispute provides a concrete example. The Supreme Court set aside the Deputy Speaker's ruling of 3 April and the resulting dissolution, restoring the constitutional parliamentary process. The significance was that a procedural ruling could not simply displace the Assembly's constitutional role.

The 2009 Sindh High Court Bar Association decision also rejected the constitutional validity of the November 2007 emergency arrangements. It demonstrated the potential of judicial scrutiny to challenge executive interference with constitutional institutions.

These interventions can strengthen administration by clarifying that officials and political authorities act within legal limits. They also protect continuity of lawful procedures against claims of unrestricted institutional discretion.

When conflict weakened administration

The underlying events also reveal serious weaknesses. Emergency measures and interference with judicial institutions disrupt predictable authority. The need for judicial restoration of a parliamentary process indicates that ordinary political safeguards have already failed.

More generally, prolonged institutional confrontation can delay policy, create uncertainty about lawful instructions and encourage officials to avoid reasonable decisions. If political accountability is displaced entirely into litigation, legislatures and administrative review mechanisms may remain underdeveloped. Judicial correction is valuable, but courts cannot sustainably perform every managerial or policy function.

Institutional independence must therefore be distinguished from institutional supremacy. Each branch can weaken accountability when it expands its role without respecting constitutional limits or treats criticism as an attack on its existence.

Overall judgement and conclusion

Pakistan's experience shows that conflict strengthens accountability when it restores lawful procedure, protects rights and secures compliance. It weakens administration when it becomes a struggle for dominance, interrupts institutions or substitutes exceptional intervention for routine scrutiny.

The remedy is principled restraint alongside effective checks: stronger parliamentary examination, reasoned executive decisions, independent adjudication and implementation of lawful outcomes. The success of constitutional balance should be measured by predictable public authority and practical remedies for citizens, not by which institution wins a particular confrontation.

Supporting references

Study note: This is an original model answer, not an official FPSC marking scheme. The outline is for revision; the prose below it provides the complete answer. Marks guide relative depth rather than a prescribed word count.