IX.5 Issues and Post-Devolution Challenges of Local Governance

🎯

Past paper: 2025 Q8a (issues) and Q8b (post-devolution challenges). Structure: define → issues → post-devolution challenges → way forward. Cite Art. 140-A.

Issues of local government in Pakistan (2025 Q8a)

• Weak devolution — provinces reluctant to hand over real power, funds and functions (esp. after the 18th Amendment concentrated power at the provincial level).
• Financial dependence — local governments have little own-revenue; depend on provincial transfers.
• Frequent suspension and delayed elections — often dissolved or left non-functional; run by administrators, not elected representatives.
• Bureaucratic–political tension — overlap between elected Nazims / Mayors and appointed officers (DC / AC).
• Capacity and staffing gaps · politicisation · weak accountability.

Post-devolution local governance challenges (2025 Q8b)

• The shift: LGO 2001 empowered districts; after 2008 the system lapsed and each province developed its own LG laws; compare actual powers, finance and accountability rather than assuming every later system is uniformly weaker.
• Key challenges:
  • unclear division of powers between province and local tier;
  • inadequate fiscal devolution (no strong Provincial Finance Commission awards);
  • recentralisation by provinces;
  • short / interrupted terms;
  • capacity deficits;
  • unresolved DC-vs-elected-Mayor role.

🔧 Way forward

• genuine political, administrative and fiscal devolution (Art. 140-A in spirit) · regular LG elections · PFC awards · clear province–local functional assignment · capacity-building.

📝 Extra notes

• Supreme Court role: the Court has directed the holding of local government elections in line with Article 140-A (notably from 2015). 🔎 Verify case details before quoting.
• Three dimensions of decentralisation (political, administrative, fiscal): many systems have political devolution (elections) without fiscal and administrative devolution — "hollow" devolution.
• Provincial motives for recentralisation: control over resources and patronage, distrust of rival parties at local level, fear of loss of MPA influence.
• Accountability gaps: weak audit of local funds, limited citizen participation and weak council oversight.
• Capacity gaps: shortage of skilled staff, unclear service rules for local government employees, training needs.
• Comparison: India's 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1992) gave constitutional status and mandatory state finance commissions and regular elections to local bodies — a model often cited. 🔎 Verify details.
• Solutions checklist: constitutional and statutory clarity, a functional assignment matrix, independent local election dates, predictable transfers via PFC formula, own-source revenue powers, capacity building, e-governance and citizen participation.

🧪 Worked example — a local council without funds

• Situation: an elected council is responsible for street lighting and sanitation but receives delayed, insufficient provincial grants and has no authority to raise property tax.
• Effect: services deteriorate; citizens blame the council; the province blames the council.
• Reform: predictable transfers by formula, power to raise local revenue, clear function list, and audit with transparency.

Deeper understanding — link powers, money and accountability

Original decentralisation test: functions must be clear; finance must be predictable; staff capacity must be adequate; local decision-makers must answer to residents. Elections alone cannot repair a mismatch among these elements.

Dated evidence: a World Bank release of 1 July 2026, summarising its fiscal-federalism report, states that local governments' share of total government spending fell from around 10% in 2005 to under 5% in 2024. Cite the dates and measure; this is a spending share, not a direct measure of service quality. World Bank.

Reform package: publish a functional-assignment matrix; use transparent transfer formulas; strengthen own-source revenue administration within law; build procurement and accounting capacity; publish budgets and results; ensure timely elections and meaningful council scrutiny.

Trade-off: local knowledge can improve responsiveness, but local elite capture and cross-boundary spillovers remain risks. Higher-level standards, equalisation and independent review can complement local autonomy.

Exam conclusion: the constitutional move towards provincial autonomy does not automatically deliver local fiscal and administrative power; provincial legal design and implementation are decisive.

✅ How to score

• Use a three-part table: Issue | Cause | Reform, and end with the political–administrative–fiscal devolution point.

⚠️ Common mistakes

• Blaming only the 18th Amendment (it devolved to provinces; provinces then did not devolve further).
• Not mentioning fiscal devolution.

❓ Active recall

• Explain why the 18th Amendment did not automatically strengthen local government.
• List six challenges and six remedies for local governance.